Lawyers set to lodge Suu Kyi appeal
1 hr 35 mins ago
YANGON (AFP) – Lawyers for Myanmar pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi said they would lodge an appeal Thursday against her conviction on charges relating to an incident in which an American man swam to her home.
The Nobel laureate was ordered to spend 18 more months under house arrest after a court on August 11 found her guilty of breaking security laws by giving shelter to US national John Yettaw at her lakeside residence.
"We will submit the appeal this afternoon. Aung San Suu Kyi's conviction is not in accordance with the law but we will have to wait to see whether the court agrees to hear the appeal," her main lawyer Kyi Win told AFP.
He said the appeal would focus on the fact that a 1974 constitution under which the ruling junta had detained Suu Kyi had been superseded by a new constitution that was approved in a controversial referendum last year.
"Altogether there are 11 reasons for the appeal, but the main thing we will point out is about the constitution," Kyi Win said.
The 64-year-old Suu Kyi had insisted on her innocence during the trial held at Yangon's notorious Insein Prison, saying that she allowed former military veteran Yettaw to stay for two nights at her home because he was ill.
Yettaw was sentenced to seven years' hard labour for the stunt in early May but was freed after a visit by US senator Jim Webb last month, on what the regime said were compassionate grounds because of health problems.
The American said he was on a "mission from God" to save Suu Kyi from assassination.
"Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is not guilty. The main person is the intruder," Nyan Win, another of her lawyers and also the spokesman for her National League for Democracy (NLD), told reporters Thursday.
Suu Kyi's conviction unleashed a wave of international outrage, with the United Nations Security Council expressing "serious concern" and the European Union extending sanctions against the junta.
US President Barack Obama described the case against her as a "show trial."
The NLD won elections in 1990 but was never allowed to take power and she has been detained by the junta for 14 of the past 20 years.
Suu Kyi now plans to renovate her home to improve security and keep out other possible trespassers, Nyan Win said Monday.
1 hr 35 mins ago
YANGON (AFP) – Lawyers for Myanmar pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi said they would lodge an appeal Thursday against her conviction on charges relating to an incident in which an American man swam to her home.
The Nobel laureate was ordered to spend 18 more months under house arrest after a court on August 11 found her guilty of breaking security laws by giving shelter to US national John Yettaw at her lakeside residence.
"We will submit the appeal this afternoon. Aung San Suu Kyi's conviction is not in accordance with the law but we will have to wait to see whether the court agrees to hear the appeal," her main lawyer Kyi Win told AFP.
He said the appeal would focus on the fact that a 1974 constitution under which the ruling junta had detained Suu Kyi had been superseded by a new constitution that was approved in a controversial referendum last year.
"Altogether there are 11 reasons for the appeal, but the main thing we will point out is about the constitution," Kyi Win said.
The 64-year-old Suu Kyi had insisted on her innocence during the trial held at Yangon's notorious Insein Prison, saying that she allowed former military veteran Yettaw to stay for two nights at her home because he was ill.
Yettaw was sentenced to seven years' hard labour for the stunt in early May but was freed after a visit by US senator Jim Webb last month, on what the regime said were compassionate grounds because of health problems.
The American said he was on a "mission from God" to save Suu Kyi from assassination.
"Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is not guilty. The main person is the intruder," Nyan Win, another of her lawyers and also the spokesman for her National League for Democracy (NLD), told reporters Thursday.
Suu Kyi's conviction unleashed a wave of international outrage, with the United Nations Security Council expressing "serious concern" and the European Union extending sanctions against the junta.
US President Barack Obama described the case against her as a "show trial."
The NLD won elections in 1990 but was never allowed to take power and she has been detained by the junta for 14 of the past 20 years.
Suu Kyi now plans to renovate her home to improve security and keep out other possible trespassers, Nyan Win said Monday.
***************************************************************
Daewoo puts Myanmar gas fields investment at $3 bln
Wed Sep 2, 2009 6:21am EDT
SEOUL, Sept 2 (Reuters) - South Korea's Daewoo International (047050.KS) said on Wednesday a consortium led by the energy developing company will invest 4 trillion won ($3.2 billion) to develop Myanmar gas fields.
The gas development plan will allow the consortium to supply natural gas to China's top state oil and gas firm, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) for 30 years, with a peak daily production of 500 million cubic feet, or about 3.8 million tonnes annually.
Daewoo spokesman Lee Bong-ju said by telephone that the investment would reach 4 trillion won, correcting the previous figure of $5.6 billion given by an unnamed official of Korea Gas Corp (036460.KS), a member of the consortium. [ID:nSEO55947]
The supply, due from 2013 from the Shwe and ShwePhyu fields in Myanmar's A-1 offshore block and Mya field in A-3 offshore block, amounts to around 7 percent of China's current gas consumption of 7.3 billion cubic feet per day and is expected to grow rapidly.
Daewoo has a 51 percent stake in the consortium and the other shareholders are India's Oil and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC.BO) with 17 percent, Myanmar Oil & Gas Enterprise with 15 percent, India's GAIL (GAIL.BO) with 8.5 percent, and Korea Gas Corp with 8.5 percent.
Wed Sep 2, 2009 6:21am EDT
SEOUL, Sept 2 (Reuters) - South Korea's Daewoo International (047050.KS) said on Wednesday a consortium led by the energy developing company will invest 4 trillion won ($3.2 billion) to develop Myanmar gas fields.
The gas development plan will allow the consortium to supply natural gas to China's top state oil and gas firm, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) for 30 years, with a peak daily production of 500 million cubic feet, or about 3.8 million tonnes annually.
Daewoo spokesman Lee Bong-ju said by telephone that the investment would reach 4 trillion won, correcting the previous figure of $5.6 billion given by an unnamed official of Korea Gas Corp (036460.KS), a member of the consortium. [ID:nSEO55947]
The supply, due from 2013 from the Shwe and ShwePhyu fields in Myanmar's A-1 offshore block and Mya field in A-3 offshore block, amounts to around 7 percent of China's current gas consumption of 7.3 billion cubic feet per day and is expected to grow rapidly.
Daewoo has a 51 percent stake in the consortium and the other shareholders are India's Oil and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC.BO) with 17 percent, Myanmar Oil & Gas Enterprise with 15 percent, India's GAIL (GAIL.BO) with 8.5 percent, and Korea Gas Corp with 8.5 percent.
***************************************************************
Analysis: US reignites debate over Myanmar sanctions
YANGON, 3 September 2009 (IRIN) - An expected review of US policy towards poverty-stricken Myanmar has reignited the debate over the effectiveness of sanctions against the country.
The persecution of Myanmar's opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi - who has spent about 14 of the last 20 years in detention - and the harassment of her pro-democracy party, was the underlying rationale for sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) in 1996 and the US a year later.
But in an acknowledgment that sanctions were failing, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a review of Washington's stance towards Myanmar in February. The review is expected to be completed soon.
"Clearly, the path we have taken in imposing sanctions hasn't influenced the Burmese junta," she said.
The news was followed by an unprecedented meeting on 15 August between the head of Myanmar's military government, Senior General Than Shwe, and US Senator Jim Webb, the highest-ranking US official to hold talks with the leader.
The meeting came days after Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced to a further 18 months of house arrest, sparking further EU sanctions.
For those who favour engagement over sanctions, the meeting between the US senator and the senior general in Naypyidaw raised hopes of a breakthrough.
But for those who believe sanctions the government offer the best way to free the opposition leader, and promote democracy and human rights in Myanmar, the encounter was an act of appeasement.
Lack of funding
Myanmar is one of the least-funded countries worldwide, and its citizens are among the poorest in Southeast Asia.
A 2005 UN Development Programme (UNDP) household survey found that one-third of the population lives below the poverty line. But Aung San Suu Kyi's continued detention remains a key obstacle for donors.
In 2007, the nation received just US$4 per person in overseas development assistance, less than any of the poorest 50 countries, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Cambodia and Laos - countries with similar poverty levels - received $47 and $68 respectively for the same period.
And while Myanmar saw a rare infusion of donor money after Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, a disaster that left close to 140,000 people dead, more than a year later, recovery efforts remain critically under-funded.
Of the $691 million needed for the Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan, only $100 million has been raised to address health, shelter, water and sanitation, and agriculture needs.
Sanctions have a role
However, Burmese activists still favour sanctions as a form of political pressure, and argue that lifting them would legitimize the military government. They also maintain that the measures only affect people and businesses linked to the junta.
The EU has a policy of "targeted measures", including a ban on arms sales and visas, and asset freezes.
A senior British Foreign Office official with the Southeast Asia department in London said these sanctions "send a strong political message about our determination to see real democracy established, and human rights respected".
Rather than sanctions affecting living standards, it is "poor governance and economic mismanagement that has resulted in the problems Myanmar faces today", said the official, who requested anonymity in line with government policy.
He stressed that EU sanctions against the country's gem, mining and timber sectors were "specifically targeted at the business interests of the military regime and those associated with them, rather than ordinary people".
Sean Turnell, an expert on Myanmar's economy from Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, said there was no doubt that the junta "got the message" from targeted sanctions.
"Especially effective in this context are the [US and EU] visa bans, combined with the financial sanctions imposed by the US," said Turnell.
"Together they provide a substantial - though not entirely insurmountable - barrier to connected figures sending their kids to US colleges. This hurts," he said.
But while Turnell agreed that sanctions had an impact by sending "signals" to the junta, he conceded that they had failed to achieve any significant changes in its behaviour.
"I don't believe anything can," he added.
Engagement preferred
Senator Webb followed his visit by writing that sanctions had been "overwhelmingly counterproductive", and argued for greater engagement with the Myanmar government.
"The ruling regime has become more entrenched and at the same time more isolated. The Burmese people have lost access to the outside world," Webb wrote on 25 August in The New York Times.
Sanctions have failed to persuade the junta to institute political reform and have made the situation "demonstrably worse", according to Derek Tonkin, a retired British diplomat to the region and veteran Myanmar observer.
"The counterproductive nature of sanctions outweighs any benefits perceived, such as 'sending a strong message' and 'punishing the regime'," Tonkin told IRIN.
The west "has lost political influence with Myanmar and has surrendered its economic and commercial interests to countries in the region" as a result of sanctions, he said.
Tonkin, a long-time critic of sanctions - except on the sale of arms - said a better approach would be for the US and the EU to review their sanctions policies.
"They should then remove those sanctions which demonstrably affect the Burmese people, and allow the ADB [Asian Development Bank], World Bank and IMF to complete a substantive reappraisal of what needs to be done to restore economic and financial stability," he said.
"Isolation and ostracism can never promote democratic reforms in the country," said Tonkin.
YANGON, 3 September 2009 (IRIN) - An expected review of US policy towards poverty-stricken Myanmar has reignited the debate over the effectiveness of sanctions against the country.
The persecution of Myanmar's opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi - who has spent about 14 of the last 20 years in detention - and the harassment of her pro-democracy party, was the underlying rationale for sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) in 1996 and the US a year later.
But in an acknowledgment that sanctions were failing, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a review of Washington's stance towards Myanmar in February. The review is expected to be completed soon.
"Clearly, the path we have taken in imposing sanctions hasn't influenced the Burmese junta," she said.
The news was followed by an unprecedented meeting on 15 August between the head of Myanmar's military government, Senior General Than Shwe, and US Senator Jim Webb, the highest-ranking US official to hold talks with the leader.
The meeting came days after Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced to a further 18 months of house arrest, sparking further EU sanctions.
For those who favour engagement over sanctions, the meeting between the US senator and the senior general in Naypyidaw raised hopes of a breakthrough.
But for those who believe sanctions the government offer the best way to free the opposition leader, and promote democracy and human rights in Myanmar, the encounter was an act of appeasement.
Lack of funding
Myanmar is one of the least-funded countries worldwide, and its citizens are among the poorest in Southeast Asia.
A 2005 UN Development Programme (UNDP) household survey found that one-third of the population lives below the poverty line. But Aung San Suu Kyi's continued detention remains a key obstacle for donors.
In 2007, the nation received just US$4 per person in overseas development assistance, less than any of the poorest 50 countries, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Cambodia and Laos - countries with similar poverty levels - received $47 and $68 respectively for the same period.
And while Myanmar saw a rare infusion of donor money after Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, a disaster that left close to 140,000 people dead, more than a year later, recovery efforts remain critically under-funded.
Of the $691 million needed for the Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan, only $100 million has been raised to address health, shelter, water and sanitation, and agriculture needs.
Sanctions have a role
However, Burmese activists still favour sanctions as a form of political pressure, and argue that lifting them would legitimize the military government. They also maintain that the measures only affect people and businesses linked to the junta.
The EU has a policy of "targeted measures", including a ban on arms sales and visas, and asset freezes.
A senior British Foreign Office official with the Southeast Asia department in London said these sanctions "send a strong political message about our determination to see real democracy established, and human rights respected".
Rather than sanctions affecting living standards, it is "poor governance and economic mismanagement that has resulted in the problems Myanmar faces today", said the official, who requested anonymity in line with government policy.
He stressed that EU sanctions against the country's gem, mining and timber sectors were "specifically targeted at the business interests of the military regime and those associated with them, rather than ordinary people".
Sean Turnell, an expert on Myanmar's economy from Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, said there was no doubt that the junta "got the message" from targeted sanctions.
"Especially effective in this context are the [US and EU] visa bans, combined with the financial sanctions imposed by the US," said Turnell.
"Together they provide a substantial - though not entirely insurmountable - barrier to connected figures sending their kids to US colleges. This hurts," he said.
But while Turnell agreed that sanctions had an impact by sending "signals" to the junta, he conceded that they had failed to achieve any significant changes in its behaviour.
"I don't believe anything can," he added.
Engagement preferred
Senator Webb followed his visit by writing that sanctions had been "overwhelmingly counterproductive", and argued for greater engagement with the Myanmar government.
"The ruling regime has become more entrenched and at the same time more isolated. The Burmese people have lost access to the outside world," Webb wrote on 25 August in The New York Times.
Sanctions have failed to persuade the junta to institute political reform and have made the situation "demonstrably worse", according to Derek Tonkin, a retired British diplomat to the region and veteran Myanmar observer.
"The counterproductive nature of sanctions outweighs any benefits perceived, such as 'sending a strong message' and 'punishing the regime'," Tonkin told IRIN.
The west "has lost political influence with Myanmar and has surrendered its economic and commercial interests to countries in the region" as a result of sanctions, he said.
Tonkin, a long-time critic of sanctions - except on the sale of arms - said a better approach would be for the US and the EU to review their sanctions policies.
"They should then remove those sanctions which demonstrably affect the Burmese people, and allow the ADB [Asian Development Bank], World Bank and IMF to complete a substantive reappraisal of what needs to be done to restore economic and financial stability," he said.
"Isolation and ostracism can never promote democratic reforms in the country," said Tonkin.
***************************************************************
Inner City Press - At UN, Myanmar Languishes in Council's Footnotes, Those Fleeing into China Are UNProtected
By Matthew Russell Lee
UNITED NATIONS, September 2 -- Myanmar is in the footnotes of the UN Security Council's agenda for September, during which U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice will serve as Council president. On Wednesday at the UN, Inner City Press asked Ambassador Rice why Myanmar is in the footnotes, to confirm reports that she warned Ban Ki-moon against visiting the country lest it just support Than Shwe, and to address Norwegian diplomat Mona Juul's leaked memo that Ban lacks "moral authority" on Myanmar, like Sri Lanka. Video here, from Minute 21:50.
Ambassador Rice replied that "Myanmar -- which we call Burma... is in the footnote because a number of members of the Council, including the United States, felt it is timely to stay focused on events there." She said that Aung San Suu Kyi's appeal of her sentence might result in an outcome that the Council might want to consider.
Ms. Rice did not address the Juul memo's critique of Ban's performance, and said that her "advice to the Secretary General, it would be wise for me to keep it private." Video here, from Minute 23:47. Rather, she noted that Ban said he received commitments by the Burmese leadership for "swift positive political steps."
In fact, the military regime in Myanmar has gone on a Sri Lanka-like assault into rebel held territory, resulting in people fleeing across the border into China.
At Wednesday's noon briefing, Inner City Press asked UN Associate Spokesperson Farhan Haq what the UN is doing, if anything, about these flows, and if the UN considers those fleeing to be refugees.
Haq didn't answer, except to say that the UN refugee agency UNHCR had answers. But journalists who have sought answers from UNCHR since Monday on this Myanmar - China question have gotten nothing. The analysis is that while UNHCR will criticize less powerful countries, for those who flee into China, whether from North Korea or Myanmar, UNHCR and the UN offer no protection. And given China's veto on the Security Council, that issue will never make it only to the full agenda, and is not even among the aspects of Myanmar which are in this month's agenda's footnotes. Watch this site.
From the U.S. Mission to the UN's transcript
Inner City Press: Myanmar's in the footnotes of your program, and it's been reported that you warned the Secretary-General against going this summer to Myanmar, that it might buttress the regime in some way. Could -- so Myanmar also shows up in this Mona Juul memo that many people have spoken about, talking about where the U.N. stands in terms of what she called a lack of moral authority on Myanmar, Sri Lanka and even Sudan. Can you say, I guess, either -- you know, why is it in the footnotes? What do you expect to come up? Do you -- can you confirm sort of your thinking on the Secretary-General's trip to Myanmar?
Ambassador Rice: Let me begin with Myanmar, which we call Burma, in my national hat. It's in the footnotes because members of the Council, including the United States, felt it timely to stay focused on events there.
We're aware that Aung San Suu Kyi has appealed her sentence, and that could potentially result in an outcome that the Council might want to consider. In addition, the Secretary-General has said, as a result of his meetings there, that he received commitments from the leadership to take very swiftly positive political steps, including the release of all political prisoners. And so we think it merits continued inclusion in the footnotes of the Council agenda for the month of September.
Just to finish the answer, with respect to my own advice or counsel provided to the Secretary-General, I think it would be wise for me to keep that private. So I'm not going to discuss press reports in that regard.
* * *
At UN, American Month of Rice Astride the Council Starts, Questions to be Asked
By Matthew Russell Lee
UNITED NATIONS, September 2, with updates -- Today at the UN is the beginning of the "American month," as some here are calling it. President Barack Obama, after nine months, will come to the UN, for speeches and climate change and to chair a meeting of the Security Council. His Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice will be president of the Council for the whole month, beginning with consultations with the other 15 members on the program of work, then a briefing of the press.
Many in the UN press corps, albeit not by name, have complained about lack of access to Ms. Rice. She arrives, unlike any other Council member, surrounded by Security. She rarely takes questions at the stakeout, and meets off the record with small groups of select reporters. There is hope, beginning with Wednesday's briefing, that this month will be a new begining, or the beginning as one reporter put it.
Beyond the staples of the Middle East and North Korea, non-proliferation and Darfur, Ms. Rice can expect to face the fallout of critiques of the UN and Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. As synthesized in the leaked memo of Norwegian deputy ambassador Mona Juul, Ban failed this year in Myanmar, which is on the Council's formal agenda, and in Sri Lanka, which even as thousands of civilians were being killed was confined to informal Council session held in the UN basement. Now that a video of the Sri Lankan Army committing summary executions has surfaced, one wonder what Ms. Rice has to say on that topic, and on Libya.
The Wednesday morning meeting at which the program of work was adopted was shorter than usual. "Just breakfast," as one Council member put it. It's said that in the Council's meeting on the Haiti mission, Bill Clinton may come. A Council member who had adopted Haiti said he will fly back to New York that day, arriving at the airport at 3 p.m. for a 4 p.m. Council session. Better get a helicopter, someone said.
The overlap of this month's General Assembly with the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh is causing major planning agita for delegations. One Latin country whose President will attend both meetings said that a sort of buddy system is being implemented, paired Presidential planes flying into the otherwise closed down Pittsburgh airport. Coming right after the UN's climate session, will any of it be carbon offset? Watch this space.
Update of 12:36 p.m. -- Amb. Rice, introduced by Mark Kornblau, begins by pitching the Obama-chaired September 24 meeting. "Consulting with colleagues on a potential product" from the meeting. Kornblau's ground rule is this will be 30 minutes, and questions should focus first on the "work of the Council."
12:38 -- 2d issue is Liberia mandate renewal, including meeting with troop contributing countries. There's a recent scandal in Liberia of an American UN employee under investigation for child sex abuse. 3d is Haiti - and yes, Bill Clinton will come.
12:40 -- 4th is Women, Peace and Security, meeting on September 30 with Hillary Clinton coming. But will the U.S. support a new ASG post? Rice says "a new SRSG" under discussion. 5th is Afghanistan.
Update of 12:59 p.m. -- Inner City Press asked Amb. Rice about Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and the Mona Juul memo, and will report her answers elsewhere on this site.
By Matthew Russell Lee
UNITED NATIONS, September 2 -- Myanmar is in the footnotes of the UN Security Council's agenda for September, during which U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice will serve as Council president. On Wednesday at the UN, Inner City Press asked Ambassador Rice why Myanmar is in the footnotes, to confirm reports that she warned Ban Ki-moon against visiting the country lest it just support Than Shwe, and to address Norwegian diplomat Mona Juul's leaked memo that Ban lacks "moral authority" on Myanmar, like Sri Lanka. Video here, from Minute 21:50.
Ambassador Rice replied that "Myanmar -- which we call Burma... is in the footnote because a number of members of the Council, including the United States, felt it is timely to stay focused on events there." She said that Aung San Suu Kyi's appeal of her sentence might result in an outcome that the Council might want to consider.
