Myanmar's Suu Kyi meets junta liaison: official
Fri Jan 15, 9:33 am ET
YANGON (AFP) – Myanmar's detained pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi met the ruling junta's liaison officer Friday, officials and her party said, in the latest sign of dialogue between the two sides.
A Myanmar official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said labour minister Aung Kyi, the government's liaison with Suu Kyi, met her for 30 minutes at a state-run guesthouse in Yangon. He gave no details of their discussions.
It is the fourth meeting between the pair since the beginning of October and comes after the country's supreme court agreed last month to hear a final appeal against her house arrest.
"We do not know details about the meeting but we expect future talks. There are several things to discuss," said Khin Maung Swe, a spokesman for Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD).
He said the NLD hoped the junta would allow members of the party's central executive committee to meet Suu Kyi at a later date.
Nobel laureate Suu Kyi, 64, was ordered to spend another 18 months in detention in August after being convicted over an incident in which an American man swam to her house. A lower court rejected an initial appeal in October.
Myanmar's military rulers have kept Suu Kyi in detention for 14 of the last 20 years, having refused to recognise her political party's landslide victory in the country's last democratic elections in 1990.
The extension of her house arrest after a trial at Yangon's notorious Insein Prison sparked international outrage as it effectively keeps her off the stage at elections promised by the regime some time in 2010.
Friday's meeting was a further sign of shifting relations between Suu Kyi and the junta since she wrote in September to the military head, Senior General Than Shwe, offering to cooperate in getting Western sanctions lifted.
She wrote a second time in November, requesting a meeting with Than Shwe.
State media reported in December that she had been "insincere" and "dishonest" in sending the letters, accusing her of leaking them to foreign media and of a "highly questionable" change of tack after years of favouring sanctions.
Fri Jan 15, 9:33 am ET
YANGON (AFP) – Myanmar's detained pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi met the ruling junta's liaison officer Friday, officials and her party said, in the latest sign of dialogue between the two sides.
A Myanmar official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said labour minister Aung Kyi, the government's liaison with Suu Kyi, met her for 30 minutes at a state-run guesthouse in Yangon. He gave no details of their discussions.
It is the fourth meeting between the pair since the beginning of October and comes after the country's supreme court agreed last month to hear a final appeal against her house arrest.
"We do not know details about the meeting but we expect future talks. There are several things to discuss," said Khin Maung Swe, a spokesman for Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD).
He said the NLD hoped the junta would allow members of the party's central executive committee to meet Suu Kyi at a later date.
Nobel laureate Suu Kyi, 64, was ordered to spend another 18 months in detention in August after being convicted over an incident in which an American man swam to her house. A lower court rejected an initial appeal in October.
Myanmar's military rulers have kept Suu Kyi in detention for 14 of the last 20 years, having refused to recognise her political party's landslide victory in the country's last democratic elections in 1990.
The extension of her house arrest after a trial at Yangon's notorious Insein Prison sparked international outrage as it effectively keeps her off the stage at elections promised by the regime some time in 2010.
Friday's meeting was a further sign of shifting relations between Suu Kyi and the junta since she wrote in September to the military head, Senior General Than Shwe, offering to cooperate in getting Western sanctions lifted.
She wrote a second time in November, requesting a meeting with Than Shwe.
State media reported in December that she had been "insincere" and "dishonest" in sending the letters, accusing her of leaking them to foreign media and of a "highly questionable" change of tack after years of favouring sanctions.
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Myanmar democracy leader Suu Kyi meets official
Fri Jan 15, 6:51 am ET
YANGON, Myanmar (AP) – Detained Myanmar pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi on Friday held her first meeting this year with the Cabinet official responsible for contact with her, as her party makes preparations for possible participation in elections.
Officials said Suu Kyi was taken from her home to meet for about 20 minutes with Relations Minister Aung Kyi. The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to release information, did not know the contents of their talk.
Myanmar's military government has set elections, the first since 1990, for an unspecified date this year. Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy party, which has not yet declared whether it will take part, this week expanded its central executive committee by nine members to 20.
Last year, party colleagues agreed to Suu Kyi's suggestion that the committee be reorganized. Most of its members are elderly.
Suu Kyi's last meeting with Aung Kyi was on Dec. 9, when he informed her that her request to be allowed to meet with the party elders was granted. She met them on Dec. 16.
Suu Kyi has also requested a meeting with junta chief Senior Gen. Than Shwe to explain how she would cooperate in tasks "beneficial to the country," but is not yet known to have received any response.
The constitution adopted in 2008 that set up this year's polls was considered undemocratic by her party. It has clauses that would ensure that the military remains the controlling power in government, and would bar Suu Kyi from holding office.
Politics in Myanmar have been deadlocked since Suu Kyi's party overwhelmingly won the 1990 elections. The military refused to allow it to take power and clamped down on the pro-democracy movement, causing the United States and another Western nations to impose economic and political sanctions in an attempt to isolate the junta.
However, the Obama administration has said the sanctions failed to foster reforms and is seeking to engage the junta through high-level talks.
Fri Jan 15, 6:51 am ET
YANGON, Myanmar (AP) – Detained Myanmar pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi on Friday held her first meeting this year with the Cabinet official responsible for contact with her, as her party makes preparations for possible participation in elections.
Officials said Suu Kyi was taken from her home to meet for about 20 minutes with Relations Minister Aung Kyi. The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to release information, did not know the contents of their talk.
Myanmar's military government has set elections, the first since 1990, for an unspecified date this year. Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy party, which has not yet declared whether it will take part, this week expanded its central executive committee by nine members to 20.
Last year, party colleagues agreed to Suu Kyi's suggestion that the committee be reorganized. Most of its members are elderly.
Suu Kyi's last meeting with Aung Kyi was on Dec. 9, when he informed her that her request to be allowed to meet with the party elders was granted. She met them on Dec. 16.
Suu Kyi has also requested a meeting with junta chief Senior Gen. Than Shwe to explain how she would cooperate in tasks "beneficial to the country," but is not yet known to have received any response.
The constitution adopted in 2008 that set up this year's polls was considered undemocratic by her party. It has clauses that would ensure that the military remains the controlling power in government, and would bar Suu Kyi from holding office.
Politics in Myanmar have been deadlocked since Suu Kyi's party overwhelmingly won the 1990 elections. The military refused to allow it to take power and clamped down on the pro-democracy movement, causing the United States and another Western nations to impose economic and political sanctions in an attempt to isolate the junta.
However, the Obama administration has said the sanctions failed to foster reforms and is seeking to engage the junta through high-level talks.
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Thousands view solar eclipse in Africa and Asia
By RAFIQ MAQBOOL, Associated Press Writer – 1 hr 48 mins ago
DHANUSHKODI, India (AP) – Thousands of people in Africa and Asia viewed an eclipse Friday as the moon crossed the sun's path blocking everything but a narrow, blazing rim of light.
The path of the eclipse began in Africa — passing through Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Kenya and Somalia before crossing the Indian Ocean, where it reached its peak, according to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Web site.
The path then continued into Asia where the eclipse could be seen in Maldives, southern India, parts of Sri Lanka, Myanmar and China.
Clouds obscured the partial solar eclipse in the Kenyan capital Nairobi, disappointing residents who were up early to catch a glimpse.
"I woke up very early because I wanted to see the eclipse, but I have only been able to catch just a few seconds of it because the clouds kept blocking the view. If I weren't more observant, I would've missed it," said Monica Kamau.
The eclipse is known as an annular eclipse because the moon doesn't block the sun completely.
Annular eclipses, which are considered far less important to astronomers than total eclipses of the sun, occur about 66 times a century and can only be viewed by people in the narrow band along its path.
In Uganda, locals refer to an eclipse as a war between the sun and moon.
"It is rare to see such an eclipse. I am excited to be seeing this one. It shows how powerful God is," said Damalie Nakaja, a shopkeeper in Kampala.
Friday's eclipse was visible from a 190-mile (300-kilometer) -wide path that passes through half the globe, according to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Web site.
Hundreds gathered to view the phenomenon in southern India's Dhanushkodi, a tiny town at the tip of a rocky strip of land jutting out into the ocean, where the eclipse could be seen for about 10 minutes.
In the southern Indian city of Bangalore, hundreds went to a planetarium to see it.
"This is my first time viewing an eclipse through a pinhole camera at a planetarium and I'm very excited," said 12-year-old Aniruddh Kaushik.
But others in India were gripped by fear and refused to come outdoors. Hindu mythology states an eclipse is caused when a dragon-demon swallows the sun, while another myth says the sun's rays during an eclipse can harm unborn children.
In northern India's Haridwar town, hosting the Kumbh Mela — touted as the world's largest religious gathering — thousands of devout Hindus were expected to mark the eclipse by taking a dip in the frigid waters of the sacred Ganges river.
The eclipse could also be viewed in Indian capital New Delhi and Mumbai, the financial hub.
In Male, capital of Maldives, hundreds of people watched the eclipse with special glasses in an open field as it reached its peak.
The last total eclipse of the sun was on July 22, 2009, when it was visible in India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, China and some Japanese islands.
By RAFIQ MAQBOOL, Associated Press Writer – 1 hr 48 mins ago
DHANUSHKODI, India (AP) – Thousands of people in Africa and Asia viewed an eclipse Friday as the moon crossed the sun's path blocking everything but a narrow, blazing rim of light.
The path of the eclipse began in Africa — passing through Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Kenya and Somalia before crossing the Indian Ocean, where it reached its peak, according to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Web site.
The path then continued into Asia where the eclipse could be seen in Maldives, southern India, parts of Sri Lanka, Myanmar and China.
Clouds obscured the partial solar eclipse in the Kenyan capital Nairobi, disappointing residents who were up early to catch a glimpse.
"I woke up very early because I wanted to see the eclipse, but I have only been able to catch just a few seconds of it because the clouds kept blocking the view. If I weren't more observant, I would've missed it," said Monica Kamau.
The eclipse is known as an annular eclipse because the moon doesn't block the sun completely.
Annular eclipses, which are considered far less important to astronomers than total eclipses of the sun, occur about 66 times a century and can only be viewed by people in the narrow band along its path.
In Uganda, locals refer to an eclipse as a war between the sun and moon.
"It is rare to see such an eclipse. I am excited to be seeing this one. It shows how powerful God is," said Damalie Nakaja, a shopkeeper in Kampala.
Friday's eclipse was visible from a 190-mile (300-kilometer) -wide path that passes through half the globe, according to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Web site.
Hundreds gathered to view the phenomenon in southern India's Dhanushkodi, a tiny town at the tip of a rocky strip of land jutting out into the ocean, where the eclipse could be seen for about 10 minutes.
In the southern Indian city of Bangalore, hundreds went to a planetarium to see it.
"This is my first time viewing an eclipse through a pinhole camera at a planetarium and I'm very excited," said 12-year-old Aniruddh Kaushik.
But others in India were gripped by fear and refused to come outdoors. Hindu mythology states an eclipse is caused when a dragon-demon swallows the sun, while another myth says the sun's rays during an eclipse can harm unborn children.
In northern India's Haridwar town, hosting the Kumbh Mela — touted as the world's largest religious gathering — thousands of devout Hindus were expected to mark the eclipse by taking a dip in the frigid waters of the sacred Ganges river.
