Drug cases shoot up 16 percent last year in China
Fri Jun 25, 6:17 am ET
BEIJING (AP) – China says drug cases shot up 16 percent last year from 2008 with courts convicting more than 56,000 people.
Chinese courts handled more than 50,000 drug trafficking cases in 2009 and about 17,000 people received severe sentences — from five years in prison to a death sentence — up almost 9 percent from the year before, the Supreme People's Court said Thursday.
Police seized nearly 28 tons of drugs last year, the official Xinhua News Agency reported Friday.
Saturday is the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, and China kicked up its state-run propaganda machine to show it is tackling drug abuse, a growing problem in the country.
A live China Central Television broadcast Friday showed more than two tons of drug packets neatly laid out in rows in the southern city of Dongguan. More drugs were being burned in a line of cauldrons nearby.
Drugs seized in China last year showed a shift toward newer types of narcotics. Court officials told a news conference Thursday that new kinds of drugs, including methamphetamine and ketamine, made up almost 40 percent of the drugs seized last year, an increase of about 7 percent from the year before.
The bulk of the rest, including heroin and opium, came from neighboring border regions of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, the officials said.
China had 1.34 million registered drug addicts as of the end of last year, Xinhua reported.
A law in 2008 ended the practice of sending drug users to labor camps, ordering them instead to be sent for community rehabilitation or to specialized drug rehabilitation centers.
But Human Rights Watch this year said the law has been poorly implemented, leading to continuing — sometimes lethal — abuse.
Fri Jun 25, 6:17 am ET
BEIJING (AP) – China says drug cases shot up 16 percent last year from 2008 with courts convicting more than 56,000 people.
Chinese courts handled more than 50,000 drug trafficking cases in 2009 and about 17,000 people received severe sentences — from five years in prison to a death sentence — up almost 9 percent from the year before, the Supreme People's Court said Thursday.
Police seized nearly 28 tons of drugs last year, the official Xinhua News Agency reported Friday.
Saturday is the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, and China kicked up its state-run propaganda machine to show it is tackling drug abuse, a growing problem in the country.
A live China Central Television broadcast Friday showed more than two tons of drug packets neatly laid out in rows in the southern city of Dongguan. More drugs were being burned in a line of cauldrons nearby.
Drugs seized in China last year showed a shift toward newer types of narcotics. Court officials told a news conference Thursday that new kinds of drugs, including methamphetamine and ketamine, made up almost 40 percent of the drugs seized last year, an increase of about 7 percent from the year before.
The bulk of the rest, including heroin and opium, came from neighboring border regions of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, the officials said.
China had 1.34 million registered drug addicts as of the end of last year, Xinhua reported.
A law in 2008 ended the practice of sending drug users to labor camps, ordering them instead to be sent for community rehabilitation or to specialized drug rehabilitation centers.
But Human Rights Watch this year said the law has been poorly implemented, leading to continuing — sometimes lethal — abuse.
*****************************************************
Jun 26, 2010
Asia Times Online - Myanmar elections mute ethnic voices
By Brian McCartan
BANGKOK - Elections slated for later this year in Myanmar seem increasingly unlikely to democratically empower the country's various ethnic minority groups, which combined account for over 30% of the population.
While the ruling generals have touted the inclusiveness of their tightly controlled democratic transition, critics say the new constitution ignores ethnic demands for federalism while junta-drafted election laws prohibit the participation of the largest ethnic parties, some of which are attached to armed insurgent groups who for decades have fought for greater autonomy.
The ruling junta has yet to announce a date for the elections, but many observers believe they will he held sometime in October. They will be the first polls held in Myanmar since 1990, when the opposition led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) swept to victory against military-sponsored parties, only to see the results annulled by the military before they could take power.
The generals have made clear their intention to hold new polls and that the participation of the NLD and ethnic ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups is not essential to their credibility. The NLD announced on March 29 that it would not re-register under the new election laws, which it considered unfair because of regulations that bar Aung San Suu Kyi, the party's detained leader, from contesting the polls.
A number of NLD party leaders and other members have argued that non-participation plays into the regime's hands by not providing an alternative to the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the National Unity Party (NUP).
At least 39 other political parties have so far applied for registration with the newly formed election commission. Of those, only 15 are considered national parties, while many of the rest aim specifically to represent the interests of ethnic groups, including the Kachin, Kayin, Mon and Shan.
The question of whether to participate in the elections has been as contentious an issue among ethnic political groups as it was with the NLD. Some see the electoral process as a sham for perpetuating military rule under the guise of democracy and advocate a boycott of the polls. Others believe the elections offer an unique chance to work from within the system and an alternative to the confrontation and armed struggle that has plagued Myanmar politics since independence from the UK in 1948.
The second and third most successful parties in the 1990 elections after the NLD, the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) and the Arakan League for Democracy, have both supported the NLD's stand and opted not to re-register their parties for the upcoming election. The SNLD's decision was also based on the junta's refusal to free its two top leaders, who were both arrested on political charges in 2005.
Local contests
Significantly, many of the ethnic-based parties are looking to contest seats in local legislatures rather than at the national level. With their relative small sizes, the high cost of party registration and their lack of a national voice, many aspiring ethnic politicians feel that their chances of success and ability to effect change are better on the local level.
Parties representing larger ethnic groups, such as the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), are seeking to contest the elections at all levels within their own states. Still other parties representing ethnic groups with much wider geographic coverage, such as the Kayin People's Party (KPP) and the Shan Nationals Democratic Party (SNDP), intend to contest the election for both local legislatures and at the national level across several states and divisions.
Competing for seats on state legislatures may have some real, if limited, advantages for ethnic aspirations. The new legislatures mandated by the 2008 constitution are a departure from the military-dominated "Peace and Development Committees" that currently decide policy in ethnic minority areas and are often a direct arm of the central government.
Ethnic politicians hope that the local legislative bodies will be more representative of local communities and give them more say over affairs that matter to their ethnic constituents. With popular representation, there may be more opportunities for the promotion of local cultures and languages though influence over the media and education. Also important is to gain more influence and scrutiny over the exploitation of natural resources in ethnic minority areas.
According to a recent report on the elections by the Transnational Institute, "Nevertheless, many ethnic leaders point out that they will have a legitimate voice for the first time. This will allow ethnic grievances, in the past too easily dismissed as the seditious rumblings of separatist insurgents, to be openly raised."
Without ethnic participation, the government backed, and largely ethnic Myanmar USDP and NUP will be calling the shots not only nationally, but also in the regional legislatures. While a far cry from the federalism that many ethnic leaders aspire for, the local legislatures offer the first forms of local autonomy since the post 1962 coup government of General Ne Win abolished ethnic councils established under the 1947 constitution.
A post-independence federal system was promised as a result of a conference held at the town of Panglong in northern Myanmar between independence leader General Aung San and representatives of several ethnic groups. Federal principles agreed to at the conference were enshrined in the 1947 constitution, but by the late 1950's many felt they had not been adequately implemented. Agitation for a more truly federalist system was a major cause of the 1962 military coup, which was carried out in the name of preserving national unity.
Myanmar's 2008 constitution keeps the seven ethnic states and creates seven new self-administered zones for less numerous ethnic groups such as the Pa-O, Kokang and Wa. However, it makes few other concessions to ethnic aspirations for federalism and power sharing between ethnic groups and the majority Myanmar population. During the 1993-2008 National Convention that drafted the constitution, calls by ethnic representatives for a federal union were ignored.
There is growing evidence that the generals are seeking to undermine and split the ethnic vote at the upcoming elections. This is being done largely through the junta's mass organization, the United Solidarity Development Association (USDA), and its newly formed political party, the USDP.
Many members of the USDP are former military officers and current members of government who have resigned their ranks to participate in the polls. They have actively courted ethnic minorities to join the junta-backed USDP. In the case of the disenfranchised Muslim Rohingya in western Myanmar, that has taken the form of offering identity cards granting them formal citizenship in exchange for their votes.
According to the exile-run media group Shan Herald Agency for News, USDP members have used the USDA and local government officials to canvass for votes and to pressure villagers in Shan State to sign their names on the party's rolls. Shan leaders in Mandalay Division, where there are significant Shan populations, were approached in March to run as part of the USDP.
The junta has also effectively blocked several of the major ethnic political players from taking part in the elections due to an impasse over the transformation of armed ceasefire groups into army-controlled border guard units. The regime's seven-step "roadmap to democracy" had originally envisioned that the groups would either hand over their weapons or join the border guard force as a prelude to forming political parties and contesting the election.
Pre-election tension
That step was supposed to be accomplished before an election date was announced. Instead tensions have spiked between the junta and the ethnic militias as several deadlines have passed - the latest on April 28 - and the issue still remains unresolved. Over 20 ethnic insurgent groups have agreed to ceasefires with the junta since 1989 and have since largely run their own affairs. They consider retaining their weapons as a necessary protection until the generals can prove the sincerity of their political promises.
Only a few, mostly small groups have agreed to the junta's terms, including the National Democratic Army - Kachin (NDA-K) and the Kachin Defence Army (KDA). However, their political leaders have resigned and are now seeking to register respectively as the Union Democracy Party (Kachin State) and the Northern Shan State Progressive Party.
The Kokang only agreed after a short offensive by the army drove out the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in August 2009 and brought in new leadership. The new leadership quickly declared its support for the 2010 elections and formed a political party.
Larger groups such as the United Wa State Party (UWSP), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) have not been allowed to register parties for the election. Instead the regime has threatened to revoke the ceasefire status of groups and declare them illegal. Most recently tensions have increased in Mon State, where the NMSP has refused to meet with the military's intelligence head Lieutenant General Ye Myint to discuss the border guard issue. The junta has threatened to use force if the Mon does not agree to a meeting.
Keeping the ceasefire groups out of the polls may work to the generals' electoral advantage. A June 2010 report by the Transnational Institute on the ethnic political situation described the ethnic ceasefire organizations, "in terms of history, membership, finance, and territorial control, the ceasefire forces far outweigh electoral parties in their ability to operate independently and, with an estimated 40,000 troops under arms, their existence was a continued reminder of the need for conflict resolution."
Both the Wa and the Kachin have said that they would like to support ethnic parties in the polls and negotiate the decommissioning of their armed wings with the new government after the elections. After two decades of unresolved political issues and disappointment in the 2008 constitution, they want to see proof of real political reform before agreeing to hand over their weapons.
Indeed, the election commission has so far refused to accept the registration of three Kachin political parties. While two of the parties represent former ceasefire groups who have now become border guards, the KSPP has several former KIO members, including its leader, former KIO vice chairman Tu Ja. Some observers believe the party's registration has yet to be approved because of these links.
There is also a fear that the government will declare a state of emergency in the ceasefire areas, which would prohibit people standing for elections and voting. Already areas of southern Shan State and Karen State are unlikely to be allowed to vote due to a legal provision that says elections can only be held in areas free of conflict. This would mean that large portions of Myanmar would not be allowed to elect representatives to local or national legislatures.
Border-based ethnic political organizations, many of which are attached to armed insurgent groups still fighting the government, will not be able to take part in the elections. Although they have seemingly declined in strength and influence in recent years, their message of equal rights and justice still resonates with many people who see the newly formed parties as junta stooges.
Peace talks with the government will also have to wait until a new government is formed following the elections. A section of the Political Parties Registration Law prohibits registration to any party that is involved with groups engaged in armed rebellion or involved with groups declared as "unlawful associations".
The generals will be hard-pressed to prove the legitimacy of the elections without the participation of ethnic opposition parties or adequate ethnic representation. Should the ethnic groups continue to feel disempowered and a democratically elected pro-military government maintain the junta's current confrontational policies, further conflict will be almost unavoidable and hinder the country's supposed democratic transition.
Brian McCartan is a Bangkok-based freelance journalist. He may be reached at brianpm@comcast.net.
Asia Times Online - Myanmar elections mute ethnic voices
By Brian McCartan
BANGKOK - Elections slated for later this year in Myanmar seem increasingly unlikely to democratically empower the country's various ethnic minority groups, which combined account for over 30% of the population.