Ms. Rice did not address the Juul memo's critique of Ban's performance, and said that her "advice to the Secretary General, it would be wise for me to keep it private." Video here, from Minute 23:47. Rather, she noted that Ban said he received commitments by the Burmese leadership for "swift positive political steps."
In fact, the military regime in Myanmar has gone on a Sri Lanka-like assault into rebel held territory, resulting in people fleeing across the border into China.
At Wednesday's noon briefing, Inner City Press asked UN Associate Spokesperson Farhan Haq what the UN is doing, if anything, about these flows, and if the UN considers those fleeing to be refugees.
Haq didn't answer, except to say that the UN refugee agency UNHCR had answers. But journalists who have sought answers from UNCHR since Monday on this Myanmar - China question have gotten nothing. The analysis is that while UNHCR will criticize less powerful countries, for those who flee into China, whether from North Korea or Myanmar, UNHCR and the UN offer no protection. And given China's veto on the Security Council, that issue will never make it only to the full agenda, and is not even among the aspects of Myanmar which are in this month's agenda's footnotes. Watch this site.
From the U.S. Mission to the UN's transcript
Inner City Press: Myanmar's in the footnotes of your program, and it's been reported that you warned the Secretary-General against going this summer to Myanmar, that it might buttress the regime in some way. Could -- so Myanmar also shows up in this Mona Juul memo that many people have spoken about, talking about where the U.N. stands in terms of what she called a lack of moral authority on Myanmar, Sri Lanka and even Sudan. Can you say, I guess, either -- you know, why is it in the footnotes? What do you expect to come up? Do you -- can you confirm sort of your thinking on the Secretary-General's trip to Myanmar?
Ambassador Rice: Let me begin with Myanmar, which we call Burma, in my national hat. It's in the footnotes because members of the Council, including the United States, felt it timely to stay focused on events there.
We're aware that Aung San Suu Kyi has appealed her sentence, and that could potentially result in an outcome that the Council might want to consider. In addition, the Secretary-General has said, as a result of his meetings there, that he received commitments from the leadership to take very swiftly positive political steps, including the release of all political prisoners. And so we think it merits continued inclusion in the footnotes of the Council agenda for the month of September.
Just to finish the answer, with respect to my own advice or counsel provided to the Secretary-General, I think it would be wise for me to keep that private. So I'm not going to discuss press reports in that regard.
* * *
At UN, American Month of Rice Astride the Council Starts, Questions to be Asked
By Matthew Russell Lee
UNITED NATIONS, September 2, with updates -- Today at the UN is the beginning of the "American month," as some here are calling it. President Barack Obama, after nine months, will come to the UN, for speeches and climate change and to chair a meeting of the Security Council. His Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice will be president of the Council for the whole month, beginning with consultations with the other 15 members on the program of work, then a briefing of the press.
Many in the UN press corps, albeit not by name, have complained about lack of access to Ms. Rice. She arrives, unlike any other Council member, surrounded by Security. She rarely takes questions at the stakeout, and meets off the record with small groups of select reporters. There is hope, beginning with Wednesday's briefing, that this month will be a new begining, or the beginning as one reporter put it.
Beyond the staples of the Middle East and North Korea, non-proliferation and Darfur, Ms. Rice can expect to face the fallout of critiques of the UN and Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. As synthesized in the leaked memo of Norwegian deputy ambassador Mona Juul, Ban failed this year in Myanmar, which is on the Council's formal agenda, and in Sri Lanka, which even as thousands of civilians were being killed was confined to informal Council session held in the UN basement. Now that a video of the Sri Lankan Army committing summary executions has surfaced, one wonder what Ms. Rice has to say on that topic, and on Libya.
The Wednesday morning meeting at which the program of work was adopted was shorter than usual. "Just breakfast," as one Council member put it. It's said that in the Council's meeting on the Haiti mission, Bill Clinton may come. A Council member who had adopted Haiti said he will fly back to New York that day, arriving at the airport at 3 p.m. for a 4 p.m. Council session. Better get a helicopter, someone said.
The overlap of this month's General Assembly with the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh is causing major planning agita for delegations. One Latin country whose President will attend both meetings said that a sort of buddy system is being implemented, paired Presidential planes flying into the otherwise closed down Pittsburgh airport. Coming right after the UN's climate session, will any of it be carbon offset? Watch this space.
Update of 12:36 p.m. -- Amb. Rice, introduced by Mark Kornblau, begins by pitching the Obama-chaired September 24 meeting. "Consulting with colleagues on a potential product" from the meeting. Kornblau's ground rule is this will be 30 minutes, and questions should focus first on the "work of the Council."
12:38 -- 2d issue is Liberia mandate renewal, including meeting with troop contributing countries. There's a recent scandal in Liberia of an American UN employee under investigation for child sex abuse. 3d is Haiti - and yes, Bill Clinton will come.
12:40 -- 4th is Women, Peace and Security, meeting on September 30 with Hillary Clinton coming. But will the U.S. support a new ASG post? Rice says "a new SRSG" under discussion. 5th is Afghanistan.
Update of 12:59 p.m. -- Inner City Press asked Amb. Rice about Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and the Mona Juul memo, and will report her answers elsewhere on this site.
***************************************************************
Inter Press Service News Agency
BURMA: ILO Turns Spotlight on Officials to End Forced Labour
By Marwaan Macan-Markar
BANGKOK, Sep 3 (IPS) - The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is turning its attention to a western corner of military-ruled Burma to end the scourge of forced labour, which remains rampant in most parts of the South-east Asian nation.
On Sunday, the ILO will be hosting a rare meeting of judges, military officers, police officers and members of the local labour department as part of its effort to raise awareness aimed at ending a form of human rights abuse that, at times, has included victims as young as 11.
"We hope to make presentations on international humanitarian law and raise issues about forced labour, child soldiers and harassment," says Steve Marshall, the ILO’s representative in Burma, also known as Myanmar. "This is a positive step."
There are a lot of "policy conflicts" on this issue, Marshall told a small group of journalists during a recent visit to Bangkok. "Even though we are being permitted to have this event, the military see themselves as above the law."
The weekend meeting in Sittwe, a port city in Burma’s Arakan state, close to the Bangladesh border, will be the fifth of its kind the Geneva-based labour organisation has held in Burma since July 2007.
The ILO’s efforts to make such inroads in a country ruled by a notoriously stubborn and defiant regime – particularly in placing strict limits on international agencies challenging its grip on power – have set this labour rights body apart from other United Nations agencies and international humanitarian organisations operating in Burma.
"The ILO is the only international organisation that has maintained principled pressure and engagement of the Burmese regime," says David Scott Mathieson, Burma consultant for Human Rights Watch, the New York-based global rights lobby. "It has shown how international organisations should deal with the Burmese government – that they will not keep quiet about problems, yet keep engaging and trying to help improve the situation."
At the same time, though, the concessions the military regime is offering to the ILO is not a sign of a growing shift in policy aimed at ending the forced labour problem, Mathieson tells IPS. "It is one of grudging respect. If the Burmese government can get away with not dealing with the ILO, it would do so."
The pressure on the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), as the military regime is formally known, stems from its running battles with the ILO. In 2006, following reports that Burma was failing in its obligations to the ILO to end forced labour, more pressure was turned on the SPDC.
The ILO’s members threatened to haul the country before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague for its record of abusive labour practices. Burma would have been the first country to face such humiliation had no changes been made on the ground.
One of the demands placed by the ILO was for Burma to have in place a "credible mechanism for dealing with complaints of forced labour with all necessary guarantees for the protection of complaints."
Yet, while the ILO office in Burma has developed a network to gather information on incidents of forced labour, the mechanism for victims of the abuse or their families to lodge complaints is far from perfect. "That people are getting arrested when complaining is still a concern," admits ILO’s Marshall. "Currently there are two people in jail for making complaints to the ILO. They have been charged under the Official Secrets Act." This law considers it an offence for any person to possess information deemed classified by the state.
Also coming in the way of the ILO’s forced labour-reporting mechanism is the junta preventing reader-friendly material about these human rights violations being printed in local languages and distributed across the country. Only the formal document, peppered with legal language, has been approved for distribution.
The junta’s resolve to stop the forced labour network being dismantled stems from how much the military culture depends on such abuse to achieve its military and development ends. The more pervasive forms of forced labour, some in almost slave-like conditions, include portering for the military, cleaning army camps, building military structures and even walking ahead of troops in areas infested with landmines.
"Forced labour and Burma is like the head and tail of a coin," states the Federation of Trade Unions – Burma, a network of Burmese labour rights activists operating in exile, including Thailand and the United States. "Millions of people of Burma have been used for state projects of railroad building, strategic road construction, army barrack building, army-run businesses and (for the) agro-economy."
The Arakan state, where the ILO is hosting Sunday’s meeting, is notorious. The victims are the state’s Rohingyas, an ethnic Muslim minority in predominantly Buddhist Burma. They have been a victim of gross rights violations, including restrictions to get married unless the state gives approval. Familes are forced to work four days a week and have to plant crops that the military orders.
Forced labour the Rohingyas are subject to during the ongoing monsoon season has been documented in the paddy fields, planting physic nut trees and rubber saplings, for road repair, states a recent report by The Arakan Project, which monitors rights violations of the Rohingyas.
In addition, due to border tensions between Burma and Bangladesh, "the Burmese regime suddenly brought shiploads of building material in order to erect a border fence along the Bangladesh-Burma border," adds the Project report, ‘Large Increase in Forced Labour along the Bangladesh-Burma Border: Forced Labour Practices in North Arakan’. "By April large numbers of villagers were then recruited to raise an embankment."
"This year forced labour in North Arakan has significantly increased mainly due to the construction of the border fence along the Bangladesh-Burma border and the sudden increase of army battalions along the border," says Chris Lewa, author of the report and coordinator of the Project.
"Forced labour occurs throughout the year and usually follows a seasonal pattern. In the dry season, villagers are mostly recruited for construction work in military camps and repairing roads," she says.
Yet she doubts the ILO’s presence in the Arakan state will reduce the suffering endured by the persecuted Rohingya minority. "Most Rohingyas would not be aware of the ILO’s complaint mechanism, but even if they were and would be ready to take the risk of lodging a complaint, they would be unable to do so due to the restriction of movement imposed on them," Lewa reveals in an interview. "They need to obtain permission even to travel to a neighbouring village."
BURMA: ILO Turns Spotlight on Officials to End Forced Labour
By Marwaan Macan-Markar
BANGKOK, Sep 3 (IPS) - The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is turning its attention to a western corner of military-ruled Burma to end the scourge of forced labour, which remains rampant in most parts of the South-east Asian nation.
On Sunday, the ILO will be hosting a rare meeting of judges, military officers, police officers and members of the local labour department as part of its effort to raise awareness aimed at ending a form of human rights abuse that, at times, has included victims as young as 11.
"We hope to make presentations on international humanitarian law and raise issues about forced labour, child soldiers and harassment," says Steve Marshall, the ILO’s representative in Burma, also known as Myanmar. "This is a positive step."
There are a lot of "policy conflicts" on this issue, Marshall told a small group of journalists during a recent visit to Bangkok. "Even though we are being permitted to have this event, the military see themselves as above the law."
The weekend meeting in Sittwe, a port city in Burma’s Arakan state, close to the Bangladesh border, will be the fifth of its kind the Geneva-based labour organisation has held in Burma since July 2007.
The ILO’s efforts to make such inroads in a country ruled by a notoriously stubborn and defiant regime – particularly in placing strict limits on international agencies challenging its grip on power – have set this labour rights body apart from other United Nations agencies and international humanitarian organisations operating in Burma.
"The ILO is the only international organisation that has maintained principled pressure and engagement of the Burmese regime," says David Scott Mathieson, Burma consultant for Human Rights Watch, the New York-based global rights lobby. "It has shown how international organisations should deal with the Burmese government – that they will not keep quiet about problems, yet keep engaging and trying to help improve the situation."
At the same time, though, the concessions the military regime is offering to the ILO is not a sign of a growing shift in policy aimed at ending the forced labour problem, Mathieson tells IPS. "It is one of grudging respect. If the Burmese government can get away with not dealing with the ILO, it would do so."
The pressure on the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), as the military regime is formally known, stems from its running battles with the ILO. In 2006, following reports that Burma was failing in its obligations to the ILO to end forced labour, more pressure was turned on the SPDC.
The ILO’s members threatened to haul the country before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague for its record of abusive labour practices. Burma would have been the first country to face such humiliation had no changes been made on the ground.
One of the demands placed by the ILO was for Burma to have in place a "credible mechanism for dealing with complaints of forced labour with all necessary guarantees for the protection of complaints."
Yet, while the ILO office in Burma has developed a network to gather information on incidents of forced labour, the mechanism for victims of the abuse or their families to lodge complaints is far from perfect. "That people are getting arrested when complaining is still a concern," admits ILO’s Marshall. "Currently there are two people in jail for making complaints to the ILO. They have been charged under the Official Secrets Act." This law considers it an offence for any person to possess information deemed classified by the state.
Also coming in the way of the ILO’s forced labour-reporting mechanism is the junta preventing reader-friendly material about these human rights violations being printed in local languages and distributed across the country. Only the formal document, peppered with legal language, has been approved for distribution.
The junta’s resolve to stop the forced labour network being dismantled stems from how much the military culture depends on such abuse to achieve its military and development ends. The more pervasive forms of forced labour, some in almost slave-like conditions, include portering for the military, cleaning army camps, building military structures and even walking ahead of troops in areas infested with landmines.
"Forced labour and Burma is like the head and tail of a coin," states the Federation of Trade Unions – Burma, a network of Burmese labour rights activists operating in exile, including Thailand and the United States. "Millions of people of Burma have been used for state projects of railroad building, strategic road construction, army barrack building, army-run businesses and (for the) agro-economy."
The Arakan state, where the ILO is hosting Sunday’s meeting, is notorious. The victims are the state’s Rohingyas, an ethnic Muslim minority in predominantly Buddhist Burma. They have been a victim of gross rights violations, including restrictions to get married unless the state gives approval. Familes are forced to work four days a week and have to plant crops that the military orders.
Forced labour the Rohingyas are subject to during the ongoing monsoon season has been documented in the paddy fields, planting physic nut trees and rubber saplings, for road repair, states a recent report by The Arakan Project, which monitors rights violations of the Rohingyas.
In addition, due to border tensions between Burma and Bangladesh, "the Burmese regime suddenly brought shiploads of building material in order to erect a border fence along the Bangladesh-Burma border," adds the Project report, ‘Large Increase in Forced Labour along the Bangladesh-Burma Border: Forced Labour Practices in North Arakan’. "By April large numbers of villagers were then recruited to raise an embankment."
"This year forced labour in North Arakan has significantly increased mainly due to the construction of the border fence along the Bangladesh-Burma border and the sudden increase of army battalions along the border," says Chris Lewa, author of the report and coordinator of the Project.
"Forced labour occurs throughout the year and usually follows a seasonal pattern. In the dry season, villagers are mostly recruited for construction work in military camps and repairing roads," she says.
Yet she doubts the ILO’s presence in the Arakan state will reduce the suffering endured by the persecuted Rohingya minority. "Most Rohingyas would not be aware of the ILO’s complaint mechanism, but even if they were and would be ready to take the risk of lodging a complaint, they would be unable to do so due to the restriction of movement imposed on them," Lewa reveals in an interview. "They need to obtain permission even to travel to a neighbouring village."
***************************************************************
BURMA: Junta Targets Ethnic Rebels to Forge Unity Ahead of Polls
By Marwaan Macan-Markar
BANGKOK, Sep 3 (IPS) - Burma’s military regime is turning to a familiar strategy – sending in troops – to impose its will on the north-eastern corner of the country that shares a border with China’s Yunnan province in the east. The move shatters a 20-year peace deal with an armed ethnic rebel group that controls part of that mountainous terrain.
This eruption of hostilities has much to do with a promised general election next year that the oppressive rulers of Burma, also known as Myanmar, are marching towards. The junta wants a "discipline-flourishing democracy" to take root with the 2010 polls, the first such election after the results of the last one, in 1990, were annulled.
Clashes between Burmese troops and the Kokang, one of four ethnic rebel groups that signed a ceasefire deal in the 1988-89 period, began in early August and escalated by the end of the month in an area close to the Chinese border. Casualty figures are still uncertain.
"About 7,000 troops with tanks, armoured vehicles and heavy cannons are trying to control the region," says the U.S. Campaign for Burma, a Washington D.C.-based group of Burmese political exiles. "The junta is sending 3,000 more troops from other parts of Burma to the region."
By Thursday, an uneasy calm had returned to Laogai, the Kokang capital, now in the hands of the Burmese troops, according to an aid worker in Burma, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Some of the 37,000 people who fled across the border to China after the fight broke out have begun to return," she says.
Sporadic sounds of gunfire were heard, she reveals, adding that the locals were not sure if the defeated Kokang rebels will resort to "guerrilla attacks" on the Burmese troops who have poured into Laogai. This capital has a substantial presence of Chinese businessmen, involved in the border economy of logging, mining and casinos for gambling.
The fighting resulted in an abrupt halt of the agriculture programmes being run by the World Food Programme (WFP), the only United Nations (UN) agency that has a permanent presence in a region known for being a poppy-growing area and having a booming narcotics trade.
"Our operations have been suspended," Chris Kaye, the head of the WFP’s operations in Burma, confirmed during a telephone interview from Rangoon, the former capital. "The people in that area are inherently poor and depend on our programmes as an alternative to growing poppy."
The U.N. agency’s work involves assisting the ethnic Kokang to grow tea, paddy and maize as an alternative source of income and to help the locals overcome food insecurity. It followed an announcement by leaders of the ethnic groups to end poppy cultivation by 2005 in the terrain that had been part of this region’s infamous ‘Golden Triangle,’ one of Asia’s largest opium-producing areas.
There are concerns, however, that the attack on the Kokang may not be a limited strike, but part of the junta’s broader plan to go after other armed ethnic groups along the country’s north-eastern border. Among those are the Wa, the most armed of the ethnic rebels, with a force of some 25,000, and the smaller Kachin.
They are concerns shaped by the political developments in the ethnic areas of Burma, which has never been able to control all of its borders since gaining independence from the British over six decades ago. The country has 135 registered ethnic groups, of which the Burmans are the largest. Scores of ethnic rebels began separatist battles with the Burmese army to create independent countries.
Peace returned to Burma’s north-eastern border in the late 1980s after the Wa, Kachin and Kokang joined 14 other ethnic rebel movements to sign ceasefire agreements in exchange for greater political autonomy, freedom for their ethnic communities and more economic independence.
"The attack against the Kokang is an attempt to intimidate the other ceasefire groups to fall in line with the regime’s plans for the elections next year," says Win Min, a Burmese national security expert at Payap University in Chiang Mai, located in northern Thailand. "They are going to deal with them one by one to impose what the junta thinks will be unity in the country. But this is only a military-imposed unity."
"It will not be easy for the Burmese army," Win Min added during a telephone interview. "Going after the Wa will result in many casualties because it is the strongest armed ethnic group in the country."
It is a view echoed by others familiar with this region of Burma, which is part of the Shan state and home to the large Shan ethnic community. "If the Burmese regime thinks they will be able to subdue the ethnic rebel groups before next year’s election, they are dreaming," Khuensai Jaiyen, editor of the Shan Herald Agency for News, told IPS. "The fighting on the border is bound to escalate."
Already the attacks against the Kokang have left the ethnic Kachin worried that they may be next in the firing line. "The attacks are a violation of the ceasefire and we are worried about who will be targeted next," says Col James Lum Dau, deputy chief of foreign affairs for the Kachin Independence Organisation. "They want us to change militarily and be under complete Burmese control before the elections. We are against this kind of thing."
"It may be good for them but not for us. This is a military solution and not a political solution," he said in a telephone interview. "We are ready to support the elections that will ensure freedom for us."
Under Burma’s new constitution, approved in a May 2008 referendum plagued with fraud, the country can only have one armed group – the military. And to bring the country’s many armed ethnic groups in line with this provision, the military regime has ordered all rebel groups to become part of a border guard force ahead of the 2010 poll.
The border guard force, which was announced in April, will strip the ethnic rebels of their troop strength and their military independence, since each of these border battalions will come under the wing of a Burmese officer. It was a disarmament plan that the Kokang rejected as did the Wa and Kachin fighters, among others.
"It is unthinkable to expect the Wa to conform to the border guard plan," says a European diplomat who regularly visits Burma. "They have a hatred towards the Burmese; it is deeply rooted."
"There is also opposition to this new force because none of these ethnic groups know what political concessions they will get after the elections," the diplomat, who requested anonymity, told IPS. "The next weeks will reveal if the attacks on the Kokang will force the Wa and others back to the negotiating table about the border guard force."
By Marwaan Macan-Markar
BANGKOK, Sep 3 (IPS) - Burma’s military regime is turning to a familiar strategy – sending in troops – to impose its will on the north-eastern corner of the country that shares a border with China’s Yunnan province in the east. The move shatters a 20-year peace deal with an armed ethnic rebel group that controls part of that mountainous terrain.
This eruption of hostilities has much to do with a promised general election next year that the oppressive rulers of Burma, also known as Myanmar, are marching towards. The junta wants a "discipline-flourishing democracy" to take root with the 2010 polls, the first such election after the results of the last one, in 1990, were annulled.
