US to commence talks with Myanmar
Tue Sep 29, 3:30 pm ET
WASHINGTON (AFP) – A senior US diplomatic official was to meet Tuesday with a delegation from Myanmar on the margins of the UN General Assembly meeting, the State Department said.
State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said at a press briefing in Washington that Kurt Campbell, assistant US secretary of state for Asia, is to meet in New York today with a delegation headed by Myanmar's science and technology minister U Thaung.
Myanmar's representative to the United Nations, Than Swe, is also expected to participate.
The meeting comes after the United States announced Monday it was starting a dialogue with the military-led Myanmar, although it insisted it would keep sanctions in place until the regime makes progress on democracy.
On Monday, Campbell announced that President Barack Obama's administration had decided to reengage Myanmar after years of stalemate proved unproductive.
"For the first time in memory the Burmese leadership has shown an interest in engaging with the United States and we intend to explore that interest," Campbell said Monday, using Myanmar's former name of Burma.
"We intend to begin a direct dialogue with Burmese authorities to lay out the path towards better relations," the diplomat said.
Myanmar's prime minister, General Thein Sein, on Monday demanded an end to economic sanctions in an address to the UN General Assembly.
"Sanctions are being employed as a political tool against Myanmar and we consider them unjust," said Thein Sein, the highest-ranking Myanmar official to address the General Assembly in 14 years. "Such acts must be stopped."
Tue Sep 29, 3:30 pm ET
WASHINGTON (AFP) – A senior US diplomatic official was to meet Tuesday with a delegation from Myanmar on the margins of the UN General Assembly meeting, the State Department said.
State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said at a press briefing in Washington that Kurt Campbell, assistant US secretary of state for Asia, is to meet in New York today with a delegation headed by Myanmar's science and technology minister U Thaung.
Myanmar's representative to the United Nations, Than Swe, is also expected to participate.
The meeting comes after the United States announced Monday it was starting a dialogue with the military-led Myanmar, although it insisted it would keep sanctions in place until the regime makes progress on democracy.
On Monday, Campbell announced that President Barack Obama's administration had decided to reengage Myanmar after years of stalemate proved unproductive.
"For the first time in memory the Burmese leadership has shown an interest in engaging with the United States and we intend to explore that interest," Campbell said Monday, using Myanmar's former name of Burma.
"We intend to begin a direct dialogue with Burmese authorities to lay out the path towards better relations," the diplomat said.
Myanmar's prime minister, General Thein Sein, on Monday demanded an end to economic sanctions in an address to the UN General Assembly.
"Sanctions are being employed as a political tool against Myanmar and we consider them unjust," said Thein Sein, the highest-ranking Myanmar official to address the General Assembly in 14 years. "Such acts must be stopped."
***************************************************************
Foreign Relations - U.S. Policy Toward Burma
Kurt M. Campbell
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Washington, DC
September 28, 2009
MR. CROWLEY: I don’t see any UNGA survivors here yet. They’re still up there. Good afternoon, and welcome to the Department of State. To kick us off this afternoon, we’ve invited down the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Pacific region Kurt Campbell, who is going to kind of follow up on some comments that the Secretary made last night – or last week, I’m sorry – regarding Burma, but will obviously entertain broader questions on the region.
Kurt, you can just kick us off.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Thank you, P.J., and it’s great to see so many friends here. This is my first time in front of the podium, so I’m going to take a variety of questions, if that’s possible.
Let me first underscore that last week was a big week for us in the Asia Pacific region. I think all of you know the President and the Secretary had a series of meetings with our friends and allies in the Asia Pacific region. President Obama met both in Pittsburgh and in New York with President Hu, had a broad range of discussions on North Korea, on Iran, on climate change, on a variety of economic and trade-related issues. The President also met with new Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama to discuss our vital, important partnership and the direction ahead. We also had strong meetings between the President – between the Secretary and her counterparts in several key countries in Asia.
The Secretary also, on Wednesday, had a meeting of the Friends of Burma, and at that meeting she rolled out some of our initial views concerning the Burma review, which is going to be fully discussed this week on Capitol Hill and also with other key players. There will be testimony before the Senate subcommittee on Wednesday; I will appear before that, before Senator Webb and the committee.
I’d like now, if possible, to read a relatively long statement. I apologize for the detail, but it will give you some context in terms of our overall review and what we’ve concluded over the course of these last seven months.
In terms of the background, the Administration launched a review of Burma policy seven months ago, recognizing that the conditions in Burma were deplorable and that neither isolation nor engagement, when implemented alone, had succeeded in improving those conditions. Throughout this review, the Administration consulted closely with Congress, the international community, and a wide range of stakeholders inside Burma, including the National League of Democracy.
For the first time in memory, the Burmese leadership has shown an interest in engaging with the United States, and we intend to explore that interest. In addition, concerns have emerged in recent days about Burma and North Korea’s relationship that require greater focus and dialogue.
What are the strategic goals and interests of this approach? We have reaffirmed our fundamental goals in Burma. We support a unified, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma that respects the human rights of its citizens. To that end, we will continue to push for the immediate and unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners, an end to conflicts with ethnic minorities and gross human rights violations, and initiation of a credible internal political dialogue with the democratic opposition and ethnic minority leaders on elements of reconciliation and reform.
We will also press Burma to comply with its international obligations, including on nonproliferation, ending any prohibited military or proliferation-related cooperation with North Korea, and full compliance with United Nations 1874 and 1718.
If Burma makes meaningful progress towards these goals, it will be possible to improve the relationship with the United States in a step-by-step process. We recognize that this will likely be a long and difficult process, and we are prepared to sustain our efforts on this front.
Burma’s continued estrangement from the international community harms the country and has direct negative consequences beyond Burma’s borders. Burma’s engagement with the outside world has the potential to encourage new thinking, reform, and participation in the work of the international community.
In terms of engagement, we intend to begin a direct dialogue with Burmese authorities to lay out a path towards better relations. The dialogue will include specific discussion of democracy and human rights inside Burma, cooperation on international security issues such as nonproliferation and compliance with 1874 and 1718, and areas that could be of mutual benefit such as counternarcotics and recovery of World War II era remains.
In terms of sanctions, we will maintain existing sanctions until we see concrete progress towards reform. Lifting sanctions now would send the wrong signal. We will tell the Burmese that we will discuss easing sanctions only if they take actions on our core concerns. We will reserve the option to apply additional targeted sanctions, if warranted, by events inside Burma.
In terms of humanitarian assistance, we will continue our commitment to the Burmese people by expanding humanitarian assistance to the extent we are confident the assistance is reaching the people in need. Our experience in providing close to $75 million to Cyclone Nargis relief efforts has proven that we can effectively provide assistance directly to the Burmese people.
In terms of the approach to the upcoming 2010 elections in Burma, we will take a measured approach to the 2010 elections until we can assess the electoral conditions and know whether opposition and ethnic groups will be able to participate. We are skeptical that the elections will be either free or fair, but we will stress to the Burmese the conditions that we consider necessary for a credible electoral process.
In terms of cooperation with others in the international community, we understand that we cannot meet all of these goals alone. We will increase efforts to engage our partners in intergovernmental forum and the region to promote change inside Burma. We value very much the strong relationships we have had with the EU, with Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UN and others in working towards the common goal of a democratic transition in Burma. We seek to continue these partnerships and relationships, and indeed have consulted very closely with all of these countries and groups over the course of the last several months.
We will also intensify our engagement with ASEAN, China, and India to press the Burmese leadership to reform and to participate responsibly in the international community.
In terms of long-term efforts, we will initiate these efforts immediately, but we will also be realistic. We know the process may be long and difficult. We should be prepared to sustain our efforts beyond the planned 2010 elections. We will be working with our partners to encourage Burma to be more open and to promote new thinking and new ideas. It is important that the Burmese people gain greater exposure to broader ideas. It’s also important that Burmese leaders, including Burma’s next generation of leaders, realize that there is a more positive way ahead. These efforts may take time, but the United States is ready to commit to that long-term effort.
With that sort of broad overview, I’d be happy to take any specific questions. Thank you.
Yes. And if you wouldn’t mind, identify yourself just so I know.
QUESTION: Kim Ghattas from the BBC.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Hi, Kim.
QUESTION: Hi. Thank you for this. I have two questions. One, you said that for the first time in history, the Burmese regime has shown interest in engaging the U.S. I was wondering why you thought that was. Why are they interested at this point in engaging with the U.S.?
And the second question is – it’s still a little bit unclear to me what has changed in the policy beyond the fact that you will engage in direct dialogue with them. And so therefore, what is the interest of the Burmese authorities of responding to your requests for improved human rights, et cetera, if the only thing they’re getting out of it is a direct dialogue with you?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Well, let me first say that one of our first questions to our Burmese interlocutors is why indeed have you sought a dialogue with the United States at this time? I think as you know over the course of the last several years, there have occasionally been episodic contacts between the United States and Burmese authorities. And I think what we would like to do is start a process, a sustained process of interaction, where hopefully we can answer some of these questions going forward.
Ultimately, as we conducted this review, we recognized that ultimately, we need to change our methods but not our goals. And I think at this early stage, we think it’s important to suggest that we are prepared to sit down, but also recognize that nothing has changed yet on the ground or in
terms of some of the activities that Burma has been involved with. And so I think this initial step is the right approach, and greater clarity can be gained, hopefully, through a process of dialogue over the course of the coming weeks.
Yes.
QUESTION: How do you – Jill Dougherty from CNN.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Hi, Jill.
QUESTION: How do you square this apparent approach that they have with the alleged cooperation with North Korea?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Well, first of all, I think that Burma has done a variety of things. We think they did play a positive role behind the scenes recently in terms of some steps associated with the implementation of 1874, UN Resolution 1874, and we have noted that in public. And so that willingness to play a more responsible role in the realm of international sanctions support vis-à-vis North Korea has been factored into our overall approach. The truth is that we’ve had so little dialogue with Burma over the course of the last several years that we’re still looking for a clear indication of the direction of its leadership in terms of what it seeks in terms of international engagement.
We’ve seen much more engagement of Burma, particularly at the level of economic engagement and other kind of interactions, both with China, with India, and other countries in Southeast Asia. It’s possible that they seek to diversify those contacts to include the United States, and we intend to explore that over the course of the next several weeks again.
Yes.
QUESTION: Andy Quinn from Reuters.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Hi, Andy?
QUESTION: It’s sort of a follow-up question. You talked about asking the Burmese to stop whatever prohibited contacts they may have had with the North Koreans. Are you willing to let us know what your assessment is of the current state of their contacts, where they’re making deals and what these sorts of deals might be?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: I don’t think I can go very much beyond what Secretary Clinton said at the ASEAN Regional Forum a few months ago in July, late July. She underscored at that time that there clearly were some areas of interaction on the military side, and perhaps even beyond that, between North Korea and Burma that raised concerns not just for the United States, but also for countries in the immediate region. And one of our goals over the course of this period of strategic review have been discussions with Thailand, with Indonesia, with the Philippines, with China. And I think there is a greater desire on the part of these regional partners for the United States to have a direct dialogue with Burma about aspects of their relationship with North Korea that we’re seeking to gain greater clarity into.
Yes. Hi.
QUESTION: A question on China.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Yeah.
QUESTION: What is your assessment of China’s willingness to go along with tougher sanctions against Iran on the nuclear question?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: It’s a good question. I think there was an important process last week. At the same time that the G-20 was meeting at the finance minister level, there was also some very important discussion taking place behind the scenes between U.S. and Chinese representatives. For the first time really, the Chinese supported elements of our tough approach on the P-5+1. I think they are asking the United States for deeper engagement on these issues, discussions around Iran. We’ve provided background and details. I think the Secretary said that we’ll take this after the first meeting on Thursday.
All I can say is that we view China’s engagement in the diplomacy surrounding Iran as increasingly central to a positive resolution.
QUESTION: When you say that they’re interested in deeper engagement, do you mean with the U.S. about what the U.S. wants, or with the Iranians?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Deeper engagement with the U.S., both on what we think we understand in terms of some of Iranian behaviors, also in terms of what American and other P-5+1 expectations are, and what positive role China can play in the peaceful resolution of this problem.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Ai Awaji from JiJi Press, Japan.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Yes, hi.
QUESTION: I have a question about North Korea.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: After the consultations in New York, it seems that you have a strong support from your partners in the Six-Party Talks about having direct talks with North Koreans. So are you ready to go ahead with the plan and send Ambassador Bosworth to Pyongyang? Could you tell us about the next step you’re taking?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Not yet. I think one of the lessons that the United States has learned in this process is a certain degree of patience pays off. We have had, I think as you underscore, very strong support from our partners in the Six-Party framework. China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia have all very clearly and strongly underscored the American approach as the right approach. And that is that we expect North Korea to abide by its commitments made as part of the Six-Party framework in both 2005 and 2007, and that if there were to be any bilateral interactions between the United States and North Korea, that they be designed towards moving back rapidly and very clearly to a Six-Party framework for formal interactions with our North Korean interlocutors.
And I think we’re in the process now of planning our next steps in terms of diplomacy in Northeast Asia. Deputy Secretary Steinberg is in Asia currently for further discussions with both China, South Korea, and Japan. And I think it’s also the case that some very senior Chinese interlocutors will be visiting North Korea in the coming days.