The eclipse could also be viewed in Indian capital New Delhi and Mumbai, the financial hub.
In Male, capital of Maldives, hundreds of people watched the eclipse with special glasses in an open field as it reached its peak.
The last total eclipse of the sun was on July 22, 2009, when it was visible in India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, China and some Japanese islands.
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Ageing Myanmar opposition gets "middle-aged" boost
Fri Jan 15, 3:54 am ET
YANGON (Reuters) – Myanmar's main opposition party has injected some youth into its aging leadership, although the new recruits are all in their 60s and the ailing 92-year-old chairman keeps the top job.
The National League for Democracy (NLD) of detained Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi said nine "middle-aged" party officials were joining its executive committee, whose 11 existing members have an average age of nearly 82.
"We have added nine middle-aged party officials to fulfill the desire of the party's youth members and help reinforce the committee," senior NLD member Khin Maung Swe told Reuters.
Much of the NLD's leadership is frail and in poor health. Chairman Aung Shwe has been housebound for over a year due to illness.
Some of the older members are against the NLD running in this year's elections, the first in two decades, because they believe the constitution gives too much power to the military, which has ruled for almost five decades.
A former top NLD official said it was unlikely the new members, all former political prisoners, would have any impact on party policy in the short term.
"The only change we can expect is a steep drop in the average age," he said. "They have injected new blood into the leadership but the brains of the party will remain as old as before."
Fri Jan 15, 3:54 am ET
YANGON (Reuters) – Myanmar's main opposition party has injected some youth into its aging leadership, although the new recruits are all in their 60s and the ailing 92-year-old chairman keeps the top job.
The National League for Democracy (NLD) of detained Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi said nine "middle-aged" party officials were joining its executive committee, whose 11 existing members have an average age of nearly 82.
"We have added nine middle-aged party officials to fulfill the desire of the party's youth members and help reinforce the committee," senior NLD member Khin Maung Swe told Reuters.
Much of the NLD's leadership is frail and in poor health. Chairman Aung Shwe has been housebound for over a year due to illness.
Some of the older members are against the NLD running in this year's elections, the first in two decades, because they believe the constitution gives too much power to the military, which has ruled for almost five decades.
A former top NLD official said it was unlikely the new members, all former political prisoners, would have any impact on party policy in the short term.
"The only change we can expect is a steep drop in the average age," he said. "They have injected new blood into the leadership but the brains of the party will remain as old as before."
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Inner City Press - At UN, Indigenous Cite Abuse from Right and Left, Myanmar, U.S. and Ecuador
By Matthew Russell Lee
UNITED NATIONS, January 14 -- A review of indigenous people's rights at the UN on July 15 found problems with "militarism" in Myanmar and Colombia, including accusations that indigenous people in active pursuit of land rights are terrorists, and a failure to respect indigenous people's rights by governments of both the right and left.
The State of the World's Indigenous People mentions that in Myanmar, for example, indigenous people were tortured and their community ransacked. Inner City Press asked about Myanmar, and the chairperson of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Victoria Tauli-Corpus from the Philippines, bemoaned the support that Asian countries have shown toward Myanmar's military government. The new ASEAN Commission on Human Rights, she argued, would take a closer look.
The UN, it appears, is taking even less of a look at Myanmar. On July 8, Inner City Press asked the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary General to comment on a dictum by Than Shwe, Burma's strongman, that voters in the upcoming election had been make the "correct choice."
There being no answer, four days later on January 12 at the noon briefing, Inner City Press put the same question to Spokesman Martin Neskiry. He responded that the statement was old, and that the UN would have no comment. He confirmed that Myanmar is being handled, such as it is, by UN chief of staff Vijay Nambiar.
Meanwhile, Ms. Tauli-Corpus' colleague, from Peru, said that entreaties are being made about American "military bases in Colombia." Ecuador was mentioned -- a leftist government that, in the name of pursuing natural resources, has enraged indigenous groups.
Inner City Press asked Mr. Corpus about the U.S. still not signing the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. The first time, the question was not answered. On a second pass, expanding to the Copenhagen climate change talks, Ms.Corpus acknowledged that the U.S. negotiators had opposed the inclusion of pro-indigenous language, before relenting and "unbracketing" it.
Not the position one would have predicted. But, Ms. Corpus said, the struggle continues. The Permanent Forum will meeting in the UN's new "UN-KIA" building. And we'll be there.
By Matthew Russell Lee
UNITED NATIONS, January 14 -- A review of indigenous people's rights at the UN on July 15 found problems with "militarism" in Myanmar and Colombia, including accusations that indigenous people in active pursuit of land rights are terrorists, and a failure to respect indigenous people's rights by governments of both the right and left.
The State of the World's Indigenous People mentions that in Myanmar, for example, indigenous people were tortured and their community ransacked. Inner City Press asked about Myanmar, and the chairperson of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Victoria Tauli-Corpus from the Philippines, bemoaned the support that Asian countries have shown toward Myanmar's military government. The new ASEAN Commission on Human Rights, she argued, would take a closer look.
The UN, it appears, is taking even less of a look at Myanmar. On July 8, Inner City Press asked the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary General to comment on a dictum by Than Shwe, Burma's strongman, that voters in the upcoming election had been make the "correct choice."
There being no answer, four days later on January 12 at the noon briefing, Inner City Press put the same question to Spokesman Martin Neskiry. He responded that the statement was old, and that the UN would have no comment. He confirmed that Myanmar is being handled, such as it is, by UN chief of staff Vijay Nambiar.
Meanwhile, Ms. Tauli-Corpus' colleague, from Peru, said that entreaties are being made about American "military bases in Colombia." Ecuador was mentioned -- a leftist government that, in the name of pursuing natural resources, has enraged indigenous groups.
Inner City Press asked Mr. Corpus about the U.S. still not signing the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. The first time, the question was not answered. On a second pass, expanding to the Copenhagen climate change talks, Ms.Corpus acknowledged that the U.S. negotiators had opposed the inclusion of pro-indigenous language, before relenting and "unbracketing" it.
Not the position one would have predicted. But, Ms. Corpus said, the struggle continues. The Permanent Forum will meeting in the UN's new "UN-KIA" building. And we'll be there.
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Annular solar eclipse moves across Myanmar
www.chinaview.cn 2010-01-15 19:23:27
YANGON, Jan. 15 (Xinhua) -- The longest annular solar eclipse of the millennium moved across Myanmar on Friday beginning in Sittway city in the west at 01:15 p.m. (local time), according to the Meteorology and Hydrology Department.
The longest duration of the eclipse in Myanmar was 8 to 12 minutes region wise reaching its maximum with 80 percent of the sun obscurity by the moon in Nay Pyi Taw and 60 percent in Yangon at between 3:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m..
The eclipse started to move out of Yangon sky towards the northeast at 3:20 p.m..
The eclipse, which crossed Myanmar, ended at 4:45 p.m., lasting for 3:30 hours, the sources said.
The eclipse entered from Sittway, Myanmar's Rakhine state in the west, and moved towards the northeast covering Shwebo, Mandalay and Monywa in the central part, and Pyin Oo Lwin and Lashio in the east and northeast, the sources added.
In Yangon, a lot of people, young and old, wearing special sun glasses, were curious to watch the partial eclipse when it started.
Viewed from the location at the Shwedagon Pagoda in Yangon, the partially obscured sun looked blazing with strong rays spreading out from the outline of the moon.
The weather in the former capital was a little cloudy without rainfall.
Air temperature fell slightly during the eclipse with little effect on daily activities.
The millennium's longest annular solar eclipse started from central Africa and moved across the Indian Ocean, southern India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar and is moving towards China where the eclipse will end.
Astronomers in Myanmar said after witnessing the solar eclipse this year, the country will only see again such solar eclipse on July 22, 2085.
Myanmar experienced similar event on Oct. 24, 1995 with 88.33 percent seen.
www.chinaview.cn 2010-01-15 19:23:27
YANGON, Jan. 15 (Xinhua) -- The longest annular solar eclipse of the millennium moved across Myanmar on Friday beginning in Sittway city in the west at 01:15 p.m. (local time), according to the Meteorology and Hydrology Department.
The longest duration of the eclipse in Myanmar was 8 to 12 minutes region wise reaching its maximum with 80 percent of the sun obscurity by the moon in Nay Pyi Taw and 60 percent in Yangon at between 3:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m..
The eclipse started to move out of Yangon sky towards the northeast at 3:20 p.m..
The eclipse, which crossed Myanmar, ended at 4:45 p.m., lasting for 3:30 hours, the sources said.
The eclipse entered from Sittway, Myanmar's Rakhine state in the west, and moved towards the northeast covering Shwebo, Mandalay and Monywa in the central part, and Pyin Oo Lwin and Lashio in the east and northeast, the sources added.
In Yangon, a lot of people, young and old, wearing special sun glasses, were curious to watch the partial eclipse when it started.
Viewed from the location at the Shwedagon Pagoda in Yangon, the partially obscured sun looked blazing with strong rays spreading out from the outline of the moon.
The weather in the former capital was a little cloudy without rainfall.
Air temperature fell slightly during the eclipse with little effect on daily activities.
The millennium's longest annular solar eclipse started from central Africa and moved across the Indian Ocean, southern India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar and is moving towards China where the eclipse will end.
Astronomers in Myanmar said after witnessing the solar eclipse this year, the country will only see again such solar eclipse on July 22, 2085.
Myanmar experienced similar event on Oct. 24, 1995 with 88.33 percent seen.
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Jan 16, 2010
Asia Times Online - India, Bangladesh look to turn a corner
By Siddharth Srivastava
NEW DELHI - Ever since India intervened in the partition of Pakistan that led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, relations between Delhi and Dhaka have been strained, with the latter ever-suspicious of its neighboring "big brother", compounded by fears of Indian goods swamping Bangladesh's economy.
India, for its part, has been frustrated by Dhaka's penchant to "obstruct" meaningful bilateral dialogue and is concerned about Pakistan-backed terrorists and insurgents seeking shelter in Bangladesh.
India has of late conveyed to the United States that its global efforts against terror in Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot succeed unless nations such as Nepal and Bangladesh are strengthened, economically and politically. Weak governments and security structures in India's smaller neighbors provide safe havens for terrorists, given the heat of US military operations in other areas.
Some of these issues were addressed this week during the maiden visit to India of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina following her electoral victory in December 2008. She sought "a path-breaking and historic opportunity" to build a "new and forward-looking" relationship.
Bangladesh looked at India as a "natural friend", said Hasina, and asked India to "open new doors and a new era" in bilateral cooperation, even as New Delhi conferred on her the prestigious Indira Gandhi Peace Prize.
Commenting on anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh, Hasina said, "Perhaps that may remain. I cannot change that ... But common people want better lives and if results are achieved [in India-Bangladesh cooperation], these sentiments will not work."
Observers say that such statements are not mere rhetoric as the ground for positive movement in India-Bangladesh relations has never been better, given that it has traditionally been Dhaka that has been "prickly" about being associated too closely with India.
First, Hasina rides on a large parliamentary majority, which means that her government does not depend for survival on Muslim hardiners and India-baiters. Former Bangladesh prime minister Khaleda Zia and her Islamist allies governed the country from 2001 to 2006, a period during which India-Bangladesh relations were particularly bitter.