While the ruling generals have touted the inclusiveness of their tightly controlled democratic transition, critics say the new constitution ignores ethnic demands for federalism while junta-drafted election laws prohibit the participation of the largest ethnic parties, some of which are attached to armed insurgent groups who for decades have fought for greater autonomy.
The ruling junta has yet to announce a date for the elections, but many observers believe they will he held sometime in October. They will be the first polls held in Myanmar since 1990, when the opposition led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) swept to victory against military-sponsored parties, only to see the results annulled by the military before they could take power.
The generals have made clear their intention to hold new polls and that the participation of the NLD and ethnic ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups is not essential to their credibility. The NLD announced on March 29 that it would not re-register under the new election laws, which it considered unfair because of regulations that bar Aung San Suu Kyi, the party's detained leader, from contesting the polls.
A number of NLD party leaders and other members have argued that non-participation plays into the regime's hands by not providing an alternative to the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the National Unity Party (NUP).
At least 39 other political parties have so far applied for registration with the newly formed election commission. Of those, only 15 are considered national parties, while many of the rest aim specifically to represent the interests of ethnic groups, including the Kachin, Kayin, Mon and Shan.
The question of whether to participate in the elections has been as contentious an issue among ethnic political groups as it was with the NLD. Some see the electoral process as a sham for perpetuating military rule under the guise of democracy and advocate a boycott of the polls. Others believe the elections offer an unique chance to work from within the system and an alternative to the confrontation and armed struggle that has plagued Myanmar politics since independence from the UK in 1948.
The second and third most successful parties in the 1990 elections after the NLD, the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) and the Arakan League for Democracy, have both supported the NLD's stand and opted not to re-register their parties for the upcoming election. The SNLD's decision was also based on the junta's refusal to free its two top leaders, who were both arrested on political charges in 2005.
Local contests
Significantly, many of the ethnic-based parties are looking to contest seats in local legislatures rather than at the national level. With their relative small sizes, the high cost of party registration and their lack of a national voice, many aspiring ethnic politicians feel that their chances of success and ability to effect change are better on the local level.
Parties representing larger ethnic groups, such as the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), are seeking to contest the elections at all levels within their own states. Still other parties representing ethnic groups with much wider geographic coverage, such as the Kayin People's Party (KPP) and the Shan Nationals Democratic Party (SNDP), intend to contest the election for both local legislatures and at the national level across several states and divisions.
Competing for seats on state legislatures may have some real, if limited, advantages for ethnic aspirations. The new legislatures mandated by the 2008 constitution are a departure from the military-dominated "Peace and Development Committees" that currently decide policy in ethnic minority areas and are often a direct arm of the central government.
Ethnic politicians hope that the local legislative bodies will be more representative of local communities and give them more say over affairs that matter to their ethnic constituents. With popular representation, there may be more opportunities for the promotion of local cultures and languages though influence over the media and education. Also important is to gain more influence and scrutiny over the exploitation of natural resources in ethnic minority areas.
According to a recent report on the elections by the Transnational Institute, "Nevertheless, many ethnic leaders point out that they will have a legitimate voice for the first time. This will allow ethnic grievances, in the past too easily dismissed as the seditious rumblings of separatist insurgents, to be openly raised."
Without ethnic participation, the government backed, and largely ethnic Myanmar USDP and NUP will be calling the shots not only nationally, but also in the regional legislatures. While a far cry from the federalism that many ethnic leaders aspire for, the local legislatures offer the first forms of local autonomy since the post 1962 coup government of General Ne Win abolished ethnic councils established under the 1947 constitution.
A post-independence federal system was promised as a result of a conference held at the town of Panglong in northern Myanmar between independence leader General Aung San and representatives of several ethnic groups. Federal principles agreed to at the conference were enshrined in the 1947 constitution, but by the late 1950's many felt they had not been adequately implemented. Agitation for a more truly federalist system was a major cause of the 1962 military coup, which was carried out in the name of preserving national unity.
Myanmar's 2008 constitution keeps the seven ethnic states and creates seven new self-administered zones for less numerous ethnic groups such as the Pa-O, Kokang and Wa. However, it makes few other concessions to ethnic aspirations for federalism and power sharing between ethnic groups and the majority Myanmar population. During the 1993-2008 National Convention that drafted the constitution, calls by ethnic representatives for a federal union were ignored.
There is growing evidence that the generals are seeking to undermine and split the ethnic vote at the upcoming elections. This is being done largely through the junta's mass organization, the United Solidarity Development Association (USDA), and its newly formed political party, the USDP.
Many members of the USDP are former military officers and current members of government who have resigned their ranks to participate in the polls. They have actively courted ethnic minorities to join the junta-backed USDP. In the case of the disenfranchised Muslim Rohingya in western Myanmar, that has taken the form of offering identity cards granting them formal citizenship in exchange for their votes.
According to the exile-run media group Shan Herald Agency for News, USDP members have used the USDA and local government officials to canvass for votes and to pressure villagers in Shan State to sign their names on the party's rolls. Shan leaders in Mandalay Division, where there are significant Shan populations, were approached in March to run as part of the USDP.
The junta has also effectively blocked several of the major ethnic political players from taking part in the elections due to an impasse over the transformation of armed ceasefire groups into army-controlled border guard units. The regime's seven-step "roadmap to democracy" had originally envisioned that the groups would either hand over their weapons or join the border guard force as a prelude to forming political parties and contesting the election.
Pre-election tension
That step was supposed to be accomplished before an election date was announced. Instead tensions have spiked between the junta and the ethnic militias as several deadlines have passed - the latest on April 28 - and the issue still remains unresolved. Over 20 ethnic insurgent groups have agreed to ceasefires with the junta since 1989 and have since largely run their own affairs. They consider retaining their weapons as a necessary protection until the generals can prove the sincerity of their political promises.
Only a few, mostly small groups have agreed to the junta's terms, including the National Democratic Army - Kachin (NDA-K) and the Kachin Defence Army (KDA). However, their political leaders have resigned and are now seeking to register respectively as the Union Democracy Party (Kachin State) and the Northern Shan State Progressive Party.
The Kokang only agreed after a short offensive by the army drove out the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in August 2009 and brought in new leadership. The new leadership quickly declared its support for the 2010 elections and formed a political party.
Larger groups such as the United Wa State Party (UWSP), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) have not been allowed to register parties for the election. Instead the regime has threatened to revoke the ceasefire status of groups and declare them illegal. Most recently tensions have increased in Mon State, where the NMSP has refused to meet with the military's intelligence head Lieutenant General Ye Myint to discuss the border guard issue. The junta has threatened to use force if the Mon does not agree to a meeting.
Keeping the ceasefire groups out of the polls may work to the generals' electoral advantage. A June 2010 report by the Transnational Institute on the ethnic political situation described the ethnic ceasefire organizations, "in terms of history, membership, finance, and territorial control, the ceasefire forces far outweigh electoral parties in their ability to operate independently and, with an estimated 40,000 troops under arms, their existence was a continued reminder of the need for conflict resolution."
Both the Wa and the Kachin have said that they would like to support ethnic parties in the polls and negotiate the decommissioning of their armed wings with the new government after the elections. After two decades of unresolved political issues and disappointment in the 2008 constitution, they want to see proof of real political reform before agreeing to hand over their weapons.
Indeed, the election commission has so far refused to accept the registration of three Kachin political parties. While two of the parties represent former ceasefire groups who have now become border guards, the KSPP has several former KIO members, including its leader, former KIO vice chairman Tu Ja. Some observers believe the party's registration has yet to be approved because of these links.
There is also a fear that the government will declare a state of emergency in the ceasefire areas, which would prohibit people standing for elections and voting. Already areas of southern Shan State and Karen State are unlikely to be allowed to vote due to a legal provision that says elections can only be held in areas free of conflict. This would mean that large portions of Myanmar would not be allowed to elect representatives to local or national legislatures.
Border-based ethnic political organizations, many of which are attached to armed insurgent groups still fighting the government, will not be able to take part in the elections. Although they have seemingly declined in strength and influence in recent years, their message of equal rights and justice still resonates with many people who see the newly formed parties as junta stooges.
Peace talks with the government will also have to wait until a new government is formed following the elections. A section of the Political Parties Registration Law prohibits registration to any party that is involved with groups engaged in armed rebellion or involved with groups declared as "unlawful associations".
The generals will be hard-pressed to prove the legitimacy of the elections without the participation of ethnic opposition parties or adequate ethnic representation. Should the ethnic groups continue to feel disempowered and a democratically elected pro-military government maintain the junta's current confrontational policies, further conflict will be almost unavoidable and hinder the country's supposed democratic transition.
Brian McCartan is a Bangkok-based freelance journalist. He may be reached at brianpm@comcast.net.
*****************************************************
Jun 26, 2010
BOOK REVIEW
Asia Times Online - Life and times of a dictator
Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma's Tyrant by Benedict Rogers
Reviewed by Bertil Lintner
CHIANG MAI - When Myanmar military dictator General Ne Win was still alive, foreign pundits often postulated that the country would change for the better once he passed from the scene. The country would still be ruled by the military, they predicted, but by a younger generation of more reform-minded officers that would bring Myanmar, also known as Burma, out of the Dark Ages.
Ne Win relinquished formal power in the late 1980s and pulled strings from behind the scenes leading up to his death in 2002. Did Myanmar change after that? Yes - but arguably for the worse. Repression intensified, with the number of political prisoners reaching into the thousands. Economic reforms put more money in circulation, but intensified already rampant corruption. The government spent even less on health and education while ramping up military spending.
Today, the Myanmar military is more firmly entrenched in power than at any time since Ne Win's coup d'etat in 1962, which ended a 14-year period of weak but functioning parliamentary democracy. Now the era of Myanmar's current strongman, General Than Shwe, is drawing to an end. The 77-year-old general will soon retire and he has promised the country's first democratic elections in 20 years to mark the transition.
A new generation of pundits has predicted hopefully that Myanmar is on the cusp of positive change. They believe a hitherto unknown generation of Young Turks and other supposed closet liberals within the military will come to the fore and push the country in a more democratic direction. Elections, they predict, will at long last give civilian leaders some say over the country's governance.
In all likelihood, however, foreign pundits will be proven wrong yet again. Benedict Rogers' highly readable new book shows why Myanmar's military, even with Than Shwe's imminent retirement, has no intention of giving up power any time soon. After this year's polls Than Shwe may no longer be Myanmar's de facto head of state, but he has ensured through that he and his by now immensely wealthy family will be well protected when the next generation of soldiers assume power.
"Motivated by power and a determination to hold onto it," Rogers writes, "Than Shwe will use any tool necessary, from detention, torture and violence against his opponents, to lies, deceit, delay and false promises to the international community, or the manipulation of astrology and religion to convince his own people."
There is scant evidence that the next generation of military officers will be any more liberal in their outlook than their predecessors - in the same way as Than Shwe's generation certainly was no more broadminded after taking over from Ne Win. After half a century of wielding absolute power, the Myanmar military has developed its own ways of dealing with internal dissent and external criticism.
And democratic reforms, even minor and gradual ones, are not part of that mindset, as Rogers' book thoughtfully illustrates. Ne Win set the repressive agenda when he and the army seized power 48 years ago, and those ways have survived him through several of his successors.
To be sure, Rogers does not feign objectivity in his assessment of Than Shwe's life and times. As a member of Christian Solidarity Worldwide, a human-rights organization that specializes in religious freedoms, he has been a Myanmar activist for many years and openly declared his support for the country's pro-democracy opposition. But that does not detract from this well-researched book.
To the contrary, it is the first thorough study of Myanmar's undisputed strongman. It chronicles with detail how Than Shwe rose from a lowly position as a junior postal clerk to the most powerful soldier in the military-run country. Joining the military as a teenager, he was always immensely loyal to his commanders, a trait the book argues was a key to his eventual success. Those who questioned their superiors and official policies were ruthlessly purged under the new military order that Ne Win introduced after 1962.
Despite claims in his own official glorified biography, Than Shwe did not see as much combat as other top army officers who fought in jungle battlefields against ethnic insurgent groups. Rather he was attached to the military's Psychological Warfare Department and, later, the grandly named Central School of Political Science, where officers and other soldiers were taught Ne Win's "Burmese Way to Socialism" ideology.