Clashes between Burmese troops and the Kokang, one of four ethnic rebel groups that signed a ceasefire deal in the 1988-89 period, began in early August and escalated by the end of the month in an area close to the Chinese border. Casualty figures are still uncertain.
"About 7,000 troops with tanks, armoured vehicles and heavy cannons are trying to control the region," says the U.S. Campaign for Burma, a Washington D.C.-based group of Burmese political exiles. "The junta is sending 3,000 more troops from other parts of Burma to the region."
By Thursday, an uneasy calm had returned to Laogai, the Kokang capital, now in the hands of the Burmese troops, according to an aid worker in Burma, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Some of the 37,000 people who fled across the border to China after the fight broke out have begun to return," she says.
Sporadic sounds of gunfire were heard, she reveals, adding that the locals were not sure if the defeated Kokang rebels will resort to "guerrilla attacks" on the Burmese troops who have poured into Laogai. This capital has a substantial presence of Chinese businessmen, involved in the border economy of logging, mining and casinos for gambling.
The fighting resulted in an abrupt halt of the agriculture programmes being run by the World Food Programme (WFP), the only United Nations (UN) agency that has a permanent presence in a region known for being a poppy-growing area and having a booming narcotics trade.
"Our operations have been suspended," Chris Kaye, the head of the WFP’s operations in Burma, confirmed during a telephone interview from Rangoon, the former capital. "The people in that area are inherently poor and depend on our programmes as an alternative to growing poppy."
The U.N. agency’s work involves assisting the ethnic Kokang to grow tea, paddy and maize as an alternative source of income and to help the locals overcome food insecurity. It followed an announcement by leaders of the ethnic groups to end poppy cultivation by 2005 in the terrain that had been part of this region’s infamous ‘Golden Triangle,’ one of Asia’s largest opium-producing areas.
There are concerns, however, that the attack on the Kokang may not be a limited strike, but part of the junta’s broader plan to go after other armed ethnic groups along the country’s north-eastern border. Among those are the Wa, the most armed of the ethnic rebels, with a force of some 25,000, and the smaller Kachin.
They are concerns shaped by the political developments in the ethnic areas of Burma, which has never been able to control all of its borders since gaining independence from the British over six decades ago. The country has 135 registered ethnic groups, of which the Burmans are the largest. Scores of ethnic rebels began separatist battles with the Burmese army to create independent countries.
Peace returned to Burma’s north-eastern border in the late 1980s after the Wa, Kachin and Kokang joined 14 other ethnic rebel movements to sign ceasefire agreements in exchange for greater political autonomy, freedom for their ethnic communities and more economic independence.
"The attack against the Kokang is an attempt to intimidate the other ceasefire groups to fall in line with the regime’s plans for the elections next year," says Win Min, a Burmese national security expert at Payap University in Chiang Mai, located in northern Thailand. "They are going to deal with them one by one to impose what the junta thinks will be unity in the country. But this is only a military-imposed unity."
"It will not be easy for the Burmese army," Win Min added during a telephone interview. "Going after the Wa will result in many casualties because it is the strongest armed ethnic group in the country."
It is a view echoed by others familiar with this region of Burma, which is part of the Shan state and home to the large Shan ethnic community. "If the Burmese regime thinks they will be able to subdue the ethnic rebel groups before next year’s election, they are dreaming," Khuensai Jaiyen, editor of the Shan Herald Agency for News, told IPS. "The fighting on the border is bound to escalate."
Already the attacks against the Kokang have left the ethnic Kachin worried that they may be next in the firing line. "The attacks are a violation of the ceasefire and we are worried about who will be targeted next," says Col James Lum Dau, deputy chief of foreign affairs for the Kachin Independence Organisation. "They want us to change militarily and be under complete Burmese control before the elections. We are against this kind of thing."
"It may be good for them but not for us. This is a military solution and not a political solution," he said in a telephone interview. "We are ready to support the elections that will ensure freedom for us."
Under Burma’s new constitution, approved in a May 2008 referendum plagued with fraud, the country can only have one armed group – the military. And to bring the country’s many armed ethnic groups in line with this provision, the military regime has ordered all rebel groups to become part of a border guard force ahead of the 2010 poll.
The border guard force, which was announced in April, will strip the ethnic rebels of their troop strength and their military independence, since each of these border battalions will come under the wing of a Burmese officer. It was a disarmament plan that the Kokang rejected as did the Wa and Kachin fighters, among others.
"It is unthinkable to expect the Wa to conform to the border guard plan," says a European diplomat who regularly visits Burma. "They have a hatred towards the Burmese; it is deeply rooted."
"There is also opposition to this new force because none of these ethnic groups know what political concessions they will get after the elections," the diplomat, who requested anonymity, told IPS. "The next weeks will reveal if the attacks on the Kokang will force the Wa and others back to the negotiating table about the border guard force."
***************************************************************
EarthTimes - Myanmar boy gets special passport to compete in Japan
Posted : Wed, 02 Sep 2009 07:53:43 GMT
Bangkok - Thailand on Wednesday granted a 12-year-old Myanmar boy a temporary passport to represent the kingdom at an origami airplane-flying contest in Japan, officials said. Mong Thongdee was given a one-year Thai passport to allow him to travel to Japan this month to enter the international competition, Thai Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Vimon Kidchob said.
Mong was born in Chiang Mai in northern Thailand to Myanmar migrant labourers. Because neither of his parents are Thai nationals, Thai law denied him Thai citizenship. Despite his stateless status, Mong received his education at a Thai primary school, where he excelled at paper airplane flying.
He was the winner of last year's national paper airplane contest, setting a record by keeping the origami plane afloat for 12.5 seconds, the longest in the under-12 category.
Japan's Origami Plane Association invited Mong to enter this month's contest in Tokyo, but the request was initially turned down by the Interior Ministry because of Mong's stateless status.
The Foreign Ministry stepped in to rectify the situation after several Thai newspapers publicized Mong's plight.
More than 1 million Myanmar migrant labourers work in Thailand, most of them illegally, exposing them to abuse by their employers.
Posted : Wed, 02 Sep 2009 07:53:43 GMT
Bangkok - Thailand on Wednesday granted a 12-year-old Myanmar boy a temporary passport to represent the kingdom at an origami airplane-flying contest in Japan, officials said. Mong Thongdee was given a one-year Thai passport to allow him to travel to Japan this month to enter the international competition, Thai Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Vimon Kidchob said.
Mong was born in Chiang Mai in northern Thailand to Myanmar migrant labourers. Because neither of his parents are Thai nationals, Thai law denied him Thai citizenship. Despite his stateless status, Mong received his education at a Thai primary school, where he excelled at paper airplane flying.
He was the winner of last year's national paper airplane contest, setting a record by keeping the origami plane afloat for 12.5 seconds, the longest in the under-12 category.
Japan's Origami Plane Association invited Mong to enter this month's contest in Tokyo, but the request was initially turned down by the Interior Ministry because of Mong's stateless status.
The Foreign Ministry stepped in to rectify the situation after several Thai newspapers publicized Mong's plight.
More than 1 million Myanmar migrant labourers work in Thailand, most of them illegally, exposing them to abuse by their employers.
***************************************************************
The New York Times - Beijing Limits Information on Burmese Refugees Remaining in China
By MICHAEL WINES
Published: September 1, 2009
BEIJING — Chinese officials imposed an information blackout on Tuesday on the situation along its border with Myanmar and began taking down tents that had sheltered an estimated 30,000 refugees who fled into China to escape recent fighting between Myanmar’s military and ethnic rebels.
But news reports stated that many thousands of refugees remained in China, unwilling or unable to return to Myanmar, formerly called Burma, and it was not clear how the Chinese government intended to address their plight.
The Chinese authorities withheld comment on the border situation on Tuesday, aside from saying, in a Foreign Ministry briefing, that “necessary humanitarian assistance” was being provided. And they began ordering foreign journalists to leave the area around Nansan and Genma, Chinese towns on the mountainous border where the refugees have been housed in seven separate camps.
While about 4,000 refugees had returned to Myanmar on Monday, the day after the fighting ended, the pace has since slowed significantly. Only about 30 people crossed the border into Myanmar in a half-hour period on Tuesday morning, The Associated Press reported.
“It seems to be slowing down,” one foreigner near Nansan said in a telephone interview on Tuesday. “There’s still a large number of refugees in and around Nansan, both in the camps and hanging around.” The foreigner, who asked not to be identified, said Chinese Army troops had stepped up patrols in the area.
An unknown number of those who fled to China during the fighting are Chinese citizens who have been conducting business in Myanmar, where China is building dams and other projects and has extensive mining ventures. They are unlikely to return soon.
China has insisted that the northern Myanmar region of Kokang is safe and stable after the fighting last week, in which hundreds of government troops overwhelmed an armed ethnic group, breaking a cease-fire that had prevailed for two decades. Human rights groups and others have warned that the junta’s actions could ignite a wider conflict in the area, where other, better armed, ethnic groups also are resisting government control.
Thai newspapers and The Irrawaddy, an independent magazine that focuses on Myanmar, have reported that the government is sending fresh troops into the northern state of Shan in an attempt to consolidate its control there. The army wants the rebels to disarm and join a government border patrol force, as required under a new Constitution. Most of the rebels have resisted the order, which would effectively place them under government control.
Myanmar’s military junta apparently seeks to take control of the region before elections, the first in almost 20 years, that are scheduled for next year. Outside monitors accuse the military junta of brutal human rights violations as part of its effort to stay in power. The Myanmar government has said that 26 of its soldiers and at least 8 rebels died in three days of battles.
The Myanmar conflict has thrust the Chinese government, one of Myanmar’s only staunch backers, into an awkward situation. China has provided diplomatic support to the junta in exchange for access to its considerable mineral wealth and cooperation in efforts to suppress a growing cross-border trade in heroin and other illicit drugs. The flood of refugees prompted the Chinese to issue muted criticism of the junta, on Friday calling for it to secure Myanmar’s borders.
By MICHAEL WINES
Published: September 1, 2009
BEIJING — Chinese officials imposed an information blackout on Tuesday on the situation along its border with Myanmar and began taking down tents that had sheltered an estimated 30,000 refugees who fled into China to escape recent fighting between Myanmar’s military and ethnic rebels.
But news reports stated that many thousands of refugees remained in China, unwilling or unable to return to Myanmar, formerly called Burma, and it was not clear how the Chinese government intended to address their plight.
The Chinese authorities withheld comment on the border situation on Tuesday, aside from saying, in a Foreign Ministry briefing, that “necessary humanitarian assistance” was being provided. And they began ordering foreign journalists to leave the area around Nansan and Genma, Chinese towns on the mountainous border where the refugees have been housed in seven separate camps.
While about 4,000 refugees had returned to Myanmar on Monday, the day after the fighting ended, the pace has since slowed significantly. Only about 30 people crossed the border into Myanmar in a half-hour period on Tuesday morning, The Associated Press reported.
“It seems to be slowing down,” one foreigner near Nansan said in a telephone interview on Tuesday. “There’s still a large number of refugees in and around Nansan, both in the camps and hanging around.” The foreigner, who asked not to be identified, said Chinese Army troops had stepped up patrols in the area.
An unknown number of those who fled to China during the fighting are Chinese citizens who have been conducting business in Myanmar, where China is building dams and other projects and has extensive mining ventures. They are unlikely to return soon.
China has insisted that the northern Myanmar region of Kokang is safe and stable after the fighting last week, in which hundreds of government troops overwhelmed an armed ethnic group, breaking a cease-fire that had prevailed for two decades. Human rights groups and others have warned that the junta’s actions could ignite a wider conflict in the area, where other, better armed, ethnic groups also are resisting government control.
Thai newspapers and The Irrawaddy, an independent magazine that focuses on Myanmar, have reported that the government is sending fresh troops into the northern state of Shan in an attempt to consolidate its control there. The army wants the rebels to disarm and join a government border patrol force, as required under a new Constitution. Most of the rebels have resisted the order, which would effectively place them under government control.
Myanmar’s military junta apparently seeks to take control of the region before elections, the first in almost 20 years, that are scheduled for next year. Outside monitors accuse the military junta of brutal human rights violations as part of its effort to stay in power. The Myanmar government has said that 26 of its soldiers and at least 8 rebels died in three days of battles.
The Myanmar conflict has thrust the Chinese government, one of Myanmar’s only staunch backers, into an awkward situation. China has provided diplomatic support to the junta in exchange for access to its considerable mineral wealth and cooperation in efforts to suppress a growing cross-border trade in heroin and other illicit drugs. The flood of refugees prompted the Chinese to issue muted criticism of the junta, on Friday calling for it to secure Myanmar’s borders.
***************************************************************
Wednesday, September 02, 2009
Daily Times - view:The Myanmar Orchestra
Simon Tay
Might it be possible that the generals in Myanmar recognise that they are in a cul de sac? Could the regime be seeking ways out of its isolation in the run-up to the 2010 elections? Could it welcome dialogue and engagement?
The recent decision by Myanmar’s government to sentence pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi to a further 18 months’ house arrest shows how difficult it is to deal with that country’s ruling generals. Yet the first steps toward a new approach may already have been taken.
The clearest sign comes from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member. At first, most of ASEAN’s member governments responded mildly to the verdict, expressing their “disappointment” — a stance that reflects the group’s principle of non-interference in fellow members’ internal politics.
But Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya then consulted his counterparts in Cambodia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam. As current ASEAN chair, he floated the idea of concertedly requesting a pardon for Aung San Suu Kyi.
ASEAN government officials have since met to draft a text. Approval by the association’s foreign ministers may come in September, with ASEAN leaders tackling the issue in October.
Of course, amendments and objections to the draft should be expected. But the pardon request is already significant. It seeks to be finely balanced, respecting the regime’s sovereignty while subtly pressing home the point in unison, as neighbouring states. The request would be politely worded, but it would also be an official and public mode of communication, instead of the usual behind-the-scenes quiet diplomacy.
What ASEAN says or does not say will not change things immediately. Cynics might add that even if Aung San Suu Kyi is pardoned, she may yet still be detained on political grounds or face other barriers aimed at preventing her from competing in the elections promised in Myanmar for 2010.
But Western sanctions have not worked, either. Since the 1990s crackdown, human rights violations have continued, most recently with the suppression of the protests led by Buddhist monks in 2007. The average citizen has grown poorer, even as those close to the junta become ostentatiously rich.
Western sanctions instead paved the way for investments in Myanmar by those with less concern about human rights violations — first by ASEAN neighbours in hotels and other sectors, and more recently by China and India, which are vying for projects and influence in the strategic energy sector. As a result, Myanmar’s generals have been able to play one side off against another.
The game, however, may now be changing. ASEAN’s initiative is a new step forward for the group. While ASEAN rejected previous calls to impose sanctions, or even to expel Myanmar, this step shows that it will not remain inert regardless of what the generals do. Moreover, some ASEAN member countries, like Singapore, have explicitly called for Aung San Suu Kyi to be allowed to participate in the 2010 elections.
The ASEAN effort coincides with two other developments. One is the decision by the United States to reconsider its policy of sanctions, becoming more flexible while remaining true to its values and interests.
Some activists have criticized US Senator Jim Webb’s journey to Yangon to obtain the release of John Yettaw, the American whose actions triggered the charges against Aung San Suu Kyi. But this is consistent with the Obama administration’s policy of seeking a dialogue even with those who are not America’s friends. Such dialogue is vital if Myanmar is to be prevented from possibly pursuing nuclear weapons and rigging elections, à la Iran.
The other development is less obvious. After the court delivered its verdict, the regime halved the sentence and agreed to keep Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, rather than moving her to one of its worst jails. This may not seem like much of a concession. But the junta seems to be trying to cause less offence.
Consider, too, the junta’s gesture in handing over Yettaw to Senator Webb, and its interaction with the international community on humanitarian assistance after Cyclone Nargis. Might it be possible that the generals in Myanmar recognise that they are in a cul de sac? Could the regime be seeking ways out of its isolation in the run-up to the 2010 elections? Could it welcome dialogue and engagement?
How the generals respond to the ASEAN request will be an important signal of the regime’s intentions. Even if the regime does want to begin talking, sustaining a dialogue will be no easier than has been the case with North Korea.
ASEAN, as the organisation of neighbouring states, is important to achieving that goal, but US involvement is key, as is inclusion of China and India. They must be pressed to see more than the opportunity for strategic access to energy and other natural resources. Japan, too — still the largest Asian economy and a traditional donor to the region — must also play a role.
A moral but pragmatic community needs to be constructed, with all in agreement on how to deal with Myanmar. Even if, like an orchestra, different countries use different instruments and play different notes, the main theme must be consistent.
If this can be done, the chances of progress in the run-up to the 2010 elections will be strengthened. Success may still prove elusive, but a new game with a greater possibility for success will have begun. —DT-PS
Simon Tay is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and a fellow of the Asia Society
Daily Times - view:The Myanmar Orchestra
Simon Tay
Might it be possible that the generals in Myanmar recognise that they are in a cul de sac? Could the regime be seeking ways out of its isolation in the run-up to the 2010 elections? Could it welcome dialogue and engagement?
The recent decision by Myanmar’s government to sentence pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi to a further 18 months’ house arrest shows how difficult it is to deal with that country’s ruling generals. Yet the first steps toward a new approach may already have been taken.
The clearest sign comes from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member. At first, most of ASEAN’s member governments responded mildly to the verdict, expressing their “disappointment” — a stance that reflects the group’s principle of non-interference in fellow members’ internal politics.
But Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya then consulted his counterparts in Cambodia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam. As current ASEAN chair, he floated the idea of concertedly requesting a pardon for Aung San Suu Kyi.
ASEAN government officials have since met to draft a text. Approval by the association’s foreign ministers may come in September, with ASEAN leaders tackling the issue in October.
Of course, amendments and objections to the draft should be expected. But the pardon request is already significant. It seeks to be finely balanced, respecting the regime’s sovereignty while subtly pressing home the point in unison, as neighbouring states. The request would be politely worded, but it would also be an official and public mode of communication, instead of the usual behind-the-scenes quiet diplomacy.
What ASEAN says or does not say will not change things immediately. Cynics might add that even if Aung San Suu Kyi is pardoned, she may yet still be detained on political grounds or face other barriers aimed at preventing her from competing in the elections promised in Myanmar for 2010.
But Western sanctions have not worked, either. Since the 1990s crackdown, human rights violations have continued, most recently with the suppression of the protests led by Buddhist monks in 2007. The average citizen has grown poorer, even as those close to the junta become ostentatiously rich.
Western sanctions instead paved the way for investments in Myanmar by those with less concern about human rights violations — first by ASEAN neighbours in hotels and other sectors, and more recently by China and India, which are vying for projects and influence in the strategic energy sector. As a result, Myanmar’s generals have been able to play one side off against another.
The game, however, may now be changing. ASEAN’s initiative is a new step forward for the group. While ASEAN rejected previous calls to impose sanctions, or even to expel Myanmar, this step shows that it will not remain inert regardless of what the generals do. Moreover, some ASEAN member countries, like Singapore, have explicitly called for Aung San Suu Kyi to be allowed to participate in the 2010 elections.
The ASEAN effort coincides with two other developments. One is the decision by the United States to reconsider its policy of sanctions, becoming more flexible while remaining true to its values and interests.
Some activists have criticized US Senator Jim Webb’s journey to Yangon to obtain the release of John Yettaw, the American whose actions triggered the charges against Aung San Suu Kyi. But this is consistent with the Obama administration’s policy of seeking a dialogue even with those who are not America’s friends. Such dialogue is vital if Myanmar is to be prevented from possibly pursuing nuclear weapons and rigging elections, à la Iran.
The other development is less obvious. After the court delivered its verdict, the regime halved the sentence and agreed to keep Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, rather than moving her to one of its worst jails. This may not seem like much of a concession. But the junta seems to be trying to cause less offence.
Consider, too, the junta’s gesture in handing over Yettaw to Senator Webb, and its interaction with the international community on humanitarian assistance after Cyclone Nargis. Might it be possible that the generals in Myanmar recognise that they are in a cul de sac? Could the regime be seeking ways out of its isolation in the run-up to the 2010 elections? Could it welcome dialogue and engagement?
How the generals respond to the ASEAN request will be an important signal of the regime’s intentions. Even if the regime does want to begin talking, sustaining a dialogue will be no easier than has been the case with North Korea.
ASEAN, as the organisation of neighbouring states, is important to achieving that goal, but US involvement is key, as is inclusion of China and India. They must be pressed to see more than the opportunity for strategic access to energy and other natural resources. Japan, too — still the largest Asian economy and a traditional donor to the region — must also play a role.
A moral but pragmatic community needs to be constructed, with all in agreement on how to deal with Myanmar. Even if, like an orchestra, different countries use different instruments and play different notes, the main theme must be consistent.
If this can be done, the chances of progress in the run-up to the 2010 elections will be strengthened. Success may still prove elusive, but a new game with a greater possibility for success will have begun. —DT-PS
Simon Tay is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and a fellow of the Asia Society
***************************************************************
Myanmar agricultural experts to undergo training in China
www.chinaview.cn 2009-09-02 11:33:21
YANGON, Sept. 2 (Xinhua) -- A total of 15 Myanmar agricultural experts will undergo advanced agriculture-related technical training in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region of China, sponsored by the regional government, sources with the Union of Myanmar Chambers of Commerce and Industry said on Wednesday.