Second, militants killed Hasina's former finance minister and have tried to assassinate her; she has little sympathy for militancy. She is aware of the situation in Pakistan, where former state-backed militants orchestrated attacks in India and elsewhere, but now threaten the existence of their creators. A reflection of changed thinking is that Dhaka recently delivered Arabinda Rajkhowa, the chief of the banned rebel group, the United Liberation Front of Assam, to India. (See India buoyed by Bangladesh's 'gift' Asia Times Online, December 9, 2009.)
Third, Bangladesh has become a bigger garment exporter than India, which gives it some confidence to stand up for itself as an economy. Dhaka is also considering inviting Indian software firms to set up in Bangladesh.
New Delhi has indicated that it aims to set in motion goodwill and structures (business, transport etc) that last beyond the thinking of a political party or an individual in power.
Thus, when Hasina met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi, the expectations were high. Manmohan was full of praise, calling Hasina an "outstanding political figure of South Asia who has worked tirelessly for the restoration of democracy in Bangladesh".
The premiers then got down to business, signing five agreements, including three pacts on counter-terrorism and one on power-sharing. A combined front against terror was at the top of the agenda.
"Terrorists do not have any religion or country and are giving a bad name to Islam, which symbolizes peace," Hasina said, emphasizing that her country was committed not to allow its soil to be used for terrorist activity against India.
The three pacts on counter-terrorism, including those on mutual legal assistance, transfer of convicted prisoners, the fight against international terrorism, organized crime and illegal drug trafficking, were aimed at concerns about stopping insurgents in India's troubled northeast from spilling into Bangladesh.
Importantly, Hasina said the countries were working on an extradition treaty. Though a timeframe was not specified, officials said the modalities would be worked out "soon".
New Delhi also announced a US$1 billion line of credit for infrastructure development in Bangladesh, which is the highest grant to any one country by India. India is also committed to supply 250 megawatts of power to its neighbor from its central grid.
India also offered a reduction of items from its negative trade list; this will benefit Bangladesh. Hasina's schedule included meetings with Indian business groups looking to invest in Bangladesh. These included the Tatas, who were earlier forced to scrap steel and power projects in Bangladesh worth US$3 billion, and India's biggest private telecom operator, Bharti Airtel, which is making a foray into Bangladesh.
Bangladesh welcomed New Delhi's initiative to provide duty-free access to the Indian market for the least-developed countries in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.
Regional Implications
Apart from acting on terror, another major breakthrough could be the proposed 950-kilometer, $1 billion Myanmar-Bangladesh-India (MBI) gas pipeline.
With the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline stalled due to US-Iran geopolitical issues, India has become a supporter of the MBI so that it can access the rich hydrocarbon resources of Myanmar.
The MBI has been in limbo since a draft memorandum of understanding was signed three years ago as Dhaka linked implementing the pipeline to a reduction of its trade imbalance with India, to the establishment of a corridor for Nepalese goods to go into Bangladeshi ports, and access to hydropower from Bhutan.
This irked New Delhi as it opposes resolving bilateral issues as part of a trilateral agreement.
All the same, Hasina has now granted India access to Mongla and Chittagong ports for the movement of goods. In exchange, India expressed its intention to give access to Nepal and Bhutan to Bangladesh through its territory.
The MBI was initially mooted by a Bangladeshi private company, Mohona Holdings Limited, in 1997, a move approved by India and Myanmar. The pipeline is proposed to cut across Shwe in Arakan province in Myanmar and then go on to the Indian states of Mizoram and Tripura, and then to Kolkata in West Bengal via Bangladesh.
Frustrated with the repeated failure to get the MBI off the ground, Myanmar opted to supply gas to China, a fierce competitor for energy. China has since begun the construction of oil and gas pipelines from Myanmar.
New Delhi, however, feels there will still be plenty left over after meeting China's demand. Gas reserves of about six trillion cubic feet have been estimated in blocks A-1 and A-2 off Myanmar's Arakan coast.
In the new climate, the MBI might yet be a goer; Bangladesh has an acute gas shortage and could certainly use MBI gas, along with transit and management revenues.
Recently, Myanmar's ambassador to India, U Kyi Thein, said the project may take shape in the near future. "Something could happen in two to three years with Indian companies like GAIL, Essar Oil, ONGC and IOC exploring gas in Myanmar,'' Thein said.
Siddharth Srivastava is a New Delhi-based journalist. He can be reached at sidsri@yahoo.com.
Asia Times Online - India, Bangladesh look to turn a corner
By Siddharth Srivastava
NEW DELHI - Ever since India intervened in the partition of Pakistan that led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, relations between Delhi and Dhaka have been strained, with the latter ever-suspicious of its neighboring "big brother", compounded by fears of Indian goods swamping Bangladesh's economy.
India, for its part, has been frustrated by Dhaka's penchant to "obstruct" meaningful bilateral dialogue and is concerned about Pakistan-backed terrorists and insurgents seeking shelter in Bangladesh.
India has of late conveyed to the United States that its global efforts against terror in Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot succeed unless nations such as Nepal and Bangladesh are strengthened, economically and politically. Weak governments and security structures in India's smaller neighbors provide safe havens for terrorists, given the heat of US military operations in other areas.
Some of these issues were addressed this week during the maiden visit to India of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina following her electoral victory in December 2008. She sought "a path-breaking and historic opportunity" to build a "new and forward-looking" relationship.
Bangladesh looked at India as a "natural friend", said Hasina, and asked India to "open new doors and a new era" in bilateral cooperation, even as New Delhi conferred on her the prestigious Indira Gandhi Peace Prize.
Commenting on anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh, Hasina said, "Perhaps that may remain. I cannot change that ... But common people want better lives and if results are achieved [in India-Bangladesh cooperation], these sentiments will not work."
Observers say that such statements are not mere rhetoric as the ground for positive movement in India-Bangladesh relations has never been better, given that it has traditionally been Dhaka that has been "prickly" about being associated too closely with India.
First, Hasina rides on a large parliamentary majority, which means that her government does not depend for survival on Muslim hardiners and India-baiters. Former Bangladesh prime minister Khaleda Zia and her Islamist allies governed the country from 2001 to 2006, a period during which India-Bangladesh relations were particularly bitter.
Second, militants killed Hasina's former finance minister and have tried to assassinate her; she has little sympathy for militancy. She is aware of the situation in Pakistan, where former state-backed militants orchestrated attacks in India and elsewhere, but now threaten the existence of their creators. A reflection of changed thinking is that Dhaka recently delivered Arabinda Rajkhowa, the chief of the banned rebel group, the United Liberation Front of Assam, to India. (See India buoyed by Bangladesh's 'gift' Asia Times Online, December 9, 2009.)
Third, Bangladesh has become a bigger garment exporter than India, which gives it some confidence to stand up for itself as an economy. Dhaka is also considering inviting Indian software firms to set up in Bangladesh.
New Delhi has indicated that it aims to set in motion goodwill and structures (business, transport etc) that last beyond the thinking of a political party or an individual in power.
Thus, when Hasina met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi, the expectations were high. Manmohan was full of praise, calling Hasina an "outstanding political figure of South Asia who has worked tirelessly for the restoration of democracy in Bangladesh".
The premiers then got down to business, signing five agreements, including three pacts on counter-terrorism and one on power-sharing. A combined front against terror was at the top of the agenda.
"Terrorists do not have any religion or country and are giving a bad name to Islam, which symbolizes peace," Hasina said, emphasizing that her country was committed not to allow its soil to be used for terrorist activity against India.
The three pacts on counter-terrorism, including those on mutual legal assistance, transfer of convicted prisoners, the fight against international terrorism, organized crime and illegal drug trafficking, were aimed at concerns about stopping insurgents in India's troubled northeast from spilling into Bangladesh.
Importantly, Hasina said the countries were working on an extradition treaty. Though a timeframe was not specified, officials said the modalities would be worked out "soon".
New Delhi also announced a US$1 billion line of credit for infrastructure development in Bangladesh, which is the highest grant to any one country by India. India is also committed to supply 250 megawatts of power to its neighbor from its central grid.
India also offered a reduction of items from its negative trade list; this will benefit Bangladesh. Hasina's schedule included meetings with Indian business groups looking to invest in Bangladesh. These included the Tatas, who were earlier forced to scrap steel and power projects in Bangladesh worth US$3 billion, and India's biggest private telecom operator, Bharti Airtel, which is making a foray into Bangladesh.
Bangladesh welcomed New Delhi's initiative to provide duty-free access to the Indian market for the least-developed countries in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.
Regional Implications
Apart from acting on terror, another major breakthrough could be the proposed 950-kilometer, $1 billion Myanmar-Bangladesh-India (MBI) gas pipeline.
With the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline stalled due to US-Iran geopolitical issues, India has become a supporter of the MBI so that it can access the rich hydrocarbon resources of Myanmar.
The MBI has been in limbo since a draft memorandum of understanding was signed three years ago as Dhaka linked implementing the pipeline to a reduction of its trade imbalance with India, to the establishment of a corridor for Nepalese goods to go into Bangladeshi ports, and access to hydropower from Bhutan.
This irked New Delhi as it opposes resolving bilateral issues as part of a trilateral agreement.
All the same, Hasina has now granted India access to Mongla and Chittagong ports for the movement of goods. In exchange, India expressed its intention to give access to Nepal and Bhutan to Bangladesh through its territory.
The MBI was initially mooted by a Bangladeshi private company, Mohona Holdings Limited, in 1997, a move approved by India and Myanmar. The pipeline is proposed to cut across Shwe in Arakan province in Myanmar and then go on to the Indian states of Mizoram and Tripura, and then to Kolkata in West Bengal via Bangladesh.
Frustrated with the repeated failure to get the MBI off the ground, Myanmar opted to supply gas to China, a fierce competitor for energy. China has since begun the construction of oil and gas pipelines from Myanmar.
New Delhi, however, feels there will still be plenty left over after meeting China's demand. Gas reserves of about six trillion cubic feet have been estimated in blocks A-1 and A-2 off Myanmar's Arakan coast.
In the new climate, the MBI might yet be a goer; Bangladesh has an acute gas shortage and could certainly use MBI gas, along with transit and management revenues.
Recently, Myanmar's ambassador to India, U Kyi Thein, said the project may take shape in the near future. "Something could happen in two to three years with Indian companies like GAIL, Essar Oil, ONGC and IOC exploring gas in Myanmar,'' Thein said.
Siddharth Srivastava is a New Delhi-based journalist. He can be reached at sidsri@yahoo.com.
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Newsweek - China's love affair with rogue states.
Friends With Benefits
By Isaac Stone Fish | Newsweek Web Exclusive
Jan 14, 2010
China is sometimes cast in the West as a selfish and intransigent child. Looking out for its own interests, this line of reasoning goes, it won't push Khartoum to curb attacks in Darfur, it won't deploy carrots or sticks to bring North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks, and it won't scold the Burmese junta for crackdowns against monks. Just this week, China's foreign ministry spokeswoman reiterated her country's commitment to distancing itself from the West's attempts to thwart Iran's quest for a nuclear bomb: "We don't believe sanctions could fundamentally solve the problem." China's investments and weapon sales to Iran made this seem largely about lust for Iran’s oil. But the truth is that in Iran, as in all of those other places, China's behavior is about more than just money. It actually has a soft spot for maverick nations that buck the international system, oppress their people, and threaten regional stability. In the end, China needs rogues.