Our goal is to remain lockstep with our partners to ensure that we are working together so that there can be no picking off of one or other members of the Six-Party framework or that there will be any tension among us as we engage together with Pyongyang.
Yes. Others?
QUESTION: Just one more?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Yeah.
QUESTION: So are you waiting for specific actions or statement from North Koreans?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Not at this juncture. We are involved – there are several elements of diplomacy. Only some of it involve the United States. As I indicated, both Chinese interlocutors, South Korean interlocutors have been engaging North Korea, making very clear what our expectations are in terms of next steps.
Yes, in the back.
QUESTION: Gail from Singapore Straits Times.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Hi, how are you?
QUESTION: Very well, thank you. Do you expect – President Obama happened to announce that he is interested in holding a U.S.-ASEAN summit in Singapore, and Singapore confirmed overnight that it might be held on November 15th. I’d like to know what was the state of the mind in, you know, proposing the summit? What caused – has there been a rethinking on the issue? And finally, if Myanmar is expected to participate in the summit?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Yeah. Look, let me just say that, first of all, I can’t say anything further beyond what you’ve already indicated. But I will say that we have heard, over the course of the last several months, that it was a shame that the U.S.-ASEAN summit had to be cancelled in 2008.
And it was important to many of our ASEAN friends and leaders that that be rescheduled as a symbolic summit to signify the importance of the progress that ASEAN has made over the last several years, and also of the relationship with the United States. And we’ve tried to listen to those concerns carefully, and I think I’ll just – I’ll leave it at that. And in terms of Burma’s participation in those meetings, I think we’ll have more to say about that subsequently. Thanks.
QUESTION: Rob Reynolds from Al Jazeera English.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Hi.
QUESTION: Given China’s expanding economic ties with Iran, isn’t it considered quite unlikely that China would go along with the kind of stringent sanctions that the U.S. might want to impose if the talks are not successful?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: First of all, China has broad and diverse interests, like any great power. And it faces now a situation in which it has several powers on its border that face the potential of specific challenges – North Korea obviously, Pakistan, and now a series of challenges near its territory from Iran.
It’s very important for China that this issue be resolved peacefully, but also that it be resolved. I think Chinese leaders and interlocutors at the foreign ministry have been very clear that it is the strong view of China that Iran not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapons capability. And so obviously, they’ll have to face some difficult choices going forward, but in terms of their basic policy approach, I think we’re very comfortable with it.
Yes.
QUESTION: Oh, yes. My name is (inaudible) Shimbun.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Yes, hi.
QUESTION: My question is about direct talk with Myanmar. So could you give us a bit more detail about how do you proceed direct talks with Myanmar? So last week, briefers mentioned that Myanmar side will appoint interlocutor and the U.S. Government may appoint a counterpart. And could you give us your image about how do you proceed direct talks?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: I can give you some general background.
QUESTION: Where and when?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Yes, some general background. We are now working on the details of our first substantive interaction with Burmese authorities, and we expect that to take place around the edges of the UN General Assembly. I will be involved in those discussions. In addition, the legislation requires – and the Administration intends to abide by that, obviously – the appointment of a Burma coordinator. And we are in the process of working with the White House, both identifying the appropriate person and consultations with Congress about this important assignment.
QUESTION: I – so sorry, Kurt – Indira.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Hi, Indira.
QUESTION: Hi. So – sorry – if you would be the person, that means within the context of UNGA this week in New York? Is that going to be – I mean, Wednesday, we know you’re going to be testifying here on the Hill. So which day would that be?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Well, let me just say we’re working on the details of this. Obviously, we’re – it is the case that we’ve had so little of discussion – so little dialogue with Burma in the past that, actually, the process of actually setting up a meeting like this has – poses its own logistics challenges. And I think it would be fair to say that your parameters are roughly right – over the course of the next week.
Yes.
QUESTION: Paul Richard with OHI.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Hi, Paul.
QUESTION: Can you tell anything more about how this outreach from the Burmese came? And does the timing suggest that they may have been reacting in part to the enforcement of 1874? I mean, did that process make them a little nervous? Is that possibly a factor into this?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: I think it is often the case that in important decisions, that more than one factor comes to play. And I think there are probably a number of factors that are based on global dynamics, some regional dynamics, and probably some internal issues as well. And we, during the process of our consultations in the region, asked some of our interlocutors to have dialogue with senior leaders in Burma, and we received a very clear message, both indirectly and then subsequently directly, that there was a desire for a dialogue at this time.
I think it’s also the case that – let’s be clear that the President’s very clear statement about approaching countries with an open hand and beginning a dialogue with them, it’s a powerful tool in – at least in the initial phase of opening up contacts. What happens subsequently will be based on concrete steps that the Government of Burma is prepared to take.
Overall, we are as interested as you are in terms of what Burma expects and what their plans are in terms of domestic steps and regional behavior. So we’re keenly interested, we’re – we have an open door, and we’re prepared to sit down and have a responsible dialogue about the way forward.
QUESTION: Well, it sounds like the U.S., though, took – it was the U.S. that initially took the initiative here, talking to our interlocutors, who contacted them?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Actually, not. The first real step came from Burmese interlocutors, but there is often in Southeast Asia, because of the lack of our dialogue, a noise-to-signal problem, trying to figure out are these authoritative voices, are they really speaking for the central elements of the government. And through a process – a very rigorous process of trying to determine exactly who this message was coming from, and sort of numerous messages, I think we arrived at a conclusion that – very clearly that they were prepared to sit down with the United States. And now we subsequently believe that’s very much to be the case.
But I must underscore we’re at the earliest possible stages here, and we’ve stated very clearly through the process of this review that there are certain elements, foundations for our approach, that we think still apply given the conditions on the ground inside Burma.
MR. CROWLEY: Last question.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Indira.
QUESTION: Thanks, Kurt. Other than the discussions that happened at UNGA and G-20 that we’re aware of on the economic front, in particular with China, can you tell us – and P-5+1 – can you tell us what else came out of the very high-level – you know, the leaders contact between Obama and Hu, specific things that came up?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Yeah, thank you. First of all, the team that the president brought from China was one of the highest-level teams I’ve ever seen assembled. Key players from all the major ministries, the key players on climate change, on the economy, on various aspects of regional diplomacy.
We talked in great detail about the way ahead on North Korea. China underscored its commitment to the Six-Party framework and its very strong insistence that North Korea abide by its statements on denuclearization. We spoke extensively about climate change and the process leading to Copenhagen. I think there was a pretty frank back-and-forth exchange between the two sides. I think the President – our President, President Obama – asked for a little bit of greater clarity to some of the positions that the Chinese interlocutors had put forward at the UN last week.
As indicated earlier, I think the President made very clear to our Chinese friends of our desire for greater assistance when it came – when it comes to Iran and our concerns about some of the steps that we’ve seen in recent weeks, and I think overall a discussion about ensuring that U.S.-China relations remain on a very stable footing. Chinese friends were very much looking forward to the visit of President Obama early next month; we talked about some of the details associated with that.
It – what in my view was impressive, it was a warm meeting, but it was very workmanlike in the sense that we went through a range of issues in great detail. And, Indira, I think what’s interesting – it’s not just the meeting itself, but the amount of preparation that went into this was as deep and intense as any international meeting that I’ve been involved with, and I think it reflects the importance of Sino-American relations in the current period.
Thank you all very much, look forward to doing this again soon.
Kurt M. Campbell
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Washington, DC
September 28, 2009
MR. CROWLEY: I don’t see any UNGA survivors here yet. They’re still up there. Good afternoon, and welcome to the Department of State. To kick us off this afternoon, we’ve invited down the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Pacific region Kurt Campbell, who is going to kind of follow up on some comments that the Secretary made last night – or last week, I’m sorry – regarding Burma, but will obviously entertain broader questions on the region.
Kurt, you can just kick us off.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Thank you, P.J., and it’s great to see so many friends here. This is my first time in front of the podium, so I’m going to take a variety of questions, if that’s possible.
Let me first underscore that last week was a big week for us in the Asia Pacific region. I think all of you know the President and the Secretary had a series of meetings with our friends and allies in the Asia Pacific region. President Obama met both in Pittsburgh and in New York with President Hu, had a broad range of discussions on North Korea, on Iran, on climate change, on a variety of economic and trade-related issues. The President also met with new Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama to discuss our vital, important partnership and the direction ahead. We also had strong meetings between the President – between the Secretary and her counterparts in several key countries in Asia.
The Secretary also, on Wednesday, had a meeting of the Friends of Burma, and at that meeting she rolled out some of our initial views concerning the Burma review, which is going to be fully discussed this week on Capitol Hill and also with other key players. There will be testimony before the Senate subcommittee on Wednesday; I will appear before that, before Senator Webb and the committee.
I’d like now, if possible, to read a relatively long statement. I apologize for the detail, but it will give you some context in terms of our overall review and what we’ve concluded over the course of these last seven months.
In terms of the background, the Administration launched a review of Burma policy seven months ago, recognizing that the conditions in Burma were deplorable and that neither isolation nor engagement, when implemented alone, had succeeded in improving those conditions. Throughout this review, the Administration consulted closely with Congress, the international community, and a wide range of stakeholders inside Burma, including the National League of Democracy.
For the first time in memory, the Burmese leadership has shown an interest in engaging with the United States, and we intend to explore that interest. In addition, concerns have emerged in recent days about Burma and North Korea’s relationship that require greater focus and dialogue.
What are the strategic goals and interests of this approach? We have reaffirmed our fundamental goals in Burma. We support a unified, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma that respects the human rights of its citizens. To that end, we will continue to push for the immediate and unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners, an end to conflicts with ethnic minorities and gross human rights violations, and initiation of a credible internal political dialogue with the democratic opposition and ethnic minority leaders on elements of reconciliation and reform.
We will also press Burma to comply with its international obligations, including on nonproliferation, ending any prohibited military or proliferation-related cooperation with North Korea, and full compliance with United Nations 1874 and 1718.
If Burma makes meaningful progress towards these goals, it will be possible to improve the relationship with the United States in a step-by-step process. We recognize that this will likely be a long and difficult process, and we are prepared to sustain our efforts on this front.
Burma’s continued estrangement from the international community harms the country and has direct negative consequences beyond Burma’s borders. Burma’s engagement with the outside world has the potential to encourage new thinking, reform, and participation in the work of the international community.
In terms of engagement, we intend to begin a direct dialogue with Burmese authorities to lay out a path towards better relations. The dialogue will include specific discussion of democracy and human rights inside Burma, cooperation on international security issues such as nonproliferation and compliance with 1874 and 1718, and areas that could be of mutual benefit such as counternarcotics and recovery of World War II era remains.
In terms of sanctions, we will maintain existing sanctions until we see concrete progress towards reform. Lifting sanctions now would send the wrong signal. We will tell the Burmese that we will discuss easing sanctions only if they take actions on our core concerns. We will reserve the option to apply additional targeted sanctions, if warranted, by events inside Burma.
In terms of humanitarian assistance, we will continue our commitment to the Burmese people by expanding humanitarian assistance to the extent we are confident the assistance is reaching the people in need. Our experience in providing close to $75 million to Cyclone Nargis relief efforts has proven that we can effectively provide assistance directly to the Burmese people.
In terms of the approach to the upcoming 2010 elections in Burma, we will take a measured approach to the 2010 elections until we can assess the electoral conditions and know whether opposition and ethnic groups will be able to participate. We are skeptical that the elections will be either free or fair, but we will stress to the Burmese the conditions that we consider necessary for a credible electoral process.
In terms of cooperation with others in the international community, we understand that we cannot meet all of these goals alone. We will increase efforts to engage our partners in intergovernmental forum and the region to promote change inside Burma. We value very much the strong relationships we have had with the EU, with Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UN and others in working towards the common goal of a democratic transition in Burma. We seek to continue these partnerships and relationships, and indeed have consulted very closely with all of these countries and groups over the course of the last several months.
We will also intensify our engagement with ASEAN, China, and India to press the Burmese leadership to reform and to participate responsibly in the international community.
In terms of long-term efforts, we will initiate these efforts immediately, but we will also be realistic. We know the process may be long and difficult. We should be prepared to sustain our efforts beyond the planned 2010 elections. We will be working with our partners to encourage Burma to be more open and to promote new thinking and new ideas. It is important that the Burmese people gain greater exposure to broader ideas. It’s also important that Burmese leaders, including Burma’s next generation of leaders, realize that there is a more positive way ahead. These efforts may take time, but the United States is ready to commit to that long-term effort.
With that sort of broad overview, I’d be happy to take any specific questions. Thank you.
Yes. And if you wouldn’t mind, identify yourself just so I know.
QUESTION: Kim Ghattas from the BBC.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Hi, Kim.
QUESTION: Hi. Thank you for this. I have two questions. One, you said that for the first time in history, the Burmese regime has shown interest in engaging the U.S. I was wondering why you thought that was. Why are they interested at this point in engaging with the U.S.?
