US must broaden Myanmar outreach: study
by Shaun Tandon – Thu Apr 1, 2:27 am ET
WASHINGTON (AFP) – The United States should broaden engagement with Myanmar to reach more of the population, taking a long-term view despite growing concern over upcoming elections, a study said Wednesday.
The New York-based Asia Society set up a task force with leading figures of both major US parties to chart a way forward after President Barack Obama's administration last year launched a dialogue with the military regime.
The study broadly endorsed Obama's approach but had no illusions about the difficulties ahead, warning that the junta may try to use talks with the United States to confer legitimacy on elections it is holding later this year.
The task force said the United States could tighten or remove sanctions on the regime based on progress but should ramp up assistance to ordinary people including non-governmental organizations, farmers and small businesses.
"This is what we can do -- we can work with the population," retired general Wesley Clark, a former Democratic presidential candidate and co-chair of the task force, told a news conference introducing the report.
"What we wanted to do was lay out a positive direction where the leadership in Burma could take a step forward and see the benefits that could occur if they would do that," Clark said, using Myanmar's former name.
The other co-chair was Henrietta Fore, who was director of foreign aid under Republican president George W. Bush. Task force members included billionaire philanthropist George Soros and Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen.
The upcoming elections will be the first in Myanmar since 1990. That vote was swept by the National League for Democracy (NLD) but it was never allowed to take power and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has spent most of the time since under house arrest.
The NLD on Monday decided to boycott this year's election after the junta imposed laws, criticized around the world, that would have forced the party to oust Nobel peace laureate Suu Kyi as its leader.
Priscilla Clapp, the former chief of mission at the US embassy in Myanmar and a principal adviser on the report, said it was important to take the "long view" beyond the election.
"My feeling is we just need to sit back and express our concerns very loudly and clearly and make it clear what will lead to a productive relationship with the United States ultimately, but not expect that we can have a lot of effect on what's happening right now during the elections," she said.
The study said that the NLD should remain the "focal point" of US support, but that Washington should also reach out to civil society and ethnic minorities.
The study cautioned against US overconfidence, saying that its influence in the reclusive nation was limited and acknowledging that Myanmar was unlikely to become a top priority in Washington.
It said the United States should work to coordinate policy with key regional players including China, India and Myanmar's fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
China in November started building an oil pipeline in Myanmar and has been the junta's chief diplomatic backer.
But the report's authors warned not to exaggerate China's role, suggesting that Beijing was "pragmatic" and had little love for the junta.
"We make a lot of the pipeline deal as if it were the essence of energy in China. It isn't; it's going to represent a very small percentage of China's energy resources," Clapp said.
"I don't think they have nearly the kind of influence that we assume they have over the government," she said.
China last year reprimanded Myanmar over fighting in Kokang, a largely ethnic Chinese region of Shan state, a rare occasion in which Beijing has initiated criticism of another country's domestic situation.
by Shaun Tandon – Thu Apr 1, 2:27 am ET
WASHINGTON (AFP) – The United States should broaden engagement with Myanmar to reach more of the population, taking a long-term view despite growing concern over upcoming elections, a study said Wednesday.
The New York-based Asia Society set up a task force with leading figures of both major US parties to chart a way forward after President Barack Obama's administration last year launched a dialogue with the military regime.
The study broadly endorsed Obama's approach but had no illusions about the difficulties ahead, warning that the junta may try to use talks with the United States to confer legitimacy on elections it is holding later this year.
The task force said the United States could tighten or remove sanctions on the regime based on progress but should ramp up assistance to ordinary people including non-governmental organizations, farmers and small businesses.
"This is what we can do -- we can work with the population," retired general Wesley Clark, a former Democratic presidential candidate and co-chair of the task force, told a news conference introducing the report.
"What we wanted to do was lay out a positive direction where the leadership in Burma could take a step forward and see the benefits that could occur if they would do that," Clark said, using Myanmar's former name.
The other co-chair was Henrietta Fore, who was director of foreign aid under Republican president George W. Bush. Task force members included billionaire philanthropist George Soros and Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen.
The upcoming elections will be the first in Myanmar since 1990. That vote was swept by the National League for Democracy (NLD) but it was never allowed to take power and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has spent most of the time since under house arrest.
The NLD on Monday decided to boycott this year's election after the junta imposed laws, criticized around the world, that would have forced the party to oust Nobel peace laureate Suu Kyi as its leader.
Priscilla Clapp, the former chief of mission at the US embassy in Myanmar and a principal adviser on the report, said it was important to take the "long view" beyond the election.
"My feeling is we just need to sit back and express our concerns very loudly and clearly and make it clear what will lead to a productive relationship with the United States ultimately, but not expect that we can have a lot of effect on what's happening right now during the elections," she said.
The study said that the NLD should remain the "focal point" of US support, but that Washington should also reach out to civil society and ethnic minorities.
The study cautioned against US overconfidence, saying that its influence in the reclusive nation was limited and acknowledging that Myanmar was unlikely to become a top priority in Washington.
It said the United States should work to coordinate policy with key regional players including China, India and Myanmar's fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
China in November started building an oil pipeline in Myanmar and has been the junta's chief diplomatic backer.
But the report's authors warned not to exaggerate China's role, suggesting that Beijing was "pragmatic" and had little love for the junta.
"We make a lot of the pipeline deal as if it were the essence of energy in China. It isn't; it's going to represent a very small percentage of China's energy resources," Clapp said.
"I don't think they have nearly the kind of influence that we assume they have over the government," she said.
China last year reprimanded Myanmar over fighting in Kokang, a largely ethnic Chinese region of Shan state, a rare occasion in which Beijing has initiated criticism of another country's domestic situation.
******************************************************
EarthTimes - Inter-Parliamentary Union urges Myanmar to change election laws
Posted : Thu, 01 Apr 2010 12:23:32 GMT
Bangkok - The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) on Thursday called on Myanmar's junta to amend its recently promulgated election laws to ensure polls planned this year are "inclusive, free and fair."
"With the elections drawing to a close, time is running short," said Philippine Senator Aquilino Pimentel, president of the IPU's human rights committee.
The IPU, an organization which brings together the national parliaments of 143 countries, wound up its 122nd assembly in Bangkok on Thursday.
Myanmar's military junta last month passed a series of election-related legislation that appeared designed to force the main opposition party - the National League for Democracy (NLD) - to boycott the polls.
The Party Registration Law, for instance, prohibits people currently serving prison terms from being party members. This would force the NLD to expel party leader Aung San Suu Kyi from their ranks before it is allowed to contest this year's election, a date for which has not yet been set. Suu Kyi is currently serving an 18-month house arrest sentence.
On Monday, the NLD announced the party would not contest the polls.
The NLD won Myanmar's last general election in 1990, but has beenblocked from power for the past two decades. The party remains the strongest political opponent to the military institution that has ruled Myanmar, also called Burma, since 1962.
The IPU human rights committee also examined the individual situations of 293 parliamentarians in 32 countries including Myanmar, Afghanistan and Malaysia.
Senator Pimentel said that the parliamentary delegation from Afghanistan had agreed to close a case against Afghan member of parliament Malalai Joya for a statement she had made, and would allow her to run in the elections in Afghanistan later this year.
He said he hoped that "in the few months between now and the elections, the Afghan Parliament will reinstate Ms Joya."
On the controversial case of Malaysian member of parliament and de facto opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, who faces sodomy charges, Pimentel said, "The investigation and the proceedings seem to suffer from the same flaws as in the previous sodomy case."
Malaysia's Federal Court overturned the conviction in his earlier sodomy case and he was released from prison in 2004.
Posted : Thu, 01 Apr 2010 12:23:32 GMT
Bangkok - The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) on Thursday called on Myanmar's junta to amend its recently promulgated election laws to ensure polls planned this year are "inclusive, free and fair."
"With the elections drawing to a close, time is running short," said Philippine Senator Aquilino Pimentel, president of the IPU's human rights committee.
The IPU, an organization which brings together the national parliaments of 143 countries, wound up its 122nd assembly in Bangkok on Thursday.
Myanmar's military junta last month passed a series of election-related legislation that appeared designed to force the main opposition party - the National League for Democracy (NLD) - to boycott the polls.
The Party Registration Law, for instance, prohibits people currently serving prison terms from being party members. This would force the NLD to expel party leader Aung San Suu Kyi from their ranks before it is allowed to contest this year's election, a date for which has not yet been set. Suu Kyi is currently serving an 18-month house arrest sentence.
On Monday, the NLD announced the party would not contest the polls.
The NLD won Myanmar's last general election in 1990, but has beenblocked from power for the past two decades. The party remains the strongest political opponent to the military institution that has ruled Myanmar, also called Burma, since 1962.
The IPU human rights committee also examined the individual situations of 293 parliamentarians in 32 countries including Myanmar, Afghanistan and Malaysia.
Senator Pimentel said that the parliamentary delegation from Afghanistan had agreed to close a case against Afghan member of parliament Malalai Joya for a statement she had made, and would allow her to run in the elections in Afghanistan later this year.
He said he hoped that "in the few months between now and the elections, the Afghan Parliament will reinstate Ms Joya."
On the controversial case of Malaysian member of parliament and de facto opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, who faces sodomy charges, Pimentel said, "The investigation and the proceedings seem to suffer from the same flaws as in the previous sodomy case."
Malaysia's Federal Court overturned the conviction in his earlier sodomy case and he was released from prison in 2004.
******************************************************
EarthTimes - In Myanmar, a man's house can be his prison - Feature
Posted : Thu, 01 Apr 2010 03:05:22 GMT
By : Peter Janssen
Yangon - Good advice for someone embarking on a career in Myanmar politics might be: make sure you have got a comfortable house.
Tin Oo, 83, the deputy leader of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), was released from house detention in February, after spending six years cooped up at home.
"I was lucky because my wife had just ordered a satellite dish before my arrest, so I could watch CNN, Al Jazeera and many stations," Tin Oo said.
A good Buddhist, Tin Oo spent three hours a day praying and meditating, and had plenty of time to catch up on his reading. "I also had the National Geographic, which the US embassy sent to me each month," Tin Oo told the German Press Agency dpa.
Of course, Myanmar's most famous detainee is NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has spent some 14 of the past 21 years jailed in her family's compound in Yangon.
Suu Kyi and Tin Oo were arrested together on May 30, 2003, while campaigning in Depayin, central Myanmar.
They were attacked by gangs of pro-military thugs who roughed them up and left up to 35 NLD supporters dead.
"We had a narrow escape," Tin Oo said. "A huge crowd was following Suu Kyi wherever she went, coming up to her and saying 'Auntie, save us. We are sunk in poverty. The education our children get is sub-standard.' The military realized they could not control her." After the Depayin incident, both Suu Kyi and Tin Oo were charged with undermining national security and sentenced to indefinite jail terms that were eventually changed to house detention.
According to the Myanmar constitution, the upper limit of their detention under such a charge should have been five years, but the junta stretched the detentions out to six years.
In Suu Kyi's case, the junta got lucky last May, when US national John William Yettaw swam to her lakeside compound on Inya Lake, providing authorities with an excuse to accuse her of violating the terms of her detention by allowing him to spend two nights at her house.
On August 11, Suu Kyi was found guilty and sentenced to three years imprisonment with hard labour.
But the verdict was commuted to 18-months of house detention by military supremo Senior General Than Shwe, head of the State Peace and Development Council, as the junta is officially called.
Than Shwe, 77, has not limited his justice to democracy icons.
Potential threats to his absolute power within the military hierarchy have also been banished to their households.
In March 2002, former military strongman General Ne Win and his daughter Sandar Win were placed under house arrest for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government using black magic.
The main plotters, Ne Win's son-in-law Aye Zaw Win and his three sons, were sentenced to death.
Ne Win, Myanmar's absolute ruler from 1962 to 1988, died at home on December 5, 2002. Myanmar's tradition of placing people under house arrest started before Ne Win's rule, during the country's brief spell of parliamentary democracy between 1949-62, according to Yangon-based historians.
"It's a bit more humane than Insein Prison, but reserved for the more privileged victims of the system," one foreign diplomat said.
Myanmar's jails, which now house an estimated 2,100 political prisoners, are notoriously bad for one's health. Another well-known house detainee is General Khin Nyunt, formerly the much-feared head of military intelligence, first secretary of the junta and prime minister from 2003-04.
In October 2004, Khin Nyunt received a letter from Than Shwe saying he had been "permitted to resign on health grounds."
Shortly thereafter, Khin Nyunt was found guilty of corruption and sentenced to 44 years in prison, later commuted to house arrest, where he remains today.
Than Shwe, whose palatial residence is in the restricted military zone of Naypyitaw, the new capital, may have been thinking of the fate of his predecessor Ne Win when he decided it was high time for Myanmar to hold an election and introduce "discipline-flourishing democracy" this year, analysts said.
"If you are an absolute ruler, the last thing you want to do is choose a successor," one diplomat noted.
Instead, Than Shwe is expected to choose the next president, while keeping his grip on the military for as long as possible.
"In Burma whoever controls the military holds the real power," said Tin Oo, himself a former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces before he first fell afoul of the system in 1976.
Posted : Thu, 01 Apr 2010 03:05:22 GMT
By : Peter Janssen
Yangon - Good advice for someone embarking on a career in Myanmar politics might be: make sure you have got a comfortable house.
Tin Oo, 83, the deputy leader of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), was released from house detention in February, after spending six years cooped up at home.
"I was lucky because my wife had just ordered a satellite dish before my arrest, so I could watch CNN, Al Jazeera and many stations," Tin Oo said.