Not that long ago, China was itself a rogue. During the Mao Zedong years, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, China's seclusion rivaled North Korea's. So it naturally gravitated toward its rogue peers; they could offer each other things they couldn't get from nations that ostracized them. After working its way back into the international system in the 1980s, China suffered a setback for cracking down on pro-democracy protestors at the end of the decade. "China was isolated after 1989, and Myanmar is isolated, so that gave the countries a natural sense of intimacy," says a foreign policy analyst working in Beijing who requested anonymity because of the sensitive nature of relations between those two countries. Like Sudan today, China faced widespread opprobrium after waging war against its own people during the Cultural Revolution and for the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.
As China slowly recovered its status in the years after 1989, it gained political and economic power and leveraged them by forging relationships—often by aid or investment—all over the world. "There's a tradition in Chinese foreign policy for being a leader in the developing world," says Abe Denmark, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security. It also used that power to help other pariahs: Supporting Myanmar's military government, delaying sanctions to Iran, propping up North Korea with donations, and sending a high-ranking envoy to visit Sudan during Obama's recent visit to Beijing are all examples of China's diplomatic love notes.
Naturally, some of this is simply about minding the store: there are huge resource-extraction opportunities in these places. China imports about 15 percent of its oil from Iran and about 5 percent from Sudan. No doubt China's economic planners sleep better at night knowing that 20 percent of their petroleum is as likely to flow tomorrow as it did yesterday. Even North Korea has untapped minerals wealth worth up to $6 trillion. (South Koreans sometimes refer to North Korea as a Chinese province because of Chinese corporate designs on resources there.) Moreover, it behooves China to invest in places that the West won't, because it doesn't have to compete against bigger, richer, and more technologically sophisticated corporations practiced at the extraction of hard-to-reach resources. The diplomatic isolation of rogue states means that Chinese companies are often the biggest game in town.
Yet there's more at work here than money. Beijing has "done some good by urging Sudan to take peacekeepers," said Denmark. It has tried to set up a border economic zone with Burma, and some interpreters even think it has caused North Korea to rethink its nuclear ambitions. By leading with its own success story, China is attempting to show rogue leaders that they can liberalize their economies (which would redound further to Chinese benefit) without liberating their people. Beijing may not merit a Nobel Peace Prize, but at least it contributes to the stability of these regimes and prevents a Somalia-like descent into chaos.
In fact, that is the animating spirit of these friendships. China needs rogues because their collapse or, even worse, their democratization, frightens the government. On the stability front, a failed North Korea would send countless thousands of refugees fleeing into China. On the other hand, a reunified Korea would put a U.S. ally—and some 25,000 U.S. troops—on China's border. In Sudan, it's true that increased human-rights abuses might damage China's image. But in the opposite scenario—where Sudan becomes a tolerant and conflict-free member in good standing of the community of nations—Sudan would attract much more Western investment, bringing competition for Chinese companies.
On the democratization front, if Iranian protestors overthrow their government, it will be another reminder of the power of protest—a lesson that the government in Beijing is not eager to teach its citizens after the collapse of the USSR and color revolutions in Eastern Europe. Already, nationalist cyberactivists in China are supporting the Iranian regime. Beijing knows that, if anything happened in Iran, the greatest worry wouldn't be the spike in oil prices but the domestic instability it might face at home.
China's relationship with these countries might be hitting a rough patch. On January 11 the Archbishop of Sudan condemned China's involvement in his country: "China is looking only for minerals, they are looking for economic benefit. That is all. That is damaging the country." Iranian cyberhackers hacked into Baidu, China's largest search engine, and displayed an Iranian flag on the homepage.
Still, some bonds are unbreakable. On a recent visit to North Korea, China's defense minister, Liang Guanglie, reminisced about his time as a soldier during the Korean War, when the two impoverished Communist allies fought against the American imperialist aggressor. "No force on earth can break the unity of the armies and peoples of the two countries and it will last forever."
Friends With Benefits
By Isaac Stone Fish | Newsweek Web Exclusive
Jan 14, 2010
China is sometimes cast in the West as a selfish and intransigent child. Looking out for its own interests, this line of reasoning goes, it won't push Khartoum to curb attacks in Darfur, it won't deploy carrots or sticks to bring North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks, and it won't scold the Burmese junta for crackdowns against monks. Just this week, China's foreign ministry spokeswoman reiterated her country's commitment to distancing itself from the West's attempts to thwart Iran's quest for a nuclear bomb: "We don't believe sanctions could fundamentally solve the problem." China's investments and weapon sales to Iran made this seem largely about lust for Iran’s oil. But the truth is that in Iran, as in all of those other places, China's behavior is about more than just money. It actually has a soft spot for maverick nations that buck the international system, oppress their people, and threaten regional stability. In the end, China needs rogues.
Not that long ago, China was itself a rogue. During the Mao Zedong years, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, China's seclusion rivaled North Korea's. So it naturally gravitated toward its rogue peers; they could offer each other things they couldn't get from nations that ostracized them. After working its way back into the international system in the 1980s, China suffered a setback for cracking down on pro-democracy protestors at the end of the decade. "China was isolated after 1989, and Myanmar is isolated, so that gave the countries a natural sense of intimacy," says a foreign policy analyst working in Beijing who requested anonymity because of the sensitive nature of relations between those two countries. Like Sudan today, China faced widespread opprobrium after waging war against its own people during the Cultural Revolution and for the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.
As China slowly recovered its status in the years after 1989, it gained political and economic power and leveraged them by forging relationships—often by aid or investment—all over the world. "There's a tradition in Chinese foreign policy for being a leader in the developing world," says Abe Denmark, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security. It also used that power to help other pariahs: Supporting Myanmar's military government, delaying sanctions to Iran, propping up North Korea with donations, and sending a high-ranking envoy to visit Sudan during Obama's recent visit to Beijing are all examples of China's diplomatic love notes.
Naturally, some of this is simply about minding the store: there are huge resource-extraction opportunities in these places. China imports about 15 percent of its oil from Iran and about 5 percent from Sudan. No doubt China's economic planners sleep better at night knowing that 20 percent of their petroleum is as likely to flow tomorrow as it did yesterday. Even North Korea has untapped minerals wealth worth up to $6 trillion. (South Koreans sometimes refer to North Korea as a Chinese province because of Chinese corporate designs on resources there.) Moreover, it behooves China to invest in places that the West won't, because it doesn't have to compete against bigger, richer, and more technologically sophisticated corporations practiced at the extraction of hard-to-reach resources. The diplomatic isolation of rogue states means that Chinese companies are often the biggest game in town.
Yet there's more at work here than money. Beijing has "done some good by urging Sudan to take peacekeepers," said Denmark. It has tried to set up a border economic zone with Burma, and some interpreters even think it has caused North Korea to rethink its nuclear ambitions. By leading with its own success story, China is attempting to show rogue leaders that they can liberalize their economies (which would redound further to Chinese benefit) without liberating their people. Beijing may not merit a Nobel Peace Prize, but at least it contributes to the stability of these regimes and prevents a Somalia-like descent into chaos.
In fact, that is the animating spirit of these friendships. China needs rogues because their collapse or, even worse, their democratization, frightens the government. On the stability front, a failed North Korea would send countless thousands of refugees fleeing into China. On the other hand, a reunified Korea would put a U.S. ally—and some 25,000 U.S. troops—on China's border. In Sudan, it's true that increased human-rights abuses might damage China's image. But in the opposite scenario—where Sudan becomes a tolerant and conflict-free member in good standing of the community of nations—Sudan would attract much more Western investment, bringing competition for Chinese companies.
On the democratization front, if Iranian protestors overthrow their government, it will be another reminder of the power of protest—a lesson that the government in Beijing is not eager to teach its citizens after the collapse of the USSR and color revolutions in Eastern Europe. Already, nationalist cyberactivists in China are supporting the Iranian regime. Beijing knows that, if anything happened in Iran, the greatest worry wouldn't be the spike in oil prices but the domestic instability it might face at home.
China's relationship with these countries might be hitting a rough patch. On January 11 the Archbishop of Sudan condemned China's involvement in his country: "China is looking only for minerals, they are looking for economic benefit. That is all. That is damaging the country." Iranian cyberhackers hacked into Baidu, China's largest search engine, and displayed an Iranian flag on the homepage.
Still, some bonds are unbreakable. On a recent visit to North Korea, China's defense minister, Liang Guanglie, reminisced about his time as a soldier during the Korean War, when the two impoverished Communist allies fought against the American imperialist aggressor. "No force on earth can break the unity of the armies and peoples of the two countries and it will last forever."
***********************************************************
chinadialogue - The Mekong under threat
Milton Osborne
January 15, 2010
South-east Asia’s longest river has been transformed in the past three decades. Now, the food security of the Lower Mekong Basin hangs in the balance, writes Milton Osborne.
“In the face of the threats posed by both the Chinese dams and those proposed for the downstream stretches of the river, there is no existing body able to mandate or control what individual countries choose to do on their sections of the Mekong.”
Until the 1980s the Mekong River flowed freely for 4,900 kilometres from its 5,100-metre-high source in Tibet to the coast of Vietnam, where it finally poured into the South China Sea. The Mekong is the world’s twelfth longest river, and the eighth or tenth largest, in terms of the 475 billion cubic metres of water it discharges annually. Then and now it passes through or by China, Burma (Myanmar), Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. It is south-east Asia’s longest river, but 44% of its course is in China, a fact of capital importance for its ecology and the problems associated with its governance.
In 1980 not only were there no dams on its course, but much of the river could not be used for sizeable, long-distance navigation because of the great barrier of the Khone Falls, located just above the border between Cambodia and Laos, and the repeated rapids and obstacles that marked its course in Laos and China. Indeed, no exaggeration is involved in noting that the Mekong’s overall physical configuration in 1980 was remarkably little changed from that existing when it was explored by the French Mekong Expedition that travelled painfully up the river from Vietnam’s Mekong Delta to Jinghong in southern Yunnan in 1866 and 1867. This was the first European expedition to explore the Mekong from southern Vietnam into China and to produce an accurate map of its course to that point.
Since 2003, the most substantial changes to the Mekong’s character below China have related to navigation. Following a major program to clear obstacles from the Mekong begun early in the present decade, a regular navigation service now exists between southern Yunnan and the northern Thai river port of Chiang Saen. It is not clear whether the Chinese, who promoted the concept of these clearances and carried out the work involved, still wish to develop navigation further down the river, as was previously their plan. To date, the environmental effects of the navigation clearances have been of a limited character.
The Mekong plays a vital role in the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB): Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. (Burma is not within the basin). In all four LMB countries the Mekong is a source of irrigation. In Vietnam’s Mekong Delta the annual pattern of flood and retreat insure that this region contributes over 50% of agriculture’s contribution to the country’s GDP. For all four LMB countries the Mekong and its associated systems, particularly Cambodia’s Great Lake (Tonle Sap), are a bountiful source of fish, with the annual value of the catch conservatively valued at US$2 billion. More than 70% of the Cambodian population’s annual animal protein consumption comes from the river’s fish. Eighty per cent of the Mekong’s fish species are migratory, some travelling many hundreds of kilometres between spawning and reaching adulthood. Overall, eight out of 10 persons living in the LMB depend on the river for sustenance, either in terms of wild fish captured in the river or through both large and small-scale agriculture and horticulture.