In July this year, a Chinese delegation, led by Guo Shengkun, chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Secretary of the Guangxi Regional Committee of the Communist Party of China came on a visit to Myanmar, aimed at strengthening the exchange and cooperation between Guangxi and Myanmar.
The two sides agreed to exchange agricultural technical knowledge and provide human resources training.
Under a media exchange and cooperation program between the two countries, Myanmar aired Guaungxi TV programs for a week then.
Meanwhile, Myanmar traders of different business sectors will participate in the 6th Nanning Trade Fair of China, which runs from Oct. 20 to 26, to seek trade promotion between Myanmar and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.
The participating Myanmar traders comprise those from the Rice Dealers' Association, Livestock Breeding and Fishery Department, Myanmar Engineers Association, Fruit Exporters Association, Forestry Department and Gems Merchants Association.
Of them, gem merchants account for the majority.
www.chinaview.cn 2009-09-02 11:33:21
YANGON, Sept. 2 (Xinhua) -- A total of 15 Myanmar agricultural experts will undergo advanced agriculture-related technical training in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region of China, sponsored by the regional government, sources with the Union of Myanmar Chambers of Commerce and Industry said on Wednesday.
In July this year, a Chinese delegation, led by Guo Shengkun, chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Secretary of the Guangxi Regional Committee of the Communist Party of China came on a visit to Myanmar, aimed at strengthening the exchange and cooperation between Guangxi and Myanmar.
The two sides agreed to exchange agricultural technical knowledge and provide human resources training.
Under a media exchange and cooperation program between the two countries, Myanmar aired Guaungxi TV programs for a week then.
Meanwhile, Myanmar traders of different business sectors will participate in the 6th Nanning Trade Fair of China, which runs from Oct. 20 to 26, to seek trade promotion between Myanmar and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.
The participating Myanmar traders comprise those from the Rice Dealers' Association, Livestock Breeding and Fishery Department, Myanmar Engineers Association, Fruit Exporters Association, Forestry Department and Gems Merchants Association.
Of them, gem merchants account for the majority.
***************************************************************
S Korea to train Myanmar technicians on nuclear energy
www.chinaview.cn 2009-09-02 21:29:19
YANGON, Sept. 2 (Xinhua) -- South Korea will provide training on nuclear energy to officials and technicians from Myanmar along with other member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the local weekly Myanmar Times reported Wednesday.
It was offered by the South Korean government when ASEAN+3 energy ministers met recently in Myanmar's second largest city of Mandalay, South Korean embassy here was quoted as disclosing.
The East Asian country agreed to the provision of technical know-how on nuclear power stations in order to reduce the burning of fossil fuels and to help protect the environment.
Under a three-year training program which lasts from 2009 to 2011, South Korea will train a total of 150 technicians and senior government officials from ASEAN countries including Myanmar, the report added.
The East Asian energy ministers, at a series of meetings with counterparts from ASEAN nations held in Mandalay, called for deeper and closer regional energy cooperation and integration, and regional actions to build a secure, stable and sustainable energy future.
www.chinaview.cn 2009-09-02 21:29:19
YANGON, Sept. 2 (Xinhua) -- South Korea will provide training on nuclear energy to officials and technicians from Myanmar along with other member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the local weekly Myanmar Times reported Wednesday.
It was offered by the South Korean government when ASEAN+3 energy ministers met recently in Myanmar's second largest city of Mandalay, South Korean embassy here was quoted as disclosing.
The East Asian country agreed to the provision of technical know-how on nuclear power stations in order to reduce the burning of fossil fuels and to help protect the environment.
Under a three-year training program which lasts from 2009 to 2011, South Korea will train a total of 150 technicians and senior government officials from ASEAN countries including Myanmar, the report added.
The East Asian energy ministers, at a series of meetings with counterparts from ASEAN nations held in Mandalay, called for deeper and closer regional energy cooperation and integration, and regional actions to build a secure, stable and sustainable energy future.
***************************************************************
IOL - Suu Kyi lawyers: Eleven reasons for appeal
September 03 2009 at 09:17AM
Lawyers for Myanmar pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi said they would lodge an appeal Thursday against her conviction on charges relating to an incident in which an American man swam to her home.
The Nobel laureate was ordered to spend 18 more months under house arrest after a court on August 11 found her guilty of breaking security laws by giving shelter to US national John Yettaw at her lakeside residence.
"We will submit the appeal this afternoon. Aung San Suu Kyi's conviction is not in accordance with the law but we will have to wait to see whether the court agrees to hear the appeal," her main lawyer Kyi Win told AFP.
He said the appeal would focus on the fact that a 1974 constitution under which the ruling junta had detained Suu Kyi had been superseded by a new constitution that was approved in a controversial referendum last year.
"Altogether there are 11 reasons for the appeal, but the main thing we will point out is about the constitution," Kyi Win said.
The 64-year-old Suu Kyi had insisted on her innocence during the trial held at Yangon's notorious Insein Prison, saying that she allowed former military veteran Yettaw to stay for two nights at her home because he was ill.
Yettaw was sentenced to seven years' hard labour for the stunt in early May but was freed after a visit by US senator Jim Webb in August, on what the regime said were compassionate grounds because of health problems.
The American said he was on a "mission from God" to save Suu Kyi from assassination.
"Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is not guilty. The main person is the intruder," Nyan Win, another of her lawyers and also the spokesperson for her National League for Democracy (NLD), told reporters Thursday.
Suu Kyi's conviction unleashed a wave of international outrage, with the United Nations Security Council expressing "serious concern" and the European Union extending sanctions against the junta.
US President Barack Obama described the case against her as a "show trial."
The NLD won elections in 1990 but was never allowed to take power and she has been detained by the junta for 14 of the past 20 years.
Suu Kyi now plans to renovate her home to improve security and keep out other possible trespassers, Nyan Win said Monday. - Sapa-AFP
September 03 2009 at 09:17AM
Lawyers for Myanmar pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi said they would lodge an appeal Thursday against her conviction on charges relating to an incident in which an American man swam to her home.
The Nobel laureate was ordered to spend 18 more months under house arrest after a court on August 11 found her guilty of breaking security laws by giving shelter to US national John Yettaw at her lakeside residence.
"We will submit the appeal this afternoon. Aung San Suu Kyi's conviction is not in accordance with the law but we will have to wait to see whether the court agrees to hear the appeal," her main lawyer Kyi Win told AFP.
He said the appeal would focus on the fact that a 1974 constitution under which the ruling junta had detained Suu Kyi had been superseded by a new constitution that was approved in a controversial referendum last year.
"Altogether there are 11 reasons for the appeal, but the main thing we will point out is about the constitution," Kyi Win said.
The 64-year-old Suu Kyi had insisted on her innocence during the trial held at Yangon's notorious Insein Prison, saying that she allowed former military veteran Yettaw to stay for two nights at her home because he was ill.
Yettaw was sentenced to seven years' hard labour for the stunt in early May but was freed after a visit by US senator Jim Webb in August, on what the regime said were compassionate grounds because of health problems.
The American said he was on a "mission from God" to save Suu Kyi from assassination.
"Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is not guilty. The main person is the intruder," Nyan Win, another of her lawyers and also the spokesperson for her National League for Democracy (NLD), told reporters Thursday.
Suu Kyi's conviction unleashed a wave of international outrage, with the United Nations Security Council expressing "serious concern" and the European Union extending sanctions against the junta.
US President Barack Obama described the case against her as a "show trial."
The NLD won elections in 1990 but was never allowed to take power and she has been detained by the junta for 14 of the past 20 years.
Suu Kyi now plans to renovate her home to improve security and keep out other possible trespassers, Nyan Win said Monday. - Sapa-AFP
***************************************************************
The Washington Post - Burma's Rising Toll
The Junta Widens a War on Ethnic Groups
By Chris Beyrer and Richard Sollom
Thursday, September 3, 2009
It has been a good few weeks for Burma's dictator, Senior Gen. Than Shwe, even though Sen. Jim Webb secured the release of an imprisoned American during his recent visit and even though the sentencing of Burma's democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, after this summer's sham trial was roundly condemned. With all the media attention, Than Shwe got a dose of what he appears to crave most: international legitimacy. And he is assured that Suu Kyi, who won Burma's last free elections in 1990, will remain under house arrest during the 2010 elections. Last month Burma's state-run media even hailed the regime for its humanitarian nature and called for targeted economic sanctions to be lifted.
But is there, in fact, a more humanitarian regime in Burma?
Distinctly negative answers come from Ho Lom village in Burma's Shan State, where junta soldiers burned 62 houses on July 29. Or from Tard Mawk, in the same district, where soldiers burned more than 100 homes. Or from the 38 other Shan villages from which villagers have been forcibly displaced in July and August, part of a systematic and brutal campaign documented by the Shan Human Rights Foundation and the Shan Women's Action Network and reported by Human Rights Watch last month. Eric Schwartz, assistant secretary of the U.S. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, noted on Aug. 19: "We've been deeply concerned by very recent reports of large-scale displacement, perhaps as many or more than 10,000 civilians . . . as a result of increased military activity in northeastern Burma."
Schwartz said this even before the latest round of attacks -- against the people of Kokang, an ethnic enclave of Chinese speakers in northeastern Shan State, close to the Chinese border. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that the fighting has driven 10,000 to 30,000 Kokang into China -- prompting a rare rebuke from the People's Republic, a longtime trade and investment partner of the junta.
Other ethnic groups, including the Karen in eastern Burma, have faced intensified fighting and egregious rights violations this summer. Some 5,000 Karen have fled into Thailand, according to Human Rights Watch. In Karen State, large numbers of land-mine injuries are being reported as untrained new conscripts, including children, are forced to fight their own people in some of the world's most heavily mined jungles.
These systematic campaigns in Burma's eastern ethnic regions have been marked by allegations of torture, extrajudicial executions and rapes of ethnic minority women and girls. Such mass atrocities are not new. Our collaborative team of medics conducted population-based health and human rights assessments in 2006-07 among more than 2,900 ethnic households in eastern Burma. We found that more than a quarter of all Shan families had been forcibly relocated in the previous year, that in 24 percent at least one family member had been taken by soldiers for forced labor and that in 9 percent of households at least one family member had been injured by a land mine -- one of the highest rates ever documented.
The current assaults appear to be part of the junta's strategy for the 2010 elections. The generals are attempting to force their ethnic opponents to become border patrol forces and to participate in their showcase elections. Most of the larger ethnic groups and political parties have rejected these offers, as did the leaders of Kokang. Most, along with Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, have also rejected the junta's constitution, which was drafted without their input and approved in the discredited referendum of May 2008.
Burma's ethnic peoples know they are not living under a new, more humanitarian regime. Quite the opposite: The junta is creating humanitarian emergencies in its quest for control. Shan, Karen, Kokang and other civilians are losing their homes, livelihoods and lives. Their suffering is directly linked to the detention of Suu Kyi and to the crackdown against Burma's democratic forces: student leaders, journalists, independent humanitarian relief workers and courageous clergy of all faiths. Indeed, essentially all the progressive forces opposing the generals are under attack.
Strikingly little international attention has been paid to this murderous turn of events. Yet these ethnic peoples must play a role if Burma is to have any sort of decent future. Suu Kyi knows this; in the only statement her people have had from her in years, given to U.N. Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari in late 2007, she highlighted the need for ethnic participation for true national reconciliation. The Obama administration, which is reviewing its Burma policy, would do well to heed Suu Kyi's advice: Don't forget Burma's ethnic groups. Whatever the administration does about sanctions, it must do much more to press the junta, Burma's neighbors and the junta's supporters to stop the campaign of bloodshed against Burma's ethnic peoples. China has a special role to play, first in providing humanitarian relief to those seeking refuge across its borders and in pressuring the junta to end its brutal campaign. Ethnic warfare and its resultant instability are in no one's interest, except perhaps Than Shwe's. He must not be allowed to continue killing with impunity.
Chris Beyrer is director of Johns Hopkins University's Center for Public Health and Human Rights. Richard Sollom leads the Burma Project at Physicians for Human Rights.
The Junta Widens a War on Ethnic Groups
By Chris Beyrer and Richard Sollom
Thursday, September 3, 2009
It has been a good few weeks for Burma's dictator, Senior Gen. Than Shwe, even though Sen. Jim Webb secured the release of an imprisoned American during his recent visit and even though the sentencing of Burma's democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, after this summer's sham trial was roundly condemned. With all the media attention, Than Shwe got a dose of what he appears to crave most: international legitimacy. And he is assured that Suu Kyi, who won Burma's last free elections in 1990, will remain under house arrest during the 2010 elections. Last month Burma's state-run media even hailed the regime for its humanitarian nature and called for targeted economic sanctions to be lifted.
But is there, in fact, a more humanitarian regime in Burma?
Distinctly negative answers come from Ho Lom village in Burma's Shan State, where junta soldiers burned 62 houses on July 29. Or from Tard Mawk, in the same district, where soldiers burned more than 100 homes. Or from the 38 other Shan villages from which villagers have been forcibly displaced in July and August, part of a systematic and brutal campaign documented by the Shan Human Rights Foundation and the Shan Women's Action Network and reported by Human Rights Watch last month. Eric Schwartz, assistant secretary of the U.S. Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, noted on Aug. 19: "We've been deeply concerned by very recent reports of large-scale displacement, perhaps as many or more than 10,000 civilians . . . as a result of increased military activity in northeastern Burma."
Schwartz said this even before the latest round of attacks -- against the people of Kokang, an ethnic enclave of Chinese speakers in northeastern Shan State, close to the Chinese border. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that the fighting has driven 10,000 to 30,000 Kokang into China -- prompting a rare rebuke from the People's Republic, a longtime trade and investment partner of the junta.
Other ethnic groups, including the Karen in eastern Burma, have faced intensified fighting and egregious rights violations this summer. Some 5,000 Karen have fled into Thailand, according to Human Rights Watch. In Karen State, large numbers of land-mine injuries are being reported as untrained new conscripts, including children, are forced to fight their own people in some of the world's most heavily mined jungles.
These systematic campaigns in Burma's eastern ethnic regions have been marked by allegations of torture, extrajudicial executions and rapes of ethnic minority women and girls. Such mass atrocities are not new. Our collaborative team of medics conducted population-based health and human rights assessments in 2006-07 among more than 2,900 ethnic households in eastern Burma. We found that more than a quarter of all Shan families had been forcibly relocated in the previous year, that in 24 percent at least one family member had been taken by soldiers for forced labor and that in 9 percent of households at least one family member had been injured by a land mine -- one of the highest rates ever documented.
The current assaults appear to be part of the junta's strategy for the 2010 elections. The generals are attempting to force their ethnic opponents to become border patrol forces and to participate in their showcase elections. Most of the larger ethnic groups and political parties have rejected these offers, as did the leaders of Kokang. Most, along with Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, have also rejected the junta's constitution, which was drafted without their input and approved in the discredited referendum of May 2008.
Burma's ethnic peoples know they are not living under a new, more humanitarian regime. Quite the opposite: The junta is creating humanitarian emergencies in its quest for control. Shan, Karen, Kokang and other civilians are losing their homes, livelihoods and lives. Their suffering is directly linked to the detention of Suu Kyi and to the crackdown against Burma's democratic forces: student leaders, journalists, independent humanitarian relief workers and courageous clergy of all faiths. Indeed, essentially all the progressive forces opposing the generals are under attack.
Strikingly little international attention has been paid to this murderous turn of events. Yet these ethnic peoples must play a role if Burma is to have any sort of decent future. Suu Kyi knows this; in the only statement her people have had from her in years, given to U.N. Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari in late 2007, she highlighted the need for ethnic participation for true national reconciliation. The Obama administration, which is reviewing its Burma policy, would do well to heed Suu Kyi's advice: Don't forget Burma's ethnic groups. Whatever the administration does about sanctions, it must do much more to press the junta, Burma's neighbors and the junta's supporters to stop the campaign of bloodshed against Burma's ethnic peoples. China has a special role to play, first in providing humanitarian relief to those seeking refuge across its borders and in pressuring the junta to end its brutal campaign. Ethnic warfare and its resultant instability are in no one's interest, except perhaps Than Shwe's. He must not be allowed to continue killing with impunity.
Chris Beyrer is director of Johns Hopkins University's Center for Public Health and Human Rights. Richard Sollom leads the Burma Project at Physicians for Human Rights.
***************************************************************
Scoop - Burma/Sri Lanka: Recent Show Trials In Asia
Thursday, 3 September 2009, 12:24 pm
Press Release: Asian Human Rights Commission
The recent case against Aung San Suu Kyi by the Burmese junta is internationally well known. The case and the verdict were condemned all over the world as one more demonstration of a completely fake trial merely orchestrated to silence Burma’s opposition leader. She has already been under house arrest for two decades. Aung San Suu Kyi was charged with violating the rules relating to detention. The court sentenced her to five years of rigorous imprisonment. Within hours the Burmese junta, which was aware of the tremendous adverse impact of their decision throughout the world, reduced the sentence to 18 months of detention in her own home. The sole exercise of the trial was to give a semblance of legality and legitimacy for further imprisonment of this lady in a way so that she could not participate in any events relating to proposed elections in the country.
J.S. Tissainayagam’s case from Sri Lanka, though not as well known as Aung San Suu Kyi case, is also quite well known internationally. The arrest, detention and the trial against this man, a well known journalist and a human rights activist, received the attention of many governments. The American president, Barrack Obama himself mentioned this case as an example of the repression of journalists throughout the world. All leading media organizations worldwide condemned the arrest, detention and trial and repeatedly called on the government for Tissainayagam’s unconditional release.
Tissainayagam was charged with aiding and abetting terrorism and instigating racial violence by writing a few lines in an article which referred to the armed conflict then taking place in the north. Tissainayagam, who had been a veteran journalist and a human rights activist, had over a long period of time reported matters regarding internal conflicts in the south as well as the north and east. In the late eighties he helped the incumbent president of Sri Lanka, who was then an opposition Member of Parliament, by preparing and translating documents relating to disappearances and other atrocities in the south. There was nothing in the alleged document on which he was prosecuted, to indicate any attempt to instigate violence or promote racial hatred. There are thousands of pieces of writing of many persons who have written about the armed conflict from different perspectives and Tissainayagam’s writing was no different to any of these.
As a Tamil, for Tissainayagam it was quite natural for him to write about the problems of the Tamils in the same way that others have written about the problems of their groups. Tissainayagam was singled out for arrest, detention and prosecution solely for the purpose of intimidating other journalists and newspaper editors from publishing materials relating to the war. Several other journalists were exposed to serious dangers and some fled the country during this time.
Like the case of Aung San Suu Kyi, the case of Tissainayagam too, had no real grounds on which to base a criminal charge. In both cases the charges were fabricated. The charges were based on special regulations and not on the normal laws of the country. These regulations themselves were made in order to give enormous powers of harassment over dissidents and anyone who holds any form of opinion that is opposed to that of the regime in power.
Where the charges themselves are not valid there cannot be a fair trial. The issue before the court in both cases was to decide on the legality and the validity of the charges in the first instant. Both courts proceeded on the basis of these bloated charges and found the two persons guilty.
The transformation of independent courts into those that merely carry out the wishes of the executive has taken a long period of time in both countries. And now, in both countries there is the possibility of having show trials.
The Sri Lankan court sentenced Tissinaiyagam to 20 years. Previously the Sri Lankan Supreme Court has, over and over again asserted the right of citizens for freedom of expression and publication. The court has also held the rights of citizens to criticize the existing government. However, the High Court trying a case based on special regulations under anti-terrorism laws has completely altered the democratic tradition which previously existed.
Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has gone further and in a communiqué issued by it stated that criticism of the judgment in the Tissainayagam case is a slur on the independence of the judiciary in the country. However, this case, like that of Aung San Suu Kyi’s demonstrates that the independence of the judiciary in both countries has suffered serious setbacks.
It is therefore fitting that J.S. Tissainayagam has been named as the first winner of the Peter Mackler Award for Courageous and Ethical Journalism. This award should bring to global notice the manner in which courts can be manipulated for the purpose of suppressing freedom of expression and publication.
About AHRC: The Asian Human Rights Commission is a regional non-governmental organisation monitoring and lobbying human rights issues in Asia. The Hong Kong-based group was founded in 1984.
Thursday, 3 September 2009, 12:24 pm
Press Release: Asian Human Rights Commission
The recent case against Aung San Suu Kyi by the Burmese junta is internationally well known. The case and the verdict were condemned all over the world as one more demonstration of a completely fake trial merely orchestrated to silence Burma’s opposition leader. She has already been under house arrest for two decades. Aung San Suu Kyi was charged with violating the rules relating to detention. The court sentenced her to five years of rigorous imprisonment. Within hours the Burmese junta, which was aware of the tremendous adverse impact of their decision throughout the world, reduced the sentence to 18 months of detention in her own home. The sole exercise of the trial was to give a semblance of legality and legitimacy for further imprisonment of this lady in a way so that she could not participate in any events relating to proposed elections in the country.
J.S. Tissainayagam’s case from Sri Lanka, though not as well known as Aung San Suu Kyi case, is also quite well known internationally. The arrest, detention and the trial against this man, a well known journalist and a human rights activist, received the attention of many governments. The American president, Barrack Obama himself mentioned this case as an example of the repression of journalists throughout the world. All leading media organizations worldwide condemned the arrest, detention and trial and repeatedly called on the government for Tissainayagam’s unconditional release.