Rogers quotes one of his inside sources as saying that Than Shwe "never talked about the country and its prospects with me. He seemed only focused on pleasing the higher officers and leaders. He always praised the leaders and never showed any ambition. He was certainly proud of being a soldier. He followed orders ... very carefully."
Rogers traces Than Shwe's rise through Myanmar's post-World War II period, the short-lived democratic era in the 1950s, and the disastrous years of austere socialism in the 1960s and 1970s which brought on the 1988 popular uprising and its bloody suppression. In 1992, Than Shwe became chairman of the ruling junta, known then as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC. He was promoted following the resignation of his predecessor General Saw Maung, who had become increasingly erratic.
Once in a position of absolute power, the postman-cum-tyrant, to use Rogers' description of Than Shwe, was surprisingly durable. Over the years he displayed an unprecedented megalomania among Myanmar military leaders. Few could have guessed that the often sullen and always taciturn soldier would endeavor to build a new capital city, Naypyidaw, or "the Abode of Kings", from an obscure patch in the jungle.
Nor did many foresee that he would replace Myanmar's original national philosophy of "unity in diversity" with a new concept of a unitary state in honor of the country's ancient warrior kings and empire-builders, Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya. Many believe his construction of the new capital city aims to leave behind a "Fourth Myanmar Empire" as a legacy of his rule.
It is unclear how Than Shwe's promised democratic transition fits with those kingly designs. Whether Myanmar holds elections this year, next year, or never, all the structures he put in place signal that the military is geared to remain in power for the foreseeable future. Rogers correctly portrays Than Shwe and his military henchmen as modern-day "tyrants" - and history shows that from a position of power tyrants have seldom negotiated their own demise.
Anyone who believes that a post-Than Shwe Myanmar is headed in a democratic direction should read this valuable book.
Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma's Tyrant by Benedict Rogers with a foreword by Vaclav Havel. Silkworm Books (May 2010). ISBN - 978-974-9511-91-6. Price US$20, 256 pages.
Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review. He is currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media Services.
BOOK REVIEW
Asia Times Online - Life and times of a dictator
Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma's Tyrant by Benedict Rogers
Reviewed by Bertil Lintner
CHIANG MAI - When Myanmar military dictator General Ne Win was still alive, foreign pundits often postulated that the country would change for the better once he passed from the scene. The country would still be ruled by the military, they predicted, but by a younger generation of more reform-minded officers that would bring Myanmar, also known as Burma, out of the Dark Ages.
Ne Win relinquished formal power in the late 1980s and pulled strings from behind the scenes leading up to his death in 2002. Did Myanmar change after that? Yes - but arguably for the worse. Repression intensified, with the number of political prisoners reaching into the thousands. Economic reforms put more money in circulation, but intensified already rampant corruption. The government spent even less on health and education while ramping up military spending.
Today, the Myanmar military is more firmly entrenched in power than at any time since Ne Win's coup d'etat in 1962, which ended a 14-year period of weak but functioning parliamentary democracy. Now the era of Myanmar's current strongman, General Than Shwe, is drawing to an end. The 77-year-old general will soon retire and he has promised the country's first democratic elections in 20 years to mark the transition.
A new generation of pundits has predicted hopefully that Myanmar is on the cusp of positive change. They believe a hitherto unknown generation of Young Turks and other supposed closet liberals within the military will come to the fore and push the country in a more democratic direction. Elections, they predict, will at long last give civilian leaders some say over the country's governance.
In all likelihood, however, foreign pundits will be proven wrong yet again. Benedict Rogers' highly readable new book shows why Myanmar's military, even with Than Shwe's imminent retirement, has no intention of giving up power any time soon. After this year's polls Than Shwe may no longer be Myanmar's de facto head of state, but he has ensured through that he and his by now immensely wealthy family will be well protected when the next generation of soldiers assume power.
"Motivated by power and a determination to hold onto it," Rogers writes, "Than Shwe will use any tool necessary, from detention, torture and violence against his opponents, to lies, deceit, delay and false promises to the international community, or the manipulation of astrology and religion to convince his own people."
There is scant evidence that the next generation of military officers will be any more liberal in their outlook than their predecessors - in the same way as Than Shwe's generation certainly was no more broadminded after taking over from Ne Win. After half a century of wielding absolute power, the Myanmar military has developed its own ways of dealing with internal dissent and external criticism.
And democratic reforms, even minor and gradual ones, are not part of that mindset, as Rogers' book thoughtfully illustrates. Ne Win set the repressive agenda when he and the army seized power 48 years ago, and those ways have survived him through several of his successors.
To be sure, Rogers does not feign objectivity in his assessment of Than Shwe's life and times. As a member of Christian Solidarity Worldwide, a human-rights organization that specializes in religious freedoms, he has been a Myanmar activist for many years and openly declared his support for the country's pro-democracy opposition. But that does not detract from this well-researched book.
To the contrary, it is the first thorough study of Myanmar's undisputed strongman. It chronicles with detail how Than Shwe rose from a lowly position as a junior postal clerk to the most powerful soldier in the military-run country. Joining the military as a teenager, he was always immensely loyal to his commanders, a trait the book argues was a key to his eventual success. Those who questioned their superiors and official policies were ruthlessly purged under the new military order that Ne Win introduced after 1962.
Despite claims in his own official glorified biography, Than Shwe did not see as much combat as other top army officers who fought in jungle battlefields against ethnic insurgent groups. Rather he was attached to the military's Psychological Warfare Department and, later, the grandly named Central School of Political Science, where officers and other soldiers were taught Ne Win's "Burmese Way to Socialism" ideology.
Rogers quotes one of his inside sources as saying that Than Shwe "never talked about the country and its prospects with me. He seemed only focused on pleasing the higher officers and leaders. He always praised the leaders and never showed any ambition. He was certainly proud of being a soldier. He followed orders ... very carefully."
Rogers traces Than Shwe's rise through Myanmar's post-World War II period, the short-lived democratic era in the 1950s, and the disastrous years of austere socialism in the 1960s and 1970s which brought on the 1988 popular uprising and its bloody suppression. In 1992, Than Shwe became chairman of the ruling junta, known then as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC. He was promoted following the resignation of his predecessor General Saw Maung, who had become increasingly erratic.
Once in a position of absolute power, the postman-cum-tyrant, to use Rogers' description of Than Shwe, was surprisingly durable. Over the years he displayed an unprecedented megalomania among Myanmar military leaders. Few could have guessed that the often sullen and always taciturn soldier would endeavor to build a new capital city, Naypyidaw, or "the Abode of Kings", from an obscure patch in the jungle.
Nor did many foresee that he would replace Myanmar's original national philosophy of "unity in diversity" with a new concept of a unitary state in honor of the country's ancient warrior kings and empire-builders, Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya. Many believe his construction of the new capital city aims to leave behind a "Fourth Myanmar Empire" as a legacy of his rule.
It is unclear how Than Shwe's promised democratic transition fits with those kingly designs. Whether Myanmar holds elections this year, next year, or never, all the structures he put in place signal that the military is geared to remain in power for the foreseeable future. Rogers correctly portrays Than Shwe and his military henchmen as modern-day "tyrants" - and history shows that from a position of power tyrants have seldom negotiated their own demise.
Anyone who believes that a post-Than Shwe Myanmar is headed in a democratic direction should read this valuable book.
Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma's Tyrant by Benedict Rogers with a foreword by Vaclav Havel. Silkworm Books (May 2010). ISBN - 978-974-9511-91-6. Price US$20, 256 pages.
Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review. He is currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media Services.
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MYANMAR: Producing drugs for the region, fuelling addiction at home
YANGON, 25 June 2010 (IRIN) - In northeastern Shan State, opium farmers have a special welcome for visitors.
“Serving opium or methamphetamines to guests is a tradition of local poppy farmers in the area. Some poppy farmers are drug addicts,” said Yarzar*, a drug addict in his 30s from Shan State, where he used to farm poppy and work in opium factories.
Myanmar is one of the world’s main sources of opiates and methamphetamines, and this production fuels rampant addiction in the country.
Opiates, especially heroin, are the most prevalent drug in Myanmar, feeding the habits of some 66,000 heroin users and 67,000 opium users, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) 2010 World Drug Report released this week.
In 2009, the country produced 330 tons of opiates, accounting for 17 percent of global cultivation, while methamphetamine seizures skyrocketed from one million tablets in 2008 to 23 million in 2009.
In the border areas of Shan and Kachin states, the region where most of the opium is produced, about 1.5 percent of the adult population is addicted.
“There are as many drug stalls in the border areas as there are betel shops or teashops in the cities,” Yarzar said in Yangon.
The primary drug of choice is heroin, followed by opium and methamphetamine, the UNODC said. Methamphetamine use increased for six years up to 2008, while heroin use has dipped, and opium has remained stable. Methamphetamine use is hard to gauge, but may be reflected in the number of seizures.
“There are clear indications of the increase in the seizures and production of ATS [amphetamine-type stimulants],” said Deepika Naruka, who coordinates UNODC’s programmes in Myanmar and East Asia.
She said figures on drug use are hard to come by because of the stigma and illegality, but “even with the limited data that is available there is an indication that ATS use is problematic”.
However, a Myanmar physician working with drug addicts in the country sees a clear trend.
“Drug users in the area of North Shan, South Shan and Mandalay are still on the rise,” said Myo Nyunt Aung, who works on the harm reduction programme of the UN and Myanmar Anti-Narcotics Association (MANA).
Cheap, easy to find
Opium production in Myanmar has decreased dramatically since the mid-90s - when about 1,700 tons of opium was produced annually. In 2009, UNODC estimated 330 tons was produced.
The agency says 95 percent of Myanmar’s opium is grown in Shan State. In that region, the prevalence rate of adult daily opium use is higher in opium-growing villages - 1.7 percent, compared to 0.5 percent in non-growing villages.
Drugs are widely available along the China-Myanmar border, like in the city of Lashio.
“In Lashio, we can buy one dose of heroin [with a penicillin bottle] for US$8-12. The price of the drug is three times cheaper than buying in a big city like Mandalay,” Yarzar said. “The closer you get to the border areas, the cheaper the drugs are and the stronger the taste.”
In Mandalay, Myanmar’s second largest city, north of Yangon, there is a steady drug supply for, and demand from, migrants from different parts of the country.
“It is not difficult to get heroin in Mandalay if you have money,” said 36-year-old Min Thura, a former drug addict from Mandalay who is now working with the National Drug User Network Myanmar (NDNM).
Many drug addicts are migrant labourers toiling in jade mines or along the China-Myanmar border, but also people from wealthy families in Mandalay, he said.
In the 1990s, Min Thura regularly shared needles with other drug users in Mandalay.
“About 50 drug users were queuing up and giving their arms to inject heroin with only one needle. Many of my friends with whom I shared needles to inject drugs have already died,” said Min Thura, who has been clean for four years.
Now, he said, there is more awareness about HIV and clean needles.
Methadone therapy
Myanmar’s first methadone therapy programme was established in March 2006, set up in drug treatment centres in several cities and towns across the country.
There is only one methadone clinic in Yangon, at the San Pya Hospital, and patients make daily appointments for treatment.
“It’s not easy for the drug users living on the outskirts of Yangon to go to the hospital every day to take methadone. It would be better if there were more drug treatment centres,” said Bae Lay, a member of NDNM.
Htoo Wint Kyaw, another NDNM member, agreed: “There are many drug users who would quit using drugs if treatment were available.”
YANGON, 25 June 2010 (IRIN) - In northeastern Shan State, opium farmers have a special welcome for visitors.
“Serving opium or methamphetamines to guests is a tradition of local poppy farmers in the area. Some poppy farmers are drug addicts,” said Yarzar*, a drug addict in his 30s from Shan State, where he used to farm poppy and work in opium factories.
Myanmar is one of the world’s main sources of opiates and methamphetamines, and this production fuels rampant addiction in the country.
Opiates, especially heroin, are the most prevalent drug in Myanmar, feeding the habits of some 66,000 heroin users and 67,000 opium users, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) 2010 World Drug Report released this week.