Since the 1980s, the character of the river has been steadily transformed by China’s dam-building program in Yunnan province. The important changes that had taken place on the course of the river since 1980 and up to 2004 were outlined in the Lowy Institute Paper, River at Risk: The Mekong and the Water Politics of Southeast Asia. In 2010 three hydroelectric dams are already in operation and two more very large dams are under construction and due for completion in 2012 and 2017. Plans exist for at least two further dams, and by 2030 there could be a “cascade” of seven dams in Yunnan. Even before that date and with five dams commissioned, China will be able to regulate the flow of the river, reducing the floods of the wet season and raising the level of the river during the dry. In building its dams, China has acted without consulting its downstream neighbours. Although until now the effects of the dams so far built have been limited, this is set to change within a decade, as discussed below.
For despite the limited environmental costs of the dams China has so far completed, and of the river clearances to aid navigation, this state of affairs will change once China has five dams in operation. And the costs exacted by the Chinese dams will be magnified if the proposed mainstream dams below China are built.
Even if no dams are built on the mainstream below China, the cascade to which it is committed will ultimately have serious effects on the functioning of the Mekong once the dams are used to control the river’s flow. This will be the case because the cascade will:
* Alter the hydrology of the river and so the current “flood pulse”, the regular rise and fall of the river on an annual basis which plays an essential part in the timing of spawning and the migration pattern. This will be particularly important in relation to the Tonle Sap in Cambodia, but will have an effect throughout the river’s course;
* Block the flow of sediment down the river which plays a vital part both in depositing nutrients on the agricultural regions flooded by the river and also as a trigger for fish migration — at present well over 50% of the river’s sediment comes from China;
* At least initially cause problems by restricting the amount of flooding that takes place most importantly in Cambodia and Vietnam; and
* Lead to the erosion of river banks.
Proposed dams below China
So China’s dam-building plans are worrying enough, but the proposed new mainstream dams would pose even more serious concerns. In contrast to what has occurred in China, and until very recently, there have been no firm plans for the construction of dams on the mainstream of the Mekong below China. This situation has changed over the past three years. Memoranda of Understanding have been signed for 11 proposed dams: seven in Laos; two between Laos and Thailand; and two in Cambodia. The proposed dams are being backed by foreign private capital or Chinese state-backed firms. Government secrecy in both Cambodia and Laos means that it is difficult to judge which, if any, of these proposed dams will actually come into being. Attention and concern have focused on two sites: Don Sahong at the Khone Falls in southern Laos and Sambor in north-eastern Cambodia. The reason for this attention is that if built these dams would block the fish migrations that are essential to insure the food supplies of Laos and Cambodia.
Those built at sites higher upstream would cause the least damage to fish stocks, but if, as currently seems possible, the most likely dams to be built would be at Don Sahong and Sambor, the costs to fish stocks could be very serious. This is because unanimous expert opinion judges that there are no ways to mitigate the blocking of fish migration that would occur if these dams are constructed. None of the suggested possible forms of mitigation — fish ladders, fish lifts, and alternative fish-passages — are feasible for the species of fish in the Mekong and the very large biomass that is involved in their migratory pattern. Fish ladders were tried and failed at the Pak Mun dam on one of the Mekong’s tributaries in Thailand in the 1990s.
Why are the governments of Laos and Cambodia contemplating the construction of dams that seem certain to have a devastating effect on their populations’ food security? The answers are complex and include some of the following:
* A lack of knowledge at some levels of government;
* A readiness to disregard available information on the basis that it may be inaccurate; and
* A belief or conviction that fishing is “old-fashioned”, whereas the production of hydroelectricity is “modern”.
In Cambodia’s case, and in particular in relation to the proposed dam at Sambor, the fact that a Chinese firm is seeking to construct the dam raises the possibility that prime minister Hun Sen is unready to offend the country that has become Cambodia’s largest aid donor and Cambodia’s “most trusted friend”. In Laos, the proposal for a dam at Don Sahong is very much linked to the interests of the Siphandone family for whom southern Laos is a virtual fief. Of all the proposed dam sites, Don Sahong is the most studied in terms of knowledge of fisheries so that it can be safely said that the planned dam would wreak havoc on a migratory system that involves fish moving through the Hou Sahong channel throughout the year, movement that takes place in both directions, upstream and downstream.
In the face of the threats posed by both the Chinese dams and those proposed for the downstream stretches of the river, there is no existing body able to mandate or control what individual countries choose to do on their sections of the Mekong. The agreement establishing the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 1995 does not include China or Burma, and though the latter’s absence is not important, the fact that China is not an MRC member underlines the body’s weakness. In any event, the MRC members’ commitment to maintaining the Mekong’s sustainability has not overcome their basic commitment to national self-interest. A prime example of this is the manner in which the Lao government has proceeded in relation to the proposed Don Sahong dam. For at least two years while the dam was under consideration there was no consultation with Cambodia. Similarly, so far as can be judged, Cambodia’s consideration of a possible dam at Sambor has taken place without consultation with the governments of either Laos or Vietnam.
At the moment the best hope is that both the Cambodian and Lao governments will abandon their plans for Sambor and Don Sahong. If they do not, the future of the Mekong as a great source of food, both through fish and agriculture, is in serious jeopardy. At the time of writing the intentions of the Lao and Cambodian governments remain uncertain.
Concern about dams in China and the LMB is given added importance in the light of worries associated with the likely effects of climate change in the region through which the river flows. Research suggests there will be a series of challenges to the Mekong’s future ecological health. Until recently concerns about the likely impact of climate change tended to focus on the ongoing reduction in the size of the glaciers from which its springs in the Himalayas and which feed it as the result of snow melt. But while there is no doubt that a diminishment in size of the glaciers feeding the Mekong is taking place, recent research has suggested that a more immediate serious threat to the river’s health will come from sea-level changes, particularly as rising levels could begin to inundate large sections of Vietnam’s Mekong Delta. To what extent the threat posed by rising sea levels will be affected by another predicted development linked to climate change — greatly increased precipitation leading to more flooding during the wet season — is not yet clearly established. But research is pointing to a greatly increased precipitation that is likely to cause major increases in flooding in the future, possibly as early as 2030.
Against the pessimistic views outlined in this article perhaps the best that can be hoped for is that once serious consequences begin to become apparent advice can be offered to mitigate the worst effects of the developments taking place. Where once it was appropriate to write of risks, when assessing the Mekong’s future it is now time to write of fundamental threats to the river’s current and vital role in all of the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin.
Milton Osborne is visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute. He has been associated with the south-east Asian region since being posted to the Australian embassy in Phnom Penh in 1959. Osborne is the author of 10 books on the history and politics of south-east Asia, including The Mekong: turbulent past, uncertain future (2006) and Southeast Asia: an introductory history.
An earlier version of this article was published as "The Mekong River Under Threat," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 2-2-10, January 11, 2010. It is used here with permission.
This article draws on the author’s Lowy Institute Paper 27, 2009. See the complete paper here. To read the complete paper, it is necessary to type in the current year after entering the site.
Homepage image shows the proposed location of the Sambor Dam, Kratie province, Cambodia. Photograph by Carl Middleton, International Rivers.
Milton Osborne
January 15, 2010
South-east Asia’s longest river has been transformed in the past three decades. Now, the food security of the Lower Mekong Basin hangs in the balance, writes Milton Osborne.
“In the face of the threats posed by both the Chinese dams and those proposed for the downstream stretches of the river, there is no existing body able to mandate or control what individual countries choose to do on their sections of the Mekong.”
Until the 1980s the Mekong River flowed freely for 4,900 kilometres from its 5,100-metre-high source in Tibet to the coast of Vietnam, where it finally poured into the South China Sea. The Mekong is the world’s twelfth longest river, and the eighth or tenth largest, in terms of the 475 billion cubic metres of water it discharges annually. Then and now it passes through or by China, Burma (Myanmar), Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. It is south-east Asia’s longest river, but 44% of its course is in China, a fact of capital importance for its ecology and the problems associated with its governance.
In 1980 not only were there no dams on its course, but much of the river could not be used for sizeable, long-distance navigation because of the great barrier of the Khone Falls, located just above the border between Cambodia and Laos, and the repeated rapids and obstacles that marked its course in Laos and China. Indeed, no exaggeration is involved in noting that the Mekong’s overall physical configuration in 1980 was remarkably little changed from that existing when it was explored by the French Mekong Expedition that travelled painfully up the river from Vietnam’s Mekong Delta to Jinghong in southern Yunnan in 1866 and 1867. This was the first European expedition to explore the Mekong from southern Vietnam into China and to produce an accurate map of its course to that point.
Since 2003, the most substantial changes to the Mekong’s character below China have related to navigation. Following a major program to clear obstacles from the Mekong begun early in the present decade, a regular navigation service now exists between southern Yunnan and the northern Thai river port of Chiang Saen. It is not clear whether the Chinese, who promoted the concept of these clearances and carried out the work involved, still wish to develop navigation further down the river, as was previously their plan. To date, the environmental effects of the navigation clearances have been of a limited character.
The Mekong plays a vital role in the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB): Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. (Burma is not within the basin). In all four LMB countries the Mekong is a source of irrigation. In Vietnam’s Mekong Delta the annual pattern of flood and retreat insure that this region contributes over 50% of agriculture’s contribution to the country’s GDP. For all four LMB countries the Mekong and its associated systems, particularly Cambodia’s Great Lake (Tonle Sap), are a bountiful source of fish, with the annual value of the catch conservatively valued at US$2 billion. More than 70% of the Cambodian population’s annual animal protein consumption comes from the river’s fish. Eighty per cent of the Mekong’s fish species are migratory, some travelling many hundreds of kilometres between spawning and reaching adulthood. Overall, eight out of 10 persons living in the LMB depend on the river for sustenance, either in terms of wild fish captured in the river or through both large and small-scale agriculture and horticulture.
Since the 1980s, the character of the river has been steadily transformed by China’s dam-building program in Yunnan province. The important changes that had taken place on the course of the river since 1980 and up to 2004 were outlined in the Lowy Institute Paper, River at Risk: The Mekong and the Water Politics of Southeast Asia. In 2010 three hydroelectric dams are already in operation and two more very large dams are under construction and due for completion in 2012 and 2017. Plans exist for at least two further dams, and by 2030 there could be a “cascade” of seven dams in Yunnan. Even before that date and with five dams commissioned, China will be able to regulate the flow of the river, reducing the floods of the wet season and raising the level of the river during the dry. In building its dams, China has acted without consulting its downstream neighbours. Although until now the effects of the dams so far built have been limited, this is set to change within a decade, as discussed below.
For despite the limited environmental costs of the dams China has so far completed, and of the river clearances to aid navigation, this state of affairs will change once China has five dams in operation. And the costs exacted by the Chinese dams will be magnified if the proposed mainstream dams below China are built.