Tissainayagam was charged with aiding and abetting terrorism and instigating racial violence by writing a few lines in an article which referred to the armed conflict then taking place in the north. Tissainayagam, who had been a veteran journalist and a human rights activist, had over a long period of time reported matters regarding internal conflicts in the south as well as the north and east. In the late eighties he helped the incumbent president of Sri Lanka, who was then an opposition Member of Parliament, by preparing and translating documents relating to disappearances and other atrocities in the south. There was nothing in the alleged document on which he was prosecuted, to indicate any attempt to instigate violence or promote racial hatred. There are thousands of pieces of writing of many persons who have written about the armed conflict from different perspectives and Tissainayagam’s writing was no different to any of these.
As a Tamil, for Tissainayagam it was quite natural for him to write about the problems of the Tamils in the same way that others have written about the problems of their groups. Tissainayagam was singled out for arrest, detention and prosecution solely for the purpose of intimidating other journalists and newspaper editors from publishing materials relating to the war. Several other journalists were exposed to serious dangers and some fled the country during this time.
Like the case of Aung San Suu Kyi, the case of Tissainayagam too, had no real grounds on which to base a criminal charge. In both cases the charges were fabricated. The charges were based on special regulations and not on the normal laws of the country. These regulations themselves were made in order to give enormous powers of harassment over dissidents and anyone who holds any form of opinion that is opposed to that of the regime in power.
Where the charges themselves are not valid there cannot be a fair trial. The issue before the court in both cases was to decide on the legality and the validity of the charges in the first instant. Both courts proceeded on the basis of these bloated charges and found the two persons guilty.
The transformation of independent courts into those that merely carry out the wishes of the executive has taken a long period of time in both countries. And now, in both countries there is the possibility of having show trials.
The Sri Lankan court sentenced Tissinaiyagam to 20 years. Previously the Sri Lankan Supreme Court has, over and over again asserted the right of citizens for freedom of expression and publication. The court has also held the rights of citizens to criticize the existing government. However, the High Court trying a case based on special regulations under anti-terrorism laws has completely altered the democratic tradition which previously existed.
Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has gone further and in a communiqué issued by it stated that criticism of the judgment in the Tissainayagam case is a slur on the independence of the judiciary in the country. However, this case, like that of Aung San Suu Kyi’s demonstrates that the independence of the judiciary in both countries has suffered serious setbacks.
It is therefore fitting that J.S. Tissainayagam has been named as the first winner of the Peter Mackler Award for Courageous and Ethical Journalism. This award should bring to global notice the manner in which courts can be manipulated for the purpose of suppressing freedom of expression and publication.
About AHRC: The Asian Human Rights Commission is a regional non-governmental organisation monitoring and lobbying human rights issues in Asia. The Hong Kong-based group was founded in 1984.
***************************************************************
Khaleej Times Online - OPINION: Burma — the Conflict Will Continue
Nehginpao Kipgen
3 September 2009
Without addressing the root cause of the problems, the Burmese military junta is intensifying attacks against its own citizens. The latest tension erupted between the Burmese army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang armed group.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 10,000 to 30,000 people have fled to China since the tension flared up on August 8, when the Burmese army raided the home of Peng Jiashen, the Kokang armed leader, in northern Shan state.
The consequence of confrontation between the two groups spills over the international border. The affected country is none other than the military junta’s closest ally, China, a country that maintains robust economic ties with Burma.
China hopes Burma “properly deal with its domestic issue to safeguard the regional stability in the China-Myanmar border area,” said the Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman, Jiang Yu, on August 28. The statement is unusual for China that usually defended Burma in the face of international criticisms.
There are two important concerns for the Beijing government. First, the victims who have fled to the Yunnan province are mostly ethnic Chinese origin or Chinese nationals; second, Beijing sees skirmishes along the border are threatening the harmony and stability of Yunnan province.
The statement, however, should not be taken as a change of China’s foreign policy toward Burma. Beijing will continue to maintain its bilateral relationship with Naypyidaw intact. The Burmese military junta is also unlikely to part ways with communist China because of such border skirmishes.
The MNDAA, which demands autonomy, rejected the military junta’s proposal to transform its armed cadres to Border Guard Force. The proposal has been rejected by many other ceasefire groups, and the issue becomes a political headache for the Burmese military junta.
The latest development is a consequence of the unresolved longstanding ethno-political conflicts in the Union of Burma. The nature of conflict is an evidence of the existence of two different sets of movement in Burma: democracy and democracy that guarantees the rights of ethnic minorities.
The Union of Burma had gained independence from the British in 1948, but its ethno-political problems have not been settled. Though more than a dozen armed groups have signed ceasefire agreements with the junta, the simmering tensions still linger.
Ethnic problems in Burma had started long before independence. The mistrust exacerbated when the spirit of Panglong agreement was not honoured. One fundamental principle of the agreement was to establish a federal government. With the assassination of Aung San, who headed negotiation for Burma’s independence from the British, the dream of establishing a federal society was shattered.
The latest tension is a consequence of the military’s attempt to silence the voice of opposition in the run up to the 2010 general election. Unless the military junta can persuade the different ceasefire groups to its own terms, it is likely that similar confrontations will occur.
Despite international criticisms, the Burmese military junta is determined to move forward with the 2010 general election. Under the guidelines of the 2008 constitution, it is by and large a forgone conclusion that the military will stay onto power after election.
Burma will see a transitional government with a military-dominated multi-party democracy. The military junta’s official name ‘State Peace and Development Council’ will either be abolished or renamed.
If the United States of America and the Peoples’ Republic of China can lead a coordinated international strategy, there still is a chance for the success of international community’s engagement. Otherwise, one thing is clear that the ethno-political conflicts in Burma will continue to remain in post 2010 election.
Nehginpao Kipgen is a researcher on the rise of political conflicts in modern Burma (1947-2004) and general secretary of the US-based Kuki International Forum.
Nehginpao Kipgen
3 September 2009
Without addressing the root cause of the problems, the Burmese military junta is intensifying attacks against its own citizens. The latest tension erupted between the Burmese army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang armed group.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 10,000 to 30,000 people have fled to China since the tension flared up on August 8, when the Burmese army raided the home of Peng Jiashen, the Kokang armed leader, in northern Shan state.
The consequence of confrontation between the two groups spills over the international border. The affected country is none other than the military junta’s closest ally, China, a country that maintains robust economic ties with Burma.
China hopes Burma “properly deal with its domestic issue to safeguard the regional stability in the China-Myanmar border area,” said the Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman, Jiang Yu, on August 28. The statement is unusual for China that usually defended Burma in the face of international criticisms.
There are two important concerns for the Beijing government. First, the victims who have fled to the Yunnan province are mostly ethnic Chinese origin or Chinese nationals; second, Beijing sees skirmishes along the border are threatening the harmony and stability of Yunnan province.
The statement, however, should not be taken as a change of China’s foreign policy toward Burma. Beijing will continue to maintain its bilateral relationship with Naypyidaw intact. The Burmese military junta is also unlikely to part ways with communist China because of such border skirmishes.
The MNDAA, which demands autonomy, rejected the military junta’s proposal to transform its armed cadres to Border Guard Force. The proposal has been rejected by many other ceasefire groups, and the issue becomes a political headache for the Burmese military junta.
The latest development is a consequence of the unresolved longstanding ethno-political conflicts in the Union of Burma. The nature of conflict is an evidence of the existence of two different sets of movement in Burma: democracy and democracy that guarantees the rights of ethnic minorities.
The Union of Burma had gained independence from the British in 1948, but its ethno-political problems have not been settled. Though more than a dozen armed groups have signed ceasefire agreements with the junta, the simmering tensions still linger.
Ethnic problems in Burma had started long before independence. The mistrust exacerbated when the spirit of Panglong agreement was not honoured. One fundamental principle of the agreement was to establish a federal government. With the assassination of Aung San, who headed negotiation for Burma’s independence from the British, the dream of establishing a federal society was shattered.
The latest tension is a consequence of the military’s attempt to silence the voice of opposition in the run up to the 2010 general election. Unless the military junta can persuade the different ceasefire groups to its own terms, it is likely that similar confrontations will occur.
Despite international criticisms, the Burmese military junta is determined to move forward with the 2010 general election. Under the guidelines of the 2008 constitution, it is by and large a forgone conclusion that the military will stay onto power after election.
Burma will see a transitional government with a military-dominated multi-party democracy. The military junta’s official name ‘State Peace and Development Council’ will either be abolished or renamed.
If the United States of America and the Peoples’ Republic of China can lead a coordinated international strategy, there still is a chance for the success of international community’s engagement. Otherwise, one thing is clear that the ethno-political conflicts in Burma will continue to remain in post 2010 election.
Nehginpao Kipgen is a researcher on the rise of political conflicts in modern Burma (1947-2004) and general secretary of the US-based Kuki International Forum.
***************************************************************
The Nation - The false and dangerous Allure of Nuclear Weapons
By Bernard F. W. Loo
Published on September 3, 2009
If Burma intends to acquire nuclear weapons, as reports suggest, this reflects a widely-held and terrible attraction that nuclear weapons maintain over military planners. This fascination stems from a misunderstanding about what nuclear weapons can do for a country's national security.
The recent allegations that Burma has started to develop a nuclear weapons programme appear to have surprised no one; in a similar vein, no one was surprised when the first news of a nuclear weapons programme in North Korea emerged. If a country is led by a paranoid government eternally suspicious of just about every other state in the international system, then nuclear weapons must surely be the ultimate guarantor of that country's national security.
Two arguments have traditionally been made in favour of nuclear weapons. First, the eminent nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie in 1946 called them the "ultimate weapon". There is something viscerally certain, even iconic, about the nuclear mushroom cloud. More recently, there was the 21st century re-imagining of the classic 1970s television series "Battlestar Galactica", which revolved around a simple premise: Two civilisations, both capable of faster-than-light travel (which Einsteinian physics maintains is impossible) seeking to destroy the other with nuclear weapons. This premise reflects the emotive power that nuclear weapons exercise over the human imagination.
Second, nuclear weapons offer an apparent cost-effective alternative to the otherwise expensive business of acquiring and maintaining armed forces. Defence budgets typically go mostly to manpower costs. A nuclear weapons programme offers the prospect of significant downsizing of the armed forces and, consequently, significant cuts in defence spending; it can also have civilian energy spin-offs. For states with nuclear ambitions - the so-called nuclear wannabes - these arguments appear to be very persuasive.
There are two key arguments that relate nuclear weapons to national security. The first posits a scenario in which a nuclear state faces potential aggression from a non-nuclear state. In this scenario, it is possible to argue that the mere possession of a nuclear weapon should be sufficient to act as a deterrent against external aggression. It would be tempting to ascribe this state of affairs to the case of Israel - long suspected of having an opaque nuclear weapons programme - in its relations with its Arab neighbours.
This scenario is, however, problematic. Any nuclear retaliation against a conventional military offensive crosses a threshold that has remained intact since 1945. This renders the nuclear state as a pariah, likely to then face a variety of very severe sanctions imposed by the international community.
The second argument involves threats to the nuclear wannabe's existence from an existing nuclear state. The argument is that for the nuclear wannabe, the possession of nuclear weapons will deter any aggression from other nuclear states, and therefore provide the country with a measure of national security. After all, as one Indian general was alleged to have remarked, the signal lesson of Operation Iraqi Freedom is that if one wishes to go up against the United States, make sure you already have a nuclear weapon.
What deters aggression between two nuclear powers, what keeps the nuclear peace, in other words, is not the fact that both are nuclear powers. If that were the case, all nuclear powers should only need to maintain only one nuclear weapon in each arsenal. The fact that this is not the case suggests that nuclear deterrence and nuclear peace may be rather more complicated.
If a nuclear wannabe genuinely believes that nuclear weapons will enhance its security, it needs to keep in mind two considerations. One is retaliation. What maintains the peace between two adversarial nuclear states is the fear that one may attack first. But the victim will still have nuclear weapons that survive this first attack. The nuclear weapons that have survived will then be sufficient for the victim to launch a retaliatory attack against the aggressor, and inflict on the aggressor levels of damage that are politically unacceptable.
This means the nuclear wannabe will need either a very extensive nuclear arsenal, or it will need to ensure that its nuclear arsenal is survivable, either by hardening nuclear silos or by deploying their nuclear weapons on mobile, difficult-to-detect platforms such as missile submarines. Neither option is cheap; both subvert the myth of nuclear weapons as a low-cost solution to national security challenges.
The second critical element in nuclear deterrence is that of sufficient warning. This typically - but not exclusively - applies in the case of states with very small nuclear arsenals that are not likely to survive a nuclear first strike. In this instance, one state has the capacity to react quickly enough in the event of a nuclear attack, to launch its own nuclear weapons against the aggressor before its arsenal is destroyed. In this instance, because both adversaries know the other has sufficient early warning of impending nuclear attack, any nuclear aggression by one will almost certainly be counter-productive, inasmuch as it will lead to the state's own nuclear demise.
The nuclear wannabe will have to undertake serious investments in geo-stationary satellites that can monitor the nuclear weapons facilities of its putative adversaries, and advanced command and control facilities that allow for quick launch of its nuclear weapons. Again, this is not a cheap option, and it demands of such states very high levels of technological expertise that most will in fact lack.
It therefore means that if any state, genuinely worried about its survival and security, seeks to acquire nuclear weapons, the mere possession of even a handful of nuclear weapons - assuming the country then has the systems that can deliver these weapons against its putative adversary - is not enough. Secondly, nuclear weapons will not constitute a cheap, cost-effective security for the country. The great irony is that if any state genuinely desires to acquire nuclear weapons, it has made itself more vulnerable to external attack than ever before.
Bernard F. W. Loo, educated at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth, is associate professor of war and military strategy at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
By Bernard F. W. Loo
Published on September 3, 2009
If Burma intends to acquire nuclear weapons, as reports suggest, this reflects a widely-held and terrible attraction that nuclear weapons maintain over military planners. This fascination stems from a misunderstanding about what nuclear weapons can do for a country's national security.
The recent allegations that Burma has started to develop a nuclear weapons programme appear to have surprised no one; in a similar vein, no one was surprised when the first news of a nuclear weapons programme in North Korea emerged. If a country is led by a paranoid government eternally suspicious of just about every other state in the international system, then nuclear weapons must surely be the ultimate guarantor of that country's national security.
Two arguments have traditionally been made in favour of nuclear weapons. First, the eminent nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie in 1946 called them the "ultimate weapon". There is something viscerally certain, even iconic, about the nuclear mushroom cloud. More recently, there was the 21st century re-imagining of the classic 1970s television series "Battlestar Galactica", which revolved around a simple premise: Two civilisations, both capable of faster-than-light travel (which Einsteinian physics maintains is impossible) seeking to destroy the other with nuclear weapons. This premise reflects the emotive power that nuclear weapons exercise over the human imagination.
Second, nuclear weapons offer an apparent cost-effective alternative to the otherwise expensive business of acquiring and maintaining armed forces. Defence budgets typically go mostly to manpower costs. A nuclear weapons programme offers the prospect of significant downsizing of the armed forces and, consequently, significant cuts in defence spending; it can also have civilian energy spin-offs. For states with nuclear ambitions - the so-called nuclear wannabes - these arguments appear to be very persuasive.
There are two key arguments that relate nuclear weapons to national security. The first posits a scenario in which a nuclear state faces potential aggression from a non-nuclear state. In this scenario, it is possible to argue that the mere possession of a nuclear weapon should be sufficient to act as a deterrent against external aggression. It would be tempting to ascribe this state of affairs to the case of Israel - long suspected of having an opaque nuclear weapons programme - in its relations with its Arab neighbours.
This scenario is, however, problematic. Any nuclear retaliation against a conventional military offensive crosses a threshold that has remained intact since 1945. This renders the nuclear state as a pariah, likely to then face a variety of very severe sanctions imposed by the international community.
The second argument involves threats to the nuclear wannabe's existence from an existing nuclear state. The argument is that for the nuclear wannabe, the possession of nuclear weapons will deter any aggression from other nuclear states, and therefore provide the country with a measure of national security. After all, as one Indian general was alleged to have remarked, the signal lesson of Operation Iraqi Freedom is that if one wishes to go up against the United States, make sure you already have a nuclear weapon.
What deters aggression between two nuclear powers, what keeps the nuclear peace, in other words, is not the fact that both are nuclear powers. If that were the case, all nuclear powers should only need to maintain only one nuclear weapon in each arsenal. The fact that this is not the case suggests that nuclear deterrence and nuclear peace may be rather more complicated.
If a nuclear wannabe genuinely believes that nuclear weapons will enhance its security, it needs to keep in mind two considerations. One is retaliation. What maintains the peace between two adversarial nuclear states is the fear that one may attack first. But the victim will still have nuclear weapons that survive this first attack. The nuclear weapons that have survived will then be sufficient for the victim to launch a retaliatory attack against the aggressor, and inflict on the aggressor levels of damage that are politically unacceptable.
This means the nuclear wannabe will need either a very extensive nuclear arsenal, or it will need to ensure that its nuclear arsenal is survivable, either by hardening nuclear silos or by deploying their nuclear weapons on mobile, difficult-to-detect platforms such as missile submarines. Neither option is cheap; both subvert the myth of nuclear weapons as a low-cost solution to national security challenges.
The second critical element in nuclear deterrence is that of sufficient warning. This typically - but not exclusively - applies in the case of states with very small nuclear arsenals that are not likely to survive a nuclear first strike. In this instance, one state has the capacity to react quickly enough in the event of a nuclear attack, to launch its own nuclear weapons against the aggressor before its arsenal is destroyed. In this instance, because both adversaries know the other has sufficient early warning of impending nuclear attack, any nuclear aggression by one will almost certainly be counter-productive, inasmuch as it will lead to the state's own nuclear demise.
The nuclear wannabe will have to undertake serious investments in geo-stationary satellites that can monitor the nuclear weapons facilities of its putative adversaries, and advanced command and control facilities that allow for quick launch of its nuclear weapons. Again, this is not a cheap option, and it demands of such states very high levels of technological expertise that most will in fact lack.
It therefore means that if any state, genuinely worried about its survival and security, seeks to acquire nuclear weapons, the mere possession of even a handful of nuclear weapons - assuming the country then has the systems that can deliver these weapons against its putative adversary - is not enough. Secondly, nuclear weapons will not constitute a cheap, cost-effective security for the country. The great irony is that if any state genuinely desires to acquire nuclear weapons, it has made itself more vulnerable to external attack than ever before.
Bernard F. W. Loo, educated at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth, is associate professor of war and military strategy at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
***************************************************************
Bangkok Post - Opinion: Junta's war on ethnic rebels alarms China
Writer: LARRY JAGAN
Published: 2/09/2009 at 12:00 AM
Newspaper section: News
Military operations by the Burmese junta along its border with China in the past few weeks have sent tensions soaring, after thousands of ethnic minorities from Burma fled for their lives.
The Burmese army's recent offensive against the ethnic rebel group Kokang, who call themselves the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (or MNDAA), has also shocked Beijing and rocked their normally very close relations.
Fears that the fighting could spread and explode into renewed civil war has led to a flurry of urgent diplomatic actvity by Beijing, as the Chinese government tries to stabilise the situation before it gets out of hand.
Senior Chinese security officials, including Meng Jian, the powerful minister for public security, have just toured the border area to assess the situation and plot the Chinese reaction.
But the whole affair casts a long shadow over what has been taken by many to be a rock-hard relationsip. It is now increasingly evident that a significant rift exits between the two countries that could have crucial implications for other countries in the region, and for any approach which the international community may take to encourage the Burmese military regime to introduce real political change.
The implications of this growing divergence could have a significant effect on the border region, as the most powerful of the ethnic groups - especially the Kachin, Kokang and Wa - in this area have ceasefire agreements with the Burmese junta, but also have traditionally close ties with the Chinese authorities.
Economically and culturally the area is closer to China than to the Burmese regime. Thousands of Chinese businessmen and workers have migrated into northern Shan State over the last decade, seeking employment and economic opportunities. Many of these ethnic leaders go to Chinese hospital across the border for medical treatent and send their children to school in China. The Chinese language and even the Chinese currency, the renminbi, are used throughout the Kokang and Wa areas in Burma's northern Shan State.
Anything which forces Beijing to choose between their ethnic brothers inside Burma - the Kokang and Wa are ethnically Chinese - and the central government in Naypidaw will cause the superpower immense problems. And in the end will bring into sharp focus the real nature of the Burma-China axis.
Alarmed and surprised by the Burmese military offensive, Beijing has already sent hundreds of extra troops and armed policemen to the area to quell any potential violence. The Chinese central authorities are very upset by the effect of the Burmese military action along the border, and are furious that they were not informed before-hand, according to a senior Chinese government official who requested anonymity.
A senior diplomat flew last week to Naypidaw, the Burmese junta's headquarters and the country's new capital, to convey Beijing's displeasure. Burma has apologised for the instability caused across the Chinese border region, according to Burmese foreign ministry officials. But the Chinese authorities remain anxious about further fallout from the offensive against the Kokang.
The operations were aimed at capturing a Kokang arms factory, the Burmese leaders told their Chinese envoys. But analysts remain sceptical and believe this was, at best, a pretext.