A good Buddhist, Tin Oo spent three hours a day praying and meditating, and had plenty of time to catch up on his reading. "I also had the National Geographic, which the US embassy sent to me each month," Tin Oo told the German Press Agency dpa.
Of course, Myanmar's most famous detainee is NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has spent some 14 of the past 21 years jailed in her family's compound in Yangon.
Suu Kyi and Tin Oo were arrested together on May 30, 2003, while campaigning in Depayin, central Myanmar.
They were attacked by gangs of pro-military thugs who roughed them up and left up to 35 NLD supporters dead.
"We had a narrow escape," Tin Oo said. "A huge crowd was following Suu Kyi wherever she went, coming up to her and saying 'Auntie, save us. We are sunk in poverty. The education our children get is sub-standard.' The military realized they could not control her." After the Depayin incident, both Suu Kyi and Tin Oo were charged with undermining national security and sentenced to indefinite jail terms that were eventually changed to house detention.
According to the Myanmar constitution, the upper limit of their detention under such a charge should have been five years, but the junta stretched the detentions out to six years.
In Suu Kyi's case, the junta got lucky last May, when US national John William Yettaw swam to her lakeside compound on Inya Lake, providing authorities with an excuse to accuse her of violating the terms of her detention by allowing him to spend two nights at her house.
On August 11, Suu Kyi was found guilty and sentenced to three years imprisonment with hard labour.
But the verdict was commuted to 18-months of house detention by military supremo Senior General Than Shwe, head of the State Peace and Development Council, as the junta is officially called.
Than Shwe, 77, has not limited his justice to democracy icons.
Potential threats to his absolute power within the military hierarchy have also been banished to their households.
In March 2002, former military strongman General Ne Win and his daughter Sandar Win were placed under house arrest for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government using black magic.
The main plotters, Ne Win's son-in-law Aye Zaw Win and his three sons, were sentenced to death.
Ne Win, Myanmar's absolute ruler from 1962 to 1988, died at home on December 5, 2002. Myanmar's tradition of placing people under house arrest started before Ne Win's rule, during the country's brief spell of parliamentary democracy between 1949-62, according to Yangon-based historians.
"It's a bit more humane than Insein Prison, but reserved for the more privileged victims of the system," one foreign diplomat said.
Myanmar's jails, which now house an estimated 2,100 political prisoners, are notoriously bad for one's health. Another well-known house detainee is General Khin Nyunt, formerly the much-feared head of military intelligence, first secretary of the junta and prime minister from 2003-04.
In October 2004, Khin Nyunt received a letter from Than Shwe saying he had been "permitted to resign on health grounds."
Shortly thereafter, Khin Nyunt was found guilty of corruption and sentenced to 44 years in prison, later commuted to house arrest, where he remains today.
Than Shwe, whose palatial residence is in the restricted military zone of Naypyitaw, the new capital, may have been thinking of the fate of his predecessor Ne Win when he decided it was high time for Myanmar to hold an election and introduce "discipline-flourishing democracy" this year, analysts said.
"If you are an absolute ruler, the last thing you want to do is choose a successor," one diplomat noted.
Instead, Than Shwe is expected to choose the next president, while keeping his grip on the military for as long as possible.
"In Burma whoever controls the military holds the real power," said Tin Oo, himself a former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces before he first fell afoul of the system in 1976.
******************************************************
Asia Security Initiative News & Blog (blog)
Leaving the Labyrinth? The Asia Society Task Force Report on Burma/Myanmar
Posted by Catharin Dalpino on March 31, 2010. Filed under Burma.
On March 31 The Asia Society released its two-part report on political and economic conditions in Burma; prospects for change in that country; an assessment of present and future US policy; and Asian perspectives on Burma. The entire package can be accessed on the Asia Society website and merits close reading. The reports were the work of the Asia Society’s Task Force on “Current Realities and Future Possibilities for Burma/Myanmar,” co-chaired by retired General Wesley Clark and former USAID Administration Henrietta Fore. US policy is the focus of one publication. Apart from a situation analysis and policy recommendations, it offers two appendices of particular value: an extensive analysis of the new Burmese constitution, and a catalogue of US sanctions on Burma. The second publication is a compilation of reports from roundtable discussions at nine partner institutions in the Asia-Pacific region, in Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. This comparative exercise is eye-opening, particularly for Americans. In the US policy community, international coordination on Burma is an unquestioned good, but the assumption is often that greater coordination will move other countries closer to the US viewpoint. The Task Force Asian reports instead suggest a multiplicity of approaches and views on the Burma situation.
The US policy report lays out a three-stage policy. Stage 1 presents a gameplan for the present situation, with a complication that did not make the publication deadline: yesterday the National League for Democracy announced it would not participate in the planned parliamentary elections this year. This raises obvious questions for US policy, which has placed the NLD at the center of policy for two decades. The report recommends pushing engagement to reasonable limits in Stage 1 but “The National League for Democracy should continue to be a focal point of US policy support…” At the roll-out event, Clark maintained that the NLD should remain the US focal point as a democratic mainstay in Burma, if not a formal party - under the new Burmese constitution, any party that does not participate in the election will be disbanded. The Task Force recommends enhanced humanitarian aid and educational exchange during this phase as a means of building ties with a broader base within Burma. The lead-up to elections could be a time of heightened instability, and the report recommends that the United States urge the Burmese government to seek a negotiated solution with armed ceasefire groups.
Stage 2 assumes that “indications of change on the part of Burmese leadership” are evident. This does not necessarily mean that elections have taken place, but the Task Force does posit one scenario in which elections replace the current military government with “a quasi-civilian government,” a seemingly civilian administration with a strong overlay of military involvement, even control. This interim stage would focus on building economic infrastructure and providing cautious support for reform. Stage 3 would commence “when real progress has been demonstrated on a sustained basis’” and is marked by US assistance to the Burmese government, including Burmese security forces. At today’s roll-out, representatives of humanitarian organizations complained that contact with the Burmese formal structure comes too late in the plan, and some maintained that work with government officials in health and education ministries is possible now and should begin immediately.
Clearly, and as the Task Force leadership freely acknowledges, even the near-term future in Burma is murky and events are not likely to go precisely according to this or any other external plan. However, the point of calibrating policy in stages and predicating assistance on incremental change is to decrease the degree of polarization on Burma in the Washington community, which has thusfar encouraged competing sides to take an absolutist, all-or-nothing approach. That said, analysts of civil-military relations may question if the Task Force model for a transition out of military rule is realistic in a Southeast Asian context. Those processes in Thailand and Indonesia have been difficult, jagged and as yet still incomplete.
That is precisely the point that many of the Asian roundtables make in the second Task Force publication. With the exception of Australia, those reports tend to give more weight to the Burmese military’s reform efforts thusfar and to express more optimism for an election outcome, if only because their expectations are lower. There may also be an implicit warning in these reports, that Burma’s neighbors see the elections as an exit ramp off the past twenty years of isolating Burma. Indeed, many of the Asian reports have a far more calibrated spectrum of possible responses to events in Burma than the US policy report. The Indonesia report wonders whether there isn’t a need to move the international community’s view of Burma “…away from a human rights-based and ‘problem-centric’ view to a ‘peace-centric’ view.” The Thai report is frank in its worry that abrupt political change in Burma could produce internal instability that might spill across borders: “The status quo is preferred if change leads to volatility, turmoil, and violence…” Presenting this variety of views not only identifies differences but may also suggest a division of labor in the international community that could be useful in supporting change in Burma. Clearly, neighboring governments may be more acceptable and effective interlocutors with the Burmese military than the United States.
The comparative report also offers a corrective to Western views of emerging power dynamics in Asia. The China report criticizes US views of Burma’s nuclear intentions; even more interesting is its embrace of a recent report by the International Crisis Group that downplays China’s influence on the Burmese government and maintains that Beijing is only able to extract minor concessions from the regime. The India report will dash the hopes of some US policymakers who believe that New Delhi can be persuaded to press the Burmese regime for change because of India’s status as the world’s largest democracy. instead, India appears to view the situation there largely with indifference. “Not a single credible person has dedicated himself or herself to studying Myanmar comprehensively as a primary interest,” the report insists. “India still accords the lowest priority to its relations with Myanmar among all its immediate neighbors.”
Leaving the Labyrinth? The Asia Society Task Force Report on Burma/Myanmar
Posted by Catharin Dalpino on March 31, 2010. Filed under Burma.
On March 31 The Asia Society released its two-part report on political and economic conditions in Burma; prospects for change in that country; an assessment of present and future US policy; and Asian perspectives on Burma. The entire package can be accessed on the Asia Society website and merits close reading. The reports were the work of the Asia Society’s Task Force on “Current Realities and Future Possibilities for Burma/Myanmar,” co-chaired by retired General Wesley Clark and former USAID Administration Henrietta Fore. US policy is the focus of one publication. Apart from a situation analysis and policy recommendations, it offers two appendices of particular value: an extensive analysis of the new Burmese constitution, and a catalogue of US sanctions on Burma. The second publication is a compilation of reports from roundtable discussions at nine partner institutions in the Asia-Pacific region, in Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. This comparative exercise is eye-opening, particularly for Americans. In the US policy community, international coordination on Burma is an unquestioned good, but the assumption is often that greater coordination will move other countries closer to the US viewpoint. The Task Force Asian reports instead suggest a multiplicity of approaches and views on the Burma situation.
The US policy report lays out a three-stage policy. Stage 1 presents a gameplan for the present situation, with a complication that did not make the publication deadline: yesterday the National League for Democracy announced it would not participate in the planned parliamentary elections this year. This raises obvious questions for US policy, which has placed the NLD at the center of policy for two decades. The report recommends pushing engagement to reasonable limits in Stage 1 but “The National League for Democracy should continue to be a focal point of US policy support…” At the roll-out event, Clark maintained that the NLD should remain the US focal point as a democratic mainstay in Burma, if not a formal party - under the new Burmese constitution, any party that does not participate in the election will be disbanded. The Task Force recommends enhanced humanitarian aid and educational exchange during this phase as a means of building ties with a broader base within Burma. The lead-up to elections could be a time of heightened instability, and the report recommends that the United States urge the Burmese government to seek a negotiated solution with armed ceasefire groups.
Stage 2 assumes that “indications of change on the part of Burmese leadership” are evident. This does not necessarily mean that elections have taken place, but the Task Force does posit one scenario in which elections replace the current military government with “a quasi-civilian government,” a seemingly civilian administration with a strong overlay of military involvement, even control. This interim stage would focus on building economic infrastructure and providing cautious support for reform. Stage 3 would commence “when real progress has been demonstrated on a sustained basis’” and is marked by US assistance to the Burmese government, including Burmese security forces. At today’s roll-out, representatives of humanitarian organizations complained that contact with the Burmese formal structure comes too late in the plan, and some maintained that work with government officials in health and education ministries is possible now and should begin immediately.
Clearly, and as the Task Force leadership freely acknowledges, even the near-term future in Burma is murky and events are not likely to go precisely according to this or any other external plan. However, the point of calibrating policy in stages and predicating assistance on incremental change is to decrease the degree of polarization on Burma in the Washington community, which has thusfar encouraged competing sides to take an absolutist, all-or-nothing approach. That said, analysts of civil-military relations may question if the Task Force model for a transition out of military rule is realistic in a Southeast Asian context. Those processes in Thailand and Indonesia have been difficult, jagged and as yet still incomplete.
That is precisely the point that many of the Asian roundtables make in the second Task Force publication. With the exception of Australia, those reports tend to give more weight to the Burmese military’s reform efforts thusfar and to express more optimism for an election outcome, if only because their expectations are lower. There may also be an implicit warning in these reports, that Burma’s neighbors see the elections as an exit ramp off the past twenty years of isolating Burma. Indeed, many of the Asian reports have a far more calibrated spectrum of possible responses to events in Burma than the US policy report. The Indonesia report wonders whether there isn’t a need to move the international community’s view of Burma “…away from a human rights-based and ‘problem-centric’ view to a ‘peace-centric’ view.” The Thai report is frank in its worry that abrupt political change in Burma could produce internal instability that might spill across borders: “The status quo is preferred if change leads to volatility, turmoil, and violence…” Presenting this variety of views not only identifies differences but may also suggest a division of labor in the international community that could be useful in supporting change in Burma. Clearly, neighboring governments may be more acceptable and effective interlocutors with the Burmese military than the United States.
The comparative report also offers a corrective to Western views of emerging power dynamics in Asia. The China report criticizes US views of Burma’s nuclear intentions; even more interesting is its embrace of a recent report by the International Crisis Group that downplays China’s influence on the Burmese government and maintains that Beijing is only able to extract minor concessions from the regime. The India report will dash the hopes of some US policymakers who believe that New Delhi can be persuaded to press the Burmese regime for change because of India’s status as the world’s largest democracy. instead, India appears to view the situation there largely with indifference. “Not a single credible person has dedicated himself or herself to studying Myanmar comprehensively as a primary interest,” the report insists. “India still accords the lowest priority to its relations with Myanmar among all its immediate neighbors.”
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New Zealand Herald - $10k raised for Myanmar children
4:15 PM Thursday Apr 1, 2010
An auction of works by New Zealand artists has raised $10,000 for needy children in Myanmar.
Artists including Misery, Flox, Guido Anton, Drypnz and Andy Shaw created 15 artworks based on drawings by Burmese children.
The works were sold at auction at Wellington's Toi Poneke Gallery last night with the proceeds going to UK-based charity Children on the Edge's programme in Burma.
The artworks by the children and the New Zealand artists will be on display at Toi Poneke Gallery until April 23.
4:15 PM Thursday Apr 1, 2010
An auction of works by New Zealand artists has raised $10,000 for needy children in Myanmar.