In 2009, the country produced 330 tons of opiates, accounting for 17 percent of global cultivation, while methamphetamine seizures skyrocketed from one million tablets in 2008 to 23 million in 2009.
In the border areas of Shan and Kachin states, the region where most of the opium is produced, about 1.5 percent of the adult population is addicted.
“There are as many drug stalls in the border areas as there are betel shops or teashops in the cities,” Yarzar said in Yangon.
The primary drug of choice is heroin, followed by opium and methamphetamine, the UNODC said. Methamphetamine use increased for six years up to 2008, while heroin use has dipped, and opium has remained stable. Methamphetamine use is hard to gauge, but may be reflected in the number of seizures.
“There are clear indications of the increase in the seizures and production of ATS [amphetamine-type stimulants],” said Deepika Naruka, who coordinates UNODC’s programmes in Myanmar and East Asia.
She said figures on drug use are hard to come by because of the stigma and illegality, but “even with the limited data that is available there is an indication that ATS use is problematic”.
However, a Myanmar physician working with drug addicts in the country sees a clear trend.
“Drug users in the area of North Shan, South Shan and Mandalay are still on the rise,” said Myo Nyunt Aung, who works on the harm reduction programme of the UN and Myanmar Anti-Narcotics Association (MANA).
Cheap, easy to find
Opium production in Myanmar has decreased dramatically since the mid-90s - when about 1,700 tons of opium was produced annually. In 2009, UNODC estimated 330 tons was produced.
The agency says 95 percent of Myanmar’s opium is grown in Shan State. In that region, the prevalence rate of adult daily opium use is higher in opium-growing villages - 1.7 percent, compared to 0.5 percent in non-growing villages.
Drugs are widely available along the China-Myanmar border, like in the city of Lashio.
“In Lashio, we can buy one dose of heroin [with a penicillin bottle] for US$8-12. The price of the drug is three times cheaper than buying in a big city like Mandalay,” Yarzar said. “The closer you get to the border areas, the cheaper the drugs are and the stronger the taste.”
In Mandalay, Myanmar’s second largest city, north of Yangon, there is a steady drug supply for, and demand from, migrants from different parts of the country.
“It is not difficult to get heroin in Mandalay if you have money,” said 36-year-old Min Thura, a former drug addict from Mandalay who is now working with the National Drug User Network Myanmar (NDNM).
Many drug addicts are migrant labourers toiling in jade mines or along the China-Myanmar border, but also people from wealthy families in Mandalay, he said.
In the 1990s, Min Thura regularly shared needles with other drug users in Mandalay.
“About 50 drug users were queuing up and giving their arms to inject heroin with only one needle. Many of my friends with whom I shared needles to inject drugs have already died,” said Min Thura, who has been clean for four years.
Now, he said, there is more awareness about HIV and clean needles.
Methadone therapy
Myanmar’s first methadone therapy programme was established in March 2006, set up in drug treatment centres in several cities and towns across the country.
There is only one methadone clinic in Yangon, at the San Pya Hospital, and patients make daily appointments for treatment.
“It’s not easy for the drug users living on the outskirts of Yangon to go to the hospital every day to take methadone. It would be better if there were more drug treatment centres,” said Bae Lay, a member of NDNM.
Htoo Wint Kyaw, another NDNM member, agreed: “There are many drug users who would quit using drugs if treatment were available.”
*****************************************************
ASIA: UN urges improved treatments for drug addicts
BANGKOK, 24 June 2010 (IRIN) - The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is urging Asian governments - which have been criticized for using “fear-based tactics” and prison-like compulsory centres to fight drug abuse - to improve and expand treatment for its addicts.
UNODC regional representative Gary Lewis said drug therapy must be made available to people who are in desperate need of it.
“Treatment is not available in our region to the degree that is required and in the quality that is required,” Lewis said on 24 June in Bangkok at the regional launch of the UNODC World Drug Report.
The regional trend of compulsory treatment centres for drug users - evident in countries like Cambodia, China, Vietnam and Malaysia - puts drug users at risk because of poor treatment and lack of HIV-prevention services, according to a World Health Organization report.
Lewis said approaches which violate the rights of the individual are ineffective.
“What does not work are fear- and scare-based tactics for prevention and [treatments] that are involving compulsory approaches,” he said.
What does work, he added, are prescription medications to treat addiction and long-term approaches based on drug dependence as a treatable disease with possibilities of chronic relapses.
Worldwide in 2008, there were 16-38 million problem drug users - including dependent and injecting drug users. Only about one fifth of them received treatment, according to the UNODC report.
Throughout Asia, almost two-thirds of users treated for drug problems used opiates, while about a fifth abused amphetamine-type stimulants (synthetic drugs), according to UNODC.
Myanmar, which produced 330 tons of opiates in 2009, has seen methamphetamine seizures skyrocket to 23 million tablets in 2009, from one million in 2008, the report said. Seizures of methamphetamines in China similarly rose from six to 40 million tablets, half of which were seized in Yunnan Province, which borders Myanmar.
BANGKOK, 24 June 2010 (IRIN) - The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is urging Asian governments - which have been criticized for using “fear-based tactics” and prison-like compulsory centres to fight drug abuse - to improve and expand treatment for its addicts.
UNODC regional representative Gary Lewis said drug therapy must be made available to people who are in desperate need of it.
“Treatment is not available in our region to the degree that is required and in the quality that is required,” Lewis said on 24 June in Bangkok at the regional launch of the UNODC World Drug Report.
The regional trend of compulsory treatment centres for drug users - evident in countries like Cambodia, China, Vietnam and Malaysia - puts drug users at risk because of poor treatment and lack of HIV-prevention services, according to a World Health Organization report.
Lewis said approaches which violate the rights of the individual are ineffective.
“What does not work are fear- and scare-based tactics for prevention and [treatments] that are involving compulsory approaches,” he said.
What does work, he added, are prescription medications to treat addiction and long-term approaches based on drug dependence as a treatable disease with possibilities of chronic relapses.
Worldwide in 2008, there were 16-38 million problem drug users - including dependent and injecting drug users. Only about one fifth of them received treatment, according to the UNODC report.
Throughout Asia, almost two-thirds of users treated for drug problems used opiates, while about a fifth abused amphetamine-type stimulants (synthetic drugs), according to UNODC.
Myanmar, which produced 330 tons of opiates in 2009, has seen methamphetamine seizures skyrocket to 23 million tablets in 2009, from one million in 2008, the report said. Seizures of methamphetamines in China similarly rose from six to 40 million tablets, half of which were seized in Yunnan Province, which borders Myanmar.
*****************************************************
The Epoch Times - Filmmaker Jeremy Taylor Wants You to Help Free Burma
Fighting the junta with awareness and fundraising
By Cary Dunst
Epoch Times Staff Created: Jun 24, 2010 Last Updated: Jun 24, 2010
Jeremy Taylor is on a mission. He wants to make a difference in the lives of the oppressed in Burma.
“There are 90,000 child soldiers in Burma. That's more than any other country on earth,” explains Taylor to me via an email interview this past week. “Over 3,500 villages have been destroyed in Burma. That's more than in Darfur. War crimes and crimes against humanity are happening today in Burma.”
Taylor first became involved in this cause after reading, in 2006, about how the country’s legitimately elected leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who is under house arrest at the hands of the military regime, was unable to leave the country to visit her dying husband in England. “If she leaves, Burma's military government won't let her back in.
“She sacrificed her family for her country. That's when she became my hero. Daw Suu Kyi is an amazing woman. She's the only Nobel Peace Prize Laureate under arrest,” explains Taylor.
He would go on to become Executive Director of the New York-based Free Burma Alliance (FBA), a coalition of human rights and humanitarian relief organizations dedicated to bringing freedom to the ill-treated and oppressed people of Burma, “especially the children.”
Perhaps the largest impediment to bringing change to Burma is awareness—it’s a situation happening far away and out of the conscious of every day life. Taylor put his heart and talents into broadening awareness by making an award-winning documentary entitled “Burma: An Indictment.”
Shot on location, capturing both the macro situation as well as personal stories of abuse and suffering, the film mixes historical context, shocking footage of the plight of the oppressed, and compelling interviews with Burmese civilians, monks, and human rights defenders. The film would go on to win Best Documentary at the SOHO Int'l Film Festival 2010, and the REMI Winner at the WorldFest-Houston International Film Fest 2010. The film's next festival entry will be this Saturday at VisionFest, where it will be screened at the Tribeca Cinemas at 7 p.m.
Watching the film and seeing the extent of the suffering, one can only begin to grasp the level of greed and corruption employed by the military regime’s control. “It's a real shame. Burma has the largest reserves of gas in Southeast Asia—she's rich in rubies and jadeite, but Burma is the poorest country outside of Africa. Senior General Than Shwe and his cohorts are plundering Burma's wealth for themselves.”
The film coherently explains the historical background of how Burma was a peaceful democracy after gaining independence from Britain following World War II. However, in 1962, a military general staged a coup and established the ruling junta, effectively ending freedom and legitimate democracy in the country.
“Every time Burma's people and clergy march in the street seeking democracy, freedom, and human rights, they get gunned down. The junta doesn't care if they shoot thousands and thousands of people dead. They've done it before; they'll do it again. The people know it. They’re living in fear. They're terrified.”
Like in other areas of the world where totalitarian regimes are able to operate, one must look to the country’s backers and follow the money trail. “China has the most influence over Burma. China keeps the junta off the U.N. Security Council agenda. China's government has a sweetheart deal with Burma's Than Shwe for Burma's gas. China's building a pipeline through Burma to Yunnan Province.”
When asked what an average person can do to help, Taylor encouraged people to go to his organization’s website: www.freeburmaalliance.org. Here you can learn more about the situation in Burma to share with others, sign a petition, and donate to the cause. “Ninety-five U.S. dollars provides one Burmese child with food, school supplies, and shelter for one year at the NLD-LA child compound,” says Taylor.
You can also watch “Burma, an Indictment” this Saturday at 7 p.m. at the Tribeca Cinemas, 54 Varick Street, as part of the VisionFest Film Festival. For more information, visit VisionFest.com.
Fighting the junta with awareness and fundraising
By Cary Dunst
Epoch Times Staff Created: Jun 24, 2010 Last Updated: Jun 24, 2010
Jeremy Taylor is on a mission. He wants to make a difference in the lives of the oppressed in Burma.
“There are 90,000 child soldiers in Burma. That's more than any other country on earth,” explains Taylor to me via an email interview this past week. “Over 3,500 villages have been destroyed in Burma. That's more than in Darfur. War crimes and crimes against humanity are happening today in Burma.”
Taylor first became involved in this cause after reading, in 2006, about how the country’s legitimately elected leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who is under house arrest at the hands of the military regime, was unable to leave the country to visit her dying husband in England. “If she leaves, Burma's military government won't let her back in.
“She sacrificed her family for her country. That's when she became my hero. Daw Suu Kyi is an amazing woman. She's the only Nobel Peace Prize Laureate under arrest,” explains Taylor.
He would go on to become Executive Director of the New York-based Free Burma Alliance (FBA), a coalition of human rights and humanitarian relief organizations dedicated to bringing freedom to the ill-treated and oppressed people of Burma, “especially the children.”
Perhaps the largest impediment to bringing change to Burma is awareness—it’s a situation happening far away and out of the conscious of every day life. Taylor put his heart and talents into broadening awareness by making an award-winning documentary entitled “Burma: An Indictment.”
Shot on location, capturing both the macro situation as well as personal stories of abuse and suffering, the film mixes historical context, shocking footage of the plight of the oppressed, and compelling interviews with Burmese civilians, monks, and human rights defenders. The film would go on to win Best Documentary at the SOHO Int'l Film Festival 2010, and the REMI Winner at the WorldFest-Houston International Film Fest 2010. The film's next festival entry will be this Saturday at VisionFest, where it will be screened at the Tribeca Cinemas at 7 p.m.
Watching the film and seeing the extent of the suffering, one can only begin to grasp the level of greed and corruption employed by the military regime’s control. “It's a real shame. Burma has the largest reserves of gas in Southeast Asia—she's rich in rubies and jadeite, but Burma is the poorest country outside of Africa. Senior General Than Shwe and his cohorts are plundering Burma's wealth for themselves.”