"The junta knows it must move to disarm these ethnic rebel groups, and the Kokang are the weakest militarily," said Win Min, the Burmese academic and military specialist at Chiang Mai University in Thailand.
The Kokang are ethnically Chinese and speak a Mandarin dialect, but have lived for many decades inside Burma. They have their own armed militia and had been fighting the Burmese army for several decades demanding autonomy until they agreed to a truce with the Burmese military regime in 1989.
Tensions have been rising in Burma's border areas for months, as the military junta pressurred the ethnic cease-fire groups - particularly the Kachin, Kokang and Wa - to surrender their arms before the planned elections next year. The Burmese government wants to integrate them into a Border Police guard but these key ethnic groups along the Chinese border have been resisting the move.
At the weekend, international NGOs reported more than 30,000 refugees had fled to China in the part week to escape the fighting. Since then the fighting seems to have subsided and refugees have begun to trickle back to the Kokang capital of Lougai which is on the border and which is firmly under the control of the Burmese army. Once a bustling border town full of bars, discos, karaoke clubs, massage parlours and gambling dens, the town centre is still virtually deserted and many buildings have been damaged.
"More confrontation and military encounters are expected in the following days and thousands of villagers are fleeing across the border [into China] to avoid the war, and subsequent human rights abuses," said a statement from the Kokang group, sent to the Bangkok Post. The 23-year-old cease-fire agreement between the Burmese junta and the Kokang seems to be effectively ended, according to Burmese dissidents based in the Chinese town of Ruili not far from where the Kokang refugees crossed the border.
"This does not augur well for the other ceasefire groups like the Kachin and Wa," said Mr Win Min. "This may be a preview of what is to come."
If the Burmese try the same tactics against the Wa, they will inevitably fight back, Mr Win Min believes. There is a very strong risk of a return to armed conflict along the Chinese-Burmese border, according to a Chinese government official who closely follows events in Burma. "The problem is that the Wa are very close to the Chinese government, and it would be very hard for Beijing to desert them at this crucial point in time," he added.
Beijing now has a major quandry to deal with. They want to stabilise the border area as soon as possible and restore peace to the region. They have advised the Burmese to stop the fighting, or risk a rift between the two governments. They have suggested that the only option is to negotiate a new peace settlement with the Kokang, and offered their support as intermediaries, according to Chinese government sources.
Beijing wants the refugees to return to Burma as soon as possible, but have no intention of pushing them back, said the government official. For the time being they are taking care of them, but are making sure they do not travel further inland.
The latest move by the Burmese only strengthens suggestions that there has been a growing disenchanment within the Burmese regime towards China. Over these past few months the Burmese junta has become disillusioned with Beijing, largely because of the latter's failure to enthusiastically back the Burmese authorities' attempts to disarm the rebel groups, especially those which enjoy a special relationship with China.
The enthusiastic reception for the US senator Jim Webb last week - usually only reserved for heads of state, and only the most important at that - was a clear sign of the winds of change in Naypidaw.
In another indication of the Burmese rift with Beijing, this week's Myanmar Times ran a short agency news story on Tibet's spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama visiting Taiwan, after it was approved by the censors, according to diplomats in Rangoon. This is the first time the media in Burma has mentioned the Dalai Lama's name in more than 20 years: anything to do with the Tibetan leader makes Beijing bristle.
So China is currently wondering to what to do. Diplomats in both countries are running round like headless chickens, according to Western diplomats in both capitals. In the meantime the fear is that the situation on the border could explode into renewed civil war at any moment.
"The majority of the Kokang troops have surrendered to China," said US-based Burmese activist Aung Din.
Once the situation calms, the Burmese junta is expected to turn its attention to other ethnic minorities along the border, Aung Din said.
"There will be more fighting, more tension and more conflict because the regime will continue to try to force these groups to surrender their arms ahead of the elections."
Much now depends on how much infleuence Beijing still has with its ally and whether China will try to pressure the Kokang and Wa to come to some accommodation with the Burmese government.
Writer: LARRY JAGAN
Published: 2/09/2009 at 12:00 AM
Newspaper section: News
Military operations by the Burmese junta along its border with China in the past few weeks have sent tensions soaring, after thousands of ethnic minorities from Burma fled for their lives.
The Burmese army's recent offensive against the ethnic rebel group Kokang, who call themselves the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (or MNDAA), has also shocked Beijing and rocked their normally very close relations.
Fears that the fighting could spread and explode into renewed civil war has led to a flurry of urgent diplomatic actvity by Beijing, as the Chinese government tries to stabilise the situation before it gets out of hand.
Senior Chinese security officials, including Meng Jian, the powerful minister for public security, have just toured the border area to assess the situation and plot the Chinese reaction.
But the whole affair casts a long shadow over what has been taken by many to be a rock-hard relationsip. It is now increasingly evident that a significant rift exits between the two countries that could have crucial implications for other countries in the region, and for any approach which the international community may take to encourage the Burmese military regime to introduce real political change.
The implications of this growing divergence could have a significant effect on the border region, as the most powerful of the ethnic groups - especially the Kachin, Kokang and Wa - in this area have ceasefire agreements with the Burmese junta, but also have traditionally close ties with the Chinese authorities.
Economically and culturally the area is closer to China than to the Burmese regime. Thousands of Chinese businessmen and workers have migrated into northern Shan State over the last decade, seeking employment and economic opportunities. Many of these ethnic leaders go to Chinese hospital across the border for medical treatent and send their children to school in China. The Chinese language and even the Chinese currency, the renminbi, are used throughout the Kokang and Wa areas in Burma's northern Shan State.
Anything which forces Beijing to choose between their ethnic brothers inside Burma - the Kokang and Wa are ethnically Chinese - and the central government in Naypidaw will cause the superpower immense problems. And in the end will bring into sharp focus the real nature of the Burma-China axis.
Alarmed and surprised by the Burmese military offensive, Beijing has already sent hundreds of extra troops and armed policemen to the area to quell any potential violence. The Chinese central authorities are very upset by the effect of the Burmese military action along the border, and are furious that they were not informed before-hand, according to a senior Chinese government official who requested anonymity.
A senior diplomat flew last week to Naypidaw, the Burmese junta's headquarters and the country's new capital, to convey Beijing's displeasure. Burma has apologised for the instability caused across the Chinese border region, according to Burmese foreign ministry officials. But the Chinese authorities remain anxious about further fallout from the offensive against the Kokang.
The operations were aimed at capturing a Kokang arms factory, the Burmese leaders told their Chinese envoys. But analysts remain sceptical and believe this was, at best, a pretext.
"The junta knows it must move to disarm these ethnic rebel groups, and the Kokang are the weakest militarily," said Win Min, the Burmese academic and military specialist at Chiang Mai University in Thailand.
The Kokang are ethnically Chinese and speak a Mandarin dialect, but have lived for many decades inside Burma. They have their own armed militia and had been fighting the Burmese army for several decades demanding autonomy until they agreed to a truce with the Burmese military regime in 1989.
Tensions have been rising in Burma's border areas for months, as the military junta pressurred the ethnic cease-fire groups - particularly the Kachin, Kokang and Wa - to surrender their arms before the planned elections next year. The Burmese government wants to integrate them into a Border Police guard but these key ethnic groups along the Chinese border have been resisting the move.
At the weekend, international NGOs reported more than 30,000 refugees had fled to China in the part week to escape the fighting. Since then the fighting seems to have subsided and refugees have begun to trickle back to the Kokang capital of Lougai which is on the border and which is firmly under the control of the Burmese army. Once a bustling border town full of bars, discos, karaoke clubs, massage parlours and gambling dens, the town centre is still virtually deserted and many buildings have been damaged.
"More confrontation and military encounters are expected in the following days and thousands of villagers are fleeing across the border [into China] to avoid the war, and subsequent human rights abuses," said a statement from the Kokang group, sent to the Bangkok Post. The 23-year-old cease-fire agreement between the Burmese junta and the Kokang seems to be effectively ended, according to Burmese dissidents based in the Chinese town of Ruili not far from where the Kokang refugees crossed the border.
"This does not augur well for the other ceasefire groups like the Kachin and Wa," said Mr Win Min. "This may be a preview of what is to come."
If the Burmese try the same tactics against the Wa, they will inevitably fight back, Mr Win Min believes. There is a very strong risk of a return to armed conflict along the Chinese-Burmese border, according to a Chinese government official who closely follows events in Burma. "The problem is that the Wa are very close to the Chinese government, and it would be very hard for Beijing to desert them at this crucial point in time," he added.
Beijing now has a major quandry to deal with. They want to stabilise the border area as soon as possible and restore peace to the region. They have advised the Burmese to stop the fighting, or risk a rift between the two governments. They have suggested that the only option is to negotiate a new peace settlement with the Kokang, and offered their support as intermediaries, according to Chinese government sources.
Beijing wants the refugees to return to Burma as soon as possible, but have no intention of pushing them back, said the government official. For the time being they are taking care of them, but are making sure they do not travel further inland.
The latest move by the Burmese only strengthens suggestions that there has been a growing disenchanment within the Burmese regime towards China. Over these past few months the Burmese junta has become disillusioned with Beijing, largely because of the latter's failure to enthusiastically back the Burmese authorities' attempts to disarm the rebel groups, especially those which enjoy a special relationship with China.
The enthusiastic reception for the US senator Jim Webb last week - usually only reserved for heads of state, and only the most important at that - was a clear sign of the winds of change in Naypidaw.
In another indication of the Burmese rift with Beijing, this week's Myanmar Times ran a short agency news story on Tibet's spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama visiting Taiwan, after it was approved by the censors, according to diplomats in Rangoon. This is the first time the media in Burma has mentioned the Dalai Lama's name in more than 20 years: anything to do with the Tibetan leader makes Beijing bristle.
So China is currently wondering to what to do. Diplomats in both countries are running round like headless chickens, according to Western diplomats in both capitals. In the meantime the fear is that the situation on the border could explode into renewed civil war at any moment.
"The majority of the Kokang troops have surrendered to China," said US-based Burmese activist Aung Din.
Once the situation calms, the Burmese junta is expected to turn its attention to other ethnic minorities along the border, Aung Din said.
"There will be more fighting, more tension and more conflict because the regime will continue to try to force these groups to surrender their arms ahead of the elections."
Much now depends on how much infleuence Beijing still has with its ally and whether China will try to pressure the Kokang and Wa to come to some accommodation with the Burmese government.
***************************************************************
VOA News - Editorial: Seeking A Stable Burma
02 September 2009
Burma, the scene of much suffering from last year’s devastating Cyclone Nargis as well as long-running political repression and egregious human rights abuses, saw more turmoil last week when fighting broke out along the northeast border with China between an armed ethnic group and government troops deployed to secure the region.
United Nations officials estimate that as many as 30,000 civilians have been forced to flee the area, home to a large number of ethnic Chinese. The tensions add a new element to concerns over stability in the region, both among Burma’s neighbors and the greater international community.
The United States is conducting a broad review of its policies toward the government in Rangoon, in an effort to find the best way to bring democratic transition and respect for human rights for the Burmese people.
World attention has focused on the continued detention of pro-democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi and 2,100 other political prisoners, but the review has multiple dimensions. Ethnic conflicts exploited by Burmese authorities pose challenges for the future of Burma, not only the recent fighting in the Kokang region but also as seen in the plight of Burma’s Muslim Rohingya minority and others.
The U.S. has a great interest in seeing Burma promote stability by heeding the UN calls for Burma to free its political prisoners and hold a genuine dialogue among the Burmese authorities, representatives of the opposition and ethnic nationality leaders on a shared vision for the way forward in Burma. Taking positive steps toward a true, representative democracy would do much to end the isolation and conflict that has caused so much suffering there.
02 September 2009
Burma, the scene of much suffering from last year’s devastating Cyclone Nargis as well as long-running political repression and egregious human rights abuses, saw more turmoil last week when fighting broke out along the northeast border with China between an armed ethnic group and government troops deployed to secure the region.
United Nations officials estimate that as many as 30,000 civilians have been forced to flee the area, home to a large number of ethnic Chinese. The tensions add a new element to concerns over stability in the region, both among Burma’s neighbors and the greater international community.
The United States is conducting a broad review of its policies toward the government in Rangoon, in an effort to find the best way to bring democratic transition and respect for human rights for the Burmese people.
World attention has focused on the continued detention of pro-democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi and 2,100 other political prisoners, but the review has multiple dimensions. Ethnic conflicts exploited by Burmese authorities pose challenges for the future of Burma, not only the recent fighting in the Kokang region but also as seen in the plight of Burma’s Muslim Rohingya minority and others.
The U.S. has a great interest in seeing Burma promote stability by heeding the UN calls for Burma to free its political prisoners and hold a genuine dialogue among the Burmese authorities, representatives of the opposition and ethnic nationality leaders on a shared vision for the way forward in Burma. Taking positive steps toward a true, representative democracy would do much to end the isolation and conflict that has caused so much suffering there.
***************************************************************
Today's Zaman - ASEAN’s new approach to Myanmar
02 September 2009, Wednesday
NEW YORK -- The recent decision by Myanmar's government to sentence pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi to a further 18 months' house arrest shows how difficult it is to deal with that country's ruling generals.
Yet the first steps toward a new approach may already have been taken.
The clearest sign comes from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member. At first, most of ASEAN's member governments responded mildly to the verdict, expressing their “disappointment” -- a stance that reflects the group's principle of noninterference in fellow members' internal politics.
But Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya then consulted his counterparts in Cambodia, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam. As current ASEAN chair, he floated the idea of concertedly requesting a pardon for Aung San Suu Kyi.
ASEAN government officials have since met to draft a text. Approval by the association's foreign ministers may come in September, with ASEAN leaders tackling the issue in October.
Of course, amendments and objections to the draft should be expected. But the pardon request is already significant. It seeks to be finely balanced, respecting the regime's sovereignty while subtly pressing home the point in unison, as neighboring states. The request would be politely worded, but it would also be an official and public mode of communication, instead of the usual behind-the-scenes quiet diplomacy.
What ASEAN says or does not say will not change things immediately. Cynics might add that even if Aung San Suu Kyi is pardoned, she may yet still be detained on political grounds or face other barriers aimed at preventing her from competing in the elections promised in Myanmar for 2010.
But Western sanctions have not worked, either. Since the 1990s crackdown, human rights violations have continued, most recently with the suppression of the protests led by Buddhist monks in 2007. The average citizen has grown poorer, even as those close to the junta become ostentatiously rich.
Western sanctions instead paved the way for investments in Myanmar by those with less concern about human rights violations -- first by ASEAN neighbors in hotels and other sectors, and more recently by China and India, which are vying for projects and influence in the strategic energy sector. As a result, Myanmar's generals have been able to play one side off against another.
The game, however, may now be changing. ASEAN's initiative is a new step forward for the group. While ASEAN rejected previous calls to impose sanctions, or even to expel Myanmar, this step shows that it will not remain inert regardless of what the generals do. Moreover, some ASEAN member countries, like Singapore, have explicitly called for Aung San Suu Kyi to be allowed to participate in the 2010 elections.
The ASEAN effort coincides with two other developments. One is the decision by the United States to reconsider its policy of sanctions, becoming more flexible while remaining true to its values and interests.
Some activists have criticized US Senator Jim Webb's journey to Yangon to obtain the release of John Yettaw, the American whose actions triggered the charges against Aung San Suu Kyi. But this is consistent with the Obama administration's policy of seeking a dialogue even with those who are not America's friends. Such dialogue is vital if Myanmar is to be prevented from possibly pursuing nuclear weapons and rigging elections, à la Iran.
The other development is less obvious. After the court delivered its verdict, the regime halved the sentence and agreed to keep Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, rather than moving her to one of its worst jails. This may not seem like much of a concession. But the junta seems to be trying to cause less offense.
Consider, too, the junta's gesture in handing over Yettaw to Senator Webb, and its interaction with the international community on humanitarian assistance after Cyclone Nargis. Might it be possible that the generals in Myanmar recognize that they are in a cul de sac? Could the regime be seeking ways out of its isolation in the run-up to the 2010 elections? Could it welcome dialogue and engagement?
How the generals respond to the ASEAN request will be an important signal of the regime's intentions. Even if the regime does want to begin talking, sustaining a dialogue will be no easier than has been the case with North Korea.
ASEAN, as the organization of neighboring states, is important to achieving that goal, but US involvement is key, as is inclusion of China and India. They must be pressed to see more than the opportunity for strategic access to energy and other natural resources. Japan, too -- still the largest Asian economy and a traditional donor to the region -- must also play a role.
A moral but pragmatic community needs to be constructed, with all in agreement on how to deal with Myanmar. Even if, like an orchestra, different countries use different instruments and play different notes, the main theme must be consistent.
If this can be done, the chances of progress in the run-up to the 2010 elections will be strengthened. Success may still prove elusive, but a new game with a greater possibility for success will have begun.
*Simon Tay is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and a fellow of the Asia Society. © Project Syndicate, 2009.
02 September 2009, Wednesday
NEW YORK -- The recent decision by Myanmar's government to sentence pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi to a further 18 months' house arrest shows how difficult it is to deal with that country's ruling generals.
Yet the first steps toward a new approach may already have been taken.
The clearest sign comes from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member. At first, most of ASEAN's member governments responded mildly to the verdict, expressing their “disappointment” -- a stance that reflects the group's principle of noninterference in fellow members' internal politics.
But Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya then consulted his counterparts in Cambodia, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam. As current ASEAN chair, he floated the idea of concertedly requesting a pardon for Aung San Suu Kyi.
ASEAN government officials have since met to draft a text. Approval by the association's foreign ministers may come in September, with ASEAN leaders tackling the issue in October.
Of course, amendments and objections to the draft should be expected. But the pardon request is already significant. It seeks to be finely balanced, respecting the regime's sovereignty while subtly pressing home the point in unison, as neighboring states. The request would be politely worded, but it would also be an official and public mode of communication, instead of the usual behind-the-scenes quiet diplomacy.
What ASEAN says or does not say will not change things immediately. Cynics might add that even if Aung San Suu Kyi is pardoned, she may yet still be detained on political grounds or face other barriers aimed at preventing her from competing in the elections promised in Myanmar for 2010.
But Western sanctions have not worked, either. Since the 1990s crackdown, human rights violations have continued, most recently with the suppression of the protests led by Buddhist monks in 2007. The average citizen has grown poorer, even as those close to the junta become ostentatiously rich.
Western sanctions instead paved the way for investments in Myanmar by those with less concern about human rights violations -- first by ASEAN neighbors in hotels and other sectors, and more recently by China and India, which are vying for projects and influence in the strategic energy sector. As a result, Myanmar's generals have been able to play one side off against another.
The game, however, may now be changing. ASEAN's initiative is a new step forward for the group. While ASEAN rejected previous calls to impose sanctions, or even to expel Myanmar, this step shows that it will not remain inert regardless of what the generals do. Moreover, some ASEAN member countries, like Singapore, have explicitly called for Aung San Suu Kyi to be allowed to participate in the 2010 elections.
The ASEAN effort coincides with two other developments. One is the decision by the United States to reconsider its policy of sanctions, becoming more flexible while remaining true to its values and interests.
Some activists have criticized US Senator Jim Webb's journey to Yangon to obtain the release of John Yettaw, the American whose actions triggered the charges against Aung San Suu Kyi. But this is consistent with the Obama administration's policy of seeking a dialogue even with those who are not America's friends. Such dialogue is vital if Myanmar is to be prevented from possibly pursuing nuclear weapons and rigging elections, à la Iran.
The other development is less obvious. After the court delivered its verdict, the regime halved the sentence and agreed to keep Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, rather than moving her to one of its worst jails. This may not seem like much of a concession. But the junta seems to be trying to cause less offense.
Consider, too, the junta's gesture in handing over Yettaw to Senator Webb, and its interaction with the international community on humanitarian assistance after Cyclone Nargis. Might it be possible that the generals in Myanmar recognize that they are in a cul de sac? Could the regime be seeking ways out of its isolation in the run-up to the 2010 elections? Could it welcome dialogue and engagement?
How the generals respond to the ASEAN request will be an important signal of the regime's intentions. Even if the regime does want to begin talking, sustaining a dialogue will be no easier than has been the case with North Korea.
ASEAN, as the organization of neighboring states, is important to achieving that goal, but US involvement is key, as is inclusion of China and India. They must be pressed to see more than the opportunity for strategic access to energy and other natural resources. Japan, too -- still the largest Asian economy and a traditional donor to the region -- must also play a role.
A moral but pragmatic community needs to be constructed, with all in agreement on how to deal with Myanmar. Even if, like an orchestra, different countries use different instruments and play different notes, the main theme must be consistent.
If this can be done, the chances of progress in the run-up to the 2010 elections will be strengthened. Success may still prove elusive, but a new game with a greater possibility for success will have begun.
*Simon Tay is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and a fellow of the Asia Society. © Project Syndicate, 2009.
***************************************************************
Thursday, Sept. 3, 2009
READERS IN COUNCIL
The Japan Times - Sanctions don't impoverish Burma
By DONALD M. SEEKINS
Motobu, Okinawa
In his Aug. 29 article, "U.S. should engage Burma," Brahma Chellaney makes some good points concerning U.S. sanctions against the military regime in Burma: that these sanctions have failed in their stated purpose to promote democracy and human rights; that they have increased China's already large influence inside the country; and that they reflect a double standard — why trade with China, but not with Burma?