And the second question is – it’s still a little bit unclear to me what has changed in the policy beyond the fact that you will engage in direct dialogue with them. And so therefore, what is the interest of the Burmese authorities of responding to your requests for improved human rights, et cetera, if the only thing they’re getting out of it is a direct dialogue with you?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Well, let me first say that one of our first questions to our Burmese interlocutors is why indeed have you sought a dialogue with the United States at this time? I think as you know over the course of the last several years, there have occasionally been episodic contacts between the United States and Burmese authorities. And I think what we would like to do is start a process, a sustained process of interaction, where hopefully we can answer some of these questions going forward.
Ultimately, as we conducted this review, we recognized that ultimately, we need to change our methods but not our goals. And I think at this early stage, we think it’s important to suggest that we are prepared to sit down, but also recognize that nothing has changed yet on the ground or in
terms of some of the activities that Burma has been involved with. And so I think this initial step is the right approach, and greater clarity can be gained, hopefully, through a process of dialogue over the course of the coming weeks.
Yes.
QUESTION: How do you – Jill Dougherty from CNN.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Hi, Jill.
QUESTION: How do you square this apparent approach that they have with the alleged cooperation with North Korea?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Well, first of all, I think that Burma has done a variety of things. We think they did play a positive role behind the scenes recently in terms of some steps associated with the implementation of 1874, UN Resolution 1874, and we have noted that in public. And so that willingness to play a more responsible role in the realm of international sanctions support vis-à-vis North Korea has been factored into our overall approach. The truth is that we’ve had so little dialogue with Burma over the course of the last several years that we’re still looking for a clear indication of the direction of its leadership in terms of what it seeks in terms of international engagement.
We’ve seen much more engagement of Burma, particularly at the level of economic engagement and other kind of interactions, both with China, with India, and other countries in Southeast Asia. It’s possible that they seek to diversify those contacts to include the United States, and we intend to explore that over the course of the next several weeks again.
Yes.
QUESTION: Andy Quinn from Reuters.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Hi, Andy?
QUESTION: It’s sort of a follow-up question. You talked about asking the Burmese to stop whatever prohibited contacts they may have had with the North Koreans. Are you willing to let us know what your assessment is of the current state of their contacts, where they’re making deals and what these sorts of deals might be?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: I don’t think I can go very much beyond what Secretary Clinton said at the ASEAN Regional Forum a few months ago in July, late July. She underscored at that time that there clearly were some areas of interaction on the military side, and perhaps even beyond that, between North Korea and Burma that raised concerns not just for the United States, but also for countries in the immediate region. And one of our goals over the course of this period of strategic review have been discussions with Thailand, with Indonesia, with the Philippines, with China. And I think there is a greater desire on the part of these regional partners for the United States to have a direct dialogue with Burma about aspects of their relationship with North Korea that we’re seeking to gain greater clarity into.
Yes. Hi.
QUESTION: A question on China.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Yeah.
QUESTION: What is your assessment of China’s willingness to go along with tougher sanctions against Iran on the nuclear question?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: It’s a good question. I think there was an important process last week. At the same time that the G-20 was meeting at the finance minister level, there was also some very important discussion taking place behind the scenes between U.S. and Chinese representatives. For the first time really, the Chinese supported elements of our tough approach on the P-5+1. I think they are asking the United States for deeper engagement on these issues, discussions around Iran. We’ve provided background and details. I think the Secretary said that we’ll take this after the first meeting on Thursday.
All I can say is that we view China’s engagement in the diplomacy surrounding Iran as increasingly central to a positive resolution.
QUESTION: When you say that they’re interested in deeper engagement, do you mean with the U.S. about what the U.S. wants, or with the Iranians?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Deeper engagement with the U.S., both on what we think we understand in terms of some of Iranian behaviors, also in terms of what American and other P-5+1 expectations are, and what positive role China can play in the peaceful resolution of this problem.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Ai Awaji from JiJi Press, Japan.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Yes, hi.
QUESTION: I have a question about North Korea.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: After the consultations in New York, it seems that you have a strong support from your partners in the Six-Party Talks about having direct talks with North Koreans. So are you ready to go ahead with the plan and send Ambassador Bosworth to Pyongyang? Could you tell us about the next step you’re taking?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Not yet. I think one of the lessons that the United States has learned in this process is a certain degree of patience pays off. We have had, I think as you underscore, very strong support from our partners in the Six-Party framework. China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia have all very clearly and strongly underscored the American approach as the right approach. And that is that we expect North Korea to abide by its commitments made as part of the Six-Party framework in both 2005 and 2007, and that if there were to be any bilateral interactions between the United States and North Korea, that they be designed towards moving back rapidly and very clearly to a Six-Party framework for formal interactions with our North Korean interlocutors.
And I think we’re in the process now of planning our next steps in terms of diplomacy in Northeast Asia. Deputy Secretary Steinberg is in Asia currently for further discussions with both China, South Korea, and Japan. And I think it’s also the case that some very senior Chinese interlocutors will be visiting North Korea in the coming days.
Our goal is to remain lockstep with our partners to ensure that we are working together so that there can be no picking off of one or other members of the Six-Party framework or that there will be any tension among us as we engage together with Pyongyang.
Yes. Others?
QUESTION: Just one more?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Yeah.
QUESTION: So are you waiting for specific actions or statement from North Koreans?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Not at this juncture. We are involved – there are several elements of diplomacy. Only some of it involve the United States. As I indicated, both Chinese interlocutors, South Korean interlocutors have been engaging North Korea, making very clear what our expectations are in terms of next steps.
Yes, in the back.
QUESTION: Gail from Singapore Straits Times.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Hi, how are you?
QUESTION: Very well, thank you. Do you expect – President Obama happened to announce that he is interested in holding a U.S.-ASEAN summit in Singapore, and Singapore confirmed overnight that it might be held on November 15th. I’d like to know what was the state of the mind in, you know, proposing the summit? What caused – has there been a rethinking on the issue? And finally, if Myanmar is expected to participate in the summit?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Yeah. Look, let me just say that, first of all, I can’t say anything further beyond what you’ve already indicated. But I will say that we have heard, over the course of the last several months, that it was a shame that the U.S.-ASEAN summit had to be cancelled in 2008.
And it was important to many of our ASEAN friends and leaders that that be rescheduled as a symbolic summit to signify the importance of the progress that ASEAN has made over the last several years, and also of the relationship with the United States. And we’ve tried to listen to those concerns carefully, and I think I’ll just – I’ll leave it at that. And in terms of Burma’s participation in those meetings, I think we’ll have more to say about that subsequently. Thanks.
QUESTION: Rob Reynolds from Al Jazeera English.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Hi.
QUESTION: Given China’s expanding economic ties with Iran, isn’t it considered quite unlikely that China would go along with the kind of stringent sanctions that the U.S. might want to impose if the talks are not successful?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: First of all, China has broad and diverse interests, like any great power. And it faces now a situation in which it has several powers on its border that face the potential of specific challenges – North Korea obviously, Pakistan, and now a series of challenges near its territory from Iran.
It’s very important for China that this issue be resolved peacefully, but also that it be resolved. I think Chinese leaders and interlocutors at the foreign ministry have been very clear that it is the strong view of China that Iran not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapons capability. And so obviously, they’ll have to face some difficult choices going forward, but in terms of their basic policy approach, I think we’re very comfortable with it.
Yes.
QUESTION: Oh, yes. My name is (inaudible) Shimbun.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Yes, hi.
QUESTION: My question is about direct talk with Myanmar. So could you give us a bit more detail about how do you proceed direct talks with Myanmar? So last week, briefers mentioned that Myanmar side will appoint interlocutor and the U.S. Government may appoint a counterpart. And could you give us your image about how do you proceed direct talks?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: I can give you some general background.
QUESTION: Where and when?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Yes, some general background. We are now working on the details of our first substantive interaction with Burmese authorities, and we expect that to take place around the edges of the UN General Assembly. I will be involved in those discussions. In addition, the legislation requires – and the Administration intends to abide by that, obviously – the appointment of a Burma coordinator. And we are in the process of working with the White House, both identifying the appropriate person and consultations with Congress about this important assignment.
QUESTION: I – so sorry, Kurt – Indira.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Hi, Indira.
QUESTION: Hi. So – sorry – if you would be the person, that means within the context of UNGA this week in New York? Is that going to be – I mean, Wednesday, we know you’re going to be testifying here on the Hill. So which day would that be?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Well, let me just say we’re working on the details of this. Obviously, we’re – it is the case that we’ve had so little of discussion – so little dialogue with Burma in the past that, actually, the process of actually setting up a meeting like this has – poses its own logistics challenges. And I think it would be fair to say that your parameters are roughly right – over the course of the next week.
Yes.
QUESTION: Paul Richard with OHI.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Hi, Paul.
QUESTION: Can you tell anything more about how this outreach from the Burmese came? And does the timing suggest that they may have been reacting in part to the enforcement of 1874? I mean, did that process make them a little nervous? Is that possibly a factor into this?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: I think it is often the case that in important decisions, that more than one factor comes to play. And I think there are probably a number of factors that are based on global dynamics, some regional dynamics, and probably some internal issues as well. And we, during the process of our consultations in the region, asked some of our interlocutors to have dialogue with senior leaders in Burma, and we received a very clear message, both indirectly and then subsequently directly, that there was a desire for a dialogue at this time.
I think it’s also the case that – let’s be clear that the President’s very clear statement about approaching countries with an open hand and beginning a dialogue with them, it’s a powerful tool in – at least in the initial phase of opening up contacts. What happens subsequently will be based on concrete steps that the Government of Burma is prepared to take.
Overall, we are as interested as you are in terms of what Burma expects and what their plans are in terms of domestic steps and regional behavior. So we’re keenly interested, we’re – we have an open door, and we’re prepared to sit down and have a responsible dialogue about the way forward.
QUESTION: Well, it sounds like the U.S., though, took – it was the U.S. that initially took the initiative here, talking to our interlocutors, who contacted them?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Actually, not. The first real step came from Burmese interlocutors, but there is often in Southeast Asia, because of the lack of our dialogue, a noise-to-signal problem, trying to figure out are these authoritative voices, are they really speaking for the central elements of the government. And through a process – a very rigorous process of trying to determine exactly who this message was coming from, and sort of numerous messages, I think we arrived at a conclusion that – very clearly that they were prepared to sit down with the United States. And now we subsequently believe that’s very much to be the case.
But I must underscore we’re at the earliest possible stages here, and we’ve stated very clearly through the process of this review that there are certain elements, foundations for our approach, that we think still apply given the conditions on the ground inside Burma.
MR. CROWLEY: Last question.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Indira.
QUESTION: Thanks, Kurt. Other than the discussions that happened at UNGA and G-20 that we’re aware of on the economic front, in particular with China, can you tell us – and P-5+1 – can you tell us what else came out of the very high-level – you know, the leaders contact between Obama and Hu, specific things that came up?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMPBELL: Yeah, thank you. First of all, the team that the president brought from China was one of the highest-level teams I’ve ever seen assembled. Key players from all the major ministries, the key players on climate change, on the economy, on various aspects of regional diplomacy.
We talked in great detail about the way ahead on North Korea. China underscored its commitment to the Six-Party framework and its very strong insistence that North Korea abide by its statements on denuclearization. We spoke extensively about climate change and the process leading to Copenhagen. I think there was a pretty frank back-and-forth exchange between the two sides. I think the President – our President, President Obama – asked for a little bit of greater clarity to some of the positions that the Chinese interlocutors had put forward at the UN last week.
As indicated earlier, I think the President made very clear to our Chinese friends of our desire for greater assistance when it came – when it comes to Iran and our concerns about some of the steps that we’ve seen in recent weeks, and I think overall a discussion about ensuring that U.S.-China relations remain on a very stable footing. Chinese friends were very much looking forward to the visit of President Obama early next month; we talked about some of the details associated with that.
It – what in my view was impressive, it was a warm meeting, but it was very workmanlike in the sense that we went through a range of issues in great detail. And, Indira, I think what’s interesting – it’s not just the meeting itself, but the amount of preparation that went into this was as deep and intense as any international meeting that I’ve been involved with, and I think it reflects the importance of Sino-American relations in the current period.
Thank you all very much, look forward to doing this again soon.
***************************************************************
THE NEW YORK TIMES - Elder of Burmese Opposition Grapples With Election Dissonance
Published: September 29, 2009
YANGON, Myanmar — U Win Tin, Myanmar’s longest-serving political prisoner, was tormented, tortured and beaten by his captors in the notorious Insein Prison for nearly two decades. Now, at 80, he faces a new kind of torment: watching colleagues from his political party decide whether to play by the rules of the junta that put him behind bars.
Released in September 2008 after more than 19 years in prison, Mr. Win Tin remains remarkably spry, upbeat, and politically engaged. A co-founder of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, he is a vocal opponent of taking part in national elections set for next year. The vote, along with the implementation of a new constitution, would introduce a shared civilian and military government after four and a half decades of military rule.
But while the constitution, passed in a disputed referendum held amid the widespread devastation of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, allows elected representation, it accords special powers to the military in what the junta calls “disciplined democracy.” Many critics call it a sham.
“The election can mean nothing as long as it activates the 2008 constitution, which is very undemocratic,” Mr. Win Tin said in a recent interview.