The film coherently explains the historical background of how Burma was a peaceful democracy after gaining independence from Britain following World War II. However, in 1962, a military general staged a coup and established the ruling junta, effectively ending freedom and legitimate democracy in the country.
“Every time Burma's people and clergy march in the street seeking democracy, freedom, and human rights, they get gunned down. The junta doesn't care if they shoot thousands and thousands of people dead. They've done it before; they'll do it again. The people know it. They’re living in fear. They're terrified.”
Like in other areas of the world where totalitarian regimes are able to operate, one must look to the country’s backers and follow the money trail. “China has the most influence over Burma. China keeps the junta off the U.N. Security Council agenda. China's government has a sweetheart deal with Burma's Than Shwe for Burma's gas. China's building a pipeline through Burma to Yunnan Province.”
When asked what an average person can do to help, Taylor encouraged people to go to his organization’s website: www.freeburmaalliance.org. Here you can learn more about the situation in Burma to share with others, sign a petition, and donate to the cause. “Ninety-five U.S. dollars provides one Burmese child with food, school supplies, and shelter for one year at the NLD-LA child compound,” says Taylor.
You can also watch “Burma, an Indictment” this Saturday at 7 p.m. at the Tribeca Cinemas, 54 Varick Street, as part of the VisionFest Film Festival. For more information, visit VisionFest.com.
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Scoop.co.nz - Relief Efforts in Flood-Affected Myanmar
Friday, 25 June 2010, 2:42 pm
Press Release: United Nations
UN Aid Agencies Continue Relief Efforts in Flood-Affected Myanmar
New York, Jun 23 2010 6:10PM United Nations aid agencies are widening their relief efforts in western Myanmar, where more than 60 people have been killed and thousands of other villagers forced out of their homes by floods brought on by monsoonal rains.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported today that more than 27,000 families have been affected by the floods, which struck Myanmar’s Rakhine state and neighbouring Bangladesh last week.
The agency is working with the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Government health staff to deploy mobile medical teams to flood-affected towns and villages.
The UN World Food Programme (WFP) plans to distribute 1,079 tons of food to affected households, in addition to the 400 tons already handed out in Maungdaw and Buthidaung, the hardest-hit areas. The food sent so far is mostly rice, but beans, pulses, oil and salt are also being included.
The UN Development Programme (UNDP) reported that it is starting income-generation activities in at least 100 villages so that residents can buy food and other essential items, such as blankets and mosquito nets.
The death toll from the floods has climbed to 63 in Myanmar, according to State media figures. Nearly 700 homes are reported to have destroyed and more than 3,500 others partially damaged. At least 58 Bangladeshis have also died from the rising waters or mudslides.
Friday, 25 June 2010, 2:42 pm
Press Release: United Nations
UN Aid Agencies Continue Relief Efforts in Flood-Affected Myanmar
New York, Jun 23 2010 6:10PM United Nations aid agencies are widening their relief efforts in western Myanmar, where more than 60 people have been killed and thousands of other villagers forced out of their homes by floods brought on by monsoonal rains.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported today that more than 27,000 families have been affected by the floods, which struck Myanmar’s Rakhine state and neighbouring Bangladesh last week.
The agency is working with the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Government health staff to deploy mobile medical teams to flood-affected towns and villages.
The UN World Food Programme (WFP) plans to distribute 1,079 tons of food to affected households, in addition to the 400 tons already handed out in Maungdaw and Buthidaung, the hardest-hit areas. The food sent so far is mostly rice, but beans, pulses, oil and salt are also being included.
The UN Development Programme (UNDP) reported that it is starting income-generation activities in at least 100 villages so that residents can buy food and other essential items, such as blankets and mosquito nets.
The death toll from the floods has climbed to 63 in Myanmar, according to State media figures. Nearly 700 homes are reported to have destroyed and more than 3,500 others partially damaged. At least 58 Bangladeshis have also died from the rising waters or mudslides.
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Myanmar to build ocean liner in cooperation with ASEAN +3
2010-06-25 19:41:04
YANGON, June 25 (Xinhua) -- Myanmar engineers are projected to build a 10,000-ton ocean liner at Ahlone shipyard in Yangon in cooperation with ASEAN member countries, China, Japan and South Korea, the local weekly Yangon Time reported Friday.
The construction of the cargo vessel, the first of its kind, will begin in July after all the related materials are shipped to the shipyard, the report said, adding that larger cargo ships of 15,000 and 20,000 tons will also be built in the future.
So far this year, the Ahlone shipyard had built 500 tons' and 3000 tons' ships ordered by private companies or other departments, it added.
Meanwhile, five Yangon port terminals, which were previously operated by the government's Transport Ministry, have been privatized last month as part of the government's plan to enable full handling of import and export goods to keep up with the growth of foreign trade yearly.
The port terminals, which are being privatized under a build- operate-transfer contract system are Botataung, Bo Aung Kyaw, Pansodan, Nanthida and Sule.
According to the government's Privatization Commission, since 2000, two port terminals in Yangon -- Asia World's in Ahlone township and Myanmar International Terminal Thilawa (MITT) in Kyauktan township had been transferred to private run.
2010-06-25 19:41:04
YANGON, June 25 (Xinhua) -- Myanmar engineers are projected to build a 10,000-ton ocean liner at Ahlone shipyard in Yangon in cooperation with ASEAN member countries, China, Japan and South Korea, the local weekly Yangon Time reported Friday.
The construction of the cargo vessel, the first of its kind, will begin in July after all the related materials are shipped to the shipyard, the report said, adding that larger cargo ships of 15,000 and 20,000 tons will also be built in the future.
So far this year, the Ahlone shipyard had built 500 tons' and 3000 tons' ships ordered by private companies or other departments, it added.
Meanwhile, five Yangon port terminals, which were previously operated by the government's Transport Ministry, have been privatized last month as part of the government's plan to enable full handling of import and export goods to keep up with the growth of foreign trade yearly.
The port terminals, which are being privatized under a build- operate-transfer contract system are Botataung, Bo Aung Kyaw, Pansodan, Nanthida and Sule.
According to the government's Privatization Commission, since 2000, two port terminals in Yangon -- Asia World's in Ahlone township and Myanmar International Terminal Thilawa (MITT) in Kyauktan township had been transferred to private run.
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TravelVideo.tv (press release) - Myanmar’s Renewed Interest for International Tourism
By Luc Citrinot, eTN | June, 2010
With Yangon served out of Kuala Lumpur, low-cost carrier AirAsia completes its presence in all ASEAN countries from its main gateway in Malaysia. Yangon was indeed the last metropolis not being served by the Malaysian carrier. Flights will start on July 20 with the destination being served on a daily basis.
Yangon is already served by Thai AirAsia out of Bangkok up to twice a day, but the opening of Kuala Lumpur confirms the interest for the Burmese junta to open up the country more to international tourism. In the last two months, Myanmar’s government gave the green light to Vietnam airlines for a new route between Hanoi and Yangon. In early May, the country made the announcement of providing visa on arrivals to travelers at international airports. Allowing Asia’s largest low-cost carrier to now fly to Myanmar’s economic capital is another sign of Myanmar’s slow awakening to the outside world. The country can probably be considered as ASEAN’s last tourism frontier, as it only welcomes each year some 300,000 international travelers.
At each edition of the ASEAN Travel Forum, Myanmar’s officials have constantly given to media a target of a million international tourists. But in reality, the figure could be more interpreted as pure propaganda as Burma’s military regime never provided the real means to achieve such a number of travelers. The recent initiatives show that the country is probably moving in the right direction, certainly not by pure commitment to tourism development, but under economic constraints due to last year’s financial crisis.
For AirAsia, the new route confirms the airline’s positioning as the first truly ASEAN carrier. It currently serves the region with over 1,530 weekly flights from its nine air bases and has been a pioneer by developing new routes. The AirAsia group was the first carrier in the region to open routes such as Kuala Lumpur-Banda Aceh, Phuket-Jakarta, or Vientiane-Kuala Lumpur. Two years ago, an AirAsia aircraft Airbus A320 was even repainted with the ASEAN logo. The new route is a further sign of AirAsia turning into one of ASEAN best ambassadors around the world.
By Luc Citrinot, eTN | June, 2010
With Yangon served out of Kuala Lumpur, low-cost carrier AirAsia completes its presence in all ASEAN countries from its main gateway in Malaysia. Yangon was indeed the last metropolis not being served by the Malaysian carrier. Flights will start on July 20 with the destination being served on a daily basis.
Yangon is already served by Thai AirAsia out of Bangkok up to twice a day, but the opening of Kuala Lumpur confirms the interest for the Burmese junta to open up the country more to international tourism. In the last two months, Myanmar’s government gave the green light to Vietnam airlines for a new route between Hanoi and Yangon. In early May, the country made the announcement of providing visa on arrivals to travelers at international airports. Allowing Asia’s largest low-cost carrier to now fly to Myanmar’s economic capital is another sign of Myanmar’s slow awakening to the outside world. The country can probably be considered as ASEAN’s last tourism frontier, as it only welcomes each year some 300,000 international travelers.
At each edition of the ASEAN Travel Forum, Myanmar’s officials have constantly given to media a target of a million international tourists. But in reality, the figure could be more interpreted as pure propaganda as Burma’s military regime never provided the real means to achieve such a number of travelers. The recent initiatives show that the country is probably moving in the right direction, certainly not by pure commitment to tourism development, but under economic constraints due to last year’s financial crisis.
For AirAsia, the new route confirms the airline’s positioning as the first truly ASEAN carrier. It currently serves the region with over 1,530 weekly flights from its nine air bases and has been a pioneer by developing new routes. The AirAsia group was the first carrier in the region to open routes such as Kuala Lumpur-Banda Aceh, Phuket-Jakarta, or Vientiane-Kuala Lumpur. Two years ago, an AirAsia aircraft Airbus A320 was even repainted with the ASEAN logo. The new route is a further sign of AirAsia turning into one of ASEAN best ambassadors around the world.
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ReliefWeb - BURMA: Un-rule of law and corruption deny rights, U.N. told
Source: Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC)
Date: 24 Jun 2010
(Hong Kong, June 24, 2010) The un-rule of law and systemic corruption go hand-in-hand to deny human rights in Burma, the Asian Legal Resource Centre has told a peak United Nations body.
The centre on Thursday submitted a five-page document to the U.N. Human Rights Council in accordance with guidelines for review of member states' records under international law. It also submitted a 30-page annexe with summaries of 47 cases to support its major findings, and highlighted sections from the 2008 Constitution and some 19 laws.
According to the ALRC, contrary to the council's expectation that state parties develop the means to uphold international standards, Burma "lacks a normative framework to protect human rights".
The country has no independent and impartial judiciary, the Hong Kong-based regional body says. "Its police force is militarized. Gross human rights abuse is systemic. Avenues for effective redress are lacking," it concludes.
The centre describes the two major obstacles to implementation of human rights as an official perception "that the rule of law is a function of the executive and therefore that the role of the judiciary is to enforce policy rather than law" and systemic corruption.
It also condemns the new constitution of Burma, which will come into effect after a semi-elected parliament sits, as a norm-less document that negates all rights which it purports to guarantee.
According to the ALRC, the U.N. human rights body has failed to grasp the extent to which human rights abuse in Burma has become institutionalised through the criminal justice institutions and for this reason among others it is not equipped to propose or pursue meaningful strategies to change conditions there.
It cautions against the council presuming or pretending that it can do anything significant to improve the situation in Burma without corresponding significant political change, and urges it to work closely with other parts of the U.N. system towards both ends.
The centre notes that its observations are based on almost a decade of detailed study of the situation in Burma, and on expert examination and analysis of hundreds of cases.
Key findings from its submission follow. Both the submission and annexe are available in full on the ALRC website at: http://www.alrc.net/doc/mainfile.php/upr/
The Human Rights Council is scheduled to review Burma in 2011 at its 10th session. The deadline for groups holding consultative status to submit comments under the Universal Periodic Review process for that session is next month.