Even if no dams are built on the mainstream below China, the cascade to which it is committed will ultimately have serious effects on the functioning of the Mekong once the dams are used to control the river’s flow. This will be the case because the cascade will:
* Alter the hydrology of the river and so the current “flood pulse”, the regular rise and fall of the river on an annual basis which plays an essential part in the timing of spawning and the migration pattern. This will be particularly important in relation to the Tonle Sap in Cambodia, but will have an effect throughout the river’s course;
* Block the flow of sediment down the river which plays a vital part both in depositing nutrients on the agricultural regions flooded by the river and also as a trigger for fish migration — at present well over 50% of the river’s sediment comes from China;
* At least initially cause problems by restricting the amount of flooding that takes place most importantly in Cambodia and Vietnam; and
* Lead to the erosion of river banks.
Proposed dams below China
So China’s dam-building plans are worrying enough, but the proposed new mainstream dams would pose even more serious concerns. In contrast to what has occurred in China, and until very recently, there have been no firm plans for the construction of dams on the mainstream of the Mekong below China. This situation has changed over the past three years. Memoranda of Understanding have been signed for 11 proposed dams: seven in Laos; two between Laos and Thailand; and two in Cambodia. The proposed dams are being backed by foreign private capital or Chinese state-backed firms. Government secrecy in both Cambodia and Laos means that it is difficult to judge which, if any, of these proposed dams will actually come into being. Attention and concern have focused on two sites: Don Sahong at the Khone Falls in southern Laos and Sambor in north-eastern Cambodia. The reason for this attention is that if built these dams would block the fish migrations that are essential to insure the food supplies of Laos and Cambodia.
Those built at sites higher upstream would cause the least damage to fish stocks, but if, as currently seems possible, the most likely dams to be built would be at Don Sahong and Sambor, the costs to fish stocks could be very serious. This is because unanimous expert opinion judges that there are no ways to mitigate the blocking of fish migration that would occur if these dams are constructed. None of the suggested possible forms of mitigation — fish ladders, fish lifts, and alternative fish-passages — are feasible for the species of fish in the Mekong and the very large biomass that is involved in their migratory pattern. Fish ladders were tried and failed at the Pak Mun dam on one of the Mekong’s tributaries in Thailand in the 1990s.
Why are the governments of Laos and Cambodia contemplating the construction of dams that seem certain to have a devastating effect on their populations’ food security? The answers are complex and include some of the following:
* A lack of knowledge at some levels of government;
* A readiness to disregard available information on the basis that it may be inaccurate; and
* A belief or conviction that fishing is “old-fashioned”, whereas the production of hydroelectricity is “modern”.
In Cambodia’s case, and in particular in relation to the proposed dam at Sambor, the fact that a Chinese firm is seeking to construct the dam raises the possibility that prime minister Hun Sen is unready to offend the country that has become Cambodia’s largest aid donor and Cambodia’s “most trusted friend”. In Laos, the proposal for a dam at Don Sahong is very much linked to the interests of the Siphandone family for whom southern Laos is a virtual fief. Of all the proposed dam sites, Don Sahong is the most studied in terms of knowledge of fisheries so that it can be safely said that the planned dam would wreak havoc on a migratory system that involves fish moving through the Hou Sahong channel throughout the year, movement that takes place in both directions, upstream and downstream.
In the face of the threats posed by both the Chinese dams and those proposed for the downstream stretches of the river, there is no existing body able to mandate or control what individual countries choose to do on their sections of the Mekong. The agreement establishing the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 1995 does not include China or Burma, and though the latter’s absence is not important, the fact that China is not an MRC member underlines the body’s weakness. In any event, the MRC members’ commitment to maintaining the Mekong’s sustainability has not overcome their basic commitment to national self-interest. A prime example of this is the manner in which the Lao government has proceeded in relation to the proposed Don Sahong dam. For at least two years while the dam was under consideration there was no consultation with Cambodia. Similarly, so far as can be judged, Cambodia’s consideration of a possible dam at Sambor has taken place without consultation with the governments of either Laos or Vietnam.
At the moment the best hope is that both the Cambodian and Lao governments will abandon their plans for Sambor and Don Sahong. If they do not, the future of the Mekong as a great source of food, both through fish and agriculture, is in serious jeopardy. At the time of writing the intentions of the Lao and Cambodian governments remain uncertain.
Concern about dams in China and the LMB is given added importance in the light of worries associated with the likely effects of climate change in the region through which the river flows. Research suggests there will be a series of challenges to the Mekong’s future ecological health. Until recently concerns about the likely impact of climate change tended to focus on the ongoing reduction in the size of the glaciers from which its springs in the Himalayas and which feed it as the result of snow melt. But while there is no doubt that a diminishment in size of the glaciers feeding the Mekong is taking place, recent research has suggested that a more immediate serious threat to the river’s health will come from sea-level changes, particularly as rising levels could begin to inundate large sections of Vietnam’s Mekong Delta. To what extent the threat posed by rising sea levels will be affected by another predicted development linked to climate change — greatly increased precipitation leading to more flooding during the wet season — is not yet clearly established. But research is pointing to a greatly increased precipitation that is likely to cause major increases in flooding in the future, possibly as early as 2030.
Against the pessimistic views outlined in this article perhaps the best that can be hoped for is that once serious consequences begin to become apparent advice can be offered to mitigate the worst effects of the developments taking place. Where once it was appropriate to write of risks, when assessing the Mekong’s future it is now time to write of fundamental threats to the river’s current and vital role in all of the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin.
Milton Osborne is visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute. He has been associated with the south-east Asian region since being posted to the Australian embassy in Phnom Penh in 1959. Osborne is the author of 10 books on the history and politics of south-east Asia, including The Mekong: turbulent past, uncertain future (2006) and Southeast Asia: an introductory history.
An earlier version of this article was published as "The Mekong River Under Threat," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 2-2-10, January 11, 2010. It is used here with permission.
This article draws on the author’s Lowy Institute Paper 27, 2009. See the complete paper here. To read the complete paper, it is necessary to type in the current year after entering the site.
Homepage image shows the proposed location of the Sambor Dam, Kratie province, Cambodia. Photograph by Carl Middleton, International Rivers.
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Topanga Messenger - Naw Paw Ray, Prize-Winning Burmese Educator, Visits Topanga
By Jesse Gordon
By Jesse Gordon
Thu Jan 14, 1:19 pm ET
Naw Paw Ray, a Burmese refugee, has been living illegally in Thailand for 18 years. This year she will finally secure her Thai citizenship and can travel freely on a temporary passport. On her first trip, this November, she came to Topanga.
The path that led her here is as complicated as it is moving and involves three stories: one of a country crushed by a brutal dictatorship; another of a self-made educator who, against all odds, has touched the lives of thousands; and a third, about the global stewardship of a tiny private school nestled in the mountains of Los Angeles.
Paw Ray spent several days of her trip at MUSE Elementary. She met with parents, teachers and administrators, but seemed most at home in the classrooms where she sang songs with the children, told stories and listened. Her relaxed manner, both firm and fun-loving, totally captivated the young Californians. A tiny woman with a wide smile, Paw Ray may be a natural "kid person," but she also has a lot of practice visiting schools; when in Thailand, she visits four or five a month. The organization she founded and directs, BMWEC (Burmese Mirgrant Workers Education Committee), runs 55 schools, employs 547 teachers and has a student body of approximately 10,000 children.
At the age of 13, Paw Ray watched her village burn down. It was in the Karen province in Eastern Burma, the home of an ethnic minority frequently targeted by the military junta that rules that country (which they renamed Myanmar). When Paw Ray tells the story of her village, she focuses on one image in particular–that of her schoolhouse in flames. She and her family–like so many other "Internally Displaced" Burmese–escaped to the jungle. When she finally made it to Thailand, she was in her mid-twenties and had three children of her own. As illegal "migrants," her children could not enroll in Thai schools. Nor could the hundreds of other kids Paw Ray saw around her neighborhood, often living on the streets. "When I saw these children, they reminded me of myself at an earlier age," she says. "I was sad that they did not have any way to study. I wanted to give them an opportunity that I didn't have."
Paw Ray's first school, which she opened in 1999, was housed in a small bamboo hut and had 25 students between the ages of 3 and 12. "The school was a home and the home was a kitchen and the kitchen was a classroom," is how she describes it. She and the students rose at 5 a.m., cooked food for the day, then cleared the space and set out tables for study. At the end of the school day, they cleared the tables and put down mats to sleep on. Indeed, from the beginning, Paw Ray's schools have been about more than just education. "I saw the kids needed a busy educational life to protect themselves from drugs and human trafficking," she said. "They needed to learn and to be safe when their parents went away to work." In addition to academics, her 55 schools provide health care, security, food, and, in many cases, housing for their students.
These needs become clearer in the context of the refugee culture that exists along the Thai-Burmese border, and particularly in the city of Mae Sot, where Paw Ray lives.
Under the current Burmese regime, which has one of the worst human rights records on the planet, more than two million Burmese have been, like Paw Ray's family, "internally displaced." Since 2004, more than 3,000 villages in the Karen province alone, have been razed to the ground. If refugees are lucky enough not to be either murdered or enslaved by the military, they may be able to escape Burma's borders. In Thailand their choices are only slightly better. They may enter one of several refugee camps which, though sanctioned by the Thai government, are themselves internationally recognized as human disaster zones. Or they may fend for themselves as illegal migrants along the border. If parents are lucky enough to find employment on farms or in factories, the hours are usually brutally long; the word, "slavery," also comes up to describe these work conditions. Their children, meanwhile, are often left uncared for and vulnerable to a variety of diseases and human predators. Stories involving working in the sex industry, forced begging, drugs, abduction and kids-for-sale, are rampant.
"It's a survival situation," says Erin Terzieff, a teacher at MUSE, who has also taught in schools in both Burma and along the Thai border. "Kids are at about 60 percent normal body-weight in Mae Sot, but in the classroom you see that their minds are working exactly the same as our kids at MUSE. They are really creative, artistic, funny; they love to act and read and laugh. But outside of school you realize that life is a very precious commodity on this border. Every time I come back, kids are missing. You have to wonder where they've gone."
Terzieff, along with the MUSE's founder Suzy Amis Cameron, started the MUSE Global Program in 2007. The idea, she says, was to "Teach through a global lens and create cultural exchange on an educational level." Working as a kind of educational ambassador, she arranges interchange between the Good Morning School, one of Paw Ray's institutions in Mae Sot; Mana Tamariki, a Maori immersion school in New Zealand; and MUSE here in Topanga. As an example of the program's effects, in the wake of Paw Ray's visit, energized first- and second-graders at MUSE wrote letters to Auung San Suu Ky, the democracy leader long held under house arrest in Burma, as well as President Obama, thanking him for supporting her release (see note below). Through donations, MUSE has additionally provided the yearly operating costs of the Good Morning School for the past two years.
"This is a great thing and very lucky for the Good Morning School," Paw Ray says. Though she acknowledges the value of "learning about American culture and American discipline," and that MUSE has inspired her to "set up new programs and use new strategies," she consistently returns to the bottom line: "Without MUSE's support, maybe these children would not be in school." Speaking with her, it becomes clear that Paw Ray's stakes in her work are existentially high, both in terms of saving young lives and in terms of her homeland. "When we get freedom in Burma, we have to go back to our own land," she says. "For the next generation, the most important [thing] is to teach them Burmese language and culture. If we lose our language and our culture, we lose our nation."