Artists including Misery, Flox, Guido Anton, Drypnz and Andy Shaw created 15 artworks based on drawings by Burmese children.
The works were sold at auction at Wellington's Toi Poneke Gallery last night with the proceeds going to UK-based charity Children on the Edge's programme in Burma.
The artworks by the children and the New Zealand artists will be on display at Toi Poneke Gallery until April 23.
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Global Times - Myanmar tightens formalities with passport application
Source: Xinhua
[21:24 April 01 2010]
The Myanmar authorities have tightened formalities for its citizens in applying for a passport by adding more complicated procedures for the applicants to go through, the local weekly Popular News reported Thursday.
Quoting Yangon division's Internal Finance and Revenue Department, the report said a passport applicant is re-set to obtain tax clearance verification not only for himself which was previously required but now also for all other household members with whom he is living together, thus adding burden to the applicant.
The authorities' move is said to prevent anyone of a household member from tax evasion.
Tax clearance is one of the procedures which requires a passport applicant to go through.
Myanmar has been taking some measures since 2006 to tighten levying of taxes in a bid to raise state revenue, while seeking ways also to expose those evading paying tax.
These measures include denying the biennial renewal of private business licenses on failure to fully settle their outstanding tax payment annually.
There are five categories of tax collected by the government, namely commercial and service tax, income tax, profit tax, tax for sale of state lottery and stamps.
Meanwhile, Myanmar on Thursday started introducing passports of international bar-code OCRB system for its citizens to replace handwritten ones in line with the demand of International Aviation Organization which called for stopping the use of the hand-written passports, according to the passport issuing authority under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Such OCRB passport-readable machines are installed at the Yangon International Airport for the move as well as to facilitate the OCRB passport holders from the international.
Over the period when the new measure is taken, matters related to Myanmar passport extension and renewal in foreign countries, where Myanmar embassies are located, are being suspended for one month from April 1 to 30, according to the ministry.
Source: Xinhua
[21:24 April 01 2010]
The Myanmar authorities have tightened formalities for its citizens in applying for a passport by adding more complicated procedures for the applicants to go through, the local weekly Popular News reported Thursday.
Quoting Yangon division's Internal Finance and Revenue Department, the report said a passport applicant is re-set to obtain tax clearance verification not only for himself which was previously required but now also for all other household members with whom he is living together, thus adding burden to the applicant.
The authorities' move is said to prevent anyone of a household member from tax evasion.
Tax clearance is one of the procedures which requires a passport applicant to go through.
Myanmar has been taking some measures since 2006 to tighten levying of taxes in a bid to raise state revenue, while seeking ways also to expose those evading paying tax.
These measures include denying the biennial renewal of private business licenses on failure to fully settle their outstanding tax payment annually.
There are five categories of tax collected by the government, namely commercial and service tax, income tax, profit tax, tax for sale of state lottery and stamps.
Meanwhile, Myanmar on Thursday started introducing passports of international bar-code OCRB system for its citizens to replace handwritten ones in line with the demand of International Aviation Organization which called for stopping the use of the hand-written passports, according to the passport issuing authority under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Such OCRB passport-readable machines are installed at the Yangon International Airport for the move as well as to facilitate the OCRB passport holders from the international.
Over the period when the new measure is taken, matters related to Myanmar passport extension and renewal in foreign countries, where Myanmar embassies are located, are being suspended for one month from April 1 to 30, according to the ministry.
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Apr 2, 2010
Asia Times Online - Suu Kyi's party goes for broke
By Marwaan Macan-Markar
BANGKOK - If Myanmar's military regime goes ahead with its promised general election this year, some 27.2 million voters will be deprived of the chance to cast a ballot for the political party that has come to symbolize democratic hope in that oppressed nation.
This is the scenario taking shape after the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by pro-democracy icon and party leader Aung San Suu Kyi, decided on Monday to boycott the general election.
A damning indictment on the Southeast Asian nation's first parliamentary poll in two decades, the NLD decision was hardly a surprise. It endorsed the unequivocal message that was delivered days before by Suu Kyi, through her lawyer Nyan Win, to over 150 central committee members and party representatives who met in Yangon, the former capital.
Suu Kyi, who has been placed under house arrest for over 14 of the past 20 years, had said "she will never accept registration [of her party to contest the poll] under unjust [electoral] laws."
"The NLD's decision not to register the party and contest the elections will be a big loss for the people," says Win Min, a Burmese national security expert at Payap University in the northern Thai city of Chiang Mai. "There are many people who wanted to vote for the NLD. They will be sad even though they will support the boycott."
Yet the NLD's position may have been exactly what Myanmar's strongman Senior General Than Shwe favored, Win Min explained to IPS. "It seems the NLD played into Than Shwe's hands. He wanted to avoid a repeat of the 1990 election outcome."
In that last election in Myanmar, also known as Burma, the newly formed NLD secured 82% of the 485 parliamentary seats up for grabs. But the military regime, in power since a 1962 coup, refused to recognize the results.
It is little wonder why the five election laws rolled out by the junta this month were aimed at avoiding a repeat of its 1990 poll defeat, and the NLD's activism that followed.
The Political Parties Registration Law, for instance, was introduced to keep Nobel Peace Laureate Suu Kyi out of contention by declaring that "people who are serving a prison term cannot form a political party" and that "people who are serving a prison term cannot be a member of a political party”.
Suu Kyi, one of the over 2,200 political prisoners in Myanmar, was convicted of violating the terms of her house arrest when US national John William Yettaw swam to her home last year.
By opting for a boycott, the NLD hierarchy has opted to remain loyal to its popular leader rather than ditching her to meet electoral requirements and contest the poll.
"Without any objections, all the party leaders reached a consensus not to register the party and join the election because the junta's election laws are unjust," Khin Maun Saw, a senior party official who attended the March 29 meeting, was quoted as having told 'The Irrawaddy' magazine run by Burmese journalists in exile.
Yet it is a high-stakes political gamble, for the NLD may have placed itself in an awkward position by taking the moral high ground instead of following pragmatic politics. The NLD ignored the "big picture in Burmese politics and the important role it has to play in helping to transform the country towards a democracy," a senior official of a Southeast Asian country told IPS. "Democracy is a process, not a morality play."
Even Western governments who have been trenchant critics of the junta are not all in agreement with the NLD's move. "It is a disappointing decision. It disregards the variety of opposition opinion inside the country," a European diplomat who regularly visits Myanmar observed in an interview. "The NLD discredits those who will form parties to contest the election."
Between 11 to 15 political parties are expected to register before the May 7 deadline, a number much lower than the nearly 100 that registered to contest the 1990 election.
The coming poll may come to haunt the NLD in other ways, too. "This election will be a referendum on the popularity of the NLD," says Benjamin Zawacki, Myanmar researcher for the London-based rights lobby Amnesty International. "The test will be whether people participate and vote or acquiesce to the NLD's call to boycott the poll."
"It is political brinkmanship on the part of the NLD," Zawacki told IPS. "Should they succeed and people boycott the poll, it could fundamentally change the political landscape of Myanmar. But if they fail - if voters ignore the boycott and vote for other parties - then it could spell the end of the NLD as a political party."
The risk that the 2010 election may sound the death knell for the NLD has not been lost on the party hierarchy. "Our party can die, but not our political movement," was how Nyan Win, Suu Kyi's lawyer and NLD spokesman described the party's sentiment to The Irrawaddy.
Asia Times Online - Suu Kyi's party goes for broke
By Marwaan Macan-Markar
BANGKOK - If Myanmar's military regime goes ahead with its promised general election this year, some 27.2 million voters will be deprived of the chance to cast a ballot for the political party that has come to symbolize democratic hope in that oppressed nation.
This is the scenario taking shape after the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by pro-democracy icon and party leader Aung San Suu Kyi, decided on Monday to boycott the general election.
A damning indictment on the Southeast Asian nation's first parliamentary poll in two decades, the NLD decision was hardly a surprise. It endorsed the unequivocal message that was delivered days before by Suu Kyi, through her lawyer Nyan Win, to over 150 central committee members and party representatives who met in Yangon, the former capital.
Suu Kyi, who has been placed under house arrest for over 14 of the past 20 years, had said "she will never accept registration [of her party to contest the poll] under unjust [electoral] laws."
"The NLD's decision not to register the party and contest the elections will be a big loss for the people," says Win Min, a Burmese national security expert at Payap University in the northern Thai city of Chiang Mai. "There are many people who wanted to vote for the NLD. They will be sad even though they will support the boycott."
Yet the NLD's position may have been exactly what Myanmar's strongman Senior General Than Shwe favored, Win Min explained to IPS. "It seems the NLD played into Than Shwe's hands. He wanted to avoid a repeat of the 1990 election outcome."
In that last election in Myanmar, also known as Burma, the newly formed NLD secured 82% of the 485 parliamentary seats up for grabs. But the military regime, in power since a 1962 coup, refused to recognize the results.
It is little wonder why the five election laws rolled out by the junta this month were aimed at avoiding a repeat of its 1990 poll defeat, and the NLD's activism that followed.
The Political Parties Registration Law, for instance, was introduced to keep Nobel Peace Laureate Suu Kyi out of contention by declaring that "people who are serving a prison term cannot form a political party" and that "people who are serving a prison term cannot be a member of a political party”.
Suu Kyi, one of the over 2,200 political prisoners in Myanmar, was convicted of violating the terms of her house arrest when US national John William Yettaw swam to her home last year.
By opting for a boycott, the NLD hierarchy has opted to remain loyal to its popular leader rather than ditching her to meet electoral requirements and contest the poll.
"Without any objections, all the party leaders reached a consensus not to register the party and join the election because the junta's election laws are unjust," Khin Maun Saw, a senior party official who attended the March 29 meeting, was quoted as having told 'The Irrawaddy' magazine run by Burmese journalists in exile.
Yet it is a high-stakes political gamble, for the NLD may have placed itself in an awkward position by taking the moral high ground instead of following pragmatic politics. The NLD ignored the "big picture in Burmese politics and the important role it has to play in helping to transform the country towards a democracy," a senior official of a Southeast Asian country told IPS. "Democracy is a process, not a morality play."
Even Western governments who have been trenchant critics of the junta are not all in agreement with the NLD's move. "It is a disappointing decision. It disregards the variety of opposition opinion inside the country," a European diplomat who regularly visits Myanmar observed in an interview. "The NLD discredits those who will form parties to contest the election."
Between 11 to 15 political parties are expected to register before the May 7 deadline, a number much lower than the nearly 100 that registered to contest the 1990 election.
The coming poll may come to haunt the NLD in other ways, too. "This election will be a referendum on the popularity of the NLD," says Benjamin Zawacki, Myanmar researcher for the London-based rights lobby Amnesty International. "The test will be whether people participate and vote or acquiesce to the NLD's call to boycott the poll."
"It is political brinkmanship on the part of the NLD," Zawacki told IPS. "Should they succeed and people boycott the poll, it could fundamentally change the political landscape of Myanmar. But if they fail - if voters ignore the boycott and vote for other parties - then it could spell the end of the NLD as a political party."
The risk that the 2010 election may sound the death knell for the NLD has not been lost on the party hierarchy. "Our party can die, but not our political movement," was how Nyan Win, Suu Kyi's lawyer and NLD spokesman described the party's sentiment to The Irrawaddy.
******************************************************
Foreign Minister questions Mynamar junta’s commitment to promised fair election
Lilian Budianto , The Jakarta Post , Jakarta | Thu, 04/01/2010 9:37 AM | Headlines
Indonesia has called on Myanmar’s military junta to uphold its commitment to stage a fair election that would allow the participation of opposition party leader Aung San Suu Kyi, during a visit by Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to Yangon on Tuesday.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said the countries would discuss Myanmar’s upcoming elections, including new poll regulations that had been boycotted by Suu Kyi’s party, during a meeting between Marty and his counterpart, U Nyan Win.
Members of the National League for Democracy party voted unanimously Monday to skip the country’s first election in two decades to send out a strong message that the army-orchestrated political process was “unjust” and “unfair”, Reuters reported.
“Indonesia will pose questions on the terms of the elections to ensure that the country upholds its commitment to have an election that allows all parties to take part,” said Faizasyah.
“The new regulations are not clear as to whether they will prevent Suu Kyi from participating. The minister will touch on this point during his visit. The credibility of Myanmar’s election will come under question if it does not include Suu Kyi.”
Faizasyah said Marty’s three-day visit to Myanmar was a courtesy call and was not directly aimed at discussing the election, which does not have a date yet.
He said there had been no talk of whether ASEAN countries could act as observers during the election.
“But we are ready to contribute if Myanmar seeks any involvement,” he said.
Rafendi Djamin, Indonesia’s commissioner for ASEAN’s human rights body, said the new election regulations set out by Myanmar’s junta sought to prevent Suu Kyi from taking part.
“The verdict against Suu Kyi last year was meant to prevent [her] from competing in the election. The credibility of Myanmar’s election has been hurt even before it has been held,” said the commissioner for the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission for Human Rights.
Indonesia has strongly condemned the junta’s placing of Suu Kyi, a Nobel laureate and general secretary of the opposition party, under house arrest after an American man swam to her house last year.
Jakarta declared the incident had been orchestrated by the junta to prevent Suu Kyi’s involvement in the election and called on the junta to release her.
Yuyun Wahyuningrum, an activist from the Asia Forum, said expectations were high that the first election in Myanmar in two decades would be a vital step on a long road to return democracy to the country.
“Myanmar’s election is a major measuring stick for the success of the ASEAN Charter. The junta has been making up new excuses to justify the election’s credibility through the new regulations that ban Suu Kyi from the elections,” she said.