However, his party is split over whether to boycott the election. Some members say participating would mean losing moral claim to the party’s landslide victory in the 1990 general election, which was ignored by the junta. Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, who has spent much of the period since under house arrest and was sentenced to a new term of 18 months in May, has not made her views on the issue public.
Still, the constitution offers some protections. In August, the International Crisis Group, the Brussels-based nongovernmental organization that seeks to prevent and resolve deadly conflicts, issued a report recommending that opposition groups participate in the election. It said that, although the new constitution “entrenches military power,” the changes at least establish “shared political spaces — the legislatures and perhaps the cabinet — where co-operation could be fostered.”
And internationally, some policies toward Myanmar are shifting.
Last week, the Obama administration announced that it would engage the junta directly, while keeping sanctions in place. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton called for the unconditional release of political prisoners, including Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, and “credible, democratic reform.”
“If the direct engagement of the U.S. will result in the release of all political prisoners and in a revision of the 2008 Constitution, then dialogue could begin between us and the junta, and we would consider running in the election,” Mr. Win Tin said.
Mr. Win Tin — warm, razor-sharp and clearly determined — said the junta might have released him, shortly before his jail sentence was complete, in order to split the party.
He admitted that “we are having some arguments about whether we are going to participate in the elections or not,” but insisted that there was “no conflict within the party now.”
Before being jailed for three years in 1989 after he became secretary of the then newly formed National League for Democracy, Mr. Win Tin had worked as a journalist. In 1991, he was given 10 more years for his involvement in popular uprisings in 1988 that were crushed by the military. In 1996, he was given seven more years for sending the United Nations a petition about abuses in Myanmar prisons. Much of the time, he was in solitary confinement.
“I could not bow down to them,” he said. “No, I could not do it. I wrote poems to keep myself from going crazy. I did mathematics with chalk on the floor.”
He added: “From time to time, they ask you to sign a statement that you are not going to do politics and that you will abide by the law and so on and so forth. I refused.”
When all his upper teeth were bashed out, he was 61. The guards refused to let him get dentures for eight years, leaving him to gum his food.
Early this month, Mr. Win Tin was briefly detained after he wrote an op-ed that appeared in The Washington Post, criticizing the ruling military junta and its plans for the election next year.
“I think they are trying to intimidate me, to stop me from appearing in the foreign media,” he said.
During the interview, on his cousin’s leafy porch in suburban Yangon, government spies openly watched and took photographs from outside the gate.
Never married, Mr. Win Tin talks fondly of his adopted daughter, who lives in Sydney, Australia, after gaining political asylum 15 years ago. He has not seen her since.
Accustomed to a spare prison diet, he has one meal early in the day and a bit of fruit in the evening.
“I don’t want to be a burden on anyone,” he said.
Since his release, Mr. Win Tin has tried to reinvigorate the leadership of the National League for Democracy by stepping up the frequency of meetings and lobbying overseas governments. Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi remains popular, despite the long years of detention, but the party has been crippled by the arrests of hundreds of the younger members, Mr. Win Tin said.
“We have some young men, but they are followed and sent to jail all the time,” he said. “Sometimes, they go to the pagoda just for praying. They are followed and charged with something and sentenced.” Many, he said, are tortured.
In one kind of torture, called “riding the motorcycle,” the subject is made to bend the knees, stand on tiptoe with sharp nails under the heels, and make the sound of a revving engine. When the subject can no longer maintain the tiptoe, the nails penetrate the foot.
All but one of Mr. Win Tin’s eight colleagues on the party’s central executive committee are older than him. The committee president and chairman, U Aung Shwe, is 92, and so infirm that he has not visited party headquarters for months. The party secretary, U Lwin, 87, is bedridden and paralyzed. The youngster in the group, is U Khin Maung Swe, 64.
Despite the challenges his party faces, Mr. Win Tin remains upbeat.
“We expect democracy can happen anytime,” he said, recalling the country’s postcolonial democracy period between 1948 and 1962. “But sometimes, you have to sacrifice everything for a long, long time. It might extend for more than your life span.”
Published: September 29, 2009
YANGON, Myanmar — U Win Tin, Myanmar’s longest-serving political prisoner, was tormented, tortured and beaten by his captors in the notorious Insein Prison for nearly two decades. Now, at 80, he faces a new kind of torment: watching colleagues from his political party decide whether to play by the rules of the junta that put him behind bars.
Released in September 2008 after more than 19 years in prison, Mr. Win Tin remains remarkably spry, upbeat, and politically engaged. A co-founder of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, he is a vocal opponent of taking part in national elections set for next year. The vote, along with the implementation of a new constitution, would introduce a shared civilian and military government after four and a half decades of military rule.
But while the constitution, passed in a disputed referendum held amid the widespread devastation of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, allows elected representation, it accords special powers to the military in what the junta calls “disciplined democracy.” Many critics call it a sham.
“The election can mean nothing as long as it activates the 2008 constitution, which is very undemocratic,” Mr. Win Tin said in a recent interview.
However, his party is split over whether to boycott the election. Some members say participating would mean losing moral claim to the party’s landslide victory in the 1990 general election, which was ignored by the junta. Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, who has spent much of the period since under house arrest and was sentenced to a new term of 18 months in May, has not made her views on the issue public.
Still, the constitution offers some protections. In August, the International Crisis Group, the Brussels-based nongovernmental organization that seeks to prevent and resolve deadly conflicts, issued a report recommending that opposition groups participate in the election. It said that, although the new constitution “entrenches military power,” the changes at least establish “shared political spaces — the legislatures and perhaps the cabinet — where co-operation could be fostered.”
And internationally, some policies toward Myanmar are shifting.
Last week, the Obama administration announced that it would engage the junta directly, while keeping sanctions in place. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton called for the unconditional release of political prisoners, including Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, and “credible, democratic reform.”
“If the direct engagement of the U.S. will result in the release of all political prisoners and in a revision of the 2008 Constitution, then dialogue could begin between us and the junta, and we would consider running in the election,” Mr. Win Tin said.
Mr. Win Tin — warm, razor-sharp and clearly determined — said the junta might have released him, shortly before his jail sentence was complete, in order to split the party.
He admitted that “we are having some arguments about whether we are going to participate in the elections or not,” but insisted that there was “no conflict within the party now.”
Before being jailed for three years in 1989 after he became secretary of the then newly formed National League for Democracy, Mr. Win Tin had worked as a journalist. In 1991, he was given 10 more years for his involvement in popular uprisings in 1988 that were crushed by the military. In 1996, he was given seven more years for sending the United Nations a petition about abuses in Myanmar prisons. Much of the time, he was in solitary confinement.
“I could not bow down to them,” he said. “No, I could not do it. I wrote poems to keep myself from going crazy. I did mathematics with chalk on the floor.”
He added: “From time to time, they ask you to sign a statement that you are not going to do politics and that you will abide by the law and so on and so forth. I refused.”
When all his upper teeth were bashed out, he was 61. The guards refused to let him get dentures for eight years, leaving him to gum his food.
Early this month, Mr. Win Tin was briefly detained after he wrote an op-ed that appeared in The Washington Post, criticizing the ruling military junta and its plans for the election next year.
“I think they are trying to intimidate me, to stop me from appearing in the foreign media,” he said.
During the interview, on his cousin’s leafy porch in suburban Yangon, government spies openly watched and took photographs from outside the gate.
Never married, Mr. Win Tin talks fondly of his adopted daughter, who lives in Sydney, Australia, after gaining political asylum 15 years ago. He has not seen her since.
Accustomed to a spare prison diet, he has one meal early in the day and a bit of fruit in the evening.
“I don’t want to be a burden on anyone,” he said.
Since his release, Mr. Win Tin has tried to reinvigorate the leadership of the National League for Democracy by stepping up the frequency of meetings and lobbying overseas governments. Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi remains popular, despite the long years of detention, but the party has been crippled by the arrests of hundreds of the younger members, Mr. Win Tin said.
“We have some young men, but they are followed and sent to jail all the time,” he said. “Sometimes, they go to the pagoda just for praying. They are followed and charged with something and sentenced.” Many, he said, are tortured.
In one kind of torture, called “riding the motorcycle,” the subject is made to bend the knees, stand on tiptoe with sharp nails under the heels, and make the sound of a revving engine. When the subject can no longer maintain the tiptoe, the nails penetrate the foot.
All but one of Mr. Win Tin’s eight colleagues on the party’s central executive committee are older than him. The committee president and chairman, U Aung Shwe, is 92, and so infirm that he has not visited party headquarters for months. The party secretary, U Lwin, 87, is bedridden and paralyzed. The youngster in the group, is U Khin Maung Swe, 64.
Despite the challenges his party faces, Mr. Win Tin remains upbeat.
“We expect democracy can happen anytime,” he said, recalling the country’s postcolonial democracy period between 1948 and 1962. “But sometimes, you have to sacrifice everything for a long, long time. It might extend for more than your life span.”
***************************************************************
US Burma dialogue begin; monks demand timeline
STAFF WRITER 11:39 HRS IST
Washington, Sept 30 (PTI) The Obama Administration and the Burmese Military junta has initiated the US-Burma dialogue process with their first meeting, amidst call from the Burmese monks that there should be time line for such a dialogue process.
Welcoming Obama Administration's decision to use a combination of sanctions and diplomacy against Burma, the International Burmese Monks Organisation (IBMO) today demanded a time line for any dialogue process with the military junta.
"US direct diplomacy with the regime should not be an open-ended process, but should take place within a reasonable timeframe and with clear benchmarks," the IBMO said in its written testimony submitted to the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Curt Campbell led the American delegation in the first US-Burma talks. The Burmese Minister of Science and Technology U Thang led the junta.
STAFF WRITER 11:39 HRS IST
Washington, Sept 30 (PTI) The Obama Administration and the Burmese Military junta has initiated the US-Burma dialogue process with their first meeting, amidst call from the Burmese monks that there should be time line for such a dialogue process.
Welcoming Obama Administration's decision to use a combination of sanctions and diplomacy against Burma, the International Burmese Monks Organisation (IBMO) today demanded a time line for any dialogue process with the military junta.
"US direct diplomacy with the regime should not be an open-ended process, but should take place within a reasonable timeframe and with clear benchmarks," the IBMO said in its written testimony submitted to the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Curt Campbell led the American delegation in the first US-Burma talks. The Burmese Minister of Science and Technology U Thang led the junta.
***************************************************************
PTI - Suu Kyi party says no pre-conditions to junta-US talks
STAFF WRITER 2:17 HRS IST
STAFF WRITER 2:17 HRS IST
Yangon, Sept 30 (AFP) Myanmar's opposition party led by Aung San Suu Kyi said today there should be no pre-conditions for the United States starting a dialogue with the ruling junta.
The US announced Monday it was starting a dialogue with the military-led nation, although it insisted it would keep sanctions in place until the regime makes progress on democracy.
"Starting a dialogue between two countries is good. Daw Suu has said so," said Nyan Win, a spokesman for the National League for Democracy (NLD). Daw is a term of respect in Myanmar.
"It will be the best if there are no pre-conditions in a dialogue," he told AFP.
The US State Department said Tuesday that a senior US diplomatic official was set to meet with a delegation from Myanmar on the margins of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York.
The US announced Monday it was starting a dialogue with the military-led nation, although it insisted it would keep sanctions in place until the regime makes progress on democracy.
"Starting a dialogue between two countries is good. Daw Suu has said so," said Nyan Win, a spokesman for the National League for Democracy (NLD). Daw is a term of respect in Myanmar.
"It will be the best if there are no pre-conditions in a dialogue," he told AFP.
The US State Department said Tuesday that a senior US diplomatic official was set to meet with a delegation from Myanmar on the margins of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York.
***************************************************************
Sep 30, 2009
Straits Times - Don't lift Myanmar sanctions
WASHINGTON - THE United States cannot 'even consider' easing sanctions on Myanmar until the military-led country has freed all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, a top US Senator said on Tuesday.
Republican Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell also said that the punitive measures should remain in force unless Myanmar holds free and fair elections in 2010 that include opposition and ethnic groups.
'There remain two significant tests of whether or not Burma's relationship with the United States has improved to the degree that we should even consider moving away from a policy of sanctions,' Mr McConnell said in a statement.
'The United States must also insist that Burma comply with its international obligations and end any prohibited military or proliferation related cooperation with North Korea,' said the senator.
His comments came as the US State Department said that, as part of a new policy of engagement, one of its top diplomats would meet on Tuesday with a delegation from Myanmar on the margins of the UN General Assembly.
State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said at a press briefing in Washington that Kurt Campbell, assistant US secretary of state for Asia, was to meet in New York today with a delegation headed by Myanmar's science and technology minister U Thaung.
Myanmar's representative to the United Nations, Than Swe, is also expected to participate.
The meeting comes after the United States announced Monday it was starting a dialogue with the military-led Myanmar, though it insisted it would keep sanctions in place until the regime makes progress on democracy.
On Monday, Campbell announced that President Barack Obama's administration had decided to reengage Myanmar after years of stalemate proved unproductive. -- AFP
Straits Times - Don't lift Myanmar sanctions
WASHINGTON - THE United States cannot 'even consider' easing sanctions on Myanmar until the military-led country has freed all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, a top US Senator said on Tuesday.