Though Paw Ray's voice is soft and her English careful, one can hear her strength and deep conviction come through in her words. Indeed, as the enormous growth of her BMWEC organization proves, her brand of educational activism has come a long way in a relatively short time. It is easy to forget that, despite her warmth and humility, Paw Ray is the CEO of a very large organization and engaged in many levels of outreach and fundraising. In 2007, she was elected to the prestigious Ashoka Fellowship. In 2008, she was visited by Laura Bush, as well as a delegation of Nobel Peace Prize winners. "Many of us believe that she will win a Nobel Prize herself; or at least she deserves to," says Terzieff. Her mission is simple and clear: the more support she can attract, the more schools she can open; the more schools she can open, the more kids she can educate and protect. "It's hard to keep track of everything I'm doing now, but I know exactly that I am working for the kids, for the next generation," she affirms. "Education is the key to everything. A country, a community, grows up with the children it has educated. Without good education our countries and our communities might fail."
In her area of the world, wherever Paw Ray sees need, she opens a school. "She goes where no-one else will, often at great personal danger," asserts Terzieff. "There are no real rules. She makes things happen first, then deals with the policies and the fiscal realities later."
Meanwhile, Paw Ray still lives in the boarding house on the campus of the first school she founded (which has now been expanded to include an orphanage). "I have no home. Perhaps my home is in Heaven only," she says cheerfully. "I live with 200 kids. This is my house and my family's house. My children sleep with the boarding house children. We are all the same–the same family." According to Terzieff, in the city of Mae Sot, any child you speak with knows Paw Ray. "They call her ‘Mother,'" she says.
Even though the kids in Topanga probably don't call her "Mother," now they know her too.
On November 17, 2009, President Obama became the first US President to meet with the 10 leaders of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). During the meeting he urged Myanmar/Burma's prime minister, Thein Sein, to release Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as other political prisoners in his country. This is a very important step in the path to freedom for Myanmar/Burma. For more information on this, or to write a letter of support, visit amnestyUSE.org. For more information on MUSE Global, visit museelementary.org. For more information on Naw Paw Ray and her work, visit ashoka.org or bmwec.org.
A gallery of additional photos of Naw Paw Ray's visit to Topanga are available at :http://gallery.me.com/jessegordon#100390.
Naw Paw Ray, a Burmese refugee, has been living illegally in Thailand for 18 years. This year she will finally secure her Thai citizenship and can travel freely on a temporary passport. On her first trip, this November, she came to Topanga.
The path that led her here is as complicated as it is moving and involves three stories: one of a country crushed by a brutal dictatorship; another of a self-made educator who, against all odds, has touched the lives of thousands; and a third, about the global stewardship of a tiny private school nestled in the mountains of Los Angeles.
Paw Ray spent several days of her trip at MUSE Elementary. She met with parents, teachers and administrators, but seemed most at home in the classrooms where she sang songs with the children, told stories and listened. Her relaxed manner, both firm and fun-loving, totally captivated the young Californians. A tiny woman with a wide smile, Paw Ray may be a natural "kid person," but she also has a lot of practice visiting schools; when in Thailand, she visits four or five a month. The organization she founded and directs, BMWEC (Burmese Mirgrant Workers Education Committee), runs 55 schools, employs 547 teachers and has a student body of approximately 10,000 children.
At the age of 13, Paw Ray watched her village burn down. It was in the Karen province in Eastern Burma, the home of an ethnic minority frequently targeted by the military junta that rules that country (which they renamed Myanmar). When Paw Ray tells the story of her village, she focuses on one image in particular–that of her schoolhouse in flames. She and her family–like so many other "Internally Displaced" Burmese–escaped to the jungle. When she finally made it to Thailand, she was in her mid-twenties and had three children of her own. As illegal "migrants," her children could not enroll in Thai schools. Nor could the hundreds of other kids Paw Ray saw around her neighborhood, often living on the streets. "When I saw these children, they reminded me of myself at an earlier age," she says. "I was sad that they did not have any way to study. I wanted to give them an opportunity that I didn't have."
Paw Ray's first school, which she opened in 1999, was housed in a small bamboo hut and had 25 students between the ages of 3 and 12. "The school was a home and the home was a kitchen and the kitchen was a classroom," is how she describes it. She and the students rose at 5 a.m., cooked food for the day, then cleared the space and set out tables for study. At the end of the school day, they cleared the tables and put down mats to sleep on. Indeed, from the beginning, Paw Ray's schools have been about more than just education. "I saw the kids needed a busy educational life to protect themselves from drugs and human trafficking," she said. "They needed to learn and to be safe when their parents went away to work." In addition to academics, her 55 schools provide health care, security, food, and, in many cases, housing for their students.
These needs become clearer in the context of the refugee culture that exists along the Thai-Burmese border, and particularly in the city of Mae Sot, where Paw Ray lives.
Under the current Burmese regime, which has one of the worst human rights records on the planet, more than two million Burmese have been, like Paw Ray's family, "internally displaced." Since 2004, more than 3,000 villages in the Karen province alone, have been razed to the ground. If refugees are lucky enough not to be either murdered or enslaved by the military, they may be able to escape Burma's borders. In Thailand their choices are only slightly better. They may enter one of several refugee camps which, though sanctioned by the Thai government, are themselves internationally recognized as human disaster zones. Or they may fend for themselves as illegal migrants along the border. If parents are lucky enough to find employment on farms or in factories, the hours are usually brutally long; the word, "slavery," also comes up to describe these work conditions. Their children, meanwhile, are often left uncared for and vulnerable to a variety of diseases and human predators. Stories involving working in the sex industry, forced begging, drugs, abduction and kids-for-sale, are rampant.
"It's a survival situation," says Erin Terzieff, a teacher at MUSE, who has also taught in schools in both Burma and along the Thai border. "Kids are at about 60 percent normal body-weight in Mae Sot, but in the classroom you see that their minds are working exactly the same as our kids at MUSE. They are really creative, artistic, funny; they love to act and read and laugh. But outside of school you realize that life is a very precious commodity on this border. Every time I come back, kids are missing. You have to wonder where they've gone."
Terzieff, along with the MUSE's founder Suzy Amis Cameron, started the MUSE Global Program in 2007. The idea, she says, was to "Teach through a global lens and create cultural exchange on an educational level." Working as a kind of educational ambassador, she arranges interchange between the Good Morning School, one of Paw Ray's institutions in Mae Sot; Mana Tamariki, a Maori immersion school in New Zealand; and MUSE here in Topanga. As an example of the program's effects, in the wake of Paw Ray's visit, energized first- and second-graders at MUSE wrote letters to Auung San Suu Ky, the democracy leader long held under house arrest in Burma, as well as President Obama, thanking him for supporting her release (see note below). Through donations, MUSE has additionally provided the yearly operating costs of the Good Morning School for the past two years.
"This is a great thing and very lucky for the Good Morning School," Paw Ray says. Though she acknowledges the value of "learning about American culture and American discipline," and that MUSE has inspired her to "set up new programs and use new strategies," she consistently returns to the bottom line: "Without MUSE's support, maybe these children would not be in school." Speaking with her, it becomes clear that Paw Ray's stakes in her work are existentially high, both in terms of saving young lives and in terms of her homeland. "When we get freedom in Burma, we have to go back to our own land," she says. "For the next generation, the most important [thing] is to teach them Burmese language and culture. If we lose our language and our culture, we lose our nation."
Though Paw Ray's voice is soft and her English careful, one can hear her strength and deep conviction come through in her words. Indeed, as the enormous growth of her BMWEC organization proves, her brand of educational activism has come a long way in a relatively short time. It is easy to forget that, despite her warmth and humility, Paw Ray is the CEO of a very large organization and engaged in many levels of outreach and fundraising. In 2007, she was elected to the prestigious Ashoka Fellowship. In 2008, she was visited by Laura Bush, as well as a delegation of Nobel Peace Prize winners. "Many of us believe that she will win a Nobel Prize herself; or at least she deserves to," says Terzieff. Her mission is simple and clear: the more support she can attract, the more schools she can open; the more schools she can open, the more kids she can educate and protect. "It's hard to keep track of everything I'm doing now, but I know exactly that I am working for the kids, for the next generation," she affirms. "Education is the key to everything. A country, a community, grows up with the children it has educated. Without good education our countries and our communities might fail."
In her area of the world, wherever Paw Ray sees need, she opens a school. "She goes where no-one else will, often at great personal danger," asserts Terzieff. "There are no real rules. She makes things happen first, then deals with the policies and the fiscal realities later."
Meanwhile, Paw Ray still lives in the boarding house on the campus of the first school she founded (which has now been expanded to include an orphanage). "I have no home. Perhaps my home is in Heaven only," she says cheerfully. "I live with 200 kids. This is my house and my family's house. My children sleep with the boarding house children. We are all the same–the same family." According to Terzieff, in the city of Mae Sot, any child you speak with knows Paw Ray. "They call her ‘Mother,'" she says.
Even though the kids in Topanga probably don't call her "Mother," now they know her too.
On November 17, 2009, President Obama became the first US President to meet with the 10 leaders of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). During the meeting he urged Myanmar/Burma's prime minister, Thein Sein, to release Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as other political prisoners in his country. This is a very important step in the path to freedom for Myanmar/Burma. For more information on this, or to write a letter of support, visit amnestyUSE.org. For more information on MUSE Global, visit museelementary.org. For more information on Naw Paw Ray and her work, visit ashoka.org or bmwec.org.
A gallery of additional photos of Naw Paw Ray's visit to Topanga are available at :http://gallery.me.com/jessegordon#100390.
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The Irrawaddy - Orwell's Old School Sold to Burmese Tycoon
By WAI MOE - Friday, January 15, 2010
The Htoo Group of Companies owned by Tay Za, a close associate of Burmese junta leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe, has reportedly bought the police headquarters buildings in Mandalay, according to local sources.
Businessmen in Mandalay said Htoo, which is on the West's economic sanctions lists, will control one of the prime business locations in the central area of the city. There was no information about the price paid for the buildings.
The old police station is bounded by 27th and 28th streets and 66th and 67th streets near the city’s moat and Sedona Hotel. Some buildings in the compound date back to the colonial period.
One building, the old Burma Provincial Police Training School, is the site where George Orwell was trained as a British police officer and is mentioned in his classic “Burmese Days.” Orwell served as police officer in Burma from 1922 to 1927.
“Not only Orwell, but recently the writer Emma Larkin wrote about the school in her book, 'Finding George Orwell in Burma,'” a journalist in Mandalay told The Irrawaddy on Friday. “We see it as a historical building. It should not be for sale.”
Previously, Tay Za reportedly bought various state-owned buildings in Rangoon, including a high school in Insein Township.
Along with other businessmen close to the ruling generals, Tay Za is targeted on the sanctions lists of the US, UK, EU and Australia, following the junta’s crackdown on demonstrations in September 2007.
In November, Tay Za received permission to import 900 vehicles for sale in Burma, a rare concession. Newer model cars are still relatively rare in the country. At the end of 2009, his company also won contracts for two hydro power dam projects in Upper Burma.
Tay Za is involved in nearly all of the key industries of Burma, including logging, gems, jewelry, tourism and transportation, civil engineering, construction, international trade, rice, rubber and other agricultural products, while importing machinery. He is also involved in the regime’s newly built Yadanabon Cyber City near Mandalay.