She said ASEAN members had failed to push for democracy in Myanmar because many remained divided over the issue.
Lilian Budianto , The Jakarta Post , Jakarta | Thu, 04/01/2010 9:37 AM | Headlines
Indonesia has called on Myanmar’s military junta to uphold its commitment to stage a fair election that would allow the participation of opposition party leader Aung San Suu Kyi, during a visit by Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to Yangon on Tuesday.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said the countries would discuss Myanmar’s upcoming elections, including new poll regulations that had been boycotted by Suu Kyi’s party, during a meeting between Marty and his counterpart, U Nyan Win.
Members of the National League for Democracy party voted unanimously Monday to skip the country’s first election in two decades to send out a strong message that the army-orchestrated political process was “unjust” and “unfair”, Reuters reported.
“Indonesia will pose questions on the terms of the elections to ensure that the country upholds its commitment to have an election that allows all parties to take part,” said Faizasyah.
“The new regulations are not clear as to whether they will prevent Suu Kyi from participating. The minister will touch on this point during his visit. The credibility of Myanmar’s election will come under question if it does not include Suu Kyi.”
Faizasyah said Marty’s three-day visit to Myanmar was a courtesy call and was not directly aimed at discussing the election, which does not have a date yet.
He said there had been no talk of whether ASEAN countries could act as observers during the election.
“But we are ready to contribute if Myanmar seeks any involvement,” he said.
Rafendi Djamin, Indonesia’s commissioner for ASEAN’s human rights body, said the new election regulations set out by Myanmar’s junta sought to prevent Suu Kyi from taking part.
“The verdict against Suu Kyi last year was meant to prevent [her] from competing in the election. The credibility of Myanmar’s election has been hurt even before it has been held,” said the commissioner for the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission for Human Rights.
Indonesia has strongly condemned the junta’s placing of Suu Kyi, a Nobel laureate and general secretary of the opposition party, under house arrest after an American man swam to her house last year.
Jakarta declared the incident had been orchestrated by the junta to prevent Suu Kyi’s involvement in the election and called on the junta to release her.
Yuyun Wahyuningrum, an activist from the Asia Forum, said expectations were high that the first election in Myanmar in two decades would be a vital step on a long road to return democracy to the country.
“Myanmar’s election is a major measuring stick for the success of the ASEAN Charter. The junta has been making up new excuses to justify the election’s credibility through the new regulations that ban Suu Kyi from the elections,” she said.
She said ASEAN members had failed to push for democracy in Myanmar because many remained divided over the issue.
******************************************************
TODAYonline - The options on Myanmar
by Simon Tay and William Hatch
05:55 AM Apr 01, 2010
THE decision not to allow iconic opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi to participate in elections in Myanmar was bad enough. But the latest news that her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), will also not participate leads many to worry that the vote later this year will be a farce.
Hopes had been raised for an end to the country's near pariah status.
First, Myanmar decided to move ahead with the long-delayed constitutional reform and elections on their self-proclaimed road to democracy. Then, the United States changed policy to engage the regime, although maintaining sanctions. Third, members of the regional group, Asean, called persistently for free and fair elections.
Hopes have now dimmed that elections will bring in a new and credible government, whether formed by Aung San Suu Kyi or parties led by those close to the military.
In the Saffron Revolution of 2007, when the military used excessive force against monks, the images were more dramatic. But the current situation is no less worrying.
What happens if the elections go ahead but lack competition and credibility? What can and should Asean neighbours like Singapore do with the new government? Might flawed elections foment internal instability, as with Iran?
There are implications for Asean and for Singapore, which has sometimes been singled out as being close to Myanmar.
While it is true that Singapore engages in investment, aid and technical assistance, it is not a defender or proxy of the regime, and increasingly has offered critical comments.
The relationship between the two countries is evolving. Even if Singapore will not join the largely Western chorus of criticism, there is a range of policy options that the Government can and should explore in future.
Such options were discussed among Singaporean experts, business leaders, and non-government organisations (NGOs) involved in Myanmar in a roundtable organised by the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA).
WHAT SINGAPORE CAN DO
Some observations may surprise. While Singaporean economic transactions in Myanmar are criticised, their absolute value is small - less than a quarter of 1 per cent of Singapore's total trade.
For investment, while some Singaporean companies went in early, few are now actively looking to increase their exposure in the country. Instead, there is considerable caution and even notes of pessimism about business prospects there.
On humanitarian efforts, Singapore-based non-government organisations have reported some success in helping people in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in 2008. But they also reported continuing limits to their direct access to citizen groups.
After the Saffron Revolution, there is also a sense that Singaporean public opinion has turned against the regime. There may not be pressure for sanctions but there is an expectation that the Singaporean leadership should not cosset or be too close to such a regime.
Going forward, there is a spectrum of policy options, ranging from "proxy" to "principled".
Some businesses and experts suggest that Singapore should implicitly accept the junta's actions and encourage the full range of business activities as well as government ties, as a "proxy".
At the other end of the spectrum, some feel that a more "principled" approach should now be taken. This would have Singapore emulate the posture of the US and Europe, with diplomatic disengagement, reduced aid and economic sanctions.
A middle path of pragmatism is also possible. Singapore would continue to work for change but in a quieter way. Aid, investment and technical assistance could continue at appropriate levels and for directed causes, while Singapore used an independent voice to encourage reform.
For elections in Myanmar, Singapore has quite consistently called for a credible process and for the participation of all parties, including the NLD.
On the NLD's boycott, Singapore has stated that it is still not too late for all parties to reach a compromise, and has urged them to do so.
Singapore's position can affect how Asean as a whole responds. The regional group is diverse, with some like Indonesia pushing actively for change and democracy, while others regard this mainly as a domestic issue for Myanmar.
Myanmar officials attend approximately 250 to 300 Asean meetings each year, at different levels of bureaucracy.
Although this has not brought change, Asean as well as Singapore can then leverage their increased access to lessen violations of human rights and encourage fundamental tenets of good governance, in keeping with the Asean Charter, which Myanmar has accepted.
Singapore's relationship with Myanmar bilaterally and through Asean can make it a significant player. It cannot shift the regime on its own. But what Singapore does can be significant, especially if there is coordination with Asean and other significant players, especially China and the US.
Coordination does not mean that countries would have identical positions. Rather, like an orchestra, different countries can and should use different instruments and play different notes, provided the main theme is consistent.
Simon Tay is chairman and William Hatch a researcher at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA). The SIIA has newly released a report, From Proxy to Principle: Singapore's Myanmar Policy, available at www.siiaonline.org.
by Simon Tay and William Hatch
05:55 AM Apr 01, 2010
THE decision not to allow iconic opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi to participate in elections in Myanmar was bad enough. But the latest news that her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), will also not participate leads many to worry that the vote later this year will be a farce.
Hopes had been raised for an end to the country's near pariah status.
First, Myanmar decided to move ahead with the long-delayed constitutional reform and elections on their self-proclaimed road to democracy. Then, the United States changed policy to engage the regime, although maintaining sanctions. Third, members of the regional group, Asean, called persistently for free and fair elections.
Hopes have now dimmed that elections will bring in a new and credible government, whether formed by Aung San Suu Kyi or parties led by those close to the military.
In the Saffron Revolution of 2007, when the military used excessive force against monks, the images were more dramatic. But the current situation is no less worrying.
What happens if the elections go ahead but lack competition and credibility? What can and should Asean neighbours like Singapore do with the new government? Might flawed elections foment internal instability, as with Iran?
There are implications for Asean and for Singapore, which has sometimes been singled out as being close to Myanmar.
While it is true that Singapore engages in investment, aid and technical assistance, it is not a defender or proxy of the regime, and increasingly has offered critical comments.
The relationship between the two countries is evolving. Even if Singapore will not join the largely Western chorus of criticism, there is a range of policy options that the Government can and should explore in future.
Such options were discussed among Singaporean experts, business leaders, and non-government organisations (NGOs) involved in Myanmar in a roundtable organised by the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA).
WHAT SINGAPORE CAN DO
Some observations may surprise. While Singaporean economic transactions in Myanmar are criticised, their absolute value is small - less than a quarter of 1 per cent of Singapore's total trade.
For investment, while some Singaporean companies went in early, few are now actively looking to increase their exposure in the country. Instead, there is considerable caution and even notes of pessimism about business prospects there.
On humanitarian efforts, Singapore-based non-government organisations have reported some success in helping people in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in 2008. But they also reported continuing limits to their direct access to citizen groups.
After the Saffron Revolution, there is also a sense that Singaporean public opinion has turned against the regime. There may not be pressure for sanctions but there is an expectation that the Singaporean leadership should not cosset or be too close to such a regime.
Going forward, there is a spectrum of policy options, ranging from "proxy" to "principled".
Some businesses and experts suggest that Singapore should implicitly accept the junta's actions and encourage the full range of business activities as well as government ties, as a "proxy".
At the other end of the spectrum, some feel that a more "principled" approach should now be taken. This would have Singapore emulate the posture of the US and Europe, with diplomatic disengagement, reduced aid and economic sanctions.
A middle path of pragmatism is also possible. Singapore would continue to work for change but in a quieter way. Aid, investment and technical assistance could continue at appropriate levels and for directed causes, while Singapore used an independent voice to encourage reform.
For elections in Myanmar, Singapore has quite consistently called for a credible process and for the participation of all parties, including the NLD.
On the NLD's boycott, Singapore has stated that it is still not too late for all parties to reach a compromise, and has urged them to do so.
Singapore's position can affect how Asean as a whole responds. The regional group is diverse, with some like Indonesia pushing actively for change and democracy, while others regard this mainly as a domestic issue for Myanmar.
Myanmar officials attend approximately 250 to 300 Asean meetings each year, at different levels of bureaucracy.
Although this has not brought change, Asean as well as Singapore can then leverage their increased access to lessen violations of human rights and encourage fundamental tenets of good governance, in keeping with the Asean Charter, which Myanmar has accepted.
Singapore's relationship with Myanmar bilaterally and through Asean can make it a significant player. It cannot shift the regime on its own. But what Singapore does can be significant, especially if there is coordination with Asean and other significant players, especially China and the US.
Coordination does not mean that countries would have identical positions. Rather, like an orchestra, different countries can and should use different instruments and play different notes, provided the main theme is consistent.
Simon Tay is chairman and William Hatch a researcher at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA). The SIIA has newly released a report, From Proxy to Principle: Singapore's Myanmar Policy, available at www.siiaonline.org.
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Asia Security Initiative News & Blog (blog)
Leaving the Labyrinth? The Asia Society Task Force Report on Burma/Myanmar
Posted by Catharin Dalpino on March 31, 2010. Filed under Burma.
On March 31 The Asia Society released its two-part report on political and economic conditions in Burma; prospects for change in that country; an assessment of present and future US policy; and Asian perspectives on Burma. The entire package can be accessed on the Asia Society website and merits close reading. The reports were the work of the Asia Society’s Task Force on “Current Realities and Future Possibilities for Burma/Myanmar,” co-chaired by retired General Wesley Clark and former USAID Administration Henrietta Fore. US policy is the focus of one publication. Apart from a situation analysis and policy recommendations, it offers two appendices of particular value: an extensive analysis of the new Burmese constitution, and a catalogue of US sanctions on Burma. The second publication is a compilation of reports from roundtable discussions at nine partner institutions in the Asia-Pacific region, in Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. This comparative exercise is eye-opening, particularly for Americans. In the US policy community, international coordination on Burma is an unquestioned good, but the assumption is often that greater coordination will move other countries closer to the US viewpoint. The Task Force Asian reports instead suggest a multiplicity of approaches and views on the Burma situation.
The US policy report lays out a three-stage policy. Stage 1 presents a gameplan for the present situation, with a complication that did not make the publication deadline: yesterday the National League for Democracy announced it would not participate in the planned parliamentary elections this year. This raises obvious questions for US policy, which has placed the NLD at the center of policy for two decades. The report recommends pushing engagement to reasonable limits in Stage 1 but “The National League for Democracy should continue to be a focal point of US policy support…” At the roll-out event, Clark maintained that the NLD should remain the US focal point as a democratic mainstay in Burma, if not a formal party - under the new Burmese constitution, any party that does not participate in the election will be disbanded. The Task Force recommends enhanced humanitarian aid and educational exchange during this phase as a means of building ties with a broader base within Burma. The lead-up to elections could be a time of heightened instability, and the report recommends that the United States urge the Burmese government to seek a negotiated solution with armed ceasefire groups.
Stage 2 assumes that “indications of change on the part of Burmese leadership” are evident. This does not necessarily mean that elections have taken place, but the Task Force does posit one scenario in which elections replace the current military government with “a quasi-civilian government,” a seemingly civilian administration with a strong overlay of military involvement, even control. This interim stage would focus on building economic infrastructure and providing cautious support for reform. Stage 3 would commence “when real progress has been demonstrated on a sustained basis’” and is marked by US assistance to the Burmese government, including Burmese security forces. At today’s roll-out, representatives of humanitarian organizations complained that contact with the Burmese formal structure comes too late in the plan, and some maintained that work with government officials in health and education ministries is possible now and should begin immediately.
Clearly, and as the Task Force leadership freely acknowledges, even the near-term future in Burma is murky and events are not likely to go precisely according to this or any other external plan. However, the point of calibrating policy in stages and predicating assistance on incremental change is to decrease the degree of polarization on Burma in the Washington community, which has thusfar encouraged competing sides to take an absolutist, all-or-nothing approach. That said, analysts of civil-military relations may question if the Task Force model for a transition out of military rule is realistic in a Southeast Asian context. Those processes in Thailand and Indonesia have been difficult, jagged and as yet still incomplete.