Republican Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell also said that the punitive measures should remain in force unless Myanmar holds free and fair elections in 2010 that include opposition and ethnic groups.
'There remain two significant tests of whether or not Burma's relationship with the United States has improved to the degree that we should even consider moving away from a policy of sanctions,' Mr McConnell said in a statement.
'The United States must also insist that Burma comply with its international obligations and end any prohibited military or proliferation related cooperation with North Korea,' said the senator.
His comments came as the US State Department said that, as part of a new policy of engagement, one of its top diplomats would meet on Tuesday with a delegation from Myanmar on the margins of the UN General Assembly.
State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said at a press briefing in Washington that Kurt Campbell, assistant US secretary of state for Asia, was to meet in New York today with a delegation headed by Myanmar's science and technology minister U Thaung.
Myanmar's representative to the United Nations, Than Swe, is also expected to participate.
The meeting comes after the United States announced Monday it was starting a dialogue with the military-led Myanmar, though it insisted it would keep sanctions in place until the regime makes progress on democracy.
On Monday, Campbell announced that President Barack Obama's administration had decided to reengage Myanmar after years of stalemate proved unproductive. -- AFP
***************************************************************
Asian Tribune - U.S. Engagement Must Understand Burma’s Diversity
Wed, 2009-09-30 12:16 — editor
By Nehginpao Kipgen
Developments are indicating that the Obama administration is starting to ease tension with the Burmese military junta. At the U.N. headquarters in New York on September 23, Hillary Clinton said the U.S. will be “moving in a direction of both engagement and continued sanctions.” Clinton is reiterating the comment she made earlier this year during her maiden visit to Asia as Secretary of State.
The announcement comes at a time when the world awaits what the U.S. government’s policy review on Burma might be. The outcome of the 9-month long policy review is something not unexpected. The Obama administration understands the ineffectiveness of either engagement or sanction by itself, without a coordinated international approach.
In another development, Burma’s foreign minister was allowed a 24-hour visit to Washington D.C. on the night of September 18. This visit happens after years of the U.S. sanctions since the late 1990s, under which the military generals were banned from traveling to the United States, except for international organizations’ meetings. Under the 2003 Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, the White House needs to approve a waiver to allow Burmese officials attending the U.N. General Assembly to travel more than 25 miles out of New York.
Though Nyan Win did not meet with the Obama administration officials, he met with Burmese embassy staffs, U.S.-Asian Business Council and James Webb, a democrat senator from Virginia, who recently returned from a visit to Burma. Webb has been a vocal proponent of engagement.
In anticipation of a softer tone at the ongoing U.N. General Assembly and from the Obama administration, the Burmese military junta on September 17 released over 7,000 prisoners, which included about 100 political prisoners. Both the Burmese opposition and the U.N. Secretary General welcomed the news.
While the U.S. is starting to engage Burma, it must understand the ethnic diversity of this Southeast Asian nation. What is today called Burma/ Myanmar came into being at the 1947 Panglong agreement. In fact, the correct name of the country should be called ‘Union of Burma’ and not just Burma. The military junta changed from Burma to Myanmar in 1989, and as a result, it becomes ‘Union of Myanmar’.
Primarily based on dialectical variations, the military junta identifies “135 races” in the Union of Burma. In fact, the peoples of Burma were under two separate British administrations before it gained independence in 1948: ‘Burma proper’ and ‘Frontier Areas’. The Burma proper was predominantly occupied by ethnic Burmans, while Frontier Areas belonged to other ethnic nationalities, which are now identified as ‘ethnic minorities’.
The Union of Burma has the longest armed insurgency in the entire Southeast Asian region. While the military has persuaded more than a dozen armed groups to sign ceasefire agreements, there are still armed groups operating along the Indo-Burma and Thai-Burma borders.
These armed groups are neither terrorists nor separatists. They are demanding autonomy under a federal government, a foundation in which the Union of Burma was established in 1947. The conflicts in Burma are not only political, but also ethnical. Only restoring democracy is unlikely to restore the trust and confidence of the so-called “ethnic minorities.”
The U.S. government and the international community need to understand the complexity nature of the conflicts. Though the Burmese military junta has the power to suppress ethnic armed insurgents, given the strength of over 400,000 armies without any foreign enemy, the aspirations of ethnic minorities cannot simply be suppressed by force. The root cause of the conflicts needs to be addressed.
There are two different stages in the ongoing democratic struggle in Burma. While majority of the ethnic Burmans may suffice with the restoration of a democratic government, the overwhelming ethnic minority population, which constitutes a little less than 40% of the country’s total population but occupies more than two-thirds of the land, will continue to demand for their fundamental political rights.
In order to find a way out for Burma, the Obama administration is doing the right thing by applying both engagement and sanction tools. The administration needs to continue to put pressure on the military junta to release all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the 1991 Nobel peace laureate. Sanctions should not be unconditionally lifted before any tangible changes are happening inside the country.
The new policy will provide a platform for the U.S. government to have access to both the engagement and isolation groups. With the engagement agenda, the Obama administration can now work with members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations, China, India, and Russia. With the continued sanction policy, the administration can still work together with the European Union, its traditional ally.
While the policy shift is a welcome move, the Obama administration needs to understand the root cause of conflicts in Burma. The U.S. engagement should not be just with the military junta and the NLD, but inclusive. The plights and aspirations of ethnic minorities should always be part of the solutions.
Nehginpao Kipgen is a researcher on the rise of political conflicts in modern Burma (1947-2004) and general secretary of the U.S.-based Kuki International Forum (www.kukiforum.com). He has written numerous analytical articles on the politics of Burma and Asia for many leading international newspapers.
Wed, 2009-09-30 12:16 — editor
By Nehginpao Kipgen
Developments are indicating that the Obama administration is starting to ease tension with the Burmese military junta. At the U.N. headquarters in New York on September 23, Hillary Clinton said the U.S. will be “moving in a direction of both engagement and continued sanctions.” Clinton is reiterating the comment she made earlier this year during her maiden visit to Asia as Secretary of State.
The announcement comes at a time when the world awaits what the U.S. government’s policy review on Burma might be. The outcome of the 9-month long policy review is something not unexpected. The Obama administration understands the ineffectiveness of either engagement or sanction by itself, without a coordinated international approach.
In another development, Burma’s foreign minister was allowed a 24-hour visit to Washington D.C. on the night of September 18. This visit happens after years of the U.S. sanctions since the late 1990s, under which the military generals were banned from traveling to the United States, except for international organizations’ meetings. Under the 2003 Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, the White House needs to approve a waiver to allow Burmese officials attending the U.N. General Assembly to travel more than 25 miles out of New York.
Though Nyan Win did not meet with the Obama administration officials, he met with Burmese embassy staffs, U.S.-Asian Business Council and James Webb, a democrat senator from Virginia, who recently returned from a visit to Burma. Webb has been a vocal proponent of engagement.
In anticipation of a softer tone at the ongoing U.N. General Assembly and from the Obama administration, the Burmese military junta on September 17 released over 7,000 prisoners, which included about 100 political prisoners. Both the Burmese opposition and the U.N. Secretary General welcomed the news.
While the U.S. is starting to engage Burma, it must understand the ethnic diversity of this Southeast Asian nation. What is today called Burma/ Myanmar came into being at the 1947 Panglong agreement. In fact, the correct name of the country should be called ‘Union of Burma’ and not just Burma. The military junta changed from Burma to Myanmar in 1989, and as a result, it becomes ‘Union of Myanmar’.
Primarily based on dialectical variations, the military junta identifies “135 races” in the Union of Burma. In fact, the peoples of Burma were under two separate British administrations before it gained independence in 1948: ‘Burma proper’ and ‘Frontier Areas’. The Burma proper was predominantly occupied by ethnic Burmans, while Frontier Areas belonged to other ethnic nationalities, which are now identified as ‘ethnic minorities’.
The Union of Burma has the longest armed insurgency in the entire Southeast Asian region. While the military has persuaded more than a dozen armed groups to sign ceasefire agreements, there are still armed groups operating along the Indo-Burma and Thai-Burma borders.
These armed groups are neither terrorists nor separatists. They are demanding autonomy under a federal government, a foundation in which the Union of Burma was established in 1947. The conflicts in Burma are not only political, but also ethnical. Only restoring democracy is unlikely to restore the trust and confidence of the so-called “ethnic minorities.”
The U.S. government and the international community need to understand the complexity nature of the conflicts. Though the Burmese military junta has the power to suppress ethnic armed insurgents, given the strength of over 400,000 armies without any foreign enemy, the aspirations of ethnic minorities cannot simply be suppressed by force. The root cause of the conflicts needs to be addressed.
There are two different stages in the ongoing democratic struggle in Burma. While majority of the ethnic Burmans may suffice with the restoration of a democratic government, the overwhelming ethnic minority population, which constitutes a little less than 40% of the country’s total population but occupies more than two-thirds of the land, will continue to demand for their fundamental political rights.
In order to find a way out for Burma, the Obama administration is doing the right thing by applying both engagement and sanction tools. The administration needs to continue to put pressure on the military junta to release all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the 1991 Nobel peace laureate. Sanctions should not be unconditionally lifted before any tangible changes are happening inside the country.
The new policy will provide a platform for the U.S. government to have access to both the engagement and isolation groups. With the engagement agenda, the Obama administration can now work with members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations, China, India, and Russia. With the continued sanction policy, the administration can still work together with the European Union, its traditional ally.
While the policy shift is a welcome move, the Obama administration needs to understand the root cause of conflicts in Burma. The U.S. engagement should not be just with the military junta and the NLD, but inclusive. The plights and aspirations of ethnic minorities should always be part of the solutions.
Nehginpao Kipgen is a researcher on the rise of political conflicts in modern Burma (1947-2004) and general secretary of the U.S.-based Kuki International Forum (www.kukiforum.com). He has written numerous analytical articles on the politics of Burma and Asia for many leading international newspapers.
***************************************************************
The Nation - Talks and sanctions
By The Statesman
New Delhi
Published on September 30, 2009
There appears to be a distinct change in the United States' policy towards Burma, with Hillary Clinton declaring that talks with the junta would be "stepped up" in parallel with the sanctions.
This certainly is a forward progression not least because the imprisoned democratic leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has lent support to the move. There may be hope yet that direct engagement with the rulers will provide the impetus for democratic reforms.
There is increasing realisation in the West that the sanctions regime hasn't been effective against a ruthless junta that is even prepared to resist diplomatic isolation. There is acknowledgement too in certain quarters that the West's hard line approach has been a disaster, with scarcely a change in the prolonged predicament of Suu Kyi.
Much will depend on the pace at which Burma names its interlocutor for the bilateral talks. The shift in the US style of engagement becomes clear from the secretary of state's address at a meeting of the Friends of Burma in New York: "Any debate that pits sanctions against engagement creates a false choice. Going forward, we'll need to employ both of these tools."
She has taken care to couch her prescription with the caveat: "Lifting sanctions now would send the wrong signal ... But we will be willing to discuss the easing of sanctions in response to significant actions that address the core human rights and democracy issues that are inhibiting Burma's progress."
For both sides, it will be a very delicate balance to sustain, given the country's brutal record in stifling democracy. Yet it must be conceded that the gesture raises hope.
As much is clear from the immediate response of Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy: "The new US approach will bring improved and more transparent relations."
Suu Kyi herself has backed the move with the very reasonable suggestion that the US dealings ought to be conducted with both the junta and the pro-democracy leaders.
One need hardly add that only then will the Obama administration's review of its policy towards Burma be meaningful.
By The Statesman
New Delhi
Published on September 30, 2009
There appears to be a distinct change in the United States' policy towards Burma, with Hillary Clinton declaring that talks with the junta would be "stepped up" in parallel with the sanctions.
This certainly is a forward progression not least because the imprisoned democratic leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has lent support to the move. There may be hope yet that direct engagement with the rulers will provide the impetus for democratic reforms.
There is increasing realisation in the West that the sanctions regime hasn't been effective against a ruthless junta that is even prepared to resist diplomatic isolation. There is acknowledgement too in certain quarters that the West's hard line approach has been a disaster, with scarcely a change in the prolonged predicament of Suu Kyi.
Much will depend on the pace at which Burma names its interlocutor for the bilateral talks. The shift in the US style of engagement becomes clear from the secretary of state's address at a meeting of the Friends of Burma in New York: "Any debate that pits sanctions against engagement creates a false choice. Going forward, we'll need to employ both of these tools."
She has taken care to couch her prescription with the caveat: "Lifting sanctions now would send the wrong signal ... But we will be willing to discuss the easing of sanctions in response to significant actions that address the core human rights and democracy issues that are inhibiting Burma's progress."
For both sides, it will be a very delicate balance to sustain, given the country's brutal record in stifling democracy. Yet it must be conceded that the gesture raises hope.
As much is clear from the immediate response of Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy: "The new US approach will bring improved and more transparent relations."
Suu Kyi herself has backed the move with the very reasonable suggestion that the US dealings ought to be conducted with both the junta and the pro-democracy leaders.