Download the full submission: ALRC-UPR-10-001-2010 & Annex
For media inquiries:
In English/French: Michael Anthony (Wellington, NZ), michael.anthony@ahrc.asia , +64 2 11027863 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting +64 2 11027863 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
In Burmese: Min Lwin Oo, +4798434085 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting +4798434085 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
KEY FINDINGS OF THE ALRC'S SUBMISSION TO THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL FOR THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW OF BURMA (MYANMAR)
1. Burma is not a party to most international human rights treaties. It has practically no domestic normative framework for the protection of human rights through the rule of law. Laws with limited provisions to protect rights are routinely ignored in practice and are formally negated through jurisprudence.
2. The preponderance of legislation in Burma is aimed not at the defence of human rights but at their denial. The State has retained and continues to use antiquated colonial-era and postcolonial statutes. Those include but are not limited to: Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, section 3; Emergency Provisions Act, 1950, section 5; Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, section 24(1); Immigration (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1947, section 13(1); Official Secrets Act, 1923, section 3(1); Penal Code, sections 124A, 153A, 186, 189, 211, 294, 295A, 332, 353, 505(b); Printers and Publishers Registration Law, 1962; the so-called State Protection Law, 1975; Tuition Law, 1984; and, Unlawful Associations Act, 1908, section 17(1). Since 1988, all laws have been passed as executive decrees, not through any legislative process. In this time, the laws that have been introduced to curtail human rights include: the so-called Anti-Subversion Law, 1996; Electronic Transactions Law, 2004; Organization Law, 1988; and, Television and Video Law, 1996.
3. The 2008 Constitution is in terms of human rights a norm-less constitution. Under its provisions, the armed forces are placed outside of judicial authority. The military, not the judiciary, is the constitution's guardian. The judiciary is separated from other branches of government only "to the extent possible". All rights are qualified with ambiguous language that permits exemptions under circumstances of the state's choosing. For instance, the right not to be held in custody for more than 24 hours before being brought before a magistrate, which already exists in the Criminal Procedure Code, is under the new constitution delimited by an exception for "matters on precautionary measures taken for the security of the Union or prevalence of law and order, peace and tranquillity in accord with the law in the interest of the public, or the matters permitted according to an existing law" (section 376). This provision effectively legalizes arbitrary detention of the sort that is already rife in Burma. Other provisions that purport to guarantee rights do so only to the extent permitted by other laws, and in so far as they do not threaten the security of the state or contravene undefined standards of public morality. The constitution allows for rights to be revoked at any time and for their suspension during a state of emergency. The cumulative effect of these qualifications is to render all guarantees of rights meaningless.
4. The police force in Burma operates as a paramilitary and intelligence agency under command of the armed forces. Policing functions are also shared among other parts of the state apparatus, including with executive councils at all levels that supervise and oversee other agencies, and with other local bodies, including the fire brigade and a government-organized mass group. At the same time, specialized agencies, in particular the Special Branch, operate as proxies for military intelligence, rather than as autonomous investigators of crime. Consequently, the characteristics of policing and prosecutions in Burma include: routine arbitrary arrest and detention; common use of torture and other forms of cruel and inhuman treatment, and frequent deaths in custody; coerced signing of documents that have no basis in law; baseless and duplicated charges; and fabricated cases.
5. As the courts are subordinate to the executive, they can neither function in accordance with the laws that they are purported to uphold nor in a manner that can defend, let alone implement human rights. Some of their features include closed and unreported trials; procedurally-incorrect and evidence-less cases; denial of defendants' rights and targeting of defence lawyers; and, lack of means for redress. Since 1962, the perception of successive governments in Burma has been that the role of the judiciary is not to protect rights but to enforce state policy. The rule of law is shorthand for the state's use of law and institutions of law to achieve whatever ends suit its purposes. It does not constitute a normative basis for the building of a regime of rights. Because this perception overrides specific qualities of the normative or institutional framework, it would be wrong to attribute to specific laws or agencies the authority to implement certain human rights. The authorit y of a law or institution is always delimited by a higher imperative, which means that the state party while passing laws, applying laws and establishing institutions to enforce laws does not actually feel beholden to those laws or institutions. Where its superior imperatives coincide with law, there is superficial coherence between executive policy and judicial activity. But where superior imperatives contradict law, they override it and the underlying incoherence in the system is manifest.
6. A major obstacle to the implementation of human rights in Burma is systemic corruption. Successive governments in Burma, including the current administration, have themselves acknowledged the incidence of corruption either directly or indirectly, including in the judiciary. However, because this corruption is intimately linked to the un-rule of law that the government has formalised and institutionalised, it cannot be addressed in any meaningful way. On the contrary, anecdotal evidence points to its persistent increase with the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the increase in market-style economics.
7. As substantive change to the situation of human rights in Burma will depend upon substantive political change, at present the U.N. Human Rights Council has very limited means to get involved in the implementing of measures to protect and uphold rights there. The Council should acknowledge these limitations rather than make unrealistic proposals and issue recommendations that will not be implemented for want of an enabling environment, or that will give a false appearance of progress.
8. Despite copious amounts of documentation narrating abuses of rights in Burma, the Council still has little detailed understanding of the institutional arrangements enabling abuse and the extent to which these are embedded in all parts of the state apparatus. It has practically no information on the endemic corruption that affects all institutions with which the Council is concerned when addressing questions of human rights implementation. The Council should consider how it can use the wider United Nations system to apprise itself of the facts and coordinate its activities with other parts of the system with a view towards substantive political change of the sort that must pre-empt any substantive change in the normative and institutional frameworks through which to implement human rights. Its strategy should take into account both initiatives on Burma in other peak bodies, including the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as the work undertaken by a range of agencies within Burma.
# # #
About the ALRC: The Asian Legal Resource Centre is an independent regional non-governmental organisation holding general consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It is the sister organisation of the Asian Human Rights Commission. The Hong Kong-based group seeks to strengthen and encourage positive action on legal and human rights issues at the local and national levels throughout Asia.
Source: Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC)
Date: 24 Jun 2010
(Hong Kong, June 24, 2010) The un-rule of law and systemic corruption go hand-in-hand to deny human rights in Burma, the Asian Legal Resource Centre has told a peak United Nations body.
The centre on Thursday submitted a five-page document to the U.N. Human Rights Council in accordance with guidelines for review of member states' records under international law. It also submitted a 30-page annexe with summaries of 47 cases to support its major findings, and highlighted sections from the 2008 Constitution and some 19 laws.
According to the ALRC, contrary to the council's expectation that state parties develop the means to uphold international standards, Burma "lacks a normative framework to protect human rights".
The country has no independent and impartial judiciary, the Hong Kong-based regional body says. "Its police force is militarized. Gross human rights abuse is systemic. Avenues for effective redress are lacking," it concludes.
The centre describes the two major obstacles to implementation of human rights as an official perception "that the rule of law is a function of the executive and therefore that the role of the judiciary is to enforce policy rather than law" and systemic corruption.
It also condemns the new constitution of Burma, which will come into effect after a semi-elected parliament sits, as a norm-less document that negates all rights which it purports to guarantee.
According to the ALRC, the U.N. human rights body has failed to grasp the extent to which human rights abuse in Burma has become institutionalised through the criminal justice institutions and for this reason among others it is not equipped to propose or pursue meaningful strategies to change conditions there.
It cautions against the council presuming or pretending that it can do anything significant to improve the situation in Burma without corresponding significant political change, and urges it to work closely with other parts of the U.N. system towards both ends.
The centre notes that its observations are based on almost a decade of detailed study of the situation in Burma, and on expert examination and analysis of hundreds of cases.
Key findings from its submission follow. Both the submission and annexe are available in full on the ALRC website at: http://www.alrc.net/doc/mainfile.php/upr/
The Human Rights Council is scheduled to review Burma in 2011 at its 10th session. The deadline for groups holding consultative status to submit comments under the Universal Periodic Review process for that session is next month.
Download the full submission: ALRC-UPR-10-001-2010 & Annex
For media inquiries:
In English/French: Michael Anthony (Wellington, NZ), michael.anthony@ahrc.asia , +64 2 11027863 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting +64 2 11027863 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
In Burmese: Min Lwin Oo, +4798434085 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting +4798434085 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
KEY FINDINGS OF THE ALRC'S SUBMISSION TO THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL FOR THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW OF BURMA (MYANMAR)
1. Burma is not a party to most international human rights treaties. It has practically no domestic normative framework for the protection of human rights through the rule of law. Laws with limited provisions to protect rights are routinely ignored in practice and are formally negated through jurisprudence.
2. The preponderance of legislation in Burma is aimed not at the defence of human rights but at their denial. The State has retained and continues to use antiquated colonial-era and postcolonial statutes. Those include but are not limited to: Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, section 3; Emergency Provisions Act, 1950, section 5; Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, section 24(1); Immigration (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1947, section 13(1); Official Secrets Act, 1923, section 3(1); Penal Code, sections 124A, 153A, 186, 189, 211, 294, 295A, 332, 353, 505(b); Printers and Publishers Registration Law, 1962; the so-called State Protection Law, 1975; Tuition Law, 1984; and, Unlawful Associations Act, 1908, section 17(1). Since 1988, all laws have been passed as executive decrees, not through any legislative process. In this time, the laws that have been introduced to curtail human rights include: the so-called Anti-Subversion Law, 1996; Electronic Transactions Law, 2004; Organization Law, 1988; and, Television and Video Law, 1996.
3. The 2008 Constitution is in terms of human rights a norm-less constitution. Under its provisions, the armed forces are placed outside of judicial authority. The military, not the judiciary, is the constitution's guardian. The judiciary is separated from other branches of government only "to the extent possible". All rights are qualified with ambiguous language that permits exemptions under circumstances of the state's choosing. For instance, the right not to be held in custody for more than 24 hours before being brought before a magistrate, which already exists in the Criminal Procedure Code, is under the new constitution delimited by an exception for "matters on precautionary measures taken for the security of the Union or prevalence of law and order, peace and tranquillity in accord with the law in the interest of the public, or the matters permitted according to an existing law" (section 376). This provision effectively legalizes arbitrary detention of the sort that is already rife in Burma. Other provisions that purport to guarantee rights do so only to the extent permitted by other laws, and in so far as they do not threaten the security of the state or contravene undefined standards of public morality. The constitution allows for rights to be revoked at any time and for their suspension during a state of emergency. The cumulative effect of these qualifications is to render all guarantees of rights meaningless.
4. The police force in Burma operates as a paramilitary and intelligence agency under command of the armed forces. Policing functions are also shared among other parts of the state apparatus, including with executive councils at all levels that supervise and oversee other agencies, and with other local bodies, including the fire brigade and a government-organized mass group. At the same time, specialized agencies, in particular the Special Branch, operate as proxies for military intelligence, rather than as autonomous investigators of crime. Consequently, the characteristics of policing and prosecutions in Burma include: routine arbitrary arrest and detention; common use of torture and other forms of cruel and inhuman treatment, and frequent deaths in custody; coerced signing of documents that have no basis in law; baseless and duplicated charges; and fabricated cases.
5. As the courts are subordinate to the executive, they can neither function in accordance with the laws that they are purported to uphold nor in a manner that can defend, let alone implement human rights. Some of their features include closed and unreported trials; procedurally-incorrect and evidence-less cases; denial of defendants' rights and targeting of defence lawyers; and, lack of means for redress. Since 1962, the perception of successive governments in Burma has been that the role of the judiciary is not to protect rights but to enforce state policy. The rule of law is shorthand for the state's use of law and institutions of law to achieve whatever ends suit its purposes. It does not constitute a normative basis for the building of a regime of rights. Because this perception overrides specific qualities of the normative or institutional framework, it would be wrong to attribute to specific laws or agencies the authority to implement certain human rights. The authorit y of a law or institution is always delimited by a higher imperative, which means that the state party while passing laws, applying laws and establishing institutions to enforce laws does not actually feel beholden to those laws or institutions. Where its superior imperatives coincide with law, there is superficial coherence between executive policy and judicial activity. But where superior imperatives contradict law, they override it and the underlying incoherence in the system is manifest.