That is precisely the point that many of the Asian roundtables make in the second Task Force publication. With the exception of Australia, those reports tend to give more weight to the Burmese military’s reform efforts thusfar and to express more optimism for an election outcome, if only because their expectations are lower. There may also be an implicit warning in these reports, that Burma’s neighbors see the elections as an exit ramp off the past twenty years of isolating Burma. Indeed, many of the Asian reports have a far more calibrated spectrum of possible responses to events in Burma than the US policy report. The Indonesia report wonders whether there isn’t a need to move the international community’s view of Burma “…away from a human rights-based and ‘problem-centric’ view to a ‘peace-centric’ view.” The Thai report is frank in its worry that abrupt political change in Burma could produce internal instability that might spill across borders: “The status quo is preferred if change leads to volatility, turmoil, and violence…” Presenting this variety of views not only identifies differences but may also suggest a division of labor in the international community that could be useful in supporting change in Burma. Clearly, neighboring governments may be more acceptable and effective interlocutors with the Burmese military than the United States.
The comparative report also offers a corrective to Western views of emerging power dynamics in Asia. The China report criticizes US views of Burma’s nuclear intentions; even more interesting is its embrace of a recent report by the International Crisis Group that downplays China’s influence on the Burmese government and maintains that Beijing is only able to extract minor concessions from the regime. The India report will dash the hopes of some US policymakers who believe that New Delhi can be persuaded to press the Burmese regime for change because of India’s status as the world’s largest democracy. instead, India appears to view the situation there largely with indifference. “Not a single credible person has dedicated himself or herself to studying Myanmar comprehensively as a primary interest,” the report insists. “India still accords the lowest priority to its relations with Myanmar among all its immediate neighbors.”
Leaving the Labyrinth? The Asia Society Task Force Report on Burma/Myanmar
Posted by Catharin Dalpino on March 31, 2010. Filed under Burma.
On March 31 The Asia Society released its two-part report on political and economic conditions in Burma; prospects for change in that country; an assessment of present and future US policy; and Asian perspectives on Burma. The entire package can be accessed on the Asia Society website and merits close reading. The reports were the work of the Asia Society’s Task Force on “Current Realities and Future Possibilities for Burma/Myanmar,” co-chaired by retired General Wesley Clark and former USAID Administration Henrietta Fore. US policy is the focus of one publication. Apart from a situation analysis and policy recommendations, it offers two appendices of particular value: an extensive analysis of the new Burmese constitution, and a catalogue of US sanctions on Burma. The second publication is a compilation of reports from roundtable discussions at nine partner institutions in the Asia-Pacific region, in Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. This comparative exercise is eye-opening, particularly for Americans. In the US policy community, international coordination on Burma is an unquestioned good, but the assumption is often that greater coordination will move other countries closer to the US viewpoint. The Task Force Asian reports instead suggest a multiplicity of approaches and views on the Burma situation.
The US policy report lays out a three-stage policy. Stage 1 presents a gameplan for the present situation, with a complication that did not make the publication deadline: yesterday the National League for Democracy announced it would not participate in the planned parliamentary elections this year. This raises obvious questions for US policy, which has placed the NLD at the center of policy for two decades. The report recommends pushing engagement to reasonable limits in Stage 1 but “The National League for Democracy should continue to be a focal point of US policy support…” At the roll-out event, Clark maintained that the NLD should remain the US focal point as a democratic mainstay in Burma, if not a formal party - under the new Burmese constitution, any party that does not participate in the election will be disbanded. The Task Force recommends enhanced humanitarian aid and educational exchange during this phase as a means of building ties with a broader base within Burma. The lead-up to elections could be a time of heightened instability, and the report recommends that the United States urge the Burmese government to seek a negotiated solution with armed ceasefire groups.
Stage 2 assumes that “indications of change on the part of Burmese leadership” are evident. This does not necessarily mean that elections have taken place, but the Task Force does posit one scenario in which elections replace the current military government with “a quasi-civilian government,” a seemingly civilian administration with a strong overlay of military involvement, even control. This interim stage would focus on building economic infrastructure and providing cautious support for reform. Stage 3 would commence “when real progress has been demonstrated on a sustained basis’” and is marked by US assistance to the Burmese government, including Burmese security forces. At today’s roll-out, representatives of humanitarian organizations complained that contact with the Burmese formal structure comes too late in the plan, and some maintained that work with government officials in health and education ministries is possible now and should begin immediately.
Clearly, and as the Task Force leadership freely acknowledges, even the near-term future in Burma is murky and events are not likely to go precisely according to this or any other external plan. However, the point of calibrating policy in stages and predicating assistance on incremental change is to decrease the degree of polarization on Burma in the Washington community, which has thusfar encouraged competing sides to take an absolutist, all-or-nothing approach. That said, analysts of civil-military relations may question if the Task Force model for a transition out of military rule is realistic in a Southeast Asian context. Those processes in Thailand and Indonesia have been difficult, jagged and as yet still incomplete.
That is precisely the point that many of the Asian roundtables make in the second Task Force publication. With the exception of Australia, those reports tend to give more weight to the Burmese military’s reform efforts thusfar and to express more optimism for an election outcome, if only because their expectations are lower. There may also be an implicit warning in these reports, that Burma’s neighbors see the elections as an exit ramp off the past twenty years of isolating Burma. Indeed, many of the Asian reports have a far more calibrated spectrum of possible responses to events in Burma than the US policy report. The Indonesia report wonders whether there isn’t a need to move the international community’s view of Burma “…away from a human rights-based and ‘problem-centric’ view to a ‘peace-centric’ view.” The Thai report is frank in its worry that abrupt political change in Burma could produce internal instability that might spill across borders: “The status quo is preferred if change leads to volatility, turmoil, and violence…” Presenting this variety of views not only identifies differences but may also suggest a division of labor in the international community that could be useful in supporting change in Burma. Clearly, neighboring governments may be more acceptable and effective interlocutors with the Burmese military than the United States.
The comparative report also offers a corrective to Western views of emerging power dynamics in Asia. The China report criticizes US views of Burma’s nuclear intentions; even more interesting is its embrace of a recent report by the International Crisis Group that downplays China’s influence on the Burmese government and maintains that Beijing is only able to extract minor concessions from the regime. The India report will dash the hopes of some US policymakers who believe that New Delhi can be persuaded to press the Burmese regime for change because of India’s status as the world’s largest democracy. instead, India appears to view the situation there largely with indifference. “Not a single credible person has dedicated himself or herself to studying Myanmar comprehensively as a primary interest,” the report insists. “India still accords the lowest priority to its relations with Myanmar among all its immediate neighbors.”
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Bangkok Post - Asean leaders discuss election
Published: 1/04/2010 at 12:00 AM
Newspaper section: News
The leaders and foreign ministers of Asean countries are expected next week to discuss the Burmese military regime's election laws which bar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from running for office.
Vitavas Srivihok, director-general of the Asean Affairs Department, yesterday said the issue would be raised next Wednesday when Asean foreign ministers sit down in Hanoi for dinner talks on regional affairs.
The Burmese election is also expected to be discussed when Asean leaders meet a day later in the Vietnamese capital. Their views are likely to form a part of the Asean chairman's statement to be issued at the end of the leaders' meeting, Mr Vitavas said.
A ministry source believed the Burmese leaders might listen to the views of the other Asean leaders if the meeting was conducted in a good atmosphere.
The National League for Democracy headed by Mrs Suu Kyi decided on Monday to boycott the election by not registering the party. The action could lead to the disbandment of the party.
Asean leaders and foreign ministers are also scheduled at their meetings to sign at least 12 documents including a statement on a joint response to climate change.
The leaders will talk with Asean lawmakers during their time in Hanoi but there have been no meetings scheduled with members of Asean civil society and youth representatives similar to last year.
Published: 1/04/2010 at 12:00 AM
Newspaper section: News
The leaders and foreign ministers of Asean countries are expected next week to discuss the Burmese military regime's election laws which bar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from running for office.
Vitavas Srivihok, director-general of the Asean Affairs Department, yesterday said the issue would be raised next Wednesday when Asean foreign ministers sit down in Hanoi for dinner talks on regional affairs.
The Burmese election is also expected to be discussed when Asean leaders meet a day later in the Vietnamese capital. Their views are likely to form a part of the Asean chairman's statement to be issued at the end of the leaders' meeting, Mr Vitavas said.
A ministry source believed the Burmese leaders might listen to the views of the other Asean leaders if the meeting was conducted in a good atmosphere.
The National League for Democracy headed by Mrs Suu Kyi decided on Monday to boycott the election by not registering the party. The action could lead to the disbandment of the party.
Asean leaders and foreign ministers are also scheduled at their meetings to sign at least 12 documents including a statement on a joint response to climate change.
The leaders will talk with Asean lawmakers during their time in Hanoi but there have been no meetings scheduled with members of Asean civil society and youth representatives similar to last year.
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The Nation - For the first time, China will provide details of dams
Published on April 1, 2010
Before the Mekong River Commission summit opens, local and foreign NGOs will hold a brainstorming session on the subject at Chulalongkorn University today and tomorrow.
Ideas resulting from this session would then be given to the government to raise during the MRC summit, which runs from tomorrow to Monday in Prachuap Khiri Khan's Hua Hin district.
Suwit Kularbwong, an activist, said he disagreed with Natural Resources Minister Suwit Khun-kitti's proposal to build seven dams in four member countries: Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia.
The activist said he regarded the 15 years of MRC's existence a failure because most of the projects were aimed at improving the economy, but failed to recognise development in cultural and social terms. He added he hoped the issue of setting up an NGO panel in the MRC would be brought up at the summit.
Thailand, currently chairing the MRC, should formally ask China to provide details about four more dams planned in addition to the four already built, the activist added.
Another activist, Phianphorn Deethes, said building a dam along the Thai-Lao border might cause massive flooding in Chiang Rai province's Wieng Kaen and Chiang Khong districts.
She said she expected the current drying up of the Mekong along the Thai-Lao border would be brought up with China at the summit. China is not a member of the MRC but has agreed to attend the summit as an observer.
Somkiat Khuenchiangsa, also an activist, said the construction of dams in China caused massive flooding in Thailand in 2008 and dried up the river this year.
Responding to the red-shirt protesters' vow to stage a rally at the seminar venue, Suwit said he hoped a pleasant atmosphere was maintained because this was the first time in 15 years that China had agreed to release details about its dam projects. He added that Thailand was also hoping to lure China and Burma into joining the MRC during the summit. "This is a key issue, because MRC has been wishing to have more members all along," he said.
Published on April 1, 2010
Before the Mekong River Commission summit opens, local and foreign NGOs will hold a brainstorming session on the subject at Chulalongkorn University today and tomorrow.
Ideas resulting from this session would then be given to the government to raise during the MRC summit, which runs from tomorrow to Monday in Prachuap Khiri Khan's Hua Hin district.
Suwit Kularbwong, an activist, said he disagreed with Natural Resources Minister Suwit Khun-kitti's proposal to build seven dams in four member countries: Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia.
The activist said he regarded the 15 years of MRC's existence a failure because most of the projects were aimed at improving the economy, but failed to recognise development in cultural and social terms. He added he hoped the issue of setting up an NGO panel in the MRC would be brought up at the summit.
Thailand, currently chairing the MRC, should formally ask China to provide details about four more dams planned in addition to the four already built, the activist added.
Another activist, Phianphorn Deethes, said building a dam along the Thai-Lao border might cause massive flooding in Chiang Rai province's Wieng Kaen and Chiang Khong districts.
She said she expected the current drying up of the Mekong along the Thai-Lao border would be brought up with China at the summit. China is not a member of the MRC but has agreed to attend the summit as an observer.
Somkiat Khuenchiangsa, also an activist, said the construction of dams in China caused massive flooding in Thailand in 2008 and dried up the river this year.
Responding to the red-shirt protesters' vow to stage a rally at the seminar venue, Suwit said he hoped a pleasant atmosphere was maintained because this was the first time in 15 years that China had agreed to release details about its dam projects. He added that Thailand was also hoping to lure China and Burma into joining the MRC during the summit. "This is a key issue, because MRC has been wishing to have more members all along," he said.
*******************************************************
Asian Tribune - Burma needs help to reverse its upcoming polls without democracy
Thu, 2010-04-01 00:54 — editor
By: Zin Linn - Burmese Journalist in exile
The withdrawal of the National League for Democracy (NLD) opposition party from an election wished-for this year has added to the awareness that the votes would bring no change to Burma's political setting, other than a magic show of the generals who aim changing into civilian clothes to maintain power.
The withdrawal decision is in line with a statement made by the NLD’s leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who said last week that she would “not even consider” the elections after unreasonable laws were released that forbid her from participating and call for her expulsion from the party if it is to run.
Burma has been under military dictatorships since 1962. The last polls in 1990 were won significantly by the NLD, which secured 82 per cent of the parliamentary seats and more than 60 per cent of the popular vote against more than 93 contesting parties.
As the NLD won a landslide victory in the 1990 elections, it has been regarding as the figurehead of Burma's democracy movement for more than 20 years. Consequently, as the NLD constantly refuses to bow to the junta’s unjust election "laws," it will be closed down by the junta soon. According to U Win Tin, one of the founding members of the party, the NLD will not disappear. It will be along with the people, in the midst of the people. NLD will keep up struggle for democracy, human rights and equality among all ethnic nationalities, by peaceful means.