But he is mistaken to assume that it is "U.S.-led sanctions" that have made Burma's people among the poorest in Asia. Responsibility for that rests squarely with Than Shwe and his fellow generals, who have squandered funds on new weapons purchased abroad and on the costly new capital city at Naypyidaw, rather than investing in health, education and other improvements in the people's standard of living. Their management of the economy has been grossly incompetent, including a complex and counterproductive system of multiple currency exchange rates and a complete lack of the rule of law in business as well as in other spheres of life.
By contrast, after it adopted liberalization policies in 1986, communist Vietnam did very well for itself despite a U.S. embargo that wasn't lifted until 1994. Washington should take modest first steps in opening up to the regime: perhaps appointing an ambassador to its embassy, still in Rangoon — there hasn't been one since the early 1990s — cutting back on often hypocritical rhetoric about human rights, and continuing to pursue dialogue with Burma's leaders.
Humanitarian aid should be dramatically increased. Washington should adopt a "wait and see" attitude concerning the general election next year. But it is premature to drop all economic sanctions as long as the junta persecutes ethnic minorities like the Karens and Shans and holds more than 2,000 political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi.
The opinions expressed in this letter to the editor are the writer's own and do not necessarily reflect the policies of The Japan Times.
READERS IN COUNCIL
The Japan Times - Sanctions don't impoverish Burma
By DONALD M. SEEKINS
Motobu, Okinawa
In his Aug. 29 article, "U.S. should engage Burma," Brahma Chellaney makes some good points concerning U.S. sanctions against the military regime in Burma: that these sanctions have failed in their stated purpose to promote democracy and human rights; that they have increased China's already large influence inside the country; and that they reflect a double standard — why trade with China, but not with Burma?
But he is mistaken to assume that it is "U.S.-led sanctions" that have made Burma's people among the poorest in Asia. Responsibility for that rests squarely with Than Shwe and his fellow generals, who have squandered funds on new weapons purchased abroad and on the costly new capital city at Naypyidaw, rather than investing in health, education and other improvements in the people's standard of living. Their management of the economy has been grossly incompetent, including a complex and counterproductive system of multiple currency exchange rates and a complete lack of the rule of law in business as well as in other spheres of life.
By contrast, after it adopted liberalization policies in 1986, communist Vietnam did very well for itself despite a U.S. embargo that wasn't lifted until 1994. Washington should take modest first steps in opening up to the regime: perhaps appointing an ambassador to its embassy, still in Rangoon — there hasn't been one since the early 1990s — cutting back on often hypocritical rhetoric about human rights, and continuing to pursue dialogue with Burma's leaders.
Humanitarian aid should be dramatically increased. Washington should adopt a "wait and see" attitude concerning the general election next year. But it is premature to drop all economic sanctions as long as the junta persecutes ethnic minorities like the Karens and Shans and holds more than 2,000 political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi.
The opinions expressed in this letter to the editor are the writer's own and do not necessarily reflect the policies of The Japan Times.
***************************************************************
The Irrawaddy - Kokang Conflict Highlights Tatmadaw Xenophobia
By WAI MOE, Thursday, September 3, 2009
The Tatmadaw of Burma, one of the most nationalistic armies in the world, demonstrated its xenophobia during the past two weeks following its capture of Kokang-Chinese territory.
According to reports from the region on the northeastern frontier of Burma, following the seizure of Laogai, the Kokang capital, on Aug. 24, government soldiers questioned civilians about whether they were Burma-born Chinese or immigrants from China.
“After answering, Chinese from mainland China were beaten by soldiers,” said a source in Laogai.
Refugees who fled to China told reporters that shops, stores and other properties owned by Chinese had been looted in various towns in the Kokang region where an estimate 90 percent of businesses are owned by Chinese businessmen.
Anti-Chinese elements among government soldiers are not new. In 1967, an anti-Chinese riot in Rangoon and other cities caused led to dozens of deaths. Observers said late dictator Ne Win’s Burmese Socialist Programme Party used the Chinese as a scapegoat to deflect public anger at the government over a rice shortage in the country.
Anti-Chinese sentiment among Burmese has increased after the Chinese and Burmese governments signed border trading agreements in 1988, and the military junta signed ceasefire agreements with ethnic militias on the Sino-Burmese border in 1989.
After the opening of border trade and the ceasefire agreements, Chinese business interests and immigrants moved into Burma in large numbers, observers said. From the northern Shan State capital of Lashio to Madalay, the second largest city, to Rangoon, Chinese migrants and businesses along with the ethnic ceasefire groups, such as the Kokang and Wa, have taken on a higher profile among Burmese.
“They say they are Wa or Kokang, but we know they are actually Chinese,” said a businessman in Mandalay, citing his experience.
During two decades, Chinese have taken over businesses owned by Burmese in northern Shan State and Mandalay. Signs on many department stores, restaurants and shops in Mandalay and Lashio are printed in the Chinese language.
Intentionally or unintentionally, the special favors granted ethnic groups by Gen Khin Nyunt, the former Burma spy chief, produced a backlash against Kokang-Chinese and other ceasefire groups among the Tatmadaw’s soldiers.
From 1989 to 2004— before Khin Nyunt’s downfall—the Kokang and Wa were allowed to take their weapons to Rangoon and Mandalay. Kokang and Wa soldiers were untouchable under Khin Nyunt’s instructions even though they committed crimes.
When vehicles from Wa and Kokang groups passed army and police checkpoints, they were not searched.
In one incident in 1999, a member of the Wa army killed a businessman in downtown Rangoon after a business conflict. The police arrested the man but he was not charged, and later Wa officials took the man from police custody.
According to Mandalay residents, members of ceasefire groups such as the Wa and Kokang were known to use pistols in personal conflicts with local people in the early 2000s.
Chan Tun, a former Burmese ambassador to China, said that after ceasefire agreements were signed, the Wa and Kokang caused many problems in cities such as Rangoon and Mandalay, and many officers and soldiers in the regime’s army have developed a negative image of the two groups as a result.
The recent military conflict between the government and ethnic groups has divided public opinion in Rangoon and Mandalay, according to journalists.
“Some people here say it is the government bullying the Kokang-Chinese. But most people support the government,” said an editor of a Rangoon-based private journal.
By WAI MOE, Thursday, September 3, 2009
The Tatmadaw of Burma, one of the most nationalistic armies in the world, demonstrated its xenophobia during the past two weeks following its capture of Kokang-Chinese territory.
According to reports from the region on the northeastern frontier of Burma, following the seizure of Laogai, the Kokang capital, on Aug. 24, government soldiers questioned civilians about whether they were Burma-born Chinese or immigrants from China.
“After answering, Chinese from mainland China were beaten by soldiers,” said a source in Laogai.
Refugees who fled to China told reporters that shops, stores and other properties owned by Chinese had been looted in various towns in the Kokang region where an estimate 90 percent of businesses are owned by Chinese businessmen.
Anti-Chinese elements among government soldiers are not new. In 1967, an anti-Chinese riot in Rangoon and other cities caused led to dozens of deaths. Observers said late dictator Ne Win’s Burmese Socialist Programme Party used the Chinese as a scapegoat to deflect public anger at the government over a rice shortage in the country.
Anti-Chinese sentiment among Burmese has increased after the Chinese and Burmese governments signed border trading agreements in 1988, and the military junta signed ceasefire agreements with ethnic militias on the Sino-Burmese border in 1989.
After the opening of border trade and the ceasefire agreements, Chinese business interests and immigrants moved into Burma in large numbers, observers said. From the northern Shan State capital of Lashio to Madalay, the second largest city, to Rangoon, Chinese migrants and businesses along with the ethnic ceasefire groups, such as the Kokang and Wa, have taken on a higher profile among Burmese.
“They say they are Wa or Kokang, but we know they are actually Chinese,” said a businessman in Mandalay, citing his experience.
During two decades, Chinese have taken over businesses owned by Burmese in northern Shan State and Mandalay. Signs on many department stores, restaurants and shops in Mandalay and Lashio are printed in the Chinese language.
Intentionally or unintentionally, the special favors granted ethnic groups by Gen Khin Nyunt, the former Burma spy chief, produced a backlash against Kokang-Chinese and other ceasefire groups among the Tatmadaw’s soldiers.
From 1989 to 2004— before Khin Nyunt’s downfall—the Kokang and Wa were allowed to take their weapons to Rangoon and Mandalay. Kokang and Wa soldiers were untouchable under Khin Nyunt’s instructions even though they committed crimes.
When vehicles from Wa and Kokang groups passed army and police checkpoints, they were not searched.
In one incident in 1999, a member of the Wa army killed a businessman in downtown Rangoon after a business conflict. The police arrested the man but he was not charged, and later Wa officials took the man from police custody.
According to Mandalay residents, members of ceasefire groups such as the Wa and Kokang were known to use pistols in personal conflicts with local people in the early 2000s.
Chan Tun, a former Burmese ambassador to China, said that after ceasefire agreements were signed, the Wa and Kokang caused many problems in cities such as Rangoon and Mandalay, and many officers and soldiers in the regime’s army have developed a negative image of the two groups as a result.
The recent military conflict between the government and ethnic groups has divided public opinion in Rangoon and Mandalay, according to journalists.
“Some people here say it is the government bullying the Kokang-Chinese. But most people support the government,” said an editor of a Rangoon-based private journal.
***************************************************************
NEWS ANALYSIS
The Irrawaddy - Junta Continues its Campaign against Burmese Diversity
By SIMON ROUGHNEEN, Thursday, September 3, 2009
Recent fighting in northern Shan state, between the junta’s army and the ethnic Kokang militia known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, has fuelled speculation that the regime intends to coerce Burma’s 17 ceasefire groups into accepting a plan to incorporate them into the state security apparatus as border guards.
The ceasefire groups are ethnic militias—most notably the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kachin Independence Army and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army—that have fought on and off, in various guises, against central rule since Burma became independent in 1948. They are part of Burma’s remarkably diverse ethnic, religious and cultural demography—40 percent of the country’s population is comprised of non-Burman minorities. In total, the state recognizes 135 different ethnicities.
However, the Burmese regime’s army has fought brutal campaigns against these groups, with long-documented human rights abuses, including mass displacement, forced labor and conscription, as well as countless cases of rape and murder targeting civilians. Some analysts believing that the level of abuses ranks alongside or even exceeds that of Darfur in western Sudan.
In some cases, the junta has successfully co-opted proxy or splinter movements from ethnic insurgent groups as part of its ongoing strategy of “divide and rule” to weaken ethnically based opposition. But far from bringing peace to the country, this approach has served only to perpetuate ethnic tensions.
Indeed, some observers believe that the regime has little interest in resolving a problem that has long been its raison d’?tre. “Burma’s ethnic diversity has been one of the main justifications for continued military rule,” said Win Min, an analyst of Burmese affairs based in Chiang Mai, Thailand, adding that the army has long seen civilian government as too weak to prevent potential secession by ethnic minorities.
Going back to the 1947 constitution, the military has always believed that civilian solutions to the problems posed by Burma’s ethnic divisions, such as local autonomy or federalism, with the option of secession in some cases, threaten national unity and foment instability.
The army goes by the maxim that diversity equals disunity, something seen in military-civilian political vehicles such as the National Unity Party, the junta-backed party that ran against the National League for Democracy in the 1990 elections, and the Union Solidarity and Development Association, a mass organization established in 1993 that is expected to be transformed into a pro-junta political party in time for elections in 2010.
The regime’s efforts to undermine ethnically based expressions of identity in Burma are also evident in the 2008 constitution, which circumscribes ethnic autonomy and is a digression away from the establishment of anything resembling a federal union—a demand of many ethnic groups.
“The constitution/election process is driving this policy to marginalize the ethnic groups,” said Sean Turnell, an economist at Australia’s Macquarie University whose research focuses on Burma. “This may come back to haunt the junta, as it has with previous governments,” he added.
If the junta proceeds with its military build-up in Shan State, close to the well-armed UWSA, it may be revisited by the ghosts of insurgencies past very soon. The prospect of renewed ethnic civil war in Burma’s borderlands has caused concern in neighboring countries, particularly China, which remains a key ally of the regime.
The Burmese generals issued an apology to Beijing after being reprimanded over the fighting in Kokang, which saw an estimated 30,000 refugees from this ethnically Chinese region cross into China’s Yunnan Province. The junta risks undermining its relationship with Beijing, as instability is perceived to be contrary to China’s interests.
As K. Yhome, an analyst at the Observer Research Foundation in India, put it: “Political stability in Myanmar [Burma] is a major concern for Beijing, particularly in the border regions.”
China’s port and pipeline plan linking the Burmese coast with Yunnan is due to get underway this month, and Beijing doubtless does not want the timeframe jeopardized by the junta’s domestic concerns. The pipeline will extend 1,200 km and allow Beijing to bypass the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea when bringing oil imports from Africa and the Middle East into China.
Given that China has “run interference for the junta at the UN Security Council”—in the words of Walter Lohman, an Asia expert at the Heritage Foundation—sending refugees streaming into China seems a bitter payback. Only three weeks ago, Beijing told critics that the August 11 decision to return Aung San Suu Kyi to house arrest was an internal Burmese matter.
Ironically, the junta’s offensive along the Sino-Burmese border may have been intended to send the same message—that the regime manages its internal affairs autonomously—to Beijing. It could also be a hint that there are other options available, should the junta want to diversify its networks of foreign partners.
The regime certainly has reason to believe that Beijing is not its only friend. While China’s tally of oil blocks in Burma is 16, India has seven and Thailand five. Meanwhile, India, South Korea and half of Burma’s fellow members in the Association of Southeast Nations are investing in the country’s vast natural resources and competing with China for trade links with the generals.
According to Turnell, the regime may even be paying China back for entering into a series of gas contracts with Bangladesh over offshore fields in disputed seas between Burma and Bangladesh.
However, it remains to be seen how far the junta could push this attempt to needle China, or to diversify its foreign trade and investment relations. “Myanmar needs to remain focused on Chinese concerns,” said Jian Junbo, an assistant professor of international studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.
If the regime seeks to pick a fight with the UWSA or any of the other larger ethnic militias, it could be stirring a hornet’s nest. This type of political instability could threaten Chinese investments in Burma, and Beijing’s growing economy cannot afford that.
Just as it does not want an unstable Burma, Beijing is almost certainly on the alert for any rapprochement between the US and the junta. It is not clear whether the Kokang offensive is linked to the recent visit by Senator Jim Webb to Burma, but the growing military presence in Shan State has taken place while international attention has been focused on Webb’s visit, and the Suu Kyi trial circus that preceded it.
“In the long term, if the US improves its ties with Myanmar, it will have strategic implications for Beijing, which wants to reach the Indian Ocean through Myanmar and the oil and gas pipeline projects that it plans through Myanmar,” said K. Yhome.
The Irrawaddy - Junta Continues its Campaign against Burmese Diversity
By SIMON ROUGHNEEN, Thursday, September 3, 2009
Recent fighting in northern Shan state, between the junta’s army and the ethnic Kokang militia known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, has fuelled speculation that the regime intends to coerce Burma’s 17 ceasefire groups into accepting a plan to incorporate them into the state security apparatus as border guards.
The ceasefire groups are ethnic militias—most notably the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kachin Independence Army and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army—that have fought on and off, in various guises, against central rule since Burma became independent in 1948. They are part of Burma’s remarkably diverse ethnic, religious and cultural demography—40 percent of the country’s population is comprised of non-Burman minorities. In total, the state recognizes 135 different ethnicities.
However, the Burmese regime’s army has fought brutal campaigns against these groups, with long-documented human rights abuses, including mass displacement, forced labor and conscription, as well as countless cases of rape and murder targeting civilians. Some analysts believing that the level of abuses ranks alongside or even exceeds that of Darfur in western Sudan.
In some cases, the junta has successfully co-opted proxy or splinter movements from ethnic insurgent groups as part of its ongoing strategy of “divide and rule” to weaken ethnically based opposition. But far from bringing peace to the country, this approach has served only to perpetuate ethnic tensions.
Indeed, some observers believe that the regime has little interest in resolving a problem that has long been its raison d’?tre. “Burma’s ethnic diversity has been one of the main justifications for continued military rule,” said Win Min, an analyst of Burmese affairs based in Chiang Mai, Thailand, adding that the army has long seen civilian government as too weak to prevent potential secession by ethnic minorities.
Going back to the 1947 constitution, the military has always believed that civilian solutions to the problems posed by Burma’s ethnic divisions, such as local autonomy or federalism, with the option of secession in some cases, threaten national unity and foment instability.
The army goes by the maxim that diversity equals disunity, something seen in military-civilian political vehicles such as the National Unity Party, the junta-backed party that ran against the National League for Democracy in the 1990 elections, and the Union Solidarity and Development Association, a mass organization established in 1993 that is expected to be transformed into a pro-junta political party in time for elections in 2010.
The regime’s efforts to undermine ethnically based expressions of identity in Burma are also evident in the 2008 constitution, which circumscribes ethnic autonomy and is a digression away from the establishment of anything resembling a federal union—a demand of many ethnic groups.
“The constitution/election process is driving this policy to marginalize the ethnic groups,” said Sean Turnell, an economist at Australia’s Macquarie University whose research focuses on Burma. “This may come back to haunt the junta, as it has with previous governments,” he added.
If the junta proceeds with its military build-up in Shan State, close to the well-armed UWSA, it may be revisited by the ghosts of insurgencies past very soon. The prospect of renewed ethnic civil war in Burma’s borderlands has caused concern in neighboring countries, particularly China, which remains a key ally of the regime.
The Burmese generals issued an apology to Beijing after being reprimanded over the fighting in Kokang, which saw an estimated 30,000 refugees from this ethnically Chinese region cross into China’s Yunnan Province. The junta risks undermining its relationship with Beijing, as instability is perceived to be contrary to China’s interests.
As K. Yhome, an analyst at the Observer Research Foundation in India, put it: “Political stability in Myanmar [Burma] is a major concern for Beijing, particularly in the border regions.”
China’s port and pipeline plan linking the Burmese coast with Yunnan is due to get underway this month, and Beijing doubtless does not want the timeframe jeopardized by the junta’s domestic concerns. The pipeline will extend 1,200 km and allow Beijing to bypass the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea when bringing oil imports from Africa and the Middle East into China.
Given that China has “run interference for the junta at the UN Security Council”—in the words of Walter Lohman, an Asia expert at the Heritage Foundation—sending refugees streaming into China seems a bitter payback. Only three weeks ago, Beijing told critics that the August 11 decision to return Aung San Suu Kyi to house arrest was an internal Burmese matter.
Ironically, the junta’s offensive along the Sino-Burmese border may have been intended to send the same message—that the regime manages its internal affairs autonomously—to Beijing. It could also be a hint that there are other options available, should the junta want to diversify its networks of foreign partners.
The regime certainly has reason to believe that Beijing is not its only friend. While China’s tally of oil blocks in Burma is 16, India has seven and Thailand five. Meanwhile, India, South Korea and half of Burma’s fellow members in the Association of Southeast Nations are investing in the country’s vast natural resources and competing with China for trade links with the generals.
According to Turnell, the regime may even be paying China back for entering into a series of gas contracts with Bangladesh over offshore fields in disputed seas between Burma and Bangladesh.
However, it remains to be seen how far the junta could push this attempt to needle China, or to diversify its foreign trade and investment relations. “Myanmar needs to remain focused on Chinese concerns,” said Jian Junbo, an assistant professor of international studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.
If the regime seeks to pick a fight with the UWSA or any of the other larger ethnic militias, it could be stirring a hornet’s nest. This type of political instability could threaten Chinese investments in Burma, and Beijing’s growing economy cannot afford that.
Just as it does not want an unstable Burma, Beijing is almost certainly on the alert for any rapprochement between the US and the junta. It is not clear whether the Kokang offensive is linked to the recent visit by Senator Jim Webb to Burma, but the growing military presence in Shan State has taken place while international attention has been focused on Webb’s visit, and the Suu Kyi trial circus that preceded it.
“In the long term, if the US improves its ties with Myanmar, it will have strategic implications for Beijing, which wants to reach the Indian Ocean through Myanmar and the oil and gas pipeline projects that it plans through Myanmar,” said K. Yhome.
***************************************************************
The Irrawaddy - A Child of Rubbish
By SOE LWIN, Thursday, September 3, 2009
RANGOON—Twelve-year-old Maung Chan Thar has only known poverty despite having a name that means “master of wealth.”
His parents gave him the name in the belief that it would bring good fortune to their eldest son.
With a meager household income, Maung Chan Thar's family of eight has to struggle to put enough food on the table each day, let alone buy clothes or things needed for school by his three younger brothers and two younger sisters.
Four years ago, when Maung Chan Thar was just eight, his parents sent him onto the streets to earn money because they could no longer afford to keep him at school.
Carrying a sack on his back, he has been working in the streets ever since, looking through the piles of rubbish on the streets, roaming the railway tracks, collecting empty water bottles, plastic bags—whatever he can resell.
The piles of rubbish at the markets and railway stations are his sources of income. On a good day, he can make the equivalent of more than US $1, but normally Maung Chan Thar only earns about 70 or 80 cents.
“I am so happy to see my mother smile when I put cash in her hands,” he said.
Maung Chan Thar is the second income earner in his family after his father, who makes about $1.50 a day pedaling a trishaw.