6. A major obstacle to the implementation of human rights in Burma is systemic corruption. Successive governments in Burma, including the current administration, have themselves acknowledged the incidence of corruption either directly or indirectly, including in the judiciary. However, because this corruption is intimately linked to the un-rule of law that the government has formalised and institutionalised, it cannot be addressed in any meaningful way. On the contrary, anecdotal evidence points to its persistent increase with the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the increase in market-style economics.
7. As substantive change to the situation of human rights in Burma will depend upon substantive political change, at present the U.N. Human Rights Council has very limited means to get involved in the implementing of measures to protect and uphold rights there. The Council should acknowledge these limitations rather than make unrealistic proposals and issue recommendations that will not be implemented for want of an enabling environment, or that will give a false appearance of progress.
8. Despite copious amounts of documentation narrating abuses of rights in Burma, the Council still has little detailed understanding of the institutional arrangements enabling abuse and the extent to which these are embedded in all parts of the state apparatus. It has practically no information on the endemic corruption that affects all institutions with which the Council is concerned when addressing questions of human rights implementation. The Council should consider how it can use the wider United Nations system to apprise itself of the facts and coordinate its activities with other parts of the system with a view towards substantive political change of the sort that must pre-empt any substantive change in the normative and institutional frameworks through which to implement human rights. Its strategy should take into account both initiatives on Burma in other peak bodies, including the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as the work undertaken by a range of agencies within Burma.
# # #
About the ALRC: The Asian Legal Resource Centre is an independent regional non-governmental organisation holding general consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It is the sister organisation of the Asian Human Rights Commission. The Hong Kong-based group seeks to strengthen and encourage positive action on legal and human rights issues at the local and national levels throughout Asia.
*****************************************************
The Irrawaddy - EC Favoring Pro-junta Ethnic Parties
By SAW YAN NAING - Friday, June 25, 2010
Burma's Election Commission (EC) appears to be approving only ethnic parties with close ties to the ruling junta to run in this year's election, while barring other parties linked to anti-regime groups, according to observers.
So far, a number of ethnic parties have been approved by the EC, including Karen, Mon, Shan, Pa-O and Palaung parties. However, three Kachin parties are still waiting for permission to run in the election, amid rumors that they will be rejected because of their ties to cease-fire groups.
The largest of the parties, the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), is led by Tu Ja, the former chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), which continues to resist the regime's efforts to transform itself into a border guard force under Burmese military command.
The KSPP says that it has no affiliation with the KIO, but the EC appears to believe otherwise, say observers.
Another Kachin-led party, the Northern Shan State Progressive Party, is also reportedly close to KIO leaders, while the United Democracy Party (Kachin State) is led by Kachin politicians who resigned from their former organization, the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K), after it decided to form a border guard force.
The regime seems to distrust the Kachin parties even though their leaders have resigned from their former organizations, said Awng Wa, a Kachin observer on the Sino-Burmese border.
“The regime think the parties are led by Kachin leaders who are anti-government,” he said.
In Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State, there are rumors that the Burmese authorities are seeking pro-regime Kachin politicians to form a new party and apply for registration.
Observers said that other ethnic parties that have been registered are close to the junta or pro-junta. Some of them are run by retired government servants, members of the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), or ethnic elders trusted by the regime.
Khin Htwe Myint, the chairperson of the National League for Democracy's branch in the Karen State capital of Hpa-an, said that the Kachin parties are unlike the Karen parties that have been approved by the EC. The Karen parties, such as Kayin People's Party (KPP) and the Union Karen League, have very good relations with the regime, she said.
Karen sources also said that most of the Karen parties leaders, like KPP leader Saw Simon Tha and Saw Khin Soe, a respected Karen elder who is campaigning for the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), are former government servants or educated Karen who support the regime.
Simon Tha became famous as a peace negotiator between Karen rebel groups and the Burmese regime. In 2004, he arranged peace talks in Rangoon between the Karen National Union, led by the late Gen Saw Bo Mya, and a government delegation led by former Burmese Premier Gen Khin Nyunt.
Saw Khin Soe once served as a military attache at the Burmese embassy in Tokyo. Karen sources said he could be given the post of Chief Minister of Karen State after the election.
Other ethnic parties, such as the All Mon Region Democracy Party (AMRDP), the ethnic Arakanese Rakhine State National Force of Myanmar (RSNFM) and the Pa-O National Organization (PNO), also have good relations with the regime. All of these parties have been granted permission by the EC to take part in the election.
The AMRDP is chaired by Nai Ngwe Thein, a Mon professor and former civil servant with close ties to the Burmese authorities. Another AMRDP committee member, Nai Seik, is also a member of the USDA.
The PNO is also a pro-junta organization, led by Aung Kham Hti, who attended the junta-sponsored National Convention.
Aye Tha Aung, a prominent Arakanese politician in Rangoon, said that the EC is obviously singling out pro-junta parties like the RSNFM for approval. The Arakanese party officially announced that it will cooperate with the USDA in the election.
According to Aye Tha Aung, these parties are only nominally ethnic, with most of their members coming from the USDA.
He said that the entire election process, including the election and party registration laws, is rigged to entrench the regime in power.
“That's why we are saying that the election will grant no rights for ethnic people,” he said.
By SAW YAN NAING - Friday, June 25, 2010
Burma's Election Commission (EC) appears to be approving only ethnic parties with close ties to the ruling junta to run in this year's election, while barring other parties linked to anti-regime groups, according to observers.
So far, a number of ethnic parties have been approved by the EC, including Karen, Mon, Shan, Pa-O and Palaung parties. However, three Kachin parties are still waiting for permission to run in the election, amid rumors that they will be rejected because of their ties to cease-fire groups.
The largest of the parties, the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), is led by Tu Ja, the former chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), which continues to resist the regime's efforts to transform itself into a border guard force under Burmese military command.
The KSPP says that it has no affiliation with the KIO, but the EC appears to believe otherwise, say observers.
Another Kachin-led party, the Northern Shan State Progressive Party, is also reportedly close to KIO leaders, while the United Democracy Party (Kachin State) is led by Kachin politicians who resigned from their former organization, the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K), after it decided to form a border guard force.
The regime seems to distrust the Kachin parties even though their leaders have resigned from their former organizations, said Awng Wa, a Kachin observer on the Sino-Burmese border.
“The regime think the parties are led by Kachin leaders who are anti-government,” he said.
In Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State, there are rumors that the Burmese authorities are seeking pro-regime Kachin politicians to form a new party and apply for registration.
Observers said that other ethnic parties that have been registered are close to the junta or pro-junta. Some of them are run by retired government servants, members of the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), or ethnic elders trusted by the regime.
Khin Htwe Myint, the chairperson of the National League for Democracy's branch in the Karen State capital of Hpa-an, said that the Kachin parties are unlike the Karen parties that have been approved by the EC. The Karen parties, such as Kayin People's Party (KPP) and the Union Karen League, have very good relations with the regime, she said.
Karen sources also said that most of the Karen parties leaders, like KPP leader Saw Simon Tha and Saw Khin Soe, a respected Karen elder who is campaigning for the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), are former government servants or educated Karen who support the regime.
Simon Tha became famous as a peace negotiator between Karen rebel groups and the Burmese regime. In 2004, he arranged peace talks in Rangoon between the Karen National Union, led by the late Gen Saw Bo Mya, and a government delegation led by former Burmese Premier Gen Khin Nyunt.
Saw Khin Soe once served as a military attache at the Burmese embassy in Tokyo. Karen sources said he could be given the post of Chief Minister of Karen State after the election.
Other ethnic parties, such as the All Mon Region Democracy Party (AMRDP), the ethnic Arakanese Rakhine State National Force of Myanmar (RSNFM) and the Pa-O National Organization (PNO), also have good relations with the regime. All of these parties have been granted permission by the EC to take part in the election.
The AMRDP is chaired by Nai Ngwe Thein, a Mon professor and former civil servant with close ties to the Burmese authorities. Another AMRDP committee member, Nai Seik, is also a member of the USDA.
The PNO is also a pro-junta organization, led by Aung Kham Hti, who attended the junta-sponsored National Convention.
Aye Tha Aung, a prominent Arakanese politician in Rangoon, said that the EC is obviously singling out pro-junta parties like the RSNFM for approval. The Arakanese party officially announced that it will cooperate with the USDA in the election.
According to Aye Tha Aung, these parties are only nominally ethnic, with most of their members coming from the USDA.
He said that the entire election process, including the election and party registration laws, is rigged to entrench the regime in power.
“That's why we are saying that the election will grant no rights for ethnic people,” he said.
*****************************************************
Junta Interrogates Political Prisoners on Election
By ZARNI MANN - Friday, June 25, 2010
The Burmese military junta has been interrogating political prisoners since early June about their opinions of the upcoming election and their intentions for future political activity, according to the families of political prisoners.
Than Than Win, the wife of Shwe Maung, a political prisoner being held in Mandalay Division, told The Irrawaddy that her husband said the special police came to his prison and asked him to give his opinion on the election and tell them whether he will continue his political activity when he gets released.
She said her husband, who was sentenced to six years in prison for his involvement in the 2007 Saffron Revolution, told the special police that, if necessary, he will enter politics again.
Shwe Maung was tortured when he was arrested, and now has a heart condition and back pain. His wife requested that the prison authorities give him a medical examination outside the prison, but the authorities refused.
The family of another political prisoner, Zaw Thet Htwe, also said the police have recently interrogated him. “The police asked Zaw Thet Htwe about his opinion of the election and what he is going to do when he gets outside,” they said.
Zaw Thet Htwe is being detained in Taungyi Township, the capital of Shan State. He was chief sports editor at a journal in Rangoon when he was sentenced in 2008 to nine years in prison for helping Cyclone Nargis victims in the Irrawaddy delta.
Ashin Gambira, a prominent monk and leader of the Saffron Revolution, has also been asked the same questions by authorities. Gambira was sentenced to 63 years in prison and is being held in Kalay prison, Sagaing Division.
There are 2,157 political prisoners in Burma, according to the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma (AAPP). Many of them were arrested in 2007 during the Saffron Revolution.
Many in the international community have called on the junta to release all political prisoners, including pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, before the election to be held late this year—the first election in Burma since 1990.
Although some political observers believe the junta will release a number of political prisoners before the election to improve its credibility with the international community, most believe the junta will release only low-profile political prisoners who won't oppose the junta or the election.
By ZARNI MANN - Friday, June 25, 2010
The Burmese military junta has been interrogating political prisoners since early June about their opinions of the upcoming election and their intentions for future political activity, according to the families of political prisoners.
Than Than Win, the wife of Shwe Maung, a political prisoner being held in Mandalay Division, told The Irrawaddy that her husband said the special police came to his prison and asked him to give his opinion on the election and tell them whether he will continue his political activity when he gets released.
She said her husband, who was sentenced to six years in prison for his involvement in the 2007 Saffron Revolution, told the special police that, if necessary, he will enter politics again.
Shwe Maung was tortured when he was arrested, and now has a heart condition and back pain. His wife requested that the prison authorities give him a medical examination outside the prison, but the authorities refused.
The family of another political prisoner, Zaw Thet Htwe, also said the police have recently interrogated him. “The police asked Zaw Thet Htwe about his opinion of the election and what he is going to do when he gets outside,” they said.
Zaw Thet Htwe is being detained in Taungyi Township, the capital of Shan State. He was chief sports editor at a journal in Rangoon when he was sentenced in 2008 to nine years in prison for helping Cyclone Nargis victims in the Irrawaddy delta.
Ashin Gambira, a prominent monk and leader of the Saffron Revolution, has also been asked the same questions by authorities. Gambira was sentenced to 63 years in prison and is being held in Kalay prison, Sagaing Division.
There are 2,157 political prisoners in Burma, according to the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma (AAPP). Many of them were arrested in 2007 during the Saffron Revolution.
Many in the international community have called on the junta to release all political prisoners, including pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, before the election to be held late this year—the first election in Burma since 1990.
Although some political observers believe the junta will release a number of political prisoners before the election to improve its credibility with the international community, most believe the junta will release only low-profile political prisoners who won't oppose the junta or the election.
*****************************************************
DVB News - Food aid cut to Thailand refugee camps
By NAW NOREEN
Published: 25 June 2010
Events have conspired to create a shortfall in funding for a prominent Thailand border aid group, meaning that food supplies to Burmese refugees in camps along the border is to be reduced.