Burma has been passing through a critical historical point in time. Since October, 2001, the secret talk has been proceeding between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, General-Secretary of the NLD and State Peace and Development Council. People welcome this procedure with the view that the root cause of all problems in Burma, economic crisis, systematic human rights violations, humanitarian crisis, drugs trade, human trafficking, child soldier issue, forced-labor problem, armed conflict, is political in nature and it is believed that those issues can be resolved politically only through dialogue, negotiation and compromise. The NLD and its ethnic alliance parties fully support the principle, reaffirmed by consecutive UN resolutions that dialogue between SPDC, NLD led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and leaders of ethnic groups is the best modus operandi for early restoration of democracy and national reconciliation Burma.
If we look back to contemporary Burmese history, it can be found that the Burmese military has in the past altered when there was a crisis and their survival was in jeopardy. It transformed the 1962 Revolutionary Council to the Socialist Regime based on 1974 Constitution. In 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) abandoned "socialism" and adopted "market economy" with the hope to replace foreign aid with foreign investment. Then the SLORC started restructuring itself into the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) on November 15, 1997. In last quarter of 2000, the State Peace and Development Council again changed tactics from confrontation to engagement.
No noteworthy political harmony reached
However, the SPDC or the junta just like before seemed to be taking the path of half-hearted reform with minimum conciliation. Even though the secret talks commenced in October 2000, no noteworthy political harmony has been reached. The demand made by Aung San Suu Kyi for the release of all political prisoners essential for confidence-building between the two parties, is being responded at a sluggish speed. The regime has not committed to finding a solution to the crisis in Burma through dialogue, negotiation and compromise. The then "secret talks" are designed to drop off the internal and international pressure and give the military ruling time to consolidate its power base. The aim is to retain its grip on power.
The talks have stalled on at least two occasions while the SPDC's the late Foreign Minister, Win Aung has continued to insist that every thing is in good shape. He kept to this line even when Special envoy Razali's visit to Burma was postponed, and when Aung San Suu Kyi refused to attend the official ceremony on Martyr's Day on 19 July 2001. Her absence on that occasion was the most obvious indication that the talks were in serious gridlock.
At that juncture, the exiled dissident groups believed that the European Union can play a key role in helping not only to ensure that the talks do not break down, but that the process does develop into a genuine and substantial political dialogue. The SPDC only embarked on a dialogue strategy in October 2000, after the strengthening of the EU Common Position in April 2000 and the ILO decision in June 2000. Take lesson on this, it is critical that the EU Common Position not be relaxed at any time soon before the junta sit at dialogue table with the Lady.
People of Burma are looking forward to the international community to stand with them. They hope not only from European Union but also from governments around the globe to say publicly that they do not take into account the regime's election and prearranged outcome, and pressure the regime to make substantive and positive change for Burma.
It should commence with the immediate release of all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and the termination of the regime's military operations against ethnic minorities. The SPDC should negotiate with Burma's existing democratic alliance, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and ethnic representatives for a peaceful solution toward national reconciliation and prosperous Burma.
Japan calls for “an open election”
The government of Japan, one of Burma’s largest donors, warned that Tokyo will not expand economic aid to Burma as earlier proposed unless the junta ensures the participation of democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and others in the country's general election this year, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada said.
Okada conveyed the stance to Burmese Ambassador to Japan U Hla Myint on March 26, and also told reporters he would like to discuss the situation in Burma with his counterparts on the sidelines of a Group of Eight foreign ministerial meeting in Canada next week. Okada said he told the ambassador that Japan is hoping for "an open election" that will allow anyone concerned and willing to participate.
The United States and Australia denounced the ruling junta, which cancelled the NLD's victory in last elections held in 1990, for pressing the party into a narrow corner and undermining hope for change after decades of military rule.
"We think this is an opportunity lost in terms of Burma's ability to demonstrate that it is willing to contemplate a different course of action, a different relationship with its own people," State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said.
"I don't believe that any election without the National League for Democracy can be a full, free and fair election," he told ABC Radio.
US and EU should pressure more
Most people in Burma believe that it is vital that United States and European Union clearly state that the pace of progress is not yet sufficient for relaxing the US’s sanctions and the EU Common Position. People of Burma believe both US and EU should look to imposing additional sanctions if the credibility of the reconciliation continues to be undermined. In such a serious moment of planning a sham election, US and European governments should make necessary preparations now for the commitment of financial sanctions and arms embargo in Burma,
While arranging the groundwork for such sanctions, US and EU should simultaneously help to prevent the junta’s deployment by clearly defining now what would be done sufficiently in the upcoming elections handled by the junta. If the junta is truly made progress then an easing, rather than a strengthening of sanctions could be offered to the regime. If the regime is insincere in its attempt to talk national reconciliation ahead of the polls, then western democracies, using a concerted effort, ought to increase pressure on the Burma’s military dictator.
Zin Linn is a freelance Burmese journalist living in exile in Bangkok, Thailand. He is vice president of Burma Media Association, which is affiliated with the Paris-based Reporters Sans Frontiers.
Thu, 2010-04-01 00:54 — editor
By: Zin Linn - Burmese Journalist in exile
The withdrawal of the National League for Democracy (NLD) opposition party from an election wished-for this year has added to the awareness that the votes would bring no change to Burma's political setting, other than a magic show of the generals who aim changing into civilian clothes to maintain power.
The withdrawal decision is in line with a statement made by the NLD’s leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who said last week that she would “not even consider” the elections after unreasonable laws were released that forbid her from participating and call for her expulsion from the party if it is to run.
Burma has been under military dictatorships since 1962. The last polls in 1990 were won significantly by the NLD, which secured 82 per cent of the parliamentary seats and more than 60 per cent of the popular vote against more than 93 contesting parties.
As the NLD won a landslide victory in the 1990 elections, it has been regarding as the figurehead of Burma's democracy movement for more than 20 years. Consequently, as the NLD constantly refuses to bow to the junta’s unjust election "laws," it will be closed down by the junta soon. According to U Win Tin, one of the founding members of the party, the NLD will not disappear. It will be along with the people, in the midst of the people. NLD will keep up struggle for democracy, human rights and equality among all ethnic nationalities, by peaceful means.
Burma has been passing through a critical historical point in time. Since October, 2001, the secret talk has been proceeding between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, General-Secretary of the NLD and State Peace and Development Council. People welcome this procedure with the view that the root cause of all problems in Burma, economic crisis, systematic human rights violations, humanitarian crisis, drugs trade, human trafficking, child soldier issue, forced-labor problem, armed conflict, is political in nature and it is believed that those issues can be resolved politically only through dialogue, negotiation and compromise. The NLD and its ethnic alliance parties fully support the principle, reaffirmed by consecutive UN resolutions that dialogue between SPDC, NLD led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and leaders of ethnic groups is the best modus operandi for early restoration of democracy and national reconciliation Burma.
If we look back to contemporary Burmese history, it can be found that the Burmese military has in the past altered when there was a crisis and their survival was in jeopardy. It transformed the 1962 Revolutionary Council to the Socialist Regime based on 1974 Constitution. In 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) abandoned "socialism" and adopted "market economy" with the hope to replace foreign aid with foreign investment. Then the SLORC started restructuring itself into the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) on November 15, 1997. In last quarter of 2000, the State Peace and Development Council again changed tactics from confrontation to engagement.
No noteworthy political harmony reached
However, the SPDC or the junta just like before seemed to be taking the path of half-hearted reform with minimum conciliation. Even though the secret talks commenced in October 2000, no noteworthy political harmony has been reached. The demand made by Aung San Suu Kyi for the release of all political prisoners essential for confidence-building between the two parties, is being responded at a sluggish speed. The regime has not committed to finding a solution to the crisis in Burma through dialogue, negotiation and compromise. The then "secret talks" are designed to drop off the internal and international pressure and give the military ruling time to consolidate its power base. The aim is to retain its grip on power.
The talks have stalled on at least two occasions while the SPDC's the late Foreign Minister, Win Aung has continued to insist that every thing is in good shape. He kept to this line even when Special envoy Razali's visit to Burma was postponed, and when Aung San Suu Kyi refused to attend the official ceremony on Martyr's Day on 19 July 2001. Her absence on that occasion was the most obvious indication that the talks were in serious gridlock.
At that juncture, the exiled dissident groups believed that the European Union can play a key role in helping not only to ensure that the talks do not break down, but that the process does develop into a genuine and substantial political dialogue. The SPDC only embarked on a dialogue strategy in October 2000, after the strengthening of the EU Common Position in April 2000 and the ILO decision in June 2000. Take lesson on this, it is critical that the EU Common Position not be relaxed at any time soon before the junta sit at dialogue table with the Lady.
People of Burma are looking forward to the international community to stand with them. They hope not only from European Union but also from governments around the globe to say publicly that they do not take into account the regime's election and prearranged outcome, and pressure the regime to make substantive and positive change for Burma.
It should commence with the immediate release of all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and the termination of the regime's military operations against ethnic minorities. The SPDC should negotiate with Burma's existing democratic alliance, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and ethnic representatives for a peaceful solution toward national reconciliation and prosperous Burma.
Japan calls for “an open election”
The government of Japan, one of Burma’s largest donors, warned that Tokyo will not expand economic aid to Burma as earlier proposed unless the junta ensures the participation of democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and others in the country's general election this year, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada said.
Okada conveyed the stance to Burmese Ambassador to Japan U Hla Myint on March 26, and also told reporters he would like to discuss the situation in Burma with his counterparts on the sidelines of a Group of Eight foreign ministerial meeting in Canada next week. Okada said he told the ambassador that Japan is hoping for "an open election" that will allow anyone concerned and willing to participate.
The United States and Australia denounced the ruling junta, which cancelled the NLD's victory in last elections held in 1990, for pressing the party into a narrow corner and undermining hope for change after decades of military rule.
"We think this is an opportunity lost in terms of Burma's ability to demonstrate that it is willing to contemplate a different course of action, a different relationship with its own people," State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said.
"I don't believe that any election without the National League for Democracy can be a full, free and fair election," he told ABC Radio.
US and EU should pressure more
Most people in Burma believe that it is vital that United States and European Union clearly state that the pace of progress is not yet sufficient for relaxing the US’s sanctions and the EU Common Position. People of Burma believe both US and EU should look to imposing additional sanctions if the credibility of the reconciliation continues to be undermined. In such a serious moment of planning a sham election, US and European governments should make necessary preparations now for the commitment of financial sanctions and arms embargo in Burma,
While arranging the groundwork for such sanctions, US and EU should simultaneously help to prevent the junta’s deployment by clearly defining now what would be done sufficiently in the upcoming elections handled by the junta. If the junta is truly made progress then an easing, rather than a strengthening of sanctions could be offered to the regime. If the regime is insincere in its attempt to talk national reconciliation ahead of the polls, then western democracies, using a concerted effort, ought to increase pressure on the Burma’s military dictator.
Zin Linn is a freelance Burmese journalist living in exile in Bangkok, Thailand. He is vice president of Burma Media Association, which is affiliated with the Paris-based Reporters Sans Frontiers.
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Phayul.com - China denies responsibility for shrinking Mekong River
AP[Thursday, April 01, 2010 20:44]
Vital waterway at its lowest level in nearly 20 years; originates in Tibet and is the lifeblood for 65 million people in Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam
Chi-Chi Zhang
Beijing — China denied Wednesday it has “hijacked” water from the Mekong River, causing its lowest levels in 20 years for areas downstream in Southeast Asia.
Liu Ning, vice minister of water resources, suggested that China's dams and irrigation projects upstream have actually helped stave off some of the effects of drought — though it was not clear whether he was referring just to parched areas of southwest China or the wider region.
The Mekong River, which originates in the Tibetan Plateau, is at its lowest level in nearly two decades, halting cargo traffic on the waterway that is the lifeblood for 65 million people in Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, according to the Mekong River Commission.
Nongovernmental organizations have long blamed China for shrinking the Mekong and causing other ecological damage. China has built several dams on the upper reaches of the river and has more planned.
“We cannot say that China hijacked water resources and contributed to the drought,” Liu told a news conference when asked about the effect of China's water projects on the water supply in Southeast Asia.
“If there were no irrigation facilities and reservoirs built in drought areas, the drought would have come earlier, the situation would have been more severe, and there would have been more people suffering from a lack of drinking water,” Mr. Liu said.
He did not specify which areas he meant.
Mr. Liu emphasized the need to step up the construction of more water conservancy projects to insure adequate drinking water.
He said neighbouring countries are aware of China's measures and China will discuss with groups like the Mekong River Commission, an intergovernmental organization that oversees the sustainable development of the river basin.
“The building and use of hydropower plants will only be done based on scientific evidence, and this process is very strict in China,” said Mr. Liu, who is also secretary-general of the State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters.
Little rainfall since late last year in southwest China has left millions of residents facing water shortages in that region's worst drought in a century. About 24 million people, twice more than in the same period during normal years, face drinking water shortages, Mr. Liu said.
“We should prepare to fight a long drought ... to prepare for the worst-case scenario,” he said.
Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guizhou regions have been the hardest hit by the drought despite teams of workers drilling for wells and transporting drinking water, Mr. Liu said.
Mr. Liu said the severity of this year's drought was due to a decline in rainfall, low river flows, higher temperatures, and inadequate water storage facilities and is likely to continue until mid- to late May, when the rainy season begins.
AP[Thursday, April 01, 2010 20:44]
Vital waterway at its lowest level in nearly 20 years; originates in Tibet and is the lifeblood for 65 million people in Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam
Chi-Chi Zhang
Beijing — China denied Wednesday it has “hijacked” water from the Mekong River, causing its lowest levels in 20 years for areas downstream in Southeast Asia.
Liu Ning, vice minister of water resources, suggested that China's dams and irrigation projects upstream have actually helped stave off some of the effects of drought — though it was not clear whether he was referring just to parched areas of southwest China or the wider region.