Though he is an important source of income for his family, his parents cannot take care of him.
Like tens of thousands of other street children in big cities such as Rangoon and Mandalay, Maung Chan Thar’s clothes are filthy and in tatters. His hair has not been washed for months, and his nails are long and dirty.
Maung Chan Thar thinks things are alright, however. He knows that in his job what matters is collecting as much recyclable material as possible.
"I hate seeing my younger brothers and sisters crying in hunger, so I work hard," he said, sifting through a pile of garbage near Kyimyindaing Railway Station. “I don’t want them to ever do work like this. I want them to keep going to school.”
When he started on the street, he was often bullied by stronger street children, who would sometimes steal what he made.
"I will never forget when three larger boys beat me up and took all my money,” Maung Chan Thar said. “When I got back home, my father beat me up again for being so weak."
Maung Chan Thar has learned how to avoid such incidents, and he has many friends who will come to his help him if someone picks on him.
His worries are far from over, however. The municipal police and staff from the Yangon [Rangoon] City Development Committee are constantly making arrests.
The risk of arrest is higher when he sleeps at railway stations or bus stops in the downtown area, he said. Since his home is located in Shwepyithar in the outskirts of Rangoon, he often sleeps downtown with his friends if it is too late to go back.
“I’ve never been arrested,” he said. “I’m good at avoiding the police.
“People look down on street children like us, thinking we are thieves,” he said. “When we go around below large buildings picking up plastic bags, residents sometimes threaten us. We have to switch collecting sites quickly when that happens.
“I don’t understand why they look down on us like that,” Maung Chan Thar said, adding that he always followed his mother’s advice.
“My mother always told me never to steal or beg, but to work hard and be honest,” he said.
Though Maung Chan Thar seems destined to keep doing his lowly job, he firmly believes he will be rich one day.
“Every night my mother has this dream in which I am a rich man,” he said, squatting on the rubbish.
“Perhaps I will find something very precious in this rubbish one day,” he said. “Who is to say that I won’t?”
By SOE LWIN, Thursday, September 3, 2009
RANGOON—Twelve-year-old Maung Chan Thar has only known poverty despite having a name that means “master of wealth.”
His parents gave him the name in the belief that it would bring good fortune to their eldest son.
With a meager household income, Maung Chan Thar's family of eight has to struggle to put enough food on the table each day, let alone buy clothes or things needed for school by his three younger brothers and two younger sisters.
Four years ago, when Maung Chan Thar was just eight, his parents sent him onto the streets to earn money because they could no longer afford to keep him at school.
Carrying a sack on his back, he has been working in the streets ever since, looking through the piles of rubbish on the streets, roaming the railway tracks, collecting empty water bottles, plastic bags—whatever he can resell.
The piles of rubbish at the markets and railway stations are his sources of income. On a good day, he can make the equivalent of more than US $1, but normally Maung Chan Thar only earns about 70 or 80 cents.
“I am so happy to see my mother smile when I put cash in her hands,” he said.
Maung Chan Thar is the second income earner in his family after his father, who makes about $1.50 a day pedaling a trishaw.
Though he is an important source of income for his family, his parents cannot take care of him.
Like tens of thousands of other street children in big cities such as Rangoon and Mandalay, Maung Chan Thar’s clothes are filthy and in tatters. His hair has not been washed for months, and his nails are long and dirty.
Maung Chan Thar thinks things are alright, however. He knows that in his job what matters is collecting as much recyclable material as possible.
"I hate seeing my younger brothers and sisters crying in hunger, so I work hard," he said, sifting through a pile of garbage near Kyimyindaing Railway Station. “I don’t want them to ever do work like this. I want them to keep going to school.”
When he started on the street, he was often bullied by stronger street children, who would sometimes steal what he made.
"I will never forget when three larger boys beat me up and took all my money,” Maung Chan Thar said. “When I got back home, my father beat me up again for being so weak."
Maung Chan Thar has learned how to avoid such incidents, and he has many friends who will come to his help him if someone picks on him.
His worries are far from over, however. The municipal police and staff from the Yangon [Rangoon] City Development Committee are constantly making arrests.
The risk of arrest is higher when he sleeps at railway stations or bus stops in the downtown area, he said. Since his home is located in Shwepyithar in the outskirts of Rangoon, he often sleeps downtown with his friends if it is too late to go back.
“I’ve never been arrested,” he said. “I’m good at avoiding the police.
“People look down on street children like us, thinking we are thieves,” he said. “When we go around below large buildings picking up plastic bags, residents sometimes threaten us. We have to switch collecting sites quickly when that happens.
“I don’t understand why they look down on us like that,” Maung Chan Thar said, adding that he always followed his mother’s advice.
“My mother always told me never to steal or beg, but to work hard and be honest,” he said.
Though Maung Chan Thar seems destined to keep doing his lowly job, he firmly believes he will be rich one day.
“Every night my mother has this dream in which I am a rich man,” he said, squatting on the rubbish.
“Perhaps I will find something very precious in this rubbish one day,” he said. “Who is to say that I won’t?”
***************************************************************
Mizzima News - Burmese Army might be targeting UWSA: Observer
by Mungpi
Thursday, 03 September 2009 23:03
New Delhi (Mizzima) - After having overrun and occupied the Kokang area in north-eastern Shan State and driving away its leader, the Burmese military junta might have initiated its move against one of the largest ceasefire groups, the United Wa State Army, an observer said.
Khuensai Jaiyen, editor of the Thailand-based Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), who is close to UWSA, said Wa leaders in Panghsang in eastern Shan state have received a letter from the Burmese Army demanding the extradition of Kokang leader Peng Jiasheng and three others. The junta had issued arrest warrants against them.
“Nobody is sure where Peng and his group are staying right now. It is absurd that the Burmese Army has demanded that the Wa hand over Peng. It seems to me that the junta is starting to pick on the Wa,” Khuensai said.
The letter dated September 1, 2009 was received by Wa leaders in Panghsang on September 2. Worried over the issue, the Wa leaders sat at a meeting on Thursday morning and decided not to respond to the letter, he added.
“The Wa leaders believe that the demand could be a point to pick by the junta and so decided to remain silent without replying to it,” said Khuensai.
He said, whichever way the Wa replies, the junta could find fault. Even by remaining silent, the junta could still find fault and find reasons to launch an attack.
Peng Jiasheng, the once supreme leader of the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), also known as the Kokang Army, was forced to flee Loa Kai, capital of Kokang region, after the Burmese junta issued an arrest warrant for him along with three others including his brother on charges of running an arms and ammunition factory and trafficking.
Peng’s flight left his deputy Bai Suoqing and a few other MNDAA soldiers, who support the junta. The MNDAA was later reformed with the help of the Burmese Army and Bai was appointed the new leader.
“When I asked Wa leaders about the whereabouts of Peng, they told me that he would most probably be with his son-in-law but did not deny or agree that Peng might be in Wa controlled area,” Khuensai said.
According to the Wa leader’s response, Peng and his troops are most likely to be with the Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) or Mongla, whose leader Sai Leun is Peng’s son-in-law.
While the information on the junta’s demand to the Wa to extradite Peng cannot be independently verified, a Sino-Burma border based military analyst Aung Kyaw Zaw said, he does not believe any such demand has been made.
“I have not heard of the demand but I think it is unlikely and Brig Gen Win Maung commander of the Regional Operations Command (ROC) in Lao Kai has no such power to make the demand as the case is to be handled by the Ministry of Home Affairs,” he added.
But he said, in connection with the conflicts last week in Kokang region, Burmese Deputy Home Minister Phone Shwe and a team of delegates, earlier this week, visited Kun Ming, capital of China’s North-western province of Yunnan, and met regional Chinese officials.
Aung Kyaw Zaw said, while the junta is determined to neutralise ethnic armed groups, particularly the ceasefire groups, in eastern Shan State, the UWSA might not be the first target to choose.
Observers agreed that the junta is unlikely to declare war on the UWSA, which is believed to have up to 20,000 soldiers, but use different tactics including ‘divide and conquer’ by exploiting the differences between the leaders, Wei Hsueh-kang and Bao You-Xiang.
by Mungpi
Thursday, 03 September 2009 23:03
New Delhi (Mizzima) - After having overrun and occupied the Kokang area in north-eastern Shan State and driving away its leader, the Burmese military junta might have initiated its move against one of the largest ceasefire groups, the United Wa State Army, an observer said.
Khuensai Jaiyen, editor of the Thailand-based Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), who is close to UWSA, said Wa leaders in Panghsang in eastern Shan state have received a letter from the Burmese Army demanding the extradition of Kokang leader Peng Jiasheng and three others. The junta had issued arrest warrants against them.
“Nobody is sure where Peng and his group are staying right now. It is absurd that the Burmese Army has demanded that the Wa hand over Peng. It seems to me that the junta is starting to pick on the Wa,” Khuensai said.
The letter dated September 1, 2009 was received by Wa leaders in Panghsang on September 2. Worried over the issue, the Wa leaders sat at a meeting on Thursday morning and decided not to respond to the letter, he added.
“The Wa leaders believe that the demand could be a point to pick by the junta and so decided to remain silent without replying to it,” said Khuensai.
He said, whichever way the Wa replies, the junta could find fault. Even by remaining silent, the junta could still find fault and find reasons to launch an attack.
Peng Jiasheng, the once supreme leader of the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), also known as the Kokang Army, was forced to flee Loa Kai, capital of Kokang region, after the Burmese junta issued an arrest warrant for him along with three others including his brother on charges of running an arms and ammunition factory and trafficking.
Peng’s flight left his deputy Bai Suoqing and a few other MNDAA soldiers, who support the junta. The MNDAA was later reformed with the help of the Burmese Army and Bai was appointed the new leader.
“When I asked Wa leaders about the whereabouts of Peng, they told me that he would most probably be with his son-in-law but did not deny or agree that Peng might be in Wa controlled area,” Khuensai said.
According to the Wa leader’s response, Peng and his troops are most likely to be with the Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) or Mongla, whose leader Sai Leun is Peng’s son-in-law.
While the information on the junta’s demand to the Wa to extradite Peng cannot be independently verified, a Sino-Burma border based military analyst Aung Kyaw Zaw said, he does not believe any such demand has been made.
“I have not heard of the demand but I think it is unlikely and Brig Gen Win Maung commander of the Regional Operations Command (ROC) in Lao Kai has no such power to make the demand as the case is to be handled by the Ministry of Home Affairs,” he added.
But he said, in connection with the conflicts last week in Kokang region, Burmese Deputy Home Minister Phone Shwe and a team of delegates, earlier this week, visited Kun Ming, capital of China’s North-western province of Yunnan, and met regional Chinese officials.
Aung Kyaw Zaw said, while the junta is determined to neutralise ethnic armed groups, particularly the ceasefire groups, in eastern Shan State, the UWSA might not be the first target to choose.
Observers agreed that the junta is unlikely to declare war on the UWSA, which is believed to have up to 20,000 soldiers, but use different tactics including ‘divide and conquer’ by exploiting the differences between the leaders, Wei Hsueh-kang and Bao You-Xiang.
***************************************************************
Mizzima News - Fresh parleys between junta and NMSP over BGF
by Phanida
Wednesday, 02 September 2009 22:12
Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – There was renewed parleys between Burmese military junta representatives and Mon leaders relating to the pressure being mounted on the ceasefire 'New Mon State Party' (NMSP) troops to transform to the Border Guard Force.
The junta's Southeast Command Commander Maj. Gen. Thet Naing Win met NMSP Vice-Chairman Nai Rao Sa, Joint Secretary Nai Chan Twe and Central Executive Committee member Nai Dala Ny at Command headquarters on August 28.
"During the last meeting we told them that it was difficult for us to accept their proposal of transforming our troops into the BGF," an official from the NMSP headquarters said on condition of anonymity.
He added that they are not aware of the junta's response since their leaders are yet come back to the headquarters.
The NMSP sent the resolution of its six-day central committee meeting held between July 27 and August 1 at the party headquarters in Ye Chaung Phya in Ye Township to Maj. Gen. Thet Naing Win on August 5. Now they are meeting again and holding discussions on the contentious issue.
The NMSP has informed the military regime that they cannot accept separation of their party and the army or disbanding their army and transforming it into the BGF without guarantee of the right to self-determination for Mon people.
It further said it would maintain the current ceasefire with the junta and would demand of the next government to resolve the political issue through dialogue.
Despite the constant pressure exerted on ceasefire groups by the junta, the powerful ceasefire groups, including the NMSP, are still rejecting the junta’s proposal.
This meeting between NMSP leaders and the regional command commander is the third since March this year.
The NMSP reached a ceasefire agreement with the junta in 1995 and attended the National Convention in 2004. But it scaled down its representation at the National Convention to observer status next year protesting against the meeting procedures of the NC.
by Phanida
Wednesday, 02 September 2009 22:12
Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – There was renewed parleys between Burmese military junta representatives and Mon leaders relating to the pressure being mounted on the ceasefire 'New Mon State Party' (NMSP) troops to transform to the Border Guard Force.
The junta's Southeast Command Commander Maj. Gen. Thet Naing Win met NMSP Vice-Chairman Nai Rao Sa, Joint Secretary Nai Chan Twe and Central Executive Committee member Nai Dala Ny at Command headquarters on August 28.
"During the last meeting we told them that it was difficult for us to accept their proposal of transforming our troops into the BGF," an official from the NMSP headquarters said on condition of anonymity.
He added that they are not aware of the junta's response since their leaders are yet come back to the headquarters.
The NMSP sent the resolution of its six-day central committee meeting held between July 27 and August 1 at the party headquarters in Ye Chaung Phya in Ye Township to Maj. Gen. Thet Naing Win on August 5. Now they are meeting again and holding discussions on the contentious issue.
The NMSP has informed the military regime that they cannot accept separation of their party and the army or disbanding their army and transforming it into the BGF without guarantee of the right to self-determination for Mon people.
It further said it would maintain the current ceasefire with the junta and would demand of the next government to resolve the political issue through dialogue.
Despite the constant pressure exerted on ceasefire groups by the junta, the powerful ceasefire groups, including the NMSP, are still rejecting the junta’s proposal.
This meeting between NMSP leaders and the regional command commander is the third since March this year.
The NMSP reached a ceasefire agreement with the junta in 1995 and attended the National Convention in 2004. But it scaled down its representation at the National Convention to observer status next year protesting against the meeting procedures of the NC.
***************************************************************
Burmese woman trafficked to China escapes
Sept 2, 2009 (DVB)– A Burmese woman who fell victim to human trafficking on the China-Burma border has escaped from a guesthouse in China, while her friend who was also kidnapped is reportedly being held for ransom.
The two women, both residents of Burma’s northeastern Shan state, were apparently tricked into traveling to the China border on 17 August on a guarantee that well-paid jobs awaited them.
An official from an anti-trafficking organization in Shan state’s Muse town said that the women were to be sold as brides.
According to a Burmese national in China who helped 32-year-old Thein Kyi after she had escaped, the two were held in a house in the Chinese town of Ruili awaiting the handover to traffickers.
Chinese citizen Som Yung, who owned the Ruili house and was allegedly in charge of the deal, then took them to a guesthouse.
“Apparently Som Yung had already sold the two women and was going to hand them to people in China by 5pm that day,” said the Burmese national. “Thein Kyi realised what was going on then fled the guesthouse.”
The whereabouts of the other woman, Eh San, are still unknown. A neighbour in her hometown of Moe Meik said that her husband yesterday received a phone call from her claiming the kidnappers had demanded 400,000 kyat ($US400) for her release.
“She said [the abductors] had bought her for 400,000 kyat and asked the husband to pay them back in a village called Naung Tauk near the border with China,” said the neighbour. “She asked him to make it before yesterday evening.”
A report by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in June said that human trafficking in Burma remains “a major problem”, particularly for women trafficked into forced labour and sexual exploitation.
China, along with Malaysia, is the main destination for Burmese women trafficked for forced marriage.
A United States report criticized the Burmese government for “not making significant efforts to comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking”.
Reporting by Naw Noreen
Sept 2, 2009 (DVB)– A Burmese woman who fell victim to human trafficking on the China-Burma border has escaped from a guesthouse in China, while her friend who was also kidnapped is reportedly being held for ransom.
The two women, both residents of Burma’s northeastern Shan state, were apparently tricked into traveling to the China border on 17 August on a guarantee that well-paid jobs awaited them.
An official from an anti-trafficking organization in Shan state’s Muse town said that the women were to be sold as brides.
According to a Burmese national in China who helped 32-year-old Thein Kyi after she had escaped, the two were held in a house in the Chinese town of Ruili awaiting the handover to traffickers.
Chinese citizen Som Yung, who owned the Ruili house and was allegedly in charge of the deal, then took them to a guesthouse.
“Apparently Som Yung had already sold the two women and was going to hand them to people in China by 5pm that day,” said the Burmese national. “Thein Kyi realised what was going on then fled the guesthouse.”
The whereabouts of the other woman, Eh San, are still unknown. A neighbour in her hometown of Moe Meik said that her husband yesterday received a phone call from her claiming the kidnappers had demanded 400,000 kyat ($US400) for her release.
“She said [the abductors] had bought her for 400,000 kyat and asked the husband to pay them back in a village called Naung Tauk near the border with China,” said the neighbour. “She asked him to make it before yesterday evening.”
A report by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in June said that human trafficking in Burma remains “a major problem”, particularly for women trafficked into forced labour and sexual exploitation.
China, along with Malaysia, is the main destination for Burmese women trafficked for forced marriage.
A United States report criticized the Burmese government for “not making significant efforts to comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking”.
Reporting by Naw Noreen
***************************************************************
Monks intimidated close to 2007 anniversary
Sept 3, 2009 (DVB)–Several Burmese monks have been arrested and others intimidated by authorities as the two-year anniversary of the September 2007 uprising approaches, according to sources inside Burma.
A monk in central Burma’s Mandalay division said recently that a local government-led Monk Adminstration committee had warned monks in the area to avoid political activities.
This follows the arrest last week of several monks in various parts of Burma in what appears to be a campaign by the government to intimidate the normally apolitical community in the run-up to the anniversary of the monk-led uprising.
A monk in Magwe division’s Chauk township, U Thumana, was taken by authorities on 29 August. The reason for his arrest and his current whereabouts are unknown.
U Thumana is originally from the town of Pakokku, which became the flashpoint of the 2007 uprising after police broke up a peaceful demonstration on 5 September, injuring three monks.
Two monks in Pakokku were arrested last week by government officials. One of them was identified as U Weithuda from West Monastery in the town, said a local monk.
“Some people came to U Weithuda’s monastery and told him there was a girl waiting for him in a teashop near the monastery,” said the monk.
“He went with him and they arrested him when he reached the outside [of the monastery compound].”
Two other monks in the division’s Yaynanchaung were also briefly took by authorities and questioned.
Monks are widely revered amongst Burma’s majority Buddhist population, and were thus heavily influential in the September 2007 uprising.
Although by protocol monks are apolitical, the community withdrew religious services for the country’s military generals during the uprising.
Some of the estimated 138 fatalities from September 2007 were monks, with eye-witness accounts of troops beating and smashing the heads of monks against walls.
The government is now on high alert, with residents in Irrawaddy division capital Bassein saying authorities were keeping close watch on monks.
“The other day, about 20 monks from Hantharwaddy monastery came outside of their compound to clean a sewer in front of it,” said a Bassein local.
“That alarmed the local authorities [who thought the monks were protesting] who dispatched a lot of police to the monastery.”
Reporting by Naw Say Phaw
Sept 3, 2009 (DVB)–Several Burmese monks have been arrested and others intimidated by authorities as the two-year anniversary of the September 2007 uprising approaches, according to sources inside Burma.
A monk in central Burma’s Mandalay division said recently that a local government-led Monk Adminstration committee had warned monks in the area to avoid political activities.
This follows the arrest last week of several monks in various parts of Burma in what appears to be a campaign by the government to intimidate the normally apolitical community in the run-up to the anniversary of the monk-led uprising.
A monk in Magwe division’s Chauk township, U Thumana, was taken by authorities on 29 August. The reason for his arrest and his current whereabouts are unknown.
U Thumana is originally from the town of Pakokku, which became the flashpoint of the 2007 uprising after police broke up a peaceful demonstration on 5 September, injuring three monks.
Two monks in Pakokku were arrested last week by government officials. One of them was identified as U Weithuda from West Monastery in the town, said a local monk.
“Some people came to U Weithuda’s monastery and told him there was a girl waiting for him in a teashop near the monastery,” said the monk.
“He went with him and they arrested him when he reached the outside [of the monastery compound].”
Two other monks in the division’s Yaynanchaung were also briefly took by authorities and questioned.
Monks are widely revered amongst Burma’s majority Buddhist population, and were thus heavily influential in the September 2007 uprising.
Although by protocol monks are apolitical, the community withdrew religious services for the country’s military generals during the uprising.
Some of the estimated 138 fatalities from September 2007 were monks, with eye-witness accounts of troops beating and smashing the heads of monks against walls.
The government is now on high alert, with residents in Irrawaddy division capital Bassein saying authorities were keeping close watch on monks.
“The other day, about 20 monks from Hantharwaddy monastery came outside of their compound to clean a sewer in front of it,” said a Bassein local.
“That alarmed the local authorities [who thought the monks were protesting] who dispatched a lot of police to the monastery.”
Reporting by Naw Say Phaw
***************************************************************
No comments:
Post a Comment