Recently, he was awarded one of the highest honorary titles, Thiri Pyanchi. Burma analysts and pro-democracy activists say junta head Snr-Gen Than Shwe and his family do business through Tay Za’s companies.
“Tay Za can be considered the only representative of Than Shwe’s family businesses, and he can influence the heads of two of the country’s biggest conglomerates, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holding Company and the Myanmar Economic Cooperation company,” Burmese researcher Win Min wrote in an academic paper on the Burmese military.
Tay Za has also been linked to arms deals for the junta, including the purchase of MiG-29s from Russia. The US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control describes Tay Za as “an arms dealer and financial henchman of Burma's repressive junta.”
By WAI MOE - Friday, January 15, 2010
The Htoo Group of Companies owned by Tay Za, a close associate of Burmese junta leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe, has reportedly bought the police headquarters buildings in Mandalay, according to local sources.
Businessmen in Mandalay said Htoo, which is on the West's economic sanctions lists, will control one of the prime business locations in the central area of the city. There was no information about the price paid for the buildings.
The old police station is bounded by 27th and 28th streets and 66th and 67th streets near the city’s moat and Sedona Hotel. Some buildings in the compound date back to the colonial period.
One building, the old Burma Provincial Police Training School, is the site where George Orwell was trained as a British police officer and is mentioned in his classic “Burmese Days.” Orwell served as police officer in Burma from 1922 to 1927.
“Not only Orwell, but recently the writer Emma Larkin wrote about the school in her book, 'Finding George Orwell in Burma,'” a journalist in Mandalay told The Irrawaddy on Friday. “We see it as a historical building. It should not be for sale.”
Previously, Tay Za reportedly bought various state-owned buildings in Rangoon, including a high school in Insein Township.
Along with other businessmen close to the ruling generals, Tay Za is targeted on the sanctions lists of the US, UK, EU and Australia, following the junta’s crackdown on demonstrations in September 2007.
In November, Tay Za received permission to import 900 vehicles for sale in Burma, a rare concession. Newer model cars are still relatively rare in the country. At the end of 2009, his company also won contracts for two hydro power dam projects in Upper Burma.
Tay Za is involved in nearly all of the key industries of Burma, including logging, gems, jewelry, tourism and transportation, civil engineering, construction, international trade, rice, rubber and other agricultural products, while importing machinery. He is also involved in the regime’s newly built Yadanabon Cyber City near Mandalay.
Recently, he was awarded one of the highest honorary titles, Thiri Pyanchi. Burma analysts and pro-democracy activists say junta head Snr-Gen Than Shwe and his family do business through Tay Za’s companies.
“Tay Za can be considered the only representative of Than Shwe’s family businesses, and he can influence the heads of two of the country’s biggest conglomerates, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holding Company and the Myanmar Economic Cooperation company,” Burmese researcher Win Min wrote in an academic paper on the Burmese military.
Tay Za has also been linked to arms deals for the junta, including the purchase of MiG-29s from Russia. The US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control describes Tay Za as “an arms dealer and financial henchman of Burma's repressive junta.”
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The Irrawaddy - Thai Cabinet to Reconsider Migrants' Work Permits
By LAWI WENG - Friday, January 15, 2010
Nearly 60,000 Burmese migrant workers in Thailand, whose migrant registration cards are due to expire on Jan 20, will be deported if they do not get work permits within the next few days or the Thai government quickly changes its policy to allow them to stay, according to leading right groups in Thailand.
“Many of the 59,228 migrant workers [whose cards expire on Jan. 20] have not been to apply for nationality verification. If the Thai government does not extend their registration cards for one more year, they will be deported,” said Andy Hall, the director of the Migrant Justice Programme (MJP), based in Bangkok.
“Even if the government deports them, they will come back illegally because they need the money. The government should find a solution for them. It is quite dangerous if they are forced to work underground,” he said.
MJP said it will ask Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to consider deeply what will happen to the 59,228 migrants if they are deported.
The Thai government announced in December 2008 that migrants who have not yet completed the nationality verification process by Feb 28, 2010, would be deported.
MJP and other rights groups said that the Thai government will have a Cabinet meeting soon and the migrants will have to wait until a Cabinet resolution is issued that allows them to formally extend their permits.
The right groups have urged the Thai government to allow two more years for migrant workers to go through the nationality verification process. In the meantime, there are only 12,000 migrant workers in Thailand who have work permits.
Of an estimated 2 to 3 million Burmese migrant workers in Thailand only 1,310,686 have registered as migrant workers.
Many of the Burmese migrants are from ethnic minority groups, such as the Mon, the Karen and the Shan, and have fled from Burmese army oppression and human rights abuses.
To verify their Burmese nationality, migrant workers have to submit detailed biographical information to the Burmese military. Many fear for their safety and of repercussions against family members in Burma if they turn up at the military government offices for nationality verification registration.
The rights groups say very limited public awareness has been raised about the national verification process and its benefits, both for migrant workers and employers.
The right groups have called on the Burmese government to send their officials to verify their people's nationalities in Thailand in order to encourage Burmese migrant workers to register. Due to a lack of information and awareness about the national verification process, they say many migrant workers have chosen to stay away from the process.
The Cambodian and Lao governments have sent their officials to Thailand to complete the process in previous years. However, the Burmese government has refused the demand and wants all migrant workers to go to three border points––Myawaddy, Tachilek and Kawthoung––for nationality verification registration.
By LAWI WENG - Friday, January 15, 2010
Nearly 60,000 Burmese migrant workers in Thailand, whose migrant registration cards are due to expire on Jan 20, will be deported if they do not get work permits within the next few days or the Thai government quickly changes its policy to allow them to stay, according to leading right groups in Thailand.
“Many of the 59,228 migrant workers [whose cards expire on Jan. 20] have not been to apply for nationality verification. If the Thai government does not extend their registration cards for one more year, they will be deported,” said Andy Hall, the director of the Migrant Justice Programme (MJP), based in Bangkok.
“Even if the government deports them, they will come back illegally because they need the money. The government should find a solution for them. It is quite dangerous if they are forced to work underground,” he said.
MJP said it will ask Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to consider deeply what will happen to the 59,228 migrants if they are deported.
The Thai government announced in December 2008 that migrants who have not yet completed the nationality verification process by Feb 28, 2010, would be deported.
MJP and other rights groups said that the Thai government will have a Cabinet meeting soon and the migrants will have to wait until a Cabinet resolution is issued that allows them to formally extend their permits.
The right groups have urged the Thai government to allow two more years for migrant workers to go through the nationality verification process. In the meantime, there are only 12,000 migrant workers in Thailand who have work permits.
Of an estimated 2 to 3 million Burmese migrant workers in Thailand only 1,310,686 have registered as migrant workers.
Many of the Burmese migrants are from ethnic minority groups, such as the Mon, the Karen and the Shan, and have fled from Burmese army oppression and human rights abuses.
To verify their Burmese nationality, migrant workers have to submit detailed biographical information to the Burmese military. Many fear for their safety and of repercussions against family members in Burma if they turn up at the military government offices for nationality verification registration.
The rights groups say very limited public awareness has been raised about the national verification process and its benefits, both for migrant workers and employers.
The right groups have called on the Burmese government to send their officials to verify their people's nationalities in Thailand in order to encourage Burmese migrant workers to register. Due to a lack of information and awareness about the national verification process, they say many migrant workers have chosen to stay away from the process.
The Cambodian and Lao governments have sent their officials to Thailand to complete the process in previous years. However, the Burmese government has refused the demand and wants all migrant workers to go to three border points––Myawaddy, Tachilek and Kawthoung––for nationality verification registration.
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Burma electoral laws ‘70 percent complete’
Jan 15, 2010 (DVB)–The majority of Burma’s electoral laws have been completed and will be rounded off in a matter of months, the Thai foreign minister reported after a meeting with his Burmese counterpart.
Speculation has been rife over the possible date of Burma’s first elections since 1990, with eyes now fixed to the latter part of 2010, most likely October. The ruling junta has confirmed only that they will be held this year.
A number of potential runners in the elections have said however that the lack of confirmation from the ruling junta of both the date and the laws governing polling has hindered their ability to prepare, and may force their withdrawal.
Thai foreign minister Kasit Piromya told Reuters yesterday after a meeting with Nyan Win that “60 to 70 percent” of the electoral and political party laws had been completed.
“You take another two or three months to make it 100 percent, so it will take you by that time from the mathematical, or the guessing point of view, to the middle of this year,” he said. “So, I think the elections would be most probably in the second half.”
According to information leaked from a meeting between the head of a prominent Japanese charity and the chief of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a proxy of the Burmese junta, the elections will be held in October, most likely on the 10th.
The 10/10/2010 date would be in keeping with the junta’s fixation on numerology, which has dictated many of the key decisions of the military since it took power, including currency devaluations and the 1990 election date.
Nyan Win also sought to assure Piromya that elections would be “free and fair”, following criticism from the international community that constitution, supposedly ratified by 92 percent of the country in the weeks following cyclone Nargis in May 2008, would entrench military rule.
Indonesia’s foreign minister echoed international concerns but said that delays to announcing the election date may remedy this.
“For us the main criterion, or the main preoccupation, would be that we have that necessary positive, democratic atmosphere for a credible election to take place,” he said, after meeting Nyan Win at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Vietnam.
“It’s best to allow things for such conditions to be established rather than to rush into it and then we have a situation where the ideal condition is not there.”
Reporting by Francis Wade
Jan 15, 2010 (DVB)–The majority of Burma’s electoral laws have been completed and will be rounded off in a matter of months, the Thai foreign minister reported after a meeting with his Burmese counterpart.
Speculation has been rife over the possible date of Burma’s first elections since 1990, with eyes now fixed to the latter part of 2010, most likely October. The ruling junta has confirmed only that they will be held this year.
A number of potential runners in the elections have said however that the lack of confirmation from the ruling junta of both the date and the laws governing polling has hindered their ability to prepare, and may force their withdrawal.
Thai foreign minister Kasit Piromya told Reuters yesterday after a meeting with Nyan Win that “60 to 70 percent” of the electoral and political party laws had been completed.
“You take another two or three months to make it 100 percent, so it will take you by that time from the mathematical, or the guessing point of view, to the middle of this year,” he said. “So, I think the elections would be most probably in the second half.”
According to information leaked from a meeting between the head of a prominent Japanese charity and the chief of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a proxy of the Burmese junta, the elections will be held in October, most likely on the 10th.
The 10/10/2010 date would be in keeping with the junta’s fixation on numerology, which has dictated many of the key decisions of the military since it took power, including currency devaluations and the 1990 election date.
Nyan Win also sought to assure Piromya that elections would be “free and fair”, following criticism from the international community that constitution, supposedly ratified by 92 percent of the country in the weeks following cyclone Nargis in May 2008, would entrench military rule.
Indonesia’s foreign minister echoed international concerns but said that delays to announcing the election date may remedy this.
“For us the main criterion, or the main preoccupation, would be that we have that necessary positive, democratic atmosphere for a credible election to take place,” he said, after meeting Nyan Win at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Vietnam.
“It’s best to allow things for such conditions to be established rather than to rush into it and then we have a situation where the ideal condition is not there.”
Reporting by Francis Wade