A doubling in price of yellow bean, a critical foodstuff in camps along the Thai-Burma border that house some 140,000 refugees, means that from August this year the supply will be cut. The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) says that it hopes the measure will only be temporary, but the group is facing a US$2.5 million shortfall in funding for this year.
“It’s largely down the change in exchange rate [that has caused the price-rise], but while some donors have increased our funding, others have reduced it,” said Sally Thompson, deputy director of TBBC.
The absence of yellow bean, one of the three main foodstuffs in the camps, will reduce daily energy content to just below 2000 kilocalories, Thompson said, adding that the figure was “still within the maintenance level for the population”.
“In the short-term we do not expect to see a deterioration in the health of the refugees, but we will monitor this through various health agencies.”
Refugees continue to arrive in the camps on an almost daily basis, the majority from Karen state in eastern Burma where the opposition Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) has been fighting a 60-year war against the Burmese military government.
Thompson said that “it is essential that Thai authorities allow these people to seek asylum on Thai soil”, and that TBBC would look for ways to maintain donor interest in the refugee situation “because it is likely to be ongoing”.
But a man called Jipsy, who lives in the Mae La camp in Thailand’s Tha Song Yan district, said that the cut in food aid “will be difficult for the refugees who don’t have jobs”.
“Here, when you are given flour, then flour is your only food – the same thing applies to beans, whether some like eating it or not. So if [food] is no longer given, then it will
be difficult for some people,” he said.
It mirrors a similar situation during the world food crisis in 2007 when TBBC, which has been active on the Thai-Burma border in various forms since 1984, was forced to cut supplies to camps. This year’s food rationing will begin in August but implementation will be staggered across the camps, Thompson said.
By NAW NOREEN
Published: 25 June 2010
Events have conspired to create a shortfall in funding for a prominent Thailand border aid group, meaning that food supplies to Burmese refugees in camps along the border is to be reduced.
A doubling in price of yellow bean, a critical foodstuff in camps along the Thai-Burma border that house some 140,000 refugees, means that from August this year the supply will be cut. The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) says that it hopes the measure will only be temporary, but the group is facing a US$2.5 million shortfall in funding for this year.
“It’s largely down the change in exchange rate [that has caused the price-rise], but while some donors have increased our funding, others have reduced it,” said Sally Thompson, deputy director of TBBC.
The absence of yellow bean, one of the three main foodstuffs in the camps, will reduce daily energy content to just below 2000 kilocalories, Thompson said, adding that the figure was “still within the maintenance level for the population”.
“In the short-term we do not expect to see a deterioration in the health of the refugees, but we will monitor this through various health agencies.”
Refugees continue to arrive in the camps on an almost daily basis, the majority from Karen state in eastern Burma where the opposition Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) has been fighting a 60-year war against the Burmese military government.
Thompson said that “it is essential that Thai authorities allow these people to seek asylum on Thai soil”, and that TBBC would look for ways to maintain donor interest in the refugee situation “because it is likely to be ongoing”.
But a man called Jipsy, who lives in the Mae La camp in Thailand’s Tha Song Yan district, said that the cut in food aid “will be difficult for the refugees who don’t have jobs”.
“Here, when you are given flour, then flour is your only food – the same thing applies to beans, whether some like eating it or not. So if [food] is no longer given, then it will
be difficult for some people,” he said.
It mirrors a similar situation during the world food crisis in 2007 when TBBC, which has been active on the Thai-Burma border in various forms since 1984, was forced to cut supplies to camps. This year’s food rationing will begin in August but implementation will be staggered across the camps, Thompson said.
*****************************************************
No big policy shifts from new Australian PM, activists say
Friday, 25 June 2010 18:48 Kyaw Mya
New Delhi (Mizzima) - Burmese activists in Australia are not expecting any big foreign policy shifts on Burma, they said, after Julia Gillard was sworn in as the country’s first woman prime minister, vowing to bring changes to the government on the domestic front.
Labor Party incumbent Kevin Rudd stepped aside for his former deputy Gillard to take power early yesterday in an apparent bid to save face ahead of a party leadership vote he was assured he would lose.
It was a speedy exit for the first Labor prime minister to be ousted in his first term, spurred by party fears over recent polls that put the opposition ahead of Labor for the first time since January 2006, according to a June 3 Nielsen poll. National broadcaster ABC’s PM programme last night reported that: “A little under 24 hours passed between the time Ms Gillard was convinced to run and the moment she was elected unopposed.”
“The only change is the deputy prime minister and the prime minister so I don’t think there will be any dynamic changes in Burmese-related issues,” Dr. Myint Cho, a spokesman for Burma Campaign Australia, said.
Dr. Myint Cho added that Rudd’s position towards military-ruled Burma had been satisfactory because of his depth of knowledge on Burmese issues from his previous stint as shadow minister of foreign affairs.
“He worked very hard to draw [the] attention of parliamentarians and government to focus on Burmese issues,” he said. “When he was the opposition leader he promised me that if he restores [Labor to] the administration, he would try to lobby international communities to introduce the idea of a global arms embargo and commissions of inquiry into crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the Burmese regime. When he became prime minister he did as he had spoken.”
Foreign Affairs Minister Stephen Smith told Parliament in an update on Burma in February that Australia had placed financial sanctions on the military regime in 2007 – a response to the violent crackdown on protests led by monks against the junta, the “saffron revolution”. It also recently began engaging the regime on counter-narcotics, human trafficking and disaster relief challenges.
He said Australia welcomed the US approach that combined engagement, sanctions and humanitarian assistance, and outlined that Australian aid was to increase over the next three years to A$50 million (US$43.3 million) annually. Last year, Aung Sang Suu Kyi asked the junta for a meeting with representatives from the European Union, the US and Australia to discuss the withdrawal of international sanctions.
Australia agreed with US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton that to lift sanctions would send the wrong message but agreed not to expand them. Australia continues to push for dialogue with the Burmese authorities, Smith said.
Though Gillard is expected to leave Australia’s external relations unchanged, she is under pressure from the Labor Party, keen to yet again appeal to key voters – sections of the Australian working and lower-middle classes – in a crackdown on asylum-seeking boatpeople. Gillard said she understood Australians’ concerns over the number of boat arrivals and pledged stronger border control, according to a report in The Sydney Morning Herald.
Unlike Rudd, a former diplomat and foreign policy expert, Gillard has little experience in the field. Gillard’s holding of the portfolios of education, employment and workplace relations and social inclusion, led Dr. Myint Cho to conclude that she would not be as interested in Burmese issues as was her predecessor.
“But the good thing is there are lots of Labor MPs [members of parliament] who are interested in Burmese issues,” he said. “As long as foreign minister Stephen Smith is in position, I don’t worry about their [Australia’s] position on Burma issues.”
But activist groups working on Burmese issues disagree with Australia’s stasis regarding sanctions, and have sought their widening, citing Australian investment in Burma’s energy resources, which they said supported a brutal regime.
Australia’s Twinza Oil is the parent company of Danford Equities Corporation, which is conducting tests in the Yetagun East Block, in the Gulf of Martaban, after signing a production exploration contract with the state-owned Burma (Myanmar) Oil and Gas Enterprise in November 2006, according to Burma Campaign Australia.
Twinza Oil’s project will provide the military regime with an estimated US$2.5 billion, and it is believed that with the help of such investments the regime’s nuclear ambitions are also proceeding, it said.
On the deal, Sharan Burrow, president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions wrote in the New Matilda online journal last year that: “By itself, this contract with an Australian company promises the Burmese junta enough money to run roughly one quarter of its military – the world’s 12th-largest – for a decade.”
That is also a lot of money that will never reach Burmese people.
Smith also told the Australian Parliament in February that half of Burma’s roughly 50 million people live in extreme poverty, which means they cannot meet the basic needs for food, water, shelter, sanitation, and health care. The World Bank defines extreme poverty as living on less than US$1.25 per day.
Friday, 25 June 2010 18:48 Kyaw Mya
New Delhi (Mizzima) - Burmese activists in Australia are not expecting any big foreign policy shifts on Burma, they said, after Julia Gillard was sworn in as the country’s first woman prime minister, vowing to bring changes to the government on the domestic front.
Labor Party incumbent Kevin Rudd stepped aside for his former deputy Gillard to take power early yesterday in an apparent bid to save face ahead of a party leadership vote he was assured he would lose.
It was a speedy exit for the first Labor prime minister to be ousted in his first term, spurred by party fears over recent polls that put the opposition ahead of Labor for the first time since January 2006, according to a June 3 Nielsen poll. National broadcaster ABC’s PM programme last night reported that: “A little under 24 hours passed between the time Ms Gillard was convinced to run and the moment she was elected unopposed.”
“The only change is the deputy prime minister and the prime minister so I don’t think there will be any dynamic changes in Burmese-related issues,” Dr. Myint Cho, a spokesman for Burma Campaign Australia, said.
Dr. Myint Cho added that Rudd’s position towards military-ruled Burma had been satisfactory because of his depth of knowledge on Burmese issues from his previous stint as shadow minister of foreign affairs.
“He worked very hard to draw [the] attention of parliamentarians and government to focus on Burmese issues,” he said. “When he was the opposition leader he promised me that if he restores [Labor to] the administration, he would try to lobby international communities to introduce the idea of a global arms embargo and commissions of inquiry into crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the Burmese regime. When he became prime minister he did as he had spoken.”
Foreign Affairs Minister Stephen Smith told Parliament in an update on Burma in February that Australia had placed financial sanctions on the military regime in 2007 – a response to the violent crackdown on protests led by monks against the junta, the “saffron revolution”. It also recently began engaging the regime on counter-narcotics, human trafficking and disaster relief challenges.
He said Australia welcomed the US approach that combined engagement, sanctions and humanitarian assistance, and outlined that Australian aid was to increase over the next three years to A$50 million (US$43.3 million) annually. Last year, Aung Sang Suu Kyi asked the junta for a meeting with representatives from the European Union, the US and Australia to discuss the withdrawal of international sanctions.
Australia agreed with US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton that to lift sanctions would send the wrong message but agreed not to expand them. Australia continues to push for dialogue with the Burmese authorities, Smith said.
Though Gillard is expected to leave Australia’s external relations unchanged, she is under pressure from the Labor Party, keen to yet again appeal to key voters – sections of the Australian working and lower-middle classes – in a crackdown on asylum-seeking boatpeople. Gillard said she understood Australians’ concerns over the number of boat arrivals and pledged stronger border control, according to a report in The Sydney Morning Herald.
Unlike Rudd, a former diplomat and foreign policy expert, Gillard has little experience in the field. Gillard’s holding of the portfolios of education, employment and workplace relations and social inclusion, led Dr. Myint Cho to conclude that she would not be as interested in Burmese issues as was her predecessor.
“But the good thing is there are lots of Labor MPs [members of parliament] who are interested in Burmese issues,” he said. “As long as foreign minister Stephen Smith is in position, I don’t worry about their [Australia’s] position on Burma issues.”
But activist groups working on Burmese issues disagree with Australia’s stasis regarding sanctions, and have sought their widening, citing Australian investment in Burma’s energy resources, which they said supported a brutal regime.
Australia’s Twinza Oil is the parent company of Danford Equities Corporation, which is conducting tests in the Yetagun East Block, in the Gulf of Martaban, after signing a production exploration contract with the state-owned Burma (Myanmar) Oil and Gas Enterprise in November 2006, according to Burma Campaign Australia.
Twinza Oil’s project will provide the military regime with an estimated US$2.5 billion, and it is believed that with the help of such investments the regime’s nuclear ambitions are also proceeding, it said.
On the deal, Sharan Burrow, president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions wrote in the New Matilda online journal last year that: “By itself, this contract with an Australian company promises the Burmese junta enough money to run roughly one quarter of its military – the world’s 12th-largest – for a decade.”
That is also a lot of money that will never reach Burmese people.
Smith also told the Australian Parliament in February that half of Burma’s roughly 50 million people live in extreme poverty, which means they cannot meet the basic needs for food, water, shelter, sanitation, and health care. The World Bank defines extreme poverty as living on less than US$1.25 per day.
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