The Mekong River, which originates in the Tibetan Plateau, is at its lowest level in nearly two decades, halting cargo traffic on the waterway that is the lifeblood for 65 million people in Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, according to the Mekong River Commission.
Nongovernmental organizations have long blamed China for shrinking the Mekong and causing other ecological damage. China has built several dams on the upper reaches of the river and has more planned.
“We cannot say that China hijacked water resources and contributed to the drought,” Liu told a news conference when asked about the effect of China's water projects on the water supply in Southeast Asia.
“If there were no irrigation facilities and reservoirs built in drought areas, the drought would have come earlier, the situation would have been more severe, and there would have been more people suffering from a lack of drinking water,” Mr. Liu said.
He did not specify which areas he meant.
Mr. Liu emphasized the need to step up the construction of more water conservancy projects to insure adequate drinking water.
He said neighbouring countries are aware of China's measures and China will discuss with groups like the Mekong River Commission, an intergovernmental organization that oversees the sustainable development of the river basin.
“The building and use of hydropower plants will only be done based on scientific evidence, and this process is very strict in China,” said Mr. Liu, who is also secretary-general of the State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters.
Little rainfall since late last year in southwest China has left millions of residents facing water shortages in that region's worst drought in a century. About 24 million people, twice more than in the same period during normal years, face drinking water shortages, Mr. Liu said.
“We should prepare to fight a long drought ... to prepare for the worst-case scenario,” he said.
Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guizhou regions have been the hardest hit by the drought despite teams of workers drilling for wells and transporting drinking water, Mr. Liu said.
Mr. Liu said the severity of this year's drought was due to a decline in rainfall, low river flows, higher temperatures, and inadequate water storage facilities and is likely to continue until mid- to late May, when the rainy season begins.
******************************************************
The Irrawaddy - Mon Decide to Field no Election Candidates
By LAWI WENG - Thursday, April 1, 2010
A political alliance representing Burma's Mon community has decided not to take part in the planned general election.
The decision, taken on March 30 at a meeting of a 15-member committee in the Mon State capital, Moulmein, leaves the Mon with no representation in the election.
The alliance includes former members of the central committee of the New Mon State Party (NMSP), an armed group that signed a ceasefire agreement with the junta in 1995, members of the Mon National Democratic Front (MNDF) and other respected Mon community leaders.
The MNDF announced last week that it will not contest the election because the junta's election law is unjust.
The NMSP announced last year its opposition to participation in the election. The party has called for a review of the 2008 constitution, saying it doesn't protect ethnic or democratic rights.
A member of the political alliance's committee, speaking anonymously, told The Irrawaddy on Thursday, that a majority rejected the election law and decided not to contest the election.
“It was like the National League for Democracy decision,” he said.
When the Mon political alliance formed in June last year it said it planned to take part in the election, although its committee was divided on the issue. The promulgation of the election laws in March swung opinion against participation in the election.
At a meeting of the committee in March, one member, Nai Banya Aung Moe, told The Irrawaddy that the Mon alliance could advance peace and democracy by taking part in the election.
“We need national reconciliation, peace, democracy and development,” he said. “I want to implement work on that.”
A Mon monk in Rangoon said: “They (regime) will not get one vote from our people if the Mon has a political party participating in the election.”
The monk said: “If there is a Mon political party at the election, the Mon people will have a chance to vote for their own people. We will be able to know what is going on inside parliament if we have representatives there. Without our people in parliament, we know nothing about what is going on.”
The MNDF participated in the 1990 election, winning five seats. The junta then disbanded the party and sentenced four elected representatives to long prison terms.
The party's military wing continues to bear arms, saying it will remained armed until the Mon people win freedom.
By LAWI WENG - Thursday, April 1, 2010
A political alliance representing Burma's Mon community has decided not to take part in the planned general election.
The decision, taken on March 30 at a meeting of a 15-member committee in the Mon State capital, Moulmein, leaves the Mon with no representation in the election.
The alliance includes former members of the central committee of the New Mon State Party (NMSP), an armed group that signed a ceasefire agreement with the junta in 1995, members of the Mon National Democratic Front (MNDF) and other respected Mon community leaders.
The MNDF announced last week that it will not contest the election because the junta's election law is unjust.
The NMSP announced last year its opposition to participation in the election. The party has called for a review of the 2008 constitution, saying it doesn't protect ethnic or democratic rights.
A member of the political alliance's committee, speaking anonymously, told The Irrawaddy on Thursday, that a majority rejected the election law and decided not to contest the election.
“It was like the National League for Democracy decision,” he said.
When the Mon political alliance formed in June last year it said it planned to take part in the election, although its committee was divided on the issue. The promulgation of the election laws in March swung opinion against participation in the election.
At a meeting of the committee in March, one member, Nai Banya Aung Moe, told The Irrawaddy that the Mon alliance could advance peace and democracy by taking part in the election.
“We need national reconciliation, peace, democracy and development,” he said. “I want to implement work on that.”
A Mon monk in Rangoon said: “They (regime) will not get one vote from our people if the Mon has a political party participating in the election.”
The monk said: “If there is a Mon political party at the election, the Mon people will have a chance to vote for their own people. We will be able to know what is going on inside parliament if we have representatives there. Without our people in parliament, we know nothing about what is going on.”
The MNDF participated in the 1990 election, winning five seats. The junta then disbanded the party and sentenced four elected representatives to long prison terms.
The party's military wing continues to bear arms, saying it will remained armed until the Mon people win freedom.
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The Irrawaddy - Forced Relocation
By SEIN HTAY - Thursday, April 1, 2010
MYITSONE—As the time to leave their villages nears, many people around the Myitsone Dam construction site feel more and more helpless.
“We don’t want to move, we don’t want to move…But, how can we resist?” complained a frustrated villager in Tanphrel village, located near the planned dam.
There are about 15,000 people from 60 villages who have been forced to relocate to as the government and Chinese Power Investment Corporation (CPI) began construction on the country’s largest hydropower plant at Myitsone (the convergence of the Maykha and Malikha Rivers), about 27 miles north of Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State.
Despite their efforts to halt the dam construction, villagers will have to relocate around May this year.
Myitsone Dam will be about 500 feet in height and produce about 3,600 megawatts of electricity. The government will get about US $500 million annually from selling electricity to China. While the dam will not expected to increase electrical capacity among the local people, it has produced a wave of negative impact on the local population and the environment.
When completed, it will flood a broad land area and will alter biodiversity and increase deforestation.
Among the first negative impacts was the forced relocation of thousands of locals and the destruction of their livelihoods. The cultural heritage of Kachin people at Myitsone is also under direct threat.
“I can’t sleep whenever I think of leaving my orchards behind and our uncertain future at a new place,” said one homemaker in Tanphrel.
She said that she has no idea how to earn a living at a new location. She will leave behind two orange orchards on which her family has relied for its main income for many years.
There are many households like hers in the Myitsone area. Since the villagers don’t want to leave and don’t want to lose their livelihoods, they have expressed their opposition against the dam construction in many ways.
Facing risks of arrest, they spoke out before local authorities. They held mass prayer services, aiming to halt the dam construction. Kachin people around the world also have sent letters to the government and the Chinese company.
More than 200 new wooden houses with zinc roofs stand on red earth, waiting for their new owners. built by Asia World Company on land near Kyin Khan Lon Ka Zwat Village, about 20 miles from Myitkyina.
Villagers were told by local authorities that they would receive compensation. However, they haven’t been told how much.
“Who can guarantee that we will get compensation for our properties?” a villager from Downphan Village said. “They [local authorities] have various kinds of dirty tricks with which they can erase our names off the compensation list.”
Villagers said they were told that they will have to show documents such as land titles, if they want to get compensation for their property.
While some villagers have land titles, others do not.
Villagers believe that there will be corruption in the compensation process. Some villagers say authorities demand money as a fee for writing a “certification letter.”
Still, there are people who are still determined to stand up for their rights.
“We won’t give up,” said a 45-year-old woman in Myitsone.“We will fight at any cost.”
By SEIN HTAY - Thursday, April 1, 2010
MYITSONE—As the time to leave their villages nears, many people around the Myitsone Dam construction site feel more and more helpless.
“We don’t want to move, we don’t want to move…But, how can we resist?” complained a frustrated villager in Tanphrel village, located near the planned dam.
There are about 15,000 people from 60 villages who have been forced to relocate to as the government and Chinese Power Investment Corporation (CPI) began construction on the country’s largest hydropower plant at Myitsone (the convergence of the Maykha and Malikha Rivers), about 27 miles north of Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State.
Despite their efforts to halt the dam construction, villagers will have to relocate around May this year.
Myitsone Dam will be about 500 feet in height and produce about 3,600 megawatts of electricity. The government will get about US $500 million annually from selling electricity to China. While the dam will not expected to increase electrical capacity among the local people, it has produced a wave of negative impact on the local population and the environment.
When completed, it will flood a broad land area and will alter biodiversity and increase deforestation.
Among the first negative impacts was the forced relocation of thousands of locals and the destruction of their livelihoods. The cultural heritage of Kachin people at Myitsone is also under direct threat.
“I can’t sleep whenever I think of leaving my orchards behind and our uncertain future at a new place,” said one homemaker in Tanphrel.
She said that she has no idea how to earn a living at a new location. She will leave behind two orange orchards on which her family has relied for its main income for many years.
There are many households like hers in the Myitsone area. Since the villagers don’t want to leave and don’t want to lose their livelihoods, they have expressed their opposition against the dam construction in many ways.
Facing risks of arrest, they spoke out before local authorities. They held mass prayer services, aiming to halt the dam construction. Kachin people around the world also have sent letters to the government and the Chinese company.
More than 200 new wooden houses with zinc roofs stand on red earth, waiting for their new owners. built by Asia World Company on land near Kyin Khan Lon Ka Zwat Village, about 20 miles from Myitkyina.
Villagers were told by local authorities that they would receive compensation. However, they haven’t been told how much.
“Who can guarantee that we will get compensation for our properties?” a villager from Downphan Village said. “They [local authorities] have various kinds of dirty tricks with which they can erase our names off the compensation list.”
Villagers said they were told that they will have to show documents such as land titles, if they want to get compensation for their property.
While some villagers have land titles, others do not.
Villagers believe that there will be corruption in the compensation process. Some villagers say authorities demand money as a fee for writing a “certification letter.”
Still, there are people who are still determined to stand up for their rights.
“We won’t give up,” said a 45-year-old woman in Myitsone.“We will fight at any cost.”
******************************************************
The Irrawaddy - Junta Turns Attention Back to the Jungle
By WAI MOE - Thursday, April 1, 2010
Following a month of relative quiet at the Sino-Burmese border while the military regime focused on election laws and the political situation in the country, attention turns once again to the border guard force (BGF) issue and the regime's attempts to bring the ethnic cease-fire groups under its command.
Naypyidaw's chief negotiator with the ethnic groups, Lt-Gen Ye Myint, is scheduled to meet on Thursday with an ethnic Wa delegation in Tangyan, a town in Shan State close to Wa territory, to discuss the military government's BGF proposal, according to sources close to the Wa.
The meeting is the first between the junta and the country's largest armed ethnic group, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), since February. At the previous meeting, Chinese officials, including commanders from the People’s Liberation Army, accompanied the Wa delegation, which was led by Bao Youxiang.
Ye Myint, who is also chief of Burma's Military Affairs Security, met on Sunday with representatives of the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), known as the Mongla Group, a cease-fire group allied to the UWSA.
During the meeting, Ye Myint reportedly urged the NDAA delegation to respond positively to the BGF plan before April 22 or face repercussions by April 28. According to ethnic sources at the Sino-Burmese border, Ye Myint took a “tougher line” with the Mongla Group.
It is now one year since Naypyidaw proposed the BGF plan to various ethnic cease-fire groups. The Burmese government set the end of March as a further deadline, but has been unable to convince the main cease-fire groups in the region––the UWSA, the Mongla Group and the Kachin Independence Army––to agree to its terms.
According to sources, the regime leaders suspended negotiations with the ethnic groups for a month while they concentrated their efforts on the election laws and marginalizing the NLD, led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.
On March 28, just a few days after Suu Kyi announced that she did not support the NLD registering for the election, the junta resumed talks with the NDAA. The NLD announced its decision not to register for this year's election the following day, on March 29, after a meeting of its executive committee in Rangoon.
“It is clear that the junta has turned its attention back to the cease-fire groups now that it believes it has strategically checkmated the NLD,” said Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese observer based on the Sino-Burmese border.
Meanwhile, Burma’s state-run media reported on Wednesday that Chinese Commerce Minister Chen Deming met Burma's Secretary-1 Gen Tin Aung Myint Oo in Naypyidaw on Tuesday though it did not report on the officials' agenda.
However, the Chinese delegation is expected to raise concerns about the Burmese regime’s growing tensions with the ethnic cease-fire groups along its border, as well as discussing bilateral economic ties.
Chinese Vice Commerce Minister Chen Jian visited Naypyidaw and spoke with Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein and Tin Aung Myint Oo on August 28 during the Burmese army’s siege of the town of Laogai, which is the headquarters of the armed ethnic Kokang group known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army.
The following day, hundreds of Kokang fighters opposed to the BGF plan crossed the Sino-Burmese border and handed over their arms to Chinese officials.
During the conflict, as many as 37,000 Kokang-Chinese villagers fled to China. Chinese businessmen lost an estimated Yuan 280 million (US $40 million) in property and trade losses during the conflict and China subsequently called for compensation.
After negotiations, the Burmese authorities agreed to pay out, but only to Chinese companies that were operating legally in the area.