One need hardly add that only then will the Obama administration's review of its policy towards Burma be meaningful.
***************************************************************
Posted: September 29, 2009 03:09 PM
The Huffington Post - As an American is Tortured in Burma, Where's the Outrage?
As I write this, an American is being tortured in Burma. Yet little is being done by the United States to secure his release and few mainstream media outlets are covering his story. So why isn't more being done on Nyi Nyi Aung's behalf?
The last time I saw Nyi Nyi Aung (also known as Kyaw Zaw Lwin) was in June at an event in New York to commemorate the 64th birthday of Burmese democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Nyi Nyi Aung was dressed in a crisp white collarless button-down shirt and a Burmese plaid sarong -- since 1988 the recognizable uniform of Burma's student democracy activists. Born in Burma, Nyi Nyi Aung fled the country following his participation in 1988's democracy protests. Since 1994, he's lived in the U.S. as a resident of suburban Maryland.
Today Nyi Nyi Aung languishes in Burma's infamous Insein (pronounced "insane") Prison, where for four decades legions of democracy activists have been imprisoned, tortured, and murdered. Since his arrest in September, credible reports have emerged that Nyi Nyi Aung has been tortured, beaten, even denied food for a week. Indeed, there's a good chance that Nyi Nyi Aung is being tortured right now -- his body spread out and tied down to a rough table while guards beat him with bamboo canes. Sadly, as the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma has thoroughly documented, such torture is routine for the roughly 2,100 political prisoners in Burma. So how does an American citizen end up tortured in Burma?
On September 3rd, Nyi Nyi Aung arrived at Rangoon's airport with a tourist visa stamped into his American passport. For whatever reason, Burma's ruling junta was waiting for him. For the more than three-weeks since he was arrested at the airport, Nyi Nyi Aung has been a prisoner of a foreign regime. Yet Nyi Nyi Aung's name and face have yet to be beamed out on the evening news, nor has the State Department made an official appeal on his behalf. The White House also hasn't done a thing despite the fact that President Obama's is bound by law to take up Nyi Nyi Aung's case if it appears that the imprisonment is wrongful (remember Bill Clinton's trip to North Korea and Senator Webb's trip to Burma earlier this year?). So why isn't there more outrage and action at this American's appalling treatment by a ruthless dictatorship? One answer is that America's recent flirtation with torture has inured it to the torture of Americans themselves, but I can't and don't want to believe this.
A more likely answer lies with the U.S.'s recent decision to rethink its foreign policy on Burma. The tough "stick" sanctions policy, which has prevailed in Washington for over a decade and admittedly hasn't brought Burma closer to democracy, seems to be quickly giving way to a softer "carrots" engagement policy despite the regime's brutal response to the 2007 democracy protests and its pitiful failure to act after Cyclone Nargis ravaged Burma last year. This policy realignment kicked off last week in Washington, D.C. with a meeting between the State Department and Burma's foreign minister. Major General Nyan Win's visit to the capital was the first by a Burmese foreign minister in nine years because of a visa ban that had kept high-level members of the military junta from traveling in the U.S. The visa ban is law, but that didn't stop the Obama administration from waiving the ban -- no doubt the first of many controversial carrots to come.
Whatever the consequences of this policy sea change, it seems clear that as a result the military dictatorship will gain at the expense of the country's embattled democracy movement, at least in the short term. But how will this change in policy affect those inside Burma, whose human rights and dignity are already threatened on a massive scale? Given the recent treatment of Nyi Nyi Aung, by both the junta and the United States government, we should be worried. Human rights are clearly not a priority of this policy reversal.
Ignoring Nyi Nyi Aung's arrest and torture, I fear, was a direct consequence of the U.S.'s reengagement with the regime. Given the delicate and controversial politics at play, calling for his release, it was probably reasoned, would have jeopardized the U.S.'s entire strategy to bring the junta to the table. Of course, you might argue that it wasn't in the best interests of the junta either to torture an American just as its foreign minister was arriving in Washington. But the junta is famous for testing the limits of what it can get away with.
The message from Washington to Burma's junta last week was clear: we will look the other way, even at the torture of one of our own, if you engage with us. The U.S.'s ultimate objective by engaging the junta remains unclear. Engagement is not a bad thing per say, in fact it's needed, but the motives for it should be made clear and transparent. Many analysts suspect that the reengagement is a purely realpolitik move directed at containing Chinese influence in Burma rather than any meaningful step towards democracy promotion. Either way, it's a gamble for a White House that is already doing too little to promote and protect human rights worldwide.
In his speech at the United Nations last week, President Obama pledged that "America will live its values, and we will lead by example." If we are to believe Mr. Obama, he must -- at the very least -- stand up for the human rights of his fellow Americans. As for the U.S.'s position on Burma, whatever we do, let's ensure that the protection and promotion of human rights remains a clear priority of that policy. The U.S.'s failure to act on Nyi Nyi Aung's behalf, much less the 2,100 other political prisoners in Burma, is a clear reminder that we must not allow human rights to be sacrificed at the altar of "diplomatic engagement."
Jonathan Hulland is a recent graduate of Columbia University's School for International and Public Affairs. He worked with Burma's democracy movement in New York and Thailand from 2003 to 2008.
The Huffington Post - As an American is Tortured in Burma, Where's the Outrage?
As I write this, an American is being tortured in Burma. Yet little is being done by the United States to secure his release and few mainstream media outlets are covering his story. So why isn't more being done on Nyi Nyi Aung's behalf?
The last time I saw Nyi Nyi Aung (also known as Kyaw Zaw Lwin) was in June at an event in New York to commemorate the 64th birthday of Burmese democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Nyi Nyi Aung was dressed in a crisp white collarless button-down shirt and a Burmese plaid sarong -- since 1988 the recognizable uniform of Burma's student democracy activists. Born in Burma, Nyi Nyi Aung fled the country following his participation in 1988's democracy protests. Since 1994, he's lived in the U.S. as a resident of suburban Maryland.
Today Nyi Nyi Aung languishes in Burma's infamous Insein (pronounced "insane") Prison, where for four decades legions of democracy activists have been imprisoned, tortured, and murdered. Since his arrest in September, credible reports have emerged that Nyi Nyi Aung has been tortured, beaten, even denied food for a week. Indeed, there's a good chance that Nyi Nyi Aung is being tortured right now -- his body spread out and tied down to a rough table while guards beat him with bamboo canes. Sadly, as the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma has thoroughly documented, such torture is routine for the roughly 2,100 political prisoners in Burma. So how does an American citizen end up tortured in Burma?
On September 3rd, Nyi Nyi Aung arrived at Rangoon's airport with a tourist visa stamped into his American passport. For whatever reason, Burma's ruling junta was waiting for him. For the more than three-weeks since he was arrested at the airport, Nyi Nyi Aung has been a prisoner of a foreign regime. Yet Nyi Nyi Aung's name and face have yet to be beamed out on the evening news, nor has the State Department made an official appeal on his behalf. The White House also hasn't done a thing despite the fact that President Obama's is bound by law to take up Nyi Nyi Aung's case if it appears that the imprisonment is wrongful (remember Bill Clinton's trip to North Korea and Senator Webb's trip to Burma earlier this year?). So why isn't there more outrage and action at this American's appalling treatment by a ruthless dictatorship? One answer is that America's recent flirtation with torture has inured it to the torture of Americans themselves, but I can't and don't want to believe this.
A more likely answer lies with the U.S.'s recent decision to rethink its foreign policy on Burma. The tough "stick" sanctions policy, which has prevailed in Washington for over a decade and admittedly hasn't brought Burma closer to democracy, seems to be quickly giving way to a softer "carrots" engagement policy despite the regime's brutal response to the 2007 democracy protests and its pitiful failure to act after Cyclone Nargis ravaged Burma last year. This policy realignment kicked off last week in Washington, D.C. with a meeting between the State Department and Burma's foreign minister. Major General Nyan Win's visit to the capital was the first by a Burmese foreign minister in nine years because of a visa ban that had kept high-level members of the military junta from traveling in the U.S. The visa ban is law, but that didn't stop the Obama administration from waiving the ban -- no doubt the first of many controversial carrots to come.
Whatever the consequences of this policy sea change, it seems clear that as a result the military dictatorship will gain at the expense of the country's embattled democracy movement, at least in the short term. But how will this change in policy affect those inside Burma, whose human rights and dignity are already threatened on a massive scale? Given the recent treatment of Nyi Nyi Aung, by both the junta and the United States government, we should be worried. Human rights are clearly not a priority of this policy reversal.
Ignoring Nyi Nyi Aung's arrest and torture, I fear, was a direct consequence of the U.S.'s reengagement with the regime. Given the delicate and controversial politics at play, calling for his release, it was probably reasoned, would have jeopardized the U.S.'s entire strategy to bring the junta to the table. Of course, you might argue that it wasn't in the best interests of the junta either to torture an American just as its foreign minister was arriving in Washington. But the junta is famous for testing the limits of what it can get away with.
The message from Washington to Burma's junta last week was clear: we will look the other way, even at the torture of one of our own, if you engage with us. The U.S.'s ultimate objective by engaging the junta remains unclear. Engagement is not a bad thing per say, in fact it's needed, but the motives for it should be made clear and transparent. Many analysts suspect that the reengagement is a purely realpolitik move directed at containing Chinese influence in Burma rather than any meaningful step towards democracy promotion. Either way, it's a gamble for a White House that is already doing too little to promote and protect human rights worldwide.
In his speech at the United Nations last week, President Obama pledged that "America will live its values, and we will lead by example." If we are to believe Mr. Obama, he must -- at the very least -- stand up for the human rights of his fellow Americans. As for the U.S.'s position on Burma, whatever we do, let's ensure that the protection and promotion of human rights remains a clear priority of that policy. The U.S.'s failure to act on Nyi Nyi Aung's behalf, much less the 2,100 other political prisoners in Burma, is a clear reminder that we must not allow human rights to be sacrificed at the altar of "diplomatic engagement."
Jonathan Hulland is a recent graduate of Columbia University's School for International and Public Affairs. He worked with Burma's democracy movement in New York and Thailand from 2003 to 2008.
***************************************************************
The Independent - Leading article: A test of Burma's sincerity
Wednesday, 30 September 2009
The emerging new US strategy of greater engagement with Burma represents the biggest shift in Washington's policy since the imposition of sanctions more than a decade ago, in protest at the trampling of democracy by the military regime, and its flagrant abuses of human rights.
In many respects this fresh approach, a logical extension of the Obama administration's willingness to reach out to longstanding American foes like Iran and Cuba, makes sense. Sanctions have manifestly failed to achieve their stated goal. Burma's generals have themselves apparently signalled they would welcome a thaw, while the change of policy in Washington has the support of Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the country's democratic movement, who remains under house arrest. Moreover, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has pointed out, shunning all contact with Burma makes it even harder to tackle a host of problems in the region, ranging from refugees, narcotics trafficking and disease control to the risk of nuclear proliferation, embodied by the junta's growing links with North Korea.
Under the new policy, Washington would add carrots to existing sticks. Sanctions, especially "smart sanctions" targeted at senior figures in the regime, would remain in force. But the US will offer greater humanitarian aid – building on the limited assistance provided after last year's Cyclone Nargis that devastated Burma, killing 150,000 people or more – as well as diplomatic engagement. If the regime takes genuine steps to improve its lamentable human rights record and foster democracy, then the sanctions could be eased. The operative word here however is "genuine". The acid test of the junta's sincerity will be the multiparty elections promised in 2010.
If the regime is seeking improved relations, little sign emerged from the speech this week to the United Nations General Assembly by General Thein Sein. The Burmese Prime Minister warned that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside. The odds are that the xenophobic regime will blatantly rig these elections to prolong military rule.
The US is right to stretch out a hand to Burma. But if the carrots are ignored, then Washington should be ready to wield an even stronger stick.
Wednesday, 30 September 2009
The emerging new US strategy of greater engagement with Burma represents the biggest shift in Washington's policy since the imposition of sanctions more than a decade ago, in protest at the trampling of democracy by the military regime, and its flagrant abuses of human rights.
In many respects this fresh approach, a logical extension of the Obama administration's willingness to reach out to longstanding American foes like Iran and Cuba, makes sense. Sanctions have manifestly failed to achieve their stated goal. Burma's generals have themselves apparently signalled they would welcome a thaw, while the change of policy in Washington has the support of Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the country's democratic movement, who remains under house arrest. Moreover, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has pointed out, shunning all contact with Burma makes it even harder to tackle a host of problems in the region, ranging from refugees, narcotics trafficking and disease control to the risk of nuclear proliferation, embodied by the junta's growing links with North Korea.
Under the new policy, Washington would add carrots to existing sticks. Sanctions, especially "smart sanctions" targeted at senior figures in the regime, would remain in force. But the US will offer greater humanitarian aid – building on the limited assistance provided after last year's Cyclone Nargis that devastated Burma, killing 150,000 people or more – as well as diplomatic engagement. If the regime takes genuine steps to improve its lamentable human rights record and foster democracy, then the sanctions could be eased. The operative word here however is "genuine". The acid test of the junta's sincerity will be the multiparty elections promised in 2010.
If the regime is seeking improved relations, little sign emerged from the speech this week to the United Nations General Assembly by General Thein Sein. The Burmese Prime Minister warned that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside. The odds are that the xenophobic regime will blatantly rig these elections to prolong military rule.
The US is right to stretch out a hand to Burma. But if the carrots are ignored, then Washington should be ready to wield an even stronger stick.
***************************************************************
US’s Burma policy; Is it flawless?
by Mungpi
Wednesday, 30 September 2009 22:24
New Delhi (Mizzima) - Accepting the failure of sanctions to usher in political change, the Burmese opposition and analysts said, the new US policy on the Southeast Asian nation could be the right approach but warned that the military junta could use it to its advantage, as it is not flawless.
The United States on Monday said, under its new Burma policy, it would seek direct engagement with the military rulers of Burma, but would continue with sanctions that can be phased out or tightened based on events inside Burma.
“In principle, this is a good policy. As sanctions or engagement alone have failed to bring change, we would like to hope that the combination of both might bring some change,” Win Min, an academic at the Chiang Mai University in Thailand and a long time Burma observer, said.
Similarly, a senior member of the National League for Democracy, Win Tin, said, while the US decides its policy, the new approach seems to be on the right track as it strikes a balance between engagement and punishment.
“We, the NLD, have been proposing engagement with the junta for the past 20 years, and so we welcome the US’s policy of engagement. We believe things could change through engagement,” Win Tin, a central executive committee member of the NLD, said.
Following US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s preview of the Burma policy at the United Nations, detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, through her party spokesperson, said she welcomed the policy of engagement but urged the US to engage both the junta and the opposition, including ethnic minorities.
Win Tin said while he agrees with party leader Aung San Suu Kyi, “I would like to add that the US should demand that the junta start a dialogue with us - the opposition.”
He said the US’s engagement with the junta is not enough because if political change is to come to Burma, dialogue between internal players must be the starting point and the US should see that the junta is on the right track for conducting such dialogues as the start of the process of national reconciliation.
While the new US policy garners some support as it incorporates the ‘Carrot and Stick’, method, Win Tin warned the US not to allow the junta to take advantage of the engagement and to court them in their playground but to stand firm on its principles.
“The junta, as we have seen in the past, is very smart in playing so the US must stand firm on its principles and not allow the junta to play with them,” he said.
He said, even if the sanctions are to be lifted, the list of targeted people such as the generals, their close relatives and business cronies should be kept as the last card to be cast on the table.
“Because sanctions do have an impact, as it is obvious, the junta really wants to come out of sanctions, and this is a good point for the US to push the generals to implement change,” he added.
Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein, in his speech at the UN General Assembly on Monday, said sanctions are ‘unjust’ and that certain countries are using sanctions as a political tool. He urged the international community to pressurize countries imposing sanctions on Burma to lift it.
Aware of the Generals’ fear, Aung San Suu Kyi on Saturday sent a letter to Snr. Gen Than Shwe, offering to work with him in order to help ease the sanctions imposed by the West.
In her letter, she requested a meeting with the Charge d’Affairs of the US embassy, Ambassadors of the European Union and Australia, to discuss the sanctions and to understand their stance on Burma.
However, Nyan Win, her party spokesperson, said, so far there has been no response from Naypyitaw on Aung San Suu Kyi’s proposal.
According to Win Min, the junta is currently looking ahead of the 2010 elections and its legitimacy, which can be gained if the international community endorses it. The US sanctions, therefore, remain a big obstacle for it and the regime is trying all it can to ease this pressure.
“We will have to wait and see how the junta responds to the new US policy. But there is always a possibility that the junta would want to use the US to support them in their plan,” Win Min said.
“Though nothing is clear, one thing is certain that the junta does not want to give up its rule and wants to legitimize its role through the road-map,” he added.
According to the junta’s seven-step roadmap to democracy, the general elections scheduled for 2010 is the fifth step and will give life to the 2008 constitution, which according to the junta was approved by over 90 per cent of voters.
The elections would be followed by convening of the Parliament and forming the cabinet, all of which will be based on the 2008 constitution, which critics said will legitimize the role of the military.
“The junta wants to see the 2010 elections going through smoothly, as it is an important step in legitimizing the role of the military,” said Win Tin. He added that winning the support of the US plays an important role for the success of the elections.
Besides, the junta’s interest in wanting the US to endorse its planned roadmap, it is also widely seen that the junta wants to use the US to balance China. Win Tin said, this could give the junta a much larger space to play in as it already has India to pit against China.
According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) report titled “China’s Myanmar Dilemma” released in mid-September, Burma’s failure to implement socio-political changes has become a burden for China, which as the closest ally had defended the Burmese military junta in the international fora.
The Burmese junta, according to analysts, is also aware of the Chinese attitude towards it and understands that it cannot forever remain under the protection of China. The junta needs alternative support base, including neighbouring countries such as India.
“In the larger context, the junta might want to pit China against the US. And diversify its support and not depend only on the Chinese,” Win Tin said.
“Now with India already backing it, the junta would want the US to have a good relationship with it,” he added.
by Mungpi
Wednesday, 30 September 2009 22:24
New Delhi (Mizzima) - Accepting the failure of sanctions to usher in political change, the Burmese opposition and analysts said, the new US policy on the Southeast Asian nation could be the right approach but warned that the military junta could use it to its advantage, as it is not flawless.
The United States on Monday said, under its new Burma policy, it would seek direct engagement with the military rulers of Burma, but would continue with sanctions that can be phased out or tightened based on events inside Burma.
“In principle, this is a good policy. As sanctions or engagement alone have failed to bring change, we would like to hope that the combination of both might bring some change,” Win Min, an academic at the Chiang Mai University in Thailand and a long time Burma observer, said.
Similarly, a senior member of the National League for Democracy, Win Tin, said, while the US decides its policy, the new approach seems to be on the right track as it strikes a balance between engagement and punishment.
“We, the NLD, have been proposing engagement with the junta for the past 20 years, and so we welcome the US’s policy of engagement. We believe things could change through engagement,” Win Tin, a central executive committee member of the NLD, said.
Following US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s preview of the Burma policy at the United Nations, detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, through her party spokesperson, said she welcomed the policy of engagement but urged the US to engage both the junta and the opposition, including ethnic minorities.
Win Tin said while he agrees with party leader Aung San Suu Kyi, “I would like to add that the US should demand that the junta start a dialogue with us - the opposition.”
He said the US’s engagement with the junta is not enough because if political change is to come to Burma, dialogue between internal players must be the starting point and the US should see that the junta is on the right track for conducting such dialogues as the start of the process of national reconciliation.
While the new US policy garners some support as it incorporates the ‘Carrot and Stick’, method, Win Tin warned the US not to allow the junta to take advantage of the engagement and to court them in their playground but to stand firm on its principles.
“The junta, as we have seen in the past, is very smart in playing so the US must stand firm on its principles and not allow the junta to play with them,” he said.
He said, even if the sanctions are to be lifted, the list of targeted people such as the generals, their close relatives and business cronies should be kept as the last card to be cast on the table.
“Because sanctions do have an impact, as it is obvious, the junta really wants to come out of sanctions, and this is a good point for the US to push the generals to implement change,” he added.
Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein, in his speech at the UN General Assembly on Monday, said sanctions are ‘unjust’ and that certain countries are using sanctions as a political tool. He urged the international community to pressurize countries imposing sanctions on Burma to lift it.
Aware of the Generals’ fear, Aung San Suu Kyi on Saturday sent a letter to Snr. Gen Than Shwe, offering to work with him in order to help ease the sanctions imposed by the West.
In her letter, she requested a meeting with the Charge d’Affairs of the US embassy, Ambassadors of the European Union and Australia, to discuss the sanctions and to understand their stance on Burma.
However, Nyan Win, her party spokesperson, said, so far there has been no response from Naypyitaw on Aung San Suu Kyi’s proposal.
According to Win Min, the junta is currently looking ahead of the 2010 elections and its legitimacy, which can be gained if the international community endorses it. The US sanctions, therefore, remain a big obstacle for it and the regime is trying all it can to ease this pressure.
“We will have to wait and see how the junta responds to the new US policy. But there is always a possibility that the junta would want to use the US to support them in their plan,” Win Min said.
“Though nothing is clear, one thing is certain that the junta does not want to give up its rule and wants to legitimize its role through the road-map,” he added.
According to the junta’s seven-step roadmap to democracy, the general elections scheduled for 2010 is the fifth step and will give life to the 2008 constitution, which according to the junta was approved by over 90 per cent of voters.
The elections would be followed by convening of the Parliament and forming the cabinet, all of which will be based on the 2008 constitution, which critics said will legitimize the role of the military.
“The junta wants to see the 2010 elections going through smoothly, as it is an important step in legitimizing the role of the military,” said Win Tin. He added that winning the support of the US plays an important role for the success of the elections.
Besides, the junta’s interest in wanting the US to endorse its planned roadmap, it is also widely seen that the junta wants to use the US to balance China. Win Tin said, this could give the junta a much larger space to play in as it already has India to pit against China.
According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) report titled “China’s Myanmar Dilemma” released in mid-September, Burma’s failure to implement socio-political changes has become a burden for China, which as the closest ally had defended the Burmese military junta in the international fora.
The Burmese junta, according to analysts, is also aware of the Chinese attitude towards it and understands that it cannot forever remain under the protection of China. The junta needs alternative support base, including neighbouring countries such as India.
“In the larger context, the junta might want to pit China against the US. And diversify its support and not depend only on the Chinese,” Win Tin said.
“Now with India already backing it, the junta would want the US to have a good relationship with it,” he added.
***************************************************************
KIO wants partial cooperation with junta
by Phanida
Wednesday, 30 September 2009 21:24
Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), an ethnic armed group in Northern Burma, have proposed the junta to cooperate with some of its departments.
Representatives of the KIO put up their proposal during a meeting with Commander of the junta’s Northern Command Maj-Gen. Soe Win on Tuesday, where they also discussed on the junta’s proposal to transform the Kachin independence Army (KIA), armed wing of KIO, into the Border Guard Force (BGF).
“Soe Win just wanted us to accept their proposal. We told them we would transform some of our departments, which can work in tandem with the junta’s departments. It is in the discussion stage,” a KIO official, who attended the meeting, told Mizzima.
“Our agriculture, forest conservation, education and health departments will cooperate with them. We will build school buildings along with them. We have communicated this,” the official added.
Led by Vice-Chairman Gauri Zau Sai the KIO delegation to the meeting included at least 10 departmental heads such as the agriculture, health, education, forest conservation, regional developments.
The junta’s delegation was led by the Regional Commander Maj. Gen. Soe Win and Col. Thet Pone from Military Affairs Security (MAS) along with others.
During the meeting, the junta’s commander, however, made no response to the KIO’s proposal of allowing some of its departments to cooperate with the Burmese army. The meeting ended with both sides agreeing to meet again in a few days.
In late April, the Burmese junta proposed all ceasefire armed groups to transform their armed wings into the Border Guard Force. Following the proposal, KIO leaders and military commanders met at least eight times and discuss over the proposal.
Despite of the much pressures by the junta, the KIO convened a mass meeting on September 5, at a KIO controlled town of Laiza at the Sino-Burmese border.
The meeting, attended 324 delegates including religious leaders, Kachin culture groups, and Kachin social groups, adopted a resolution to transform to the KIO into a Kachin Regional Guard Force (KRGF) to be maintained and administered by the KIO instead of the BGF.
On September, the MAS Chief Lt. Gen. Ye Myint told the KIO in a meeting to take a final decision on the BGF issue by October.
Later, six top rank KIO leaders including Vice-Chairman Dr. Tu Ja resigned from their posts and formed the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP) to contest the 2010 general election.
by Phanida
Wednesday, 30 September 2009 21:24
Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), an ethnic armed group in Northern Burma, have proposed the junta to cooperate with some of its departments.
Representatives of the KIO put up their proposal during a meeting with Commander of the junta’s Northern Command Maj-Gen. Soe Win on Tuesday, where they also discussed on the junta’s proposal to transform the Kachin independence Army (KIA), armed wing of KIO, into the Border Guard Force (BGF).
“Soe Win just wanted us to accept their proposal. We told them we would transform some of our departments, which can work in tandem with the junta’s departments. It is in the discussion stage,” a KIO official, who attended the meeting, told Mizzima.
“Our agriculture, forest conservation, education and health departments will cooperate with them. We will build school buildings along with them. We have communicated this,” the official added.
Led by Vice-Chairman Gauri Zau Sai the KIO delegation to the meeting included at least 10 departmental heads such as the agriculture, health, education, forest conservation, regional developments.
The junta’s delegation was led by the Regional Commander Maj. Gen. Soe Win and Col. Thet Pone from Military Affairs Security (MAS) along with others.
During the meeting, the junta’s commander, however, made no response to the KIO’s proposal of allowing some of its departments to cooperate with the Burmese army. The meeting ended with both sides agreeing to meet again in a few days.
In late April, the Burmese junta proposed all ceasefire armed groups to transform their armed wings into the Border Guard Force. Following the proposal, KIO leaders and military commanders met at least eight times and discuss over the proposal.