Analysts say the Burmese army’s treatment of ethnic groups along the Sino-Burmese border in 2009 distressed Beijing and caused it to rethink its Burma policy.
“In view of the unilateral action taken by Naypyidaw that inadvertently served to upset the order in the local communities on the Chinese border in the summer of 2009, Beijing may be compelled to conclude that when it comes to peace on its doorstep, the issues involved are not entirely 'internal' after all,” wrote Xiaolin Guo, a Sino-Burmese affairs expert, in her policy brief in December.
Regarding ongoing ethnic issues, Burmese generals reportedly boasted they can conquer the armed ethnic groups easily. However, Chinese experts on Sino-Burmese issues say resolving tension with force is not so easy.
Li Chenyang and Lye Liang Fook noted in their article, “China’s Policy towards Myanmar: a Successful Model for Dealing with the Myanmar Issue?” that the Sino-Burmese border is an estimated 2,204 km long with more than 40,000 ethnic militia fighters based there, but less than 300 km of the border is directly controlled by the military regime.
Chenyang and Fook said that ethnic groups along the border have pursued independence or greater autonomy for a long time, which has implications for the safety and stability of southwest China.
By WAI MOE - Thursday, April 1, 2010
Following a month of relative quiet at the Sino-Burmese border while the military regime focused on election laws and the political situation in the country, attention turns once again to the border guard force (BGF) issue and the regime's attempts to bring the ethnic cease-fire groups under its command.
Naypyidaw's chief negotiator with the ethnic groups, Lt-Gen Ye Myint, is scheduled to meet on Thursday with an ethnic Wa delegation in Tangyan, a town in Shan State close to Wa territory, to discuss the military government's BGF proposal, according to sources close to the Wa.
The meeting is the first between the junta and the country's largest armed ethnic group, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), since February. At the previous meeting, Chinese officials, including commanders from the People’s Liberation Army, accompanied the Wa delegation, which was led by Bao Youxiang.
Ye Myint, who is also chief of Burma's Military Affairs Security, met on Sunday with representatives of the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), known as the Mongla Group, a cease-fire group allied to the UWSA.
During the meeting, Ye Myint reportedly urged the NDAA delegation to respond positively to the BGF plan before April 22 or face repercussions by April 28. According to ethnic sources at the Sino-Burmese border, Ye Myint took a “tougher line” with the Mongla Group.
It is now one year since Naypyidaw proposed the BGF plan to various ethnic cease-fire groups. The Burmese government set the end of March as a further deadline, but has been unable to convince the main cease-fire groups in the region––the UWSA, the Mongla Group and the Kachin Independence Army––to agree to its terms.
According to sources, the regime leaders suspended negotiations with the ethnic groups for a month while they concentrated their efforts on the election laws and marginalizing the NLD, led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.
On March 28, just a few days after Suu Kyi announced that she did not support the NLD registering for the election, the junta resumed talks with the NDAA. The NLD announced its decision not to register for this year's election the following day, on March 29, after a meeting of its executive committee in Rangoon.
“It is clear that the junta has turned its attention back to the cease-fire groups now that it believes it has strategically checkmated the NLD,” said Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese observer based on the Sino-Burmese border.
Meanwhile, Burma’s state-run media reported on Wednesday that Chinese Commerce Minister Chen Deming met Burma's Secretary-1 Gen Tin Aung Myint Oo in Naypyidaw on Tuesday though it did not report on the officials' agenda.
However, the Chinese delegation is expected to raise concerns about the Burmese regime’s growing tensions with the ethnic cease-fire groups along its border, as well as discussing bilateral economic ties.
Chinese Vice Commerce Minister Chen Jian visited Naypyidaw and spoke with Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein and Tin Aung Myint Oo on August 28 during the Burmese army’s siege of the town of Laogai, which is the headquarters of the armed ethnic Kokang group known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army.
The following day, hundreds of Kokang fighters opposed to the BGF plan crossed the Sino-Burmese border and handed over their arms to Chinese officials.
During the conflict, as many as 37,000 Kokang-Chinese villagers fled to China. Chinese businessmen lost an estimated Yuan 280 million (US $40 million) in property and trade losses during the conflict and China subsequently called for compensation.
After negotiations, the Burmese authorities agreed to pay out, but only to Chinese companies that were operating legally in the area.
Analysts say the Burmese army’s treatment of ethnic groups along the Sino-Burmese border in 2009 distressed Beijing and caused it to rethink its Burma policy.
“In view of the unilateral action taken by Naypyidaw that inadvertently served to upset the order in the local communities on the Chinese border in the summer of 2009, Beijing may be compelled to conclude that when it comes to peace on its doorstep, the issues involved are not entirely 'internal' after all,” wrote Xiaolin Guo, a Sino-Burmese affairs expert, in her policy brief in December.
Regarding ongoing ethnic issues, Burmese generals reportedly boasted they can conquer the armed ethnic groups easily. However, Chinese experts on Sino-Burmese issues say resolving tension with force is not so easy.
Li Chenyang and Lye Liang Fook noted in their article, “China’s Policy towards Myanmar: a Successful Model for Dealing with the Myanmar Issue?” that the Sino-Burmese border is an estimated 2,204 km long with more than 40,000 ethnic militia fighters based there, but less than 300 km of the border is directly controlled by the military regime.
Chenyang and Fook said that ethnic groups along the border have pursued independence or greater autonomy for a long time, which has implications for the safety and stability of southwest China.
******************************************************
Nine hundred Karen refugees head home
Thursday, 01 April 2010 22:12 Kyaw Kha
Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – In what is ostensibly a voluntary action, 900 war refugees, who had stayed back in the two refugee camps on the Thai-Burma border, are going back home today, despite the fear of landmine explosions.
An official of one of the warring groups, the ‘Democratic Karen Buddhist Army’ (DKBA) has admitted on condition of anonymity that the danger of landmine explosions in the areas where the refugees hail from, is very much real. And they are risking their lives in going back home.
The Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) said the return of 785 refugees from Uthu Tha camp and 108 refugees from No Boe camp in Thar Saung Yang Township, Tak province is on a voluntary basis.
“The Thai Army escorted them till the river bank but there was no one to receive them. They came here because of war in their areas, not out of choice,” KRC Secretary (1) Saya George said.
The refugees are ethnic Karen people hailing from Pai Kyone and Hlaing Bwe townships in Pa-an District, Karen State. They fled to the two refugee camps because of war between KNU and the joint forces of the Burmese Army and the KNU breakaway faction, the ‘Democratic Karen Buddhist Army’ (DKBA). The number of refugees in the camps was over 2,400.
An officer of the 999th Battalion of the DKBA, who wished to remain anonymous, admitted the danger of land mine explosions in the villages where the refugees hail from.
“We are aware of the return of the refugees and the landmines cannot be seen. Their lives are in their hands. Though they are our fellow ethnic Karen, under the circumstances, we cannot do anything for them,” he said.
“We have to start our lives afresh but we cannot live in this crowded place,” a refugee from Pa Nwe Pu village, Pai Kyone township, who is going back home today, told Mizzima.
“The hardships and difficulties compelled us to flee from our homes. If there is peace and tranquility, we would like to stay in our country. We have to flee from our homes again if war breaks out yet again. Our family has fled home three times,” another refugee said.
“The Thais wish them well on their return home. The refugees want to work on their farmlands again. But KNU cannot provide any assistance to them,” Karen National Union (KNU) Vice-Chairman David Tharkapaw said.
Thursday, 01 April 2010 22:12 Kyaw Kha
Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – In what is ostensibly a voluntary action, 900 war refugees, who had stayed back in the two refugee camps on the Thai-Burma border, are going back home today, despite the fear of landmine explosions.
An official of one of the warring groups, the ‘Democratic Karen Buddhist Army’ (DKBA) has admitted on condition of anonymity that the danger of landmine explosions in the areas where the refugees hail from, is very much real. And they are risking their lives in going back home.
The Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) said the return of 785 refugees from Uthu Tha camp and 108 refugees from No Boe camp in Thar Saung Yang Township, Tak province is on a voluntary basis.
“The Thai Army escorted them till the river bank but there was no one to receive them. They came here because of war in their areas, not out of choice,” KRC Secretary (1) Saya George said.
The refugees are ethnic Karen people hailing from Pai Kyone and Hlaing Bwe townships in Pa-an District, Karen State. They fled to the two refugee camps because of war between KNU and the joint forces of the Burmese Army and the KNU breakaway faction, the ‘Democratic Karen Buddhist Army’ (DKBA). The number of refugees in the camps was over 2,400.
An officer of the 999th Battalion of the DKBA, who wished to remain anonymous, admitted the danger of land mine explosions in the villages where the refugees hail from.
“We are aware of the return of the refugees and the landmines cannot be seen. Their lives are in their hands. Though they are our fellow ethnic Karen, under the circumstances, we cannot do anything for them,” he said.
“We have to start our lives afresh but we cannot live in this crowded place,” a refugee from Pa Nwe Pu village, Pai Kyone township, who is going back home today, told Mizzima.
“The hardships and difficulties compelled us to flee from our homes. If there is peace and tranquility, we would like to stay in our country. We have to flee from our homes again if war breaks out yet again. Our family has fled home three times,” another refugee said.
“The Thais wish them well on their return home. The refugees want to work on their farmlands again. But KNU cannot provide any assistance to them,” Karen National Union (KNU) Vice-Chairman David Tharkapaw said.
******************************************************
DVB News - Deported Karen boy killed by grenade
By FRANCIS WADE
Published: 1 April 2010
A five-year-old boy who was sent back to eastern Burma’s Karen state by the Thai military recently has died and his brother seriously injured after triggering an unexploded grenade.
The boy had been staying at the Mae Usu refugee camp in Thailand’s western Tha Song Yang district until he was repatriated to Burma earlier this year.
Nearly all 2,400 Karen refugees in Mae Usu and nearby Nong Bua have since followed suit, despite warnings that conditions in Karen state remain dangerous. Another 600 returned yesterday, leaving the two camps almost empty.
The seven-year-old survivor was yesterday taken to hospital in Thailand’s border town of Mae Sot. Matt Finch from the Karen Human Right Group (KHRG) said that his condition remains critical.
“As far as I know he has not woken up and he is in a critical condition; it’ll be two or three days before the hospital knows whether he’ll live or not,” he said.
The boys had reportedly been playing with the M79 grenade when it exploded near to Mae La Ah Kee village, an area of return for the 2,400 refugees who fled fighting between Burmese troops and the opposition Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in June last year.
Plans tabled by the Thai military in January to repatriate the refugees back to Burma had been put on hold following warnings of the conditions that returnees faced, but most have now left.
“What [the Thais] have done since then is continue to harass and pressure the refugees in these sites; telling them that they should leave, that they don’t belong in Thailand, and so people have been leaving in groups,” said Finch.
“[The death] is another incident of the type that we have been very worried about; that refugees leaving Thailand and returning to this area of Pa-an district [in Karen state] are incredibly unsafe – the area is very unstable because of things like landmines and unexploded ordinance.”
His claims have been corroborated by a refugee from Mae Usu camp who said that she was asked by the Thai military to sign an agreement promising that she would leave Thailand.
“We didn’t want to sign it but we had to. They also told us to say we were not pressured to leave when asked,” she said, adding that people “we are afraid to walk around” once they returned to Burma.
The UN refugee agency said yesterday that refugees had told them of their plans to return to tend to their crops. But, according to Finch, this would only be part of the reason.
“This may be true in part, but no-one wants to be in that situation. They returned because of harassment by the Thai military.”
By FRANCIS WADE
Published: 1 April 2010
A five-year-old boy who was sent back to eastern Burma’s Karen state by the Thai military recently has died and his brother seriously injured after triggering an unexploded grenade.
The boy had been staying at the Mae Usu refugee camp in Thailand’s western Tha Song Yang district until he was repatriated to Burma earlier this year.
Nearly all 2,400 Karen refugees in Mae Usu and nearby Nong Bua have since followed suit, despite warnings that conditions in Karen state remain dangerous. Another 600 returned yesterday, leaving the two camps almost empty.
The seven-year-old survivor was yesterday taken to hospital in Thailand’s border town of Mae Sot. Matt Finch from the Karen Human Right Group (KHRG) said that his condition remains critical.
“As far as I know he has not woken up and he is in a critical condition; it’ll be two or three days before the hospital knows whether he’ll live or not,” he said.
The boys had reportedly been playing with the M79 grenade when it exploded near to Mae La Ah Kee village, an area of return for the 2,400 refugees who fled fighting between Burmese troops and the opposition Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in June last year.
Plans tabled by the Thai military in January to repatriate the refugees back to Burma had been put on hold following warnings of the conditions that returnees faced, but most have now left.
“What [the Thais] have done since then is continue to harass and pressure the refugees in these sites; telling them that they should leave, that they don’t belong in Thailand, and so people have been leaving in groups,” said Finch.
“[The death] is another incident of the type that we have been very worried about; that refugees leaving Thailand and returning to this area of Pa-an district [in Karen state] are incredibly unsafe – the area is very unstable because of things like landmines and unexploded ordinance.”
His claims have been corroborated by a refugee from Mae Usu camp who said that she was asked by the Thai military to sign an agreement promising that she would leave Thailand.
“We didn’t want to sign it but we had to. They also told us to say we were not pressured to leave when asked,” she said, adding that people “we are afraid to walk around” once they returned to Burma.
The UN refugee agency said yesterday that refugees had told them of their plans to return to tend to their crops. But, according to Finch, this would only be part of the reason.
“This may be true in part, but no-one wants to be in that situation. They returned because of harassment by the Thai military.”
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