Despite of the much pressures by the junta, the KIO convened a mass meeting on September 5, at a KIO controlled town of Laiza at the Sino-Burmese border.
The meeting, attended 324 delegates including religious leaders, Kachin culture groups, and Kachin social groups, adopted a resolution to transform to the KIO into a Kachin Regional Guard Force (KRGF) to be maintained and administered by the KIO instead of the BGF.
On September, the MAS Chief Lt. Gen. Ye Myint told the KIO in a meeting to take a final decision on the BGF issue by October.
Later, six top rank KIO leaders including Vice-Chairman Dr. Tu Ja resigned from their posts and formed the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP) to contest the 2010 general election.
***************************************************************
The Irrawaddy - China’s Dilemma: Junta Oil and Wa Refugees?
By SAW YAN NAING, Wednesday, September 30, 2009
As the October deadline nears for ethnic cease-fire groups to capitulate to the Burmese regime’s demands to join its border guard force, it appears unavoidable that, sooner or later, major fighting will break out between government forces and the Wa army.
About 50 government battalions have been deployed around the regions where units of the United Wa State Army (UWSA)—the strongest ethnic cease-fire army with an estimated 20 to 25,000 troops—are based in southern Shan State, according to Shan and Kachin leaders.
Burma analysts say military preparations for the inevitable showdown have been ongoing since the regime’s troops seized the Kokang capital, Laogai, on August 24.
The government seizure of Laogai is considered a strong military location. Analysts say that it strategically cuts off the route for communications and transportation of troops and supplies between the UWSA units in southern Shan State and their headquarters in Panghsang in northern Shan State.
Apart from a direct military offensive against the cease-fire groups—in particular the UWSA and the Mongla-based National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)—the Burmese generals will typically employ their tried and tested policy of “divide and rule”—a successful tactic in the recent offensive against the Kokang when they seized upon rumors of a split in the Kokang ranks and ousted leader Peng Jiasheng.
Another policy the junta can be relied on to use is discrediting their enemies through national media, mostly by broadcasting accusations of drug trafficking against them.
After the fall of Laogai, the government media reported drug seizures which they linked to the cease-fire groups, particularly the UWSA, whose name has become synonymous with drug trafficking in Burma, despite the close drug-related relationship the Wa enjoyed with the military government just a few years ago.
Htay Aung, a Burmese researcher with the exiled Network for Democracy and Development, said that “double pressure” will apply on the cease-fire groups after the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on Oct 1.
Beijing would not want a refugee crisis on its borders during its celebrations and has undoubtedly warned Naypyidaw to refrain from causing bloodshed until after the party.
Thailand-based observers, such as Htay Aung, say that—provided they are given the green light by China—the Burmese generals have given themselves little option but to launch military operations against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the UWSA and the NDAA.
The next question is: what will Beijing do if and when war breaks out along its southwestern border?
Burmese dissidents and the exiled media have stated that the Chinese government has dual interests—its trade and gas pipelines with the Burmese junta, and its arms sales and blood ties with the Wa and other border-based groups.
David Mathieson, a Burma analyst with Human Rights Watch, said that it is very clear that China is unhappy with the prospect of an armed conflict on its border and certainly does not want an influx of refugees. (In August, 37,000 Kokang and Chinese refugees fled across the border to China after the Burmese army seized Laogai.)
China will be putting pressure on the Kachin, the Wa and the Burmese regime to avoid conflict, said Mathieson.
Thakin Chan Tun, a former Burmese ambassador to China, said, “If China backs only the Wa, this will damage its image [given the Wa reputation as drug traffickers].
“It also has to consider the relationship between Burma and India. If Burma turns its attention fully to India, China will lose out,” he said.
As well as having India to turn to, the Burmese regime has also opened up recently to the US.
Saeng Juen, an editor with the Thailand-based Shan Herald Agency for News, said, “To be able to play with the Chinese government over the cease-fire issue, the junta is now renewing its relationship with the US.”
Meanwhile, according to Reuters news agency, the Burmese ambassador to China, Thein Lwin, said on Wednesday that peace has now “more or less returned” to the Kokang region.
However, Chinese authorities have been building three camps as temporary shelters in Yunnan Province opposite Panghsang in anticipation of an incursion of refugees.
Burmese dissidents have said that China will be deeply torn if fighting breaks out along its border between its ethnic blood brothers and the Burmese government.
However, it would be prudent of Beijing to shelter the ethnic refugees and offer lip-service criticism of the junta while maintaining its diplomatic relationship with Naypyidaw and the security of its pipelines.
According to Thakin Chan Tun, Beijing may be finally realizing its role in Burma: working with refugees and ignoring the Burmese regime’s human rights abuses, and in return securing its long-term national interests in Burma.
By SAW YAN NAING, Wednesday, September 30, 2009
As the October deadline nears for ethnic cease-fire groups to capitulate to the Burmese regime’s demands to join its border guard force, it appears unavoidable that, sooner or later, major fighting will break out between government forces and the Wa army.
About 50 government battalions have been deployed around the regions where units of the United Wa State Army (UWSA)—the strongest ethnic cease-fire army with an estimated 20 to 25,000 troops—are based in southern Shan State, according to Shan and Kachin leaders.
Burma analysts say military preparations for the inevitable showdown have been ongoing since the regime’s troops seized the Kokang capital, Laogai, on August 24.
The government seizure of Laogai is considered a strong military location. Analysts say that it strategically cuts off the route for communications and transportation of troops and supplies between the UWSA units in southern Shan State and their headquarters in Panghsang in northern Shan State.
Apart from a direct military offensive against the cease-fire groups—in particular the UWSA and the Mongla-based National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)—the Burmese generals will typically employ their tried and tested policy of “divide and rule”—a successful tactic in the recent offensive against the Kokang when they seized upon rumors of a split in the Kokang ranks and ousted leader Peng Jiasheng.
Another policy the junta can be relied on to use is discrediting their enemies through national media, mostly by broadcasting accusations of drug trafficking against them.
After the fall of Laogai, the government media reported drug seizures which they linked to the cease-fire groups, particularly the UWSA, whose name has become synonymous with drug trafficking in Burma, despite the close drug-related relationship the Wa enjoyed with the military government just a few years ago.
Htay Aung, a Burmese researcher with the exiled Network for Democracy and Development, said that “double pressure” will apply on the cease-fire groups after the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on Oct 1.
Beijing would not want a refugee crisis on its borders during its celebrations and has undoubtedly warned Naypyidaw to refrain from causing bloodshed until after the party.
Thailand-based observers, such as Htay Aung, say that—provided they are given the green light by China—the Burmese generals have given themselves little option but to launch military operations against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the UWSA and the NDAA.
The next question is: what will Beijing do if and when war breaks out along its southwestern border?
Burmese dissidents and the exiled media have stated that the Chinese government has dual interests—its trade and gas pipelines with the Burmese junta, and its arms sales and blood ties with the Wa and other border-based groups.
David Mathieson, a Burma analyst with Human Rights Watch, said that it is very clear that China is unhappy with the prospect of an armed conflict on its border and certainly does not want an influx of refugees. (In August, 37,000 Kokang and Chinese refugees fled across the border to China after the Burmese army seized Laogai.)
China will be putting pressure on the Kachin, the Wa and the Burmese regime to avoid conflict, said Mathieson.
Thakin Chan Tun, a former Burmese ambassador to China, said, “If China backs only the Wa, this will damage its image [given the Wa reputation as drug traffickers].
“It also has to consider the relationship between Burma and India. If Burma turns its attention fully to India, China will lose out,” he said.
As well as having India to turn to, the Burmese regime has also opened up recently to the US.
Saeng Juen, an editor with the Thailand-based Shan Herald Agency for News, said, “To be able to play with the Chinese government over the cease-fire issue, the junta is now renewing its relationship with the US.”
Meanwhile, according to Reuters news agency, the Burmese ambassador to China, Thein Lwin, said on Wednesday that peace has now “more or less returned” to the Kokang region.
However, Chinese authorities have been building three camps as temporary shelters in Yunnan Province opposite Panghsang in anticipation of an incursion of refugees.
Burmese dissidents have said that China will be deeply torn if fighting breaks out along its border between its ethnic blood brothers and the Burmese government.
However, it would be prudent of Beijing to shelter the ethnic refugees and offer lip-service criticism of the junta while maintaining its diplomatic relationship with Naypyidaw and the security of its pipelines.
According to Thakin Chan Tun, Beijing may be finally realizing its role in Burma: working with refugees and ignoring the Burmese regime’s human rights abuses, and in return securing its long-term national interests in Burma.
***************************************************************
US senator against lifting Burma sanctions
Sept 30, 2009 (DVB)–The United States should wait for major concessions from Burma’s ruling junta before considering whether to lift sanctions on the country, a top US senator said yesterday.
The “release of all political prisoners…and the conduct of free and fair elections in 2010” are the key factors that the Washington must demand, said US senate republican leader Mitch McConnell.
"[These] remain two significant tests of whether or not Burma's relationship with the United States has improved to the degree that we should even consider moving away from a policy of sanctions,” he said.
“The United States must also insist that Burma comply with its international obligations and end any prohibited military or proliferation related cooperation with North Korea."
The remarks coincided with a meeting between top US diplomats, headed by secretary of state for Asia, Kurt Campbell, and senior members of the Burmese government in New York yesterday.
Campbell, who said last week that the US was taking a “measured approach” to the 2010 elections, met with Burmese minister for science and technology, U Thaung.
The Burmese delegation arrived in New York last week for the United Nations General Assembly, the first such visit to the US in 14 years.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s announcement last week that the US will maintain sanctions but look also to engage directly with the ruling junta, following years of a failed isolationist policy on Burma, has drawn controversy.
The pro-sanctions lobby has said that the move is akin to rewarding the junta despite gaining no concessions, while those who favour greater engagement point to the apparent lack of results from past US policy.
In recent months the US has expressed concern about Burma’s nuclear ambitions, following an apparent warming of relations between the generals and North Korea.
Burma’s prime minister, Thein Sein, told the General Assembly on Monday that “it is our hope that all nations of the world will continue to work together to eliminate nuclear weapons” and that Burma “supports the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones”.
Reporting by Francis Wade
Sept 30, 2009 (DVB)–The United States should wait for major concessions from Burma’s ruling junta before considering whether to lift sanctions on the country, a top US senator said yesterday.
The “release of all political prisoners…and the conduct of free and fair elections in 2010” are the key factors that the Washington must demand, said US senate republican leader Mitch McConnell.
"[These] remain two significant tests of whether or not Burma's relationship with the United States has improved to the degree that we should even consider moving away from a policy of sanctions,” he said.
“The United States must also insist that Burma comply with its international obligations and end any prohibited military or proliferation related cooperation with North Korea."
The remarks coincided with a meeting between top US diplomats, headed by secretary of state for Asia, Kurt Campbell, and senior members of the Burmese government in New York yesterday.
Campbell, who said last week that the US was taking a “measured approach” to the 2010 elections, met with Burmese minister for science and technology, U Thaung.
The Burmese delegation arrived in New York last week for the United Nations General Assembly, the first such visit to the US in 14 years.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s announcement last week that the US will maintain sanctions but look also to engage directly with the ruling junta, following years of a failed isolationist policy on Burma, has drawn controversy.
The pro-sanctions lobby has said that the move is akin to rewarding the junta despite gaining no concessions, while those who favour greater engagement point to the apparent lack of results from past US policy.
In recent months the US has expressed concern about Burma’s nuclear ambitions, following an apparent warming of relations between the generals and North Korea.
Burma’s prime minister, Thein Sein, told the General Assembly on Monday that “it is our hope that all nations of the world will continue to work together to eliminate nuclear weapons” and that Burma “supports the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones”.
Reporting by Francis Wade
***************************************************************
Burma immune to ‘soft’ US approachSept 30, 2009 (DVB)–Burma’s ruling junta may be immune to the ‘soft’ approach of engagement announced by the United States last week, according to a senior Burmese opposition party member.
The new US approach mirrors policy advocated by Burma’s regional neighbours, according to National League for Democracy (NLD) party member, Win Tin.
“I don’t think [Burma’s] situation could be handled by this soft diplomacy method,” he said.
“As we have experienced before, the junta plays games, makes lies, breaks promises and then says whatever it wants to say through state-run newspapers.”
US secretary of state Hillary Clinton announced last week that Washington will look to engage directly with the Burmese government, whilst maintaining sanctions, after years of a failed isolationist policy.
Win Tin said however that the US was “stepping onto the same path” as members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc, who have shunned sanctions in favour of engagement.
“What has ASEAN managed to achieve?” he said. “There is nothing to show that the engagement trend initiated by the [former Singaporean prime minister] Lee Kuan Yew found success.”
The spokesperson for the NLD, Nyan Win, said that any engagement with Burma must include opposition groups in the country.
“The interaction must be started locally,” he said. “Internal relations also play an important role.
“International engagement without engagement within the country would not be very effective.”
UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon came under fire during a trip to Burma in July after only being allowed to meet with the NLD for two minutes, despite holding a number of meetings with government officials.
Win Tin said that the US must fall into the same trap where every aspect of engagement is dictated by the government.
No comments:
Post a